media: af9005: Fix null-ptr-deref in af9005_i2c_xfer

[ Upstream commit f4ee84f27625ce1fdf41e8483fa0561a1b837d10 ]

In af9005_i2c_xfer, msg is controlled by user. When msg[i].buf
is null and msg[i].len is zero, former checks on msg[i].buf would be
passed. Malicious data finally reach af9005_i2c_xfer. If accessing
msg[i].buf[0] without sanity check, null ptr deref would happen.
We add check on msg[i].len to prevent crash.

Similar commit:
commit 0ed554fd769a
("media: dvb-usb: az6027: fix null-ptr-deref in az6027_i2c_xfer()")

Signed-off-by: Zhang Shurong <zhang_shurong@foxmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

diff --git a/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/af9005.c b/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/af9005.c
index 0827bf3d4e8c7f3bd17ab236de4301246b0c0347..13604e6acdb83bf0fe832c2e47987b0df57ea647 100644 (file)
--- a/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/af9005.c
+++ b/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/af9005.c
@@ -422,6 +422,10 @@ static int af9005_i2c_xfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap, struct i2c_msg msg[],
                if (ret == 0)
                        ret = 2;
        } else {
+               if (msg[0].len < 2) {
+                       ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+                       goto unlock;
+               }
                /* write one or more registers */
                reg = msg[0].buf[0];
                addr = msg[0].addr;
@@ -431,6 +435,7 @@ static int af9005_i2c_xfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap, struct i2c_msg msg[],
                        ret = 1;
        }
 
+unlock:
        mutex_unlock(&d->i2c_mutex);
        return ret;
 }