tools/testing/cxl: Add "passphrase secure erase" opcode support

Add support to emulate a CXL mem device support the "passphrase secure
erase" operation.

Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/166983615879.2734609.5177049043677443736.stgit@djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>

diff --git a/tools/testing/cxl/test/mem.c b/tools/testing/cxl/test/mem.c
index ddd4a17..1008ee2 100644 (file)
--- a/tools/testing/cxl/test/mem.c
+++ b/tools/testing/cxl/test/mem.c
@@ -373,6 +373,105 @@ static int mock_unlock_security(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds, struct cxl_mbox_cmd
        return 0;
 }
 
+static int mock_passphrase_secure_erase(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds,
+                                       struct cxl_mbox_cmd *cmd)
+{
+       struct cxl_mock_mem_pdata *mdata = dev_get_platdata(cxlds->dev);
+       struct cxl_pass_erase *erase;
+
+       if (cmd->size_in != sizeof(*erase))
+               return -EINVAL;
+
+       if (cmd->size_out != 0)
+               return -EINVAL;
+
+       erase = cmd->payload_in;
+       if (mdata->security_state & CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_FROZEN) {
+               cmd->return_code = CXL_MBOX_CMD_RC_SECURITY;
+               return -ENXIO;
+       }
+
+       if (mdata->security_state & CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_USER_PLIMIT &&
+           erase->type == CXL_PMEM_SEC_PASS_USER) {
+               cmd->return_code = CXL_MBOX_CMD_RC_SECURITY;
+               return -ENXIO;
+       }
+
+       if (mdata->security_state & CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_MASTER_PLIMIT &&
+           erase->type == CXL_PMEM_SEC_PASS_MASTER) {
+               cmd->return_code = CXL_MBOX_CMD_RC_SECURITY;
+               return -ENXIO;
+       }
+
+       switch (erase->type) {
+       case CXL_PMEM_SEC_PASS_MASTER:
+               /*
+                * The spec does not clearly define the behavior of the scenario
+                * where a master passphrase is passed in while the master
+                * passphrase is not set and user passphrase is not set. The
+                * code will take the assumption that it will behave the same
+                * as a CXL secure erase command without passphrase (0x4401).
+                */
+               if (mdata->security_state & CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_MASTER_PASS_SET) {
+                       if (memcmp(mdata->master_pass, erase->pass,
+                                  NVDIMM_PASSPHRASE_LEN)) {
+                               master_plimit_check(mdata);
+                               cmd->return_code = CXL_MBOX_CMD_RC_PASSPHRASE;
+                               return -ENXIO;
+                       }
+                       mdata->master_limit = 0;
+                       mdata->user_limit = 0;
+                       mdata->security_state &= ~CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_USER_PASS_SET;
+                       memset(mdata->user_pass, 0, NVDIMM_PASSPHRASE_LEN);
+                       mdata->security_state &= ~CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_LOCKED;
+               } else {
+                       /*
+                        * CXL rev3 8.2.9.8.6.3 Disable Passphrase
+                        * When master passphrase is disabled, the device shall
+                        * return Invalid Input for the Passphrase Secure Erase
+                        * command with master passphrase.
+                        */
+                       return -EINVAL;
+               }
+               /* Scramble encryption keys so that data is effectively erased */
+               break;
+       case CXL_PMEM_SEC_PASS_USER:
+               /*
+                * The spec does not clearly define the behavior of the scenario
+                * where a user passphrase is passed in while the user
+                * passphrase is not set. The code will take the assumption that
+                * it will behave the same as a CXL secure erase command without
+                * passphrase (0x4401).
+                */
+               if (mdata->security_state & CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_USER_PASS_SET) {
+                       if (memcmp(mdata->user_pass, erase->pass,
+                                  NVDIMM_PASSPHRASE_LEN)) {
+                               user_plimit_check(mdata);
+                               cmd->return_code = CXL_MBOX_CMD_RC_PASSPHRASE;
+                               return -ENXIO;
+                       }
+                       mdata->user_limit = 0;
+                       mdata->security_state &= ~CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_USER_PASS_SET;
+                       memset(mdata->user_pass, 0, NVDIMM_PASSPHRASE_LEN);
+               }
+
+               /*
+                * CXL rev3 Table 8-118
+                * If user passphrase is not set or supported by device, current
+                * passphrase value is ignored. Will make the assumption that
+                * the operation will proceed as secure erase w/o passphrase
+                * since spec is not explicit.
+                */
+
+               /* Scramble encryption keys so that data is effectively erased */
+               break;
+       default:
+               return -EINVAL;
+       }
+
+       return 0;
+}
+
 static int mock_get_lsa(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds, struct cxl_mbox_cmd *cmd)
 {
        struct cxl_mbox_get_lsa *get_lsa = cmd->payload_in;
@@ -483,6 +582,9 @@ static int cxl_mock_mbox_send(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds, struct cxl_mbox_cmd *
        case CXL_MBOX_OP_UNLOCK:
                rc = mock_unlock_security(cxlds, cmd);
                break;
+       case CXL_MBOX_OP_PASSPHRASE_SECURE_ERASE:
+               rc = mock_passphrase_secure_erase(cxlds, cmd);
+               break;
        default:
                break;
        }