The virtio_queue_notify() function checks that the virtqueue number is
less than the maximum number of virtqueues. A signed comparison is used
but the virtqueue number could be negative if a buggy or malicious guest
is run. This results in memory accesses outside of the virtqueue array.
It is risky doing input validation in common code instead of at the
guest<->host boundary. Note that virtio_queue_set_addr(),
virtio_queue_get_addr(), virtio_queue_get_num(), and many other virtio
functions do *not* validate the virtqueue number argument.
Instead of fixing the comparison in virtio_queue_notify(), move the
comparison to the virtio bindings (just like VIRTIO_PCI_QUEUE_SEL) where
we have a uint32_t value and can avoid ever calling into common virtio
code if the virtqueue number is invalid.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
vdev->queue_sel = value;
break;
case SYBORG_VIRTIO_QUEUE_NOTIFY:
- virtio_queue_notify(vdev, value);
+ if (value < VIRTIO_PCI_QUEUE_MAX) {
+ virtio_queue_notify(vdev, value);
+ }
break;
case SYBORG_VIRTIO_STATUS:
virtio_set_status(vdev, value & 0xFF);
vdev->queue_sel = val;
break;
case VIRTIO_PCI_QUEUE_NOTIFY:
- virtio_queue_notify(vdev, val);
+ if (val < VIRTIO_PCI_QUEUE_MAX) {
+ virtio_queue_notify(vdev, val);
+ }
break;
case VIRTIO_PCI_STATUS:
if (!(val & VIRTIO_CONFIG_S_DRIVER_OK)) {
void virtio_queue_notify(VirtIODevice *vdev, int n)
{
- if (n < VIRTIO_PCI_QUEUE_MAX) {
- virtio_queue_notify_vq(&vdev->vq[n]);
- }
+ virtio_queue_notify_vq(&vdev->vq[n]);
}
uint16_t virtio_queue_vector(VirtIODevice *vdev, int n)