core: ProtectHostname= feature

Let services use a private UTS namespace. In addition, a seccomp filter is
installed on set{host,domain}name and a ro bind mounts on
/proc/sys/kernel/{host,domain}name.

diff --git a/man/systemd.exec.xml b/man/systemd.exec.xml
index eb47632..ce374f3 100644 (file)
--- a/man/systemd.exec.xml
+++ b/man/systemd.exec.xml
@@ -1130,6 +1130,17 @@ BindReadOnlyPaths=/var/lib/systemd</programlisting>
       </varlistentry>
 
       <varlistentry>
+        <term><varname>ProtectHostname=</varname></term>
+
+        <listitem><para>Takes a boolean argument. When set, sets up a new UTS namespace for the executed
+        processes. In addition, changing hostname or domainname is prevented. Defaults to off.</para>
+
+        <para>Note that the implementation of this setting might be impossible (for example if UTS namespaces are not
+        available), and the unit should be written in a way that does not solely rely on this setting for
+        security.</para></listitem>
+      </varlistentry>
+
+      <varlistentry>
         <term><varname>ProtectKernelTunables=</varname></term>
 
         <listitem><para>Takes a boolean argument. If true, kernel variables accessible through

diff --git a/src/core/dbus-execute.c b/src/core/dbus-execute.c
index 11301e4..f22bf4a 100644 (file)
--- a/src/core/dbus-execute.c
+++ b/src/core/dbus-execute.c
@@ -777,6 +777,7 @@ const sd_bus_vtable bus_exec_vtable[] = {
         SD_BUS_PROPERTY("TemporaryFileSystem", "a(ss)", property_get_temporary_filesystems, 0, SD_BUS_VTABLE_PROPERTY_CONST),
         SD_BUS_PROPERTY("MountAPIVFS", "b", bus_property_get_bool, offsetof(ExecContext, mount_apivfs), SD_BUS_VTABLE_PROPERTY_CONST),
         SD_BUS_PROPERTY("KeyringMode", "s", property_get_exec_keyring_mode, offsetof(ExecContext, keyring_mode), SD_BUS_VTABLE_PROPERTY_CONST),
+        SD_BUS_PROPERTY("ProtectHostname", "b", bus_property_get_bool, offsetof(ExecContext, protect_hostname), SD_BUS_VTABLE_PROPERTY_CONST),
 
         /* Obsolete/redundant properties: */
         SD_BUS_PROPERTY("Capabilities", "s", property_get_empty_string, 0, SD_BUS_VTABLE_PROPERTY_CONST|SD_BUS_VTABLE_HIDDEN),
@@ -1153,6 +1154,9 @@ int bus_exec_context_set_transient_property(
         if (streq(name, "LockPersonality"))
                 return bus_set_transient_bool(u, name, &c->lock_personality, message, flags, error);
 
+        if (streq(name, "ProtectHostname"))
+                return bus_set_transient_bool(u, name, &c->protect_hostname, message, flags, error);
+
         if (streq(name, "UtmpIdentifier"))
                 return bus_set_transient_string(u, name, &c->utmp_id, message, flags, error);
 

diff --git a/src/core/execute.c b/src/core/execute.c
index a708231..fe5cf96 100644 (file)
--- a/src/core/execute.c
+++ b/src/core/execute.c
@@ -1410,7 +1410,8 @@ static bool context_has_no_new_privileges(const ExecContext *c) {
                 c->private_devices ||
                 context_has_syscall_filters(c) ||
                 !set_isempty(c->syscall_archs) ||
-                c->lock_personality;
+                c->lock_personality ||
+                c->protect_hostname;
 }
 
 #if HAVE_SECCOMP
@@ -2420,6 +2421,7 @@ static int apply_mount_namespace(
                         .protect_control_groups = context->protect_control_groups,
                         .protect_kernel_tunables = context->protect_kernel_tunables,
                         .protect_kernel_modules = context->protect_kernel_modules,
+                        .protect_hostname = context->protect_hostname,
                         .mount_apivfs = context->mount_apivfs,
                         .private_mounts = context->private_mounts,
                 };
@@ -3286,6 +3288,23 @@ static int exec_child(
                 }
         }
 
+        if (context->protect_hostname) {
+                if (ns_type_supported(NAMESPACE_UTS)) {
+                        if (unshare(CLONE_NEWUTS) < 0) {
+                                *exit_status = EXIT_NAMESPACE;
+                                return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to set up UTS namespacing: %m");
+                        }
+                } else
+                        log_unit_warning(unit, "ProtectHostname=yes is configured, but the kernel does not support UTS namespaces, ignoring namespace setup.");
+#if HAVE_SECCOMP
+                r = seccomp_protect_hostname();
+                if (r < 0) {
+                        *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP;
+                        return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to apply hostname restrictions: %m");
+                }
+#endif
+        }
+
         /* Drop groups as early as possbile */
         if (needs_setuid) {
                 r = enforce_groups(gid, supplementary_gids, ngids);
@@ -4163,7 +4182,8 @@ void exec_context_dump(const ExecContext *c, FILE* f, const char *prefix) {
                 "%sIgnoreSIGPIPE: %s\n"
                 "%sMemoryDenyWriteExecute: %s\n"
                 "%sRestrictRealtime: %s\n"
-                "%sKeyringMode: %s\n",
+                "%sKeyringMode: %s\n"
+                "%sProtectHostname: %s\n",
                 prefix, c->umask,
                 prefix, c->working_directory ? c->working_directory : "/",
                 prefix, c->root_directory ? c->root_directory : "/",
@@ -4181,7 +4201,8 @@ void exec_context_dump(const ExecContext *c, FILE* f, const char *prefix) {
                 prefix, yes_no(c->ignore_sigpipe),
                 prefix, yes_no(c->memory_deny_write_execute),
                 prefix, yes_no(c->restrict_realtime),
-                prefix, exec_keyring_mode_to_string(c->keyring_mode));
+                prefix, exec_keyring_mode_to_string(c->keyring_mode),
+                prefix, yes_no(c->protect_hostname));
 
         if (c->root_image)
                 fprintf(f, "%sRootImage: %s\n", prefix, c->root_image);

diff --git a/src/core/execute.h b/src/core/execute.h
index 0f1bf56..12a6e92 100644 (file)
--- a/src/core/execute.h
+++ b/src/core/execute.h
@@ -272,6 +272,7 @@ struct ExecContext {
 
         bool memory_deny_write_execute;
         bool restrict_realtime;
+        bool protect_hostname;
 
         bool oom_score_adjust_set:1;
         bool nice_set:1;

diff --git a/src/core/load-fragment-gperf.gperf.m4 b/src/core/load-fragment-gperf.gperf.m4
index cdbc67f..38ac6a8 100644 (file)
--- a/src/core/load-fragment-gperf.gperf.m4
+++ b/src/core/load-fragment-gperf.gperf.m4
@@ -133,6 +133,7 @@ $1.LogsDirectoryMode,            config_parse_mode,                  0,
 $1.LogsDirectory,                config_parse_exec_directories,      0,                             offsetof($1, exec_context.directories[EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS].paths)
 $1.ConfigurationDirectoryMode,   config_parse_mode,                  0,                             offsetof($1, exec_context.directories[EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION].mode)
 $1.ConfigurationDirectory,       config_parse_exec_directories,      0,                             offsetof($1, exec_context.directories[EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION].paths)
+$1.ProtectHostname,              config_parse_bool,                  0,                             offsetof($1, exec_context.protect_hostname)
 m4_ifdef(`HAVE_PAM',
 `$1.PAMName,                     config_parse_unit_string_printf,    0,                             offsetof($1, exec_context.pam_name)',
 `$1.PAMName,                     config_parse_warn_compat,           DISABLED_CONFIGURATION,        0')

diff --git a/src/core/namespace.c b/src/core/namespace.c
index 7f553a4..d482c40 100644 (file)
--- a/src/core/namespace.c
+++ b/src/core/namespace.c
@@ -1117,6 +1117,7 @@ static size_t namespace_calculate_mounts(
                 (ns_info->protect_control_groups ? 1 : 0) +
                 (ns_info->protect_kernel_modules ? ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_modules_table) : 0) +
                 protect_home_cnt + protect_system_cnt +
+                (ns_info->protect_hostname ? 2 : 0) +
                 (namespace_info_mount_apivfs(ns_info) ? ELEMENTSOF(apivfs_table) : 0);
 }
 
@@ -1301,6 +1302,17 @@ int setup_namespace(
                                 goto finish;
                 }
 
+                if (ns_info->protect_hostname) {
+                        *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
+                                .path_const = "/proc/sys/kernel/hostname",
+                                .mode = READONLY,
+                        };
+                        *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
+                                .path_const = "/proc/sys/kernel/domainname",
+                                .mode = READONLY,
+                        };
+                }
+
                 assert(mounts + n_mounts == m);
 
                 /* Prepend the root directory where that's necessary */

diff --git a/src/core/namespace.h b/src/core/namespace.h
index 5e0ec97..ab3983f 100644 (file)
--- a/src/core/namespace.h
+++ b/src/core/namespace.h
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ struct NamespaceInfo {
         bool protect_kernel_tunables:1;
         bool protect_kernel_modules:1;
         bool mount_apivfs:1;
+        bool protect_hostname:1;
 };
 
 struct BindMount {

diff --git a/src/shared/bus-unit-util.c b/src/shared/bus-unit-util.c
index 9a8051d..d464340 100644 (file)
--- a/src/shared/bus-unit-util.c
+++ b/src/shared/bus-unit-util.c
@@ -740,7 +740,7 @@ static int bus_append_execute_property(sd_bus_message *m, const char *field, con
                        "PrivateMounts", "NoNewPrivileges", "SyslogLevelPrefix",
                        "MemoryDenyWriteExecute", "RestrictRealtime", "DynamicUser", "RemoveIPC",
                        "ProtectKernelTunables", "ProtectKernelModules", "ProtectControlGroups",
-                       "MountAPIVFS", "CPUSchedulingResetOnFork", "LockPersonality"))
+                       "MountAPIVFS", "CPUSchedulingResetOnFork", "LockPersonality", "ProtectHostname"))
 
                 return bus_append_parse_boolean(m, field, eq);
 

diff --git a/src/shared/seccomp-util.c b/src/shared/seccomp-util.c
index cc58b3c..98a0066 100644 (file)
--- a/src/shared/seccomp-util.c
+++ b/src/shared/seccomp-util.c
@@ -1762,3 +1762,40 @@ int seccomp_lock_personality(unsigned long personality) {
 
         return 0;
 }
+
+int seccomp_protect_hostname(void) {
+        uint32_t arch;
+        int r;
+
+        SECCOMP_FOREACH_LOCAL_ARCH(arch) {
+                _cleanup_(seccomp_releasep) scmp_filter_ctx seccomp = NULL;
+
+                r = seccomp_init_for_arch(&seccomp, arch, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW);
+                if (r < 0)
+                        return r;
+
+                r = seccomp_rule_add_exact(
+                                seccomp,
+                                SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM),
+                                SCMP_SYS(sethostname),
+                                0);
+                if (r < 0)
+                        continue;
+
+                r = seccomp_rule_add_exact(
+                                seccomp,
+                                SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM),
+                                SCMP_SYS(setdomainname),
+                                0);
+                if (r < 0)
+                        continue;
+
+                r = seccomp_load(seccomp);
+                if (IN_SET(r, -EPERM, -EACCES))
+                        return r;
+                if (r < 0)
+                        log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to apply hostname restrictions for architecture %s, skipping: %m", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch));
+        }
+
+        return 0;
+}

diff --git a/src/shared/seccomp-util.h b/src/shared/seccomp-util.h
index d8a36c4..4774002 100644 (file)
--- a/src/shared/seccomp-util.h
+++ b/src/shared/seccomp-util.h
@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ int seccomp_restrict_address_families(Set *address_families, bool whitelist);
 int seccomp_restrict_realtime(void);
 int seccomp_memory_deny_write_execute(void);
 int seccomp_lock_personality(unsigned long personality);
+int seccomp_protect_hostname(void);
 
 extern const uint32_t seccomp_local_archs[];