let Subjects = SubjectList<[Var]>;
let Documentation = [AlwaysDestroyDocs];
}
+
+def SpeculativeLoadHardening : InheritableAttr {
+ let Spellings = [Clang<"speculative_load_hardening">];
+ let Subjects = SubjectList<[Function, ObjCMethod], ErrorDiag>;
+ let Documentation = [SpeculativeLoadHardeningDocs];
+}
``-std=c89``, ``-std=c94``, or ``-fgnu89-inline``.
}];
}
+
+def SpeculativeLoadHardeningDocs : Documentation {
+ let Category = DocCatFunction;
+ let Content = [{
+ This attribute can be applied to a function declaration in order to indicate
+ that `Speculative Load Hardening <https://llvm.org/docs/SpeculativeLoadHardening.html>`_
+ should be enabled for the function body. This can also be applied to a method
+ in Objective C.
+
+ Speculative Load Hardening is a best-effort mitigation against
+ information leak attacks that make use of control flow
+ miss-speculation - specifically miss-speculation of whether a branch
+ is taken or not. Typically vulnerabilities enabling such attacks are
+ classified as "Spectre variant #1". Notably, this does not attempt to
+ mitigate against miss-speculation of branch target, classified as
+ "Spectre variant #2" vulnerabilities.
+
+ When inlining, the attribute is sticky. Inlining a function that
+ carries this attribute will cause the caller to gain the
+ attribute. This is intended to provide a maximally conservative model
+ where the code in a function annotated with this attribute will always
+ (even after inlining) end up hardened.
+ }];
+}
if (CodeGenOpts.Backchain)
FuncAttrs.addAttribute("backchain");
+ // FIXME: The interaction of this attribute with the SLH command line flag
+ // has not been determined.
if (CodeGenOpts.SpeculativeLoadHardening)
FuncAttrs.addAttribute(llvm::Attribute::SpeculativeLoadHardening);
}
FuncAttrs.addAttribute(llvm::Attribute::NoDuplicate);
if (TargetDecl->hasAttr<ConvergentAttr>())
FuncAttrs.addAttribute(llvm::Attribute::Convergent);
+ if (TargetDecl->hasAttr<SpeculativeLoadHardeningAttr>())
+ FuncAttrs.addAttribute(llvm::Attribute::SpeculativeLoadHardening);
if (const FunctionDecl *Fn = dyn_cast<FunctionDecl>(TargetDecl)) {
AddAttributesFromFunctionProtoType(
case ParsedAttr::AT_Section:
handleSectionAttr(S, D, AL);
break;
+ case ParsedAttr::AT_SpeculativeLoadHardening:
+ handleSimpleAttribute<SpeculativeLoadHardeningAttr>(S, D, AL);
+ break;
case ParsedAttr::AT_CodeSeg:
handleCodeSegAttr(S, D, AL);
break;
--- /dev/null
+// RUN: %clang_cc1 -std=c++11 -disable-llvm-passes -emit-llvm %s -o - | FileCheck %s --check-prefix=CHECK1
+// RUN: %clang_cc1 -std=c++11 -disable-llvm-passes -emit-llvm %s -o - | FileCheck %s --check-prefix=CHECK2
+//
+// Check that we set the attribute on each function.
+
+[[clang::speculative_load_hardening]]
+int test1() {
+ return 42;
+}
+
+int __attribute__((speculative_load_hardening)) test2() {
+ return 42;
+}
+// CHECK1: @{{.*}}test1{{.*}}[[SLH1:#[0-9]+]]
+// CHECK1: attributes [[SLH1]] = { {{.*}}speculative_load_hardening{{.*}} }
+
+// CHECK2: @{{.*}}test2{{.*}}[[SLH2:#[0-9]+]]
+// CHECK2: attributes [[SLH2]] = { {{.*}}speculative_load_hardening{{.*}} }
--- /dev/null
+// RUN: %clang -emit-llvm %s -o - -S | FileCheck %s -check-prefix=SLH
+
+int main() __attribute__((speculative_load_hardening)) {
+ return 0;
+}
+
+// SLH: @{{.*}}main{{.*}}[[SLH:#[0-9]+]]
+
+// SLH: attributes [[SLH]] = { {{.*}}speculative_load_hardening{{.*}} }
--- /dev/null
+// RUN: %clang_cc1 -std=c++11 -fsyntax-only -verify %s
+
+int i __attribute__((speculative_load_hardening)); // expected-error {{'speculative_load_hardening' attribute only applies to functions}}
+
+void f1() __attribute__((speculative_load_hardening));
+void f2() __attribute__((speculative_load_hardening(1))); // expected-error {{'speculative_load_hardening' attribute takes no arguments}}
+
+template <typename T>
+void tf1() __attribute__((speculative_load_hardening));
+
+int f3(int __attribute__((speculative_load_hardening)), int); // expected-error {{'speculative_load_hardening' attribute only applies to functions}}
+
+struct A {
+ int f __attribute__((speculative_load_hardening)); // expected-error {{'speculative_load_hardening' attribute only applies to functions}}
+ void mf1() __attribute__((speculative_load_hardening));
+ static void mf2() __attribute__((speculative_load_hardening));
+};
+
+int ci [[speculative_load_hardening]]; // expected-error {{'speculative_load_hardening' attribute only applies to functions}}
+
+[[speculative_load_hardening]] void cf1();
+[[speculative_load_hardening(1)]] void cf2(); // expected-error {{'speculative_load_hardening' attribute takes no arguments}}
+
+template <typename T>
+[[speculative_load_hardening]]
+void ctf1();
+
+int cf3(int c[[speculative_load_hardening]], int); // expected-error {{'speculative_load_hardening' attribute only applies to functions}}
+
+struct CA {
+ int f [[speculative_load_hardening]]; // expected-error {{'speculative_load_hardening' attribute only applies to functions}}
+ [[speculative_load_hardening]] void mf1();
+ [[speculative_load_hardening]] static void mf2();
+};
``speculative_load_hardening``
This attribute indicates that
`Speculative Load Hardening <https://llvm.org/docs/SpeculativeLoadHardening.html>`_
- should be enabled for the function body. This is a best-effort attempt to
- mitigate all known speculative execution information leak vulnerabilities
- that are based on the fundamental principles of modern processors'
- speculative execution. These vulnerabilities are classified as "Spectre
- variant #1" vulnerabilities typically. Notably, this does not attempt to
- mitigate any vulnerabilities where the speculative execution and/or
- prediction devices of specific processors can be *completely* undermined
- (such as "Branch Target Injection", a.k.a, "Spectre variant #2"). Instead,
- this is a target-independent request to harden against the completely
- generic risk posed by speculative execution to incorrectly load secret data,
- making it available to some micro-architectural side-channel for information
- leak. For a processor without any speculative execution or predictors, this
- is expected to be a no-op.
+ should be enabled for the function body.
+
+ Speculative Load Hardening is a best-effort mitigation against
+ information leak attacks that make use of control flow
+ miss-speculation - specifically miss-speculation of whether a branch
+ is taken or not. Typically vulnerabilities enabling such attacks are
+ classified as "Spectre variant #1". Notably, this does not attempt to
+ mitigate against miss-speculation of branch target, classified as
+ "Spectre variant #2" vulnerabilities.
When inlining, the attribute is sticky. Inlining a function that carries
this attribute will cause the caller to gain the attribute. This is intended