A malicious USB device could feed in a large nr_rates value. This would
cause the subsequent call to kmemdup() to allocate a smaller buffer than
expected, leading to out-of-bounds access.
This patch validates the nr_rates value and reuses the limit introduced
in commit
4fa0e81b ("ALSA: usb-audio: fix possible hang and overflow
in parse_uac2_sample_rate_range()").
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
#ifndef __USBAUDIO_CARD_H
#define __USBAUDIO_CARD_H
+#define MAX_NR_RATES 1024
#define MAX_PACKS 20
#define MAX_PACKS_HS (MAX_PACKS * 8) /* in high speed mode */
#define MAX_URBS 8
return 0;
}
-#define MAX_UAC2_NR_RATES 1024
-
/*
* Helper function to walk the array of sample rate triplets reported by
* the device. The problem is that we need to parse whole array first to
fp->rates |= snd_pcm_rate_to_rate_bit(rate);
nr_rates++;
- if (nr_rates >= MAX_UAC2_NR_RATES) {
+ if (nr_rates >= MAX_NR_RATES) {
snd_printk(KERN_ERR "invalid uac2 rates\n");
break;
}
unsigned *rate_table = NULL;
fp = kmemdup(quirk->data, sizeof(*fp), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (! fp) {
+ if (!fp) {
snd_printk(KERN_ERR "cannot memdup\n");
return -ENOMEM;
}
+ if (fp->nr_rates > MAX_NR_RATES) {
+ kfree(fp);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
if (fp->nr_rates > 0) {
rate_table = kmemdup(fp->rate_table,
sizeof(int) * fp->nr_rates, GFP_KERNEL);