arm64: spectre: increase parameters that can be used to turn off bhb mitigation indiv...
authorLiu Song <liusong@linux.alibaba.com>
Fri, 26 Aug 2022 11:40:50 +0000 (19:40 +0800)
committerCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Fri, 9 Sep 2022 18:02:22 +0000 (19:02 +0100)
In our environment, it was found that the mitigation BHB has a great
impact on the benchmark performance. For example, in the lmbench test,
the "process fork && exit" test performance drops by 20%.
So it is necessary to have the ability to turn off the mitigation
individually through cmdline, thus avoiding having to compile the
kernel by adjusting the config.

Signed-off-by: Liu Song <liusong@linux.alibaba.com>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1661514050-22263-1-git-send-email-liusong@linux.alibaba.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c

index 426fa89..a1e88e9 100644 (file)
                                               spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
                                               spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC]
                                               ssbd=force-off [ARM64]
+                                              nospectre_bhb [ARM64]
                                               l1tf=off [X86]
                                               mds=off [X86]
                                               tsx_async_abort=off [X86]
                        vulnerability. System may allow data leaks with this
                        option.
 
+       nospectre_bhb   [ARM64] Disable all mitigations for Spectre-BHB (branch
+                       history injection) vulnerability. System may allow data leaks
+                       with this option.
+
        nospec_store_bypass_disable
                        [HW] Disable all mitigations for the Speculative Store Bypass vulnerability
 
index 40be3a7..bd16903 100644 (file)
@@ -988,6 +988,14 @@ static void this_cpu_set_vectors(enum arm64_bp_harden_el1_vectors slot)
        isb();
 }
 
+static bool __read_mostly __nospectre_bhb;
+static int __init parse_spectre_bhb_param(char *str)
+{
+       __nospectre_bhb = true;
+       return 0;
+}
+early_param("nospectre_bhb", parse_spectre_bhb_param);
+
 void spectre_bhb_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry)
 {
        bp_hardening_cb_t cpu_cb;
@@ -1001,7 +1009,7 @@ void spectre_bhb_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry)
                /* No point mitigating Spectre-BHB alone. */
        } else if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY)) {
                pr_info_once("spectre-bhb mitigation disabled by compile time option\n");
-       } else if (cpu_mitigations_off()) {
+       } else if (cpu_mitigations_off() || __nospectre_bhb) {
                pr_info_once("spectre-bhb mitigation disabled by command line option\n");
        } else if (supports_ecbhb(SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)) {
                state = SPECTRE_MITIGATED;