bpf: Fix spelling mistakes

Fix some spelling mistakes in comments:
aother ==> another
Netiher ==> Neither
desribe ==> describe
intializing ==> initializing
funciton ==> function
wont ==> won't and move the word 'the' at the end to the next line
accross ==> across
pathes ==> paths
triggerred ==> triggered
excute ==> execute
ether ==> either
conervative ==> conservative
convetion ==> convention
markes ==> marks
interpeter ==> interpreter

Signed-off-by: Zhen Lei <thunder.leizhen@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210525025659.8898-2-thunder.leizhen@huawei.com

diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_local_storage.h b/include/linux/bpf_local_storage.h
index b902c58..24496bc 100644 (file)
--- a/include/linux/bpf_local_storage.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf_local_storage.h
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ struct bpf_local_storage_data {
         * from the object's bpf_local_storage.
         *
         * Put it in the same cacheline as the data to minimize
-        * the number of cachelines access during the cache hit case.
+        * the number of cachelines accessed during the cache hit case.
         */
        struct bpf_local_storage_map __rcu *smap;
        u8 data[] __aligned(8);
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ struct bpf_local_storage_elem {
        struct bpf_local_storage __rcu *local_storage;
        struct rcu_head rcu;
        /* 8 bytes hole */
-       /* The data is stored in aother cacheline to minimize
+       /* The data is stored in another cacheline to minimize
         * the number of cachelines access during a cache hit.
         */
        struct bpf_local_storage_data sdata ____cacheline_aligned;

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/bpf_inode_storage.c b/kernel/bpf/bpf_inode_storage.c
index 2921ca3..96ceed0 100644 (file)
--- a/kernel/bpf/bpf_inode_storage.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/bpf_inode_storage.c
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ void bpf_inode_storage_free(struct inode *inode)
                return;
        }
 
-       /* Netiher the bpf_prog nor the bpf-map's syscall
+       /* Neither the bpf_prog nor the bpf-map's syscall
         * could be modifying the local_storage->list now.
         * Thus, no elem can be added-to or deleted-from the
         * local_storage->list by the bpf_prog or by the bpf-map's syscall.

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/btf.c b/kernel/bpf/btf.c
index 8571632..a6e39c5 100644 (file)
--- a/kernel/bpf/btf.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/btf.c
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@
  * The BTF type section contains a list of 'struct btf_type' objects.
  * Each one describes a C type.  Recall from the above section
  * that a 'struct btf_type' object could be immediately followed by extra
- * data in order to desribe some particular C types.
+ * data in order to describe some particular C types.
  *
  * type_id:
  * ~~~~~~~
@@ -1143,7 +1143,7 @@ static void *btf_show_obj_safe(struct btf_show *show,
 
        /*
         * We need a new copy to our safe object, either because we haven't
-        * yet copied and are intializing safe data, or because the data
+        * yet copied and are initializing safe data, or because the data
         * we want falls outside the boundaries of the safe object.
         */
        if (!safe) {
@@ -3417,7 +3417,7 @@ static struct btf_kind_operations func_proto_ops = {
         * BTF_KIND_FUNC_PROTO cannot be directly referred by
         * a struct's member.
         *
-        * It should be a funciton pointer instead.
+        * It should be a function pointer instead.
         * (i.e. struct's member -> BTF_KIND_PTR -> BTF_KIND_FUNC_PROTO)
         *
         * Hence, there is no btf_func_check_member().

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/devmap.c b/kernel/bpf/devmap.c
index aa51647..d60d617 100644 (file)
--- a/kernel/bpf/devmap.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/devmap.c
@@ -382,8 +382,8 @@ void __dev_flush(void)
 }
 
 /* rcu_read_lock (from syscall and BPF contexts) ensures that if a delete and/or
- * update happens in parallel here a dev_put wont happen until after reading the
- * ifindex.
+ * update happens in parallel here a dev_put won't happen until after reading
+ * the ifindex.
  */
 static void *__dev_map_lookup_elem(struct bpf_map *map, u32 key)
 {

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/hashtab.c b/kernel/bpf/hashtab.c
index 9da0a04..6f6681b 100644 (file)
--- a/kernel/bpf/hashtab.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/hashtab.c
@@ -46,12 +46,12 @@
  * events, kprobes and tracing to be invoked before the prior invocation
  * from one of these contexts completed. sys_bpf() uses the same mechanism
  * by pinning the task to the current CPU and incrementing the recursion
- * protection accross the map operation.
+ * protection across the map operation.
  *
  * This has subtle implications on PREEMPT_RT. PREEMPT_RT forbids certain
  * operations like memory allocations (even with GFP_ATOMIC) from atomic
  * contexts. This is required because even with GFP_ATOMIC the memory
- * allocator calls into code pathes which acquire locks with long held lock
+ * allocator calls into code paths which acquire locks with long held lock
  * sections. To ensure the deterministic behaviour these locks are regular
  * spinlocks, which are converted to 'sleepable' spinlocks on RT. The only
  * true atomic contexts on an RT kernel are the low level hardware

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/reuseport_array.c b/kernel/bpf/reuseport_array.c
index 4838922..93a5539 100644 (file)
--- a/kernel/bpf/reuseport_array.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/reuseport_array.c
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ static void reuseport_array_free(struct bpf_map *map)
        /*
         * ops->map_*_elem() will not be able to access this
         * array now. Hence, this function only races with
-        * bpf_sk_reuseport_detach() which was triggerred by
+        * bpf_sk_reuseport_detach() which was triggered by
         * close() or disconnect().
         *
         * This function and bpf_sk_reuseport_detach() are

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/trampoline.c b/kernel/bpf/trampoline.c
index 2d44b5a..28a3630 100644 (file)
--- a/kernel/bpf/trampoline.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/trampoline.c
@@ -552,7 +552,7 @@ static void notrace inc_misses_counter(struct bpf_prog *prog)
  * __bpf_prog_enter returns:
  * 0 - skip execution of the bpf prog
  * 1 - execute bpf prog
- * [2..MAX_U64] - excute bpf prog and record execution time.
+ * [2..MAX_U64] - execute bpf prog and record execution time.
  *     This is start time.
  */
 u64 notrace __bpf_prog_enter(struct bpf_prog *prog)

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 9189eec..1de4b8c 100644 (file)
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ static const struct bpf_verifier_ops * const bpf_verifier_ops[] = {
  * - unreachable insns exist (shouldn't be a forest. program = one function)
  * - out of bounds or malformed jumps
  * The second pass is all possible path descent from the 1st insn.
- * Since it's analyzing all pathes through the program, the length of the
+ * Since it's analyzing all paths through the program, the length of the
  * analysis is limited to 64k insn, which may be hit even if total number of
  * insn is less then 4K, but there are too many branches that change stack/regs.
  * Number of 'branches to be analyzed' is limited to 1k
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ static const struct bpf_verifier_ops * const bpf_verifier_ops[] = {
  * If it's ok, then verifier allows this BPF_CALL insn and looks at
  * .ret_type which is RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL, so it sets
  * R0->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL which means bpf_map_lookup_elem() function
- * returns ether pointer to map value or NULL.
+ * returns either pointer to map value or NULL.
  *
  * When type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL passes through 'if (reg != 0) goto +off'
  * insn, the register holding that pointer in the true branch changes state to
@@ -2616,7 +2616,7 @@ static int check_stack_write_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
                if (dst_reg != BPF_REG_FP) {
                        /* The backtracking logic can only recognize explicit
                         * stack slot address like [fp - 8]. Other spill of
-                        * scalar via different register has to be conervative.
+                        * scalar via different register has to be conservative.
                         * Backtrack from here and mark all registers as precise
                         * that contributed into 'reg' being a constant.
                         */
@@ -9053,7 +9053,7 @@ static int check_return_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
            !prog->aux->attach_func_proto->type)
                return 0;
 
-       /* eBPF calling convetion is such that R0 is used
+       /* eBPF calling convention is such that R0 is used
         * to return the value from eBPF program.
         * Make sure that it's readable at this time
         * of bpf_exit, which means that program wrote
@@ -9844,7 +9844,7 @@ static void clean_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
  * Since the verifier pushes the branch states as it sees them while exploring
  * the program the condition of walking the branch instruction for the second
  * time means that all states below this branch were already explored and
- * their final liveness markes are already propagated.
+ * their final liveness marks are already propagated.
  * Hence when the verifier completes the search of state list in is_state_visited()
  * we can call this clean_live_states() function to mark all liveness states
  * as REG_LIVE_DONE to indicate that 'parent' pointers of 'struct bpf_reg_state'
@@ -12464,7 +12464,7 @@ static int do_misc_fixups(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
                        prog->aux->max_pkt_offset = MAX_PACKET_OFF;
 
                        /* mark bpf_tail_call as different opcode to avoid
-                        * conditional branch in the interpeter for every normal
+                        * conditional branch in the interpreter for every normal
                         * call and to prevent accidental JITing by JIT compiler
                         * that doesn't support bpf_tail_call yet
                         */