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net: prevent mss overflow in skb_segment()
author
Eric Dumazet
<edumazet@google.com>
Tue, 12 Dec 2023 16:46:21 +0000
(16:46 +0000)
committer
Greg Kroah-Hartman
<gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Wed, 10 Jan 2024 16:16:59 +0000
(17:16 +0100)
[ Upstream commit
23d05d563b7e7b0314e65c8e882bc27eac2da8e7
]
Once again syzbot is able to crash the kernel in skb_segment() [1]
GSO_BY_FRAGS is a forbidden value, but unfortunately the following
computation in skb_segment() can reach it quite easily :
mss = mss * partial_segs;
65535 = 3 * 5 * 17 * 257, so many initial values of mss can lead to
a bad final result.
Make sure to limit segmentation so that the new mss value is smaller
than GSO_BY_FRAGS.
[1]
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000e: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000070-0x0000000000000077]
CPU: 1 PID: 5079 Comm: syz-executor993 Not tainted 6.7.0-rc4-syzkaller-00141-g1ae4cd3cbdd0 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 11/10/2023
RIP: 0010:skb_segment+0x181d/0x3f30 net/core/skbuff.c:4551
Code: 83 e3 02 e9 fb ed ff ff e8 90 68 1c f9 48 8b 84 24 f8 00 00 00 48 8d 78 70 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e 8a 21 00 00 48 8b 84 24 f8 00
RSP: 0018:
ffffc900043473d0
EFLAGS:
00010202
RAX:
dffffc0000000000
RBX:
0000000000010046
RCX:
ffffffff886b1597
RDX:
000000000000000e
RSI:
ffffffff886b2520
RDI:
0000000000000070
RBP:
ffffc90004347578
R08:
0000000000000005
R09:
000000000000ffff
R10:
000000000000ffff
R11:
0000000000000002
R12:
ffff888063202ac0
R13:
0000000000010000
R14:
000000000000ffff
R15:
0000000000000046
FS:
0000555556e7e380
(0000) GS:
ffff8880b9900000
(0000) knlGS:
0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0:
0000000080050033
CR2:
0000000020010000
CR3:
0000000027ee2000
CR4:
00000000003506f0
DR0:
0000000000000000
DR1:
0000000000000000
DR2:
0000000000000000
DR3:
0000000000000000
DR6:
00000000fffe0ff0
DR7:
0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
udp6_ufo_fragment+0xa0e/0xd00 net/ipv6/udp_offload.c:109
ipv6_gso_segment+0x534/0x17e0 net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c:120
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x290/0x610 net/core/gso.c:53
__skb_gso_segment+0x339/0x710 net/core/gso.c:124
skb_gso_segment include/net/gso.h:83 [inline]
validate_xmit_skb+0x36c/0xeb0 net/core/dev.c:3626
__dev_queue_xmit+0x6f3/0x3d60 net/core/dev.c:4338
dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3134 [inline]
packet_xmit+0x257/0x380 net/packet/af_packet.c:276
packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3087 [inline]
packet_sendmsg+0x24c6/0x5220 net/packet/af_packet.c:3119
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x180 net/socket.c:745
__sys_sendto+0x255/0x340 net/socket.c:2190
__do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2202 [inline]
__se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2198 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendto+0xe0/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2198
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x40/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b
RIP: 0033:0x7f8692032aa9
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 d1 19 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:
00007fff8d685418
EFLAGS:
00000246
ORIG_RAX:
000000000000002c
RAX:
ffffffffffffffda
RBX:
0000000000000003
RCX:
00007f8692032aa9
RDX:
0000000000010048
RSI:
00000000200000c0
RDI:
0000000000000003
RBP:
00000000000f4240
R08:
0000000020000540
R09:
0000000000000014
R10:
0000000000000000
R11:
0000000000000246
R12:
00007fff8d685480
R13:
0000000000000001
R14:
00007fff8d685480
R15:
0000000000000003
</TASK>
Modules linked in:
---[ end trace
0000000000000000
]---
RIP: 0010:skb_segment+0x181d/0x3f30 net/core/skbuff.c:4551
Code: 83 e3 02 e9 fb ed ff ff e8 90 68 1c f9 48 8b 84 24 f8 00 00 00 48 8d 78 70 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e 8a 21 00 00 48 8b 84 24 f8 00
RSP: 0018:
ffffc900043473d0
EFLAGS:
00010202
RAX:
dffffc0000000000
RBX:
0000000000010046
RCX:
ffffffff886b1597
RDX:
000000000000000e
RSI:
ffffffff886b2520
RDI:
0000000000000070
RBP:
ffffc90004347578
R08:
0000000000000005
R09:
000000000000ffff
R10:
000000000000ffff
R11:
0000000000000002
R12:
ffff888063202ac0
R13:
0000000000010000
R14:
000000000000ffff
R15:
0000000000000046
FS:
0000555556e7e380
(0000) GS:
ffff8880b9900000
(0000) knlGS:
0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0:
0000000080050033
CR2:
0000000020010000
CR3:
0000000027ee2000
CR4:
00000000003506f0
DR0:
0000000000000000
DR1:
0000000000000000
DR2:
0000000000000000
DR3:
0000000000000000
DR6:
00000000fffe0ff0
DR7:
0000000000000400
Fixes:
3953c46c3ac7
("sk_buff: allow segmenting based on frag sizes")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Link:
https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231212164621.4131800-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
net/core/skbuff.c
patch
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diff --git
a/net/core/skbuff.c
b/net/core/skbuff.c
index
6d204cf
..
011d690
100644
(file)
--- a/
net/core/skbuff.c
+++ b/
net/core/skbuff.c
@@
-4508,8
+4508,9
@@
struct sk_buff *skb_segment(struct sk_buff *head_skb,
/* GSO partial only requires that we trim off any excess that
* doesn't fit into an MSS sized block, so take care of that
* now.
+ * Cap len to not accidentally hit GSO_BY_FRAGS.
*/
- partial_segs =
len
/ mss;
+ partial_segs =
min(len, GSO_BY_FRAGS - 1U)
/ mss;
if (partial_segs > 1)
mss *= partial_segs;
else