selinux: fix empty write to keycreate file
authorOndrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Wed, 12 Jun 2019 08:12:26 +0000 (10:12 +0200)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Fri, 26 Jul 2019 07:14:07 +0000 (09:14 +0200)
[ Upstream commit 464c258aa45b09f16aa0f05847ed8895873262d9 ]

When sid == 0 (we are resetting keycreate_sid to the default value), we
should skip the KEY__CREATE check.

Before this patch, doing a zero-sized write to /proc/self/keycreate
would check if the current task can create unlabeled keys (which would
usually fail with -EACCESS and generate an AVC). Now it skips the check
and correctly sets the task's keycreate_sid to 0.

Bug report: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1719067

Tested using the reproducer from the report above.

Fixes: 4eb582cf1fbd ("[PATCH] keys: add a way to store the appropriate context for newly-created keys")
Reported-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kir@sacred.ru>
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
security/selinux/hooks.c

index 70bad15..109ab51 100644 (file)
@@ -6550,11 +6550,12 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
        } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
                tsec->create_sid = sid;
        } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
-               error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
-                                    mysid, sid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE,
-                                    NULL);
-               if (error)
-                       goto abort_change;
+               if (sid) {
+                       error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, mysid, sid,
+                                            SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
+                       if (error)
+                               goto abort_change;
+               }
                tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
        } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
                tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;