/* Control conditional STIPB in switch_to() */
DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_to_cond_stibp);
+/* Control conditional IBPB in switch_mm() */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_ibpb);
+/* Control unconditional IBPB in switch_mm() */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_always_ibpb);
void __init check_bugs(void)
{
/* Initialize Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB);
- pr_info("Spectre v2 mitigation: Enabling Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier\n");
+
+ switch (mode) {
+ case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT:
+ static_branch_enable(&switch_mm_always_ibpb);
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ pr_info("mitigation: Enabling %s Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier\n",
+ mode == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ? "always-on" : "conditional");
}
/* If enhanced IBRS is enabled no STIPB required */
static char *ibpb_state(void)
{
- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB))
- return ", IBPB";
- else
- return "";
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) {
+ switch (spectre_v2_user) {
+ case SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE:
+ return ", IBPB: disabled";
+ case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT:
+ return ", IBPB: always-on";
+ }
+ }
+ return "";
}
static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/cpu.h>
#include <linux/debugfs.h>
-#include <linux/ptrace.h>
#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
*/
/*
+ * Use bit 0 to mangle the TIF_SPEC_IB state into the mm pointer which is
+ * stored in cpu_tlb_state.last_user_mm_ibpb.
+ */
+#define LAST_USER_MM_IBPB 0x1UL
+
+/*
* We get here when we do something requiring a TLB invalidation
* but could not go invalidate all of the contexts. We do the
* necessary invalidation by clearing out the 'ctx_id' which
}
}
-static bool ibpb_needed(struct task_struct *tsk, u64 last_ctx_id)
+static inline unsigned long mm_mangle_tif_spec_ib(struct task_struct *next)
+{
+ unsigned long next_tif = task_thread_info(next)->flags;
+ unsigned long ibpb = (next_tif >> TIF_SPEC_IB) & LAST_USER_MM_IBPB;
+
+ return (unsigned long)next->mm | ibpb;
+}
+
+static void cond_ibpb(struct task_struct *next)
{
+ if (!next || !next->mm)
+ return;
+
/*
- * Check if the current (previous) task has access to the memory
- * of the @tsk (next) task. If access is denied, make sure to
- * issue a IBPB to stop user->user Spectre-v2 attacks.
- *
- * Note: __ptrace_may_access() returns 0 or -ERRNO.
+ * Both, the conditional and the always IBPB mode use the mm
+ * pointer to avoid the IBPB when switching between tasks of the
+ * same process. Using the mm pointer instead of mm->context.ctx_id
+ * opens a hypothetical hole vs. mm_struct reuse, which is more or
+ * less impossible to control by an attacker. Aside of that it
+ * would only affect the first schedule so the theoretically
+ * exposed data is not really interesting.
*/
- return (tsk && tsk->mm && tsk->mm->context.ctx_id != last_ctx_id &&
- ptrace_may_access_sched(tsk, PTRACE_MODE_SPEC_IBPB));
+ if (static_branch_likely(&switch_mm_cond_ibpb)) {
+ unsigned long prev_mm, next_mm;
+
+ /*
+ * This is a bit more complex than the always mode because
+ * it has to handle two cases:
+ *
+ * 1) Switch from a user space task (potential attacker)
+ * which has TIF_SPEC_IB set to a user space task
+ * (potential victim) which has TIF_SPEC_IB not set.
+ *
+ * 2) Switch from a user space task (potential attacker)
+ * which has TIF_SPEC_IB not set to a user space task
+ * (potential victim) which has TIF_SPEC_IB set.
+ *
+ * This could be done by unconditionally issuing IBPB when
+ * a task which has TIF_SPEC_IB set is either scheduled in
+ * or out. Though that results in two flushes when:
+ *
+ * - the same user space task is scheduled out and later
+ * scheduled in again and only a kernel thread ran in
+ * between.
+ *
+ * - a user space task belonging to the same process is
+ * scheduled in after a kernel thread ran in between
+ *
+ * - a user space task belonging to the same process is
+ * scheduled in immediately.
+ *
+ * Optimize this with reasonably small overhead for the
+ * above cases. Mangle the TIF_SPEC_IB bit into the mm
+ * pointer of the incoming task which is stored in
+ * cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm_ibpb for comparison.
+ */
+ next_mm = mm_mangle_tif_spec_ib(next);
+ prev_mm = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm_ibpb);
+
+ /*
+ * Issue IBPB only if the mm's are different and one or
+ * both have the IBPB bit set.
+ */
+ if (next_mm != prev_mm &&
+ (next_mm | prev_mm) & LAST_USER_MM_IBPB)
+ indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
+
+ this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm_ibpb, next_mm);
+ }
+
+ if (static_branch_unlikely(&switch_mm_always_ibpb)) {
+ /*
+ * Only flush when switching to a user space task with a
+ * different context than the user space task which ran
+ * last on this CPU.
+ */
+ if (this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm) != next->mm) {
+ indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
+ this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm, next->mm);
+ }
+ }
}
void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
} else {
u16 new_asid;
bool need_flush;
- u64 last_ctx_id = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.last_ctx_id);
/*
* Avoid user/user BTB poisoning by flushing the branch
* predictor when switching between processes. This stops
* one process from doing Spectre-v2 attacks on another.
- *
- * As an optimization, flush indirect branches only when
- * switching into a processes that can't be ptrace by the
- * current one (as in such case, attacker has much more
- * convenient way how to tamper with the next process than
- * branch buffer poisoning).
*/
- if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB) &&
- ibpb_needed(tsk, last_ctx_id))
- indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
+ cond_ibpb(tsk);
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMAP_STACK)) {
/*
trace_tlb_flush_rcuidle(TLB_FLUSH_ON_TASK_SWITCH, 0);
}
- /*
- * Record last user mm's context id, so we can avoid
- * flushing branch buffer with IBPB if we switch back
- * to the same user.
- */
- if (next != &init_mm)
- this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.last_ctx_id, next->context.ctx_id);
-
/* Make sure we write CR3 before loaded_mm. */
barrier();
write_cr3(build_cr3(mm->pgd, 0));
/* Reinitialize tlbstate. */
- this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.last_ctx_id, mm->context.ctx_id);
+ this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm_ibpb, LAST_USER_MM_IBPB);
this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm_asid, 0);
this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.next_asid, 1);
this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.ctxs[0].ctx_id, mm->context.ctx_id);
projects / platform / kernel / linux-rpi3.git / commitdiff