audit: allow unsetting the loginuid (with priv)
authorEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Fri, 24 May 2013 13:49:14 +0000 (09:49 -0400)
committerEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Tue, 5 Nov 2013 16:08:09 +0000 (11:08 -0500)
If a task has CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL allow that task to unset their loginuid.
This would allow a child of that task to set their loginuid without
CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL.  Thus when launching a new login daemon, a
priviledged helper would be able to unset the loginuid and then the
daemon, which may be malicious user facing, do not need priv to function
correctly.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
fs/proc/base.c
kernel/auditsc.c

index 1485e38..03c8d74 100644 (file)
@@ -1151,10 +1151,16 @@ static ssize_t proc_loginuid_write(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
                goto out_free_page;
 
        }
-       kloginuid = make_kuid(file->f_cred->user_ns, loginuid);
-       if (!uid_valid(kloginuid)) {
-               length = -EINVAL;
-               goto out_free_page;
+
+       /* is userspace tring to explicitly UNSET the loginuid? */
+       if (loginuid == AUDIT_UID_UNSET) {
+               kloginuid = INVALID_UID;
+       } else {
+               kloginuid = make_kuid(file->f_cred->user_ns, loginuid);
+               if (!uid_valid(kloginuid)) {
+                       length = -EINVAL;
+                       goto out_free_page;
+               }
        }
 
        length = audit_set_loginuid(kloginuid);
index b55788b..c75d781 100644 (file)
@@ -2019,7 +2019,9 @@ int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid)
        if (rc)
                goto out;
 
-       sessionid = atomic_inc_return(&session_id);
+       /* are we setting or clearing? */
+       if (uid_valid(loginuid))
+               sessionid = atomic_inc_return(&session_id);
 
        task->sessionid = sessionid;
        task->loginuid = loginuid;