Btrfs: fix an integer overflow check

[ Upstream commit 457ae7268b29c33dee1c0feb143a15f6029d177b ]

This isn't super serious because you need CAP_ADMIN to run this code.

I added this integer overflow check last year but apparently I am
rubbish at writing integer overflow checks...  There are two issues.
First, access_ok() works on unsigned long type and not u64 so on 32 bit
systems the access_ok() could be checking a truncated size.  The other
issue is that we should be using a stricter limit so we don't overflow
the kzalloc() setting ctx->clone_roots later in the function after the
access_ok():

	alloc_size = sizeof(struct clone_root) * (arg->clone_sources_count + 1);
	sctx->clone_roots = kzalloc(alloc_size, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN);

Fixes: f5ecec3ce21f ("btrfs: send: silence an integer overflow warning")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[ added comment ]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

diff --git a/fs/btrfs/send.c b/fs/btrfs/send.c
index 77f9efc..9a47b55 100644 (file)
--- a/fs/btrfs/send.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/send.c
@@ -6196,8 +6196,13 @@ long btrfs_ioctl_send(struct file *mnt_file, void __user *arg_)
                goto out;
        }
 
+       /*
+        * Check that we don't overflow at later allocations, we request
+        * clone_sources_count + 1 items, and compare to unsigned long inside
+        * access_ok.
+        */
        if (arg->clone_sources_count >
-           ULLONG_MAX / sizeof(*arg->clone_sources)) {
+           ULONG_MAX / sizeof(struct clone_root) - 1) {
                ret = -EINVAL;
                goto out;
        }