ipv4: tcp_input: fix stack out of bounds when parsing TCP options.
authorYoung Xiao <92siuyang@gmail.com>
Wed, 29 May 2019 08:10:59 +0000 (16:10 +0800)
committerDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Thu, 30 May 2019 19:32:47 +0000 (12:32 -0700)
The TCP option parsing routines in tcp_parse_options function could
read one byte out of the buffer of the TCP options.

1         while (length > 0) {
2                 int opcode = *ptr++;
3                 int opsize;
4
5                 switch (opcode) {
6                 case TCPOPT_EOL:
7                         return;
8                 case TCPOPT_NOP:        /* Ref: RFC 793 section 3.1 */
9                         length--;
10                        continue;
11                default:
12                        opsize = *ptr++; //out of bound access

If length = 1, then there is an access in line2.
And another access is occurred in line 12.
This would lead to out-of-bound access.

Therefore, in the patch we check that the available data length is
larger enough to pase both TCP option code and size.

Signed-off-by: Young Xiao <92siuyang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
net/ipv4/tcp_input.c

index c61edd0..08a477e 100644 (file)
@@ -3791,6 +3791,8 @@ void tcp_parse_options(const struct net *net,
                        length--;
                        continue;
                default:
+                       if (length < 2)
+                               return;
                        opsize = *ptr++;
                        if (opsize < 2) /* "silly options" */
                                return;