ecryptfs: fix a memory leak bug in parse_tag_1_packet()
authorWenwen Wang <wenwen@cs.uga.edu>
Tue, 20 Aug 2019 05:16:40 +0000 (00:16 -0500)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Fri, 28 Feb 2020 16:22:13 +0000 (17:22 +0100)
commit fe2e082f5da5b4a0a92ae32978f81507ef37ec66 upstream.

In parse_tag_1_packet(), if tag 1 packet contains a key larger than
ECRYPTFS_MAX_ENCRYPTED_KEY_BYTES, no cleanup is executed, leading to a
memory leak on the allocated 'auth_tok_list_item'. To fix this issue, go to
the label 'out_free' to perform the cleanup work.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: dddfa461fc89 ("[PATCH] eCryptfs: Public key; packet management")
Signed-off-by: Wenwen Wang <wenwen@cs.uga.edu>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c

index 216fbe6a4837caf9eabb728689730a0bad97324d..4dc09638de8fa5e7bce61ca48fc7a76a4d40fc4c 100644 (file)
@@ -1304,7 +1304,7 @@ parse_tag_1_packet(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat,
                printk(KERN_WARNING "Tag 1 packet contains key larger "
                       "than ECRYPTFS_MAX_ENCRYPTED_KEY_BYTES\n");
                rc = -EINVAL;
-               goto out;
+               goto out_free;
        }
        memcpy((*new_auth_tok)->session_key.encrypted_key,
               &data[(*packet_size)], (body_size - (ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE + 2)));