KVM: x86/mmu: Disallow guest from using !visible slots for page tables

Explicitly inject a page fault if guest attempts to use a !visible gfn
as a page table.  kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_hva_prot() will naturally handle the
case where there is no memslot, but doesn't catch the scenario where the
gfn points at a KVM-internal memslot.

Letting the guest backdoor its way into accessing KVM-internal memslots
isn't dangerous on its own, e.g. at worst the guest can crash itself, but
disallowing the behavior will simplify fixing how KVM handles !visible
guest root gfns (immediately synthesizing a triple fault when loading the
root is architecturally wrong).

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230729005200.1057358-5-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
index f8d3582..89eb45e 100644 (file)
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
@@ -361,6 +361,7 @@ retry_walk:
        ++walker->level;
 
        do {
+               struct kvm_memory_slot *slot;
                unsigned long host_addr;
 
                pt_access = pte_access;
@@ -391,7 +392,11 @@ retry_walk:
                if (unlikely(real_gpa == INVALID_GPA))
                        return 0;
 
-               host_addr = kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_hva_prot(vcpu, gpa_to_gfn(real_gpa),
+               slot = kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot(vcpu, gpa_to_gfn(real_gpa));
+               if (!kvm_is_visible_memslot(slot))
+                       goto error;
+
+               host_addr = gfn_to_hva_memslot_prot(slot, gpa_to_gfn(real_gpa),
                                            &walker->pte_writable[walker->level - 1]);
                if (unlikely(kvm_is_error_hva(host_addr)))
                        goto error;