fork,random: use get_random_canary() to set tsk->stack_canary
authorRik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Wed, 12 Jul 2017 21:36:20 +0000 (14:36 -0700)
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Wed, 12 Jul 2017 23:26:03 +0000 (16:26 -0700)
Use the ascii-armor canary to prevent unterminated C string overflows
from being able to successfully overwrite the canary, even if they
somehow obtain the canary value.

Inspired by execshield ascii-armor and Daniel Micay's linux-hardened
tree.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170524155751.424-3-riel@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
kernel/fork.c

index ade237a..17921b0 100644 (file)
@@ -554,7 +554,7 @@ static struct task_struct *dup_task_struct(struct task_struct *orig, int node)
        set_task_stack_end_magic(tsk);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
-       tsk->stack_canary = get_random_long();
+       tsk->stack_canary = get_random_canary();
 #endif
 
        /*