[ Upstream commit
1367afaa2ee90d1c956dfc224e199fcb3ff3f8cc ]
The commit
c75890700455 ("x86/entry/64: Remove unneeded kernel CR3 switching")
removed a CR3 write in the faulting path of load_gs_index().
But the path's FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY has no fence operation if PTI is
enabled, see spectre_v1_select_mitigation().
Rather, it depended on the serializing CR3 write of SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3
and since it got removed, add a FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY call to make
sure speculation is blocked.
[ bp: Massage commit message and comment. ]
Fixes:
c75890700455 ("x86/entry/64: Remove unneeded kernel CR3 switching")
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211126101209.8613-3-jiangshanlai@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
pushq %r12
ret
-.Lerror_entry_done_lfence:
- FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY
-.Lerror_entry_done:
- ret
-
/*
* There are two places in the kernel that can potentially fault with
* usergs. Handle them here. B stepping K8s sometimes report a
* .Lgs_change's error handler with kernel gsbase.
*/
SWAPGS
- FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY
- jmp .Lerror_entry_done
+
+ /*
+ * Issue an LFENCE to prevent GS speculation, regardless of whether it is a
+ * kernel or user gsbase.
+ */
+.Lerror_entry_done_lfence:
+ FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY
+ ret
.Lbstep_iret:
/* Fix truncated RIP */