net/packet: fix overflow in check for tp_frame_nr 08/155208/1
authorAndrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Wed, 29 Mar 2017 14:11:21 +0000 (16:11 +0200)
committerSeung-Woo Kim <sw0312.kim@samsung.com>
Thu, 12 Oct 2017 09:36:37 +0000 (18:36 +0900)
commit 8f8d28e4d6d815a391285e121c3a53a0b6cb9e7b upstream.

When calculating rb->frames_per_block * req->tp_block_nr the result
can overflow.

Add a check that tp_block_size * tp_block_nr <= UINT_MAX.

Since frames_per_block <= tp_block_size, the expression would
never overflow.

Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
[sw0312.kim: cherry-pick from linux-3.10.y to fix CVE-2017-7308]
Signed-off-by: Seung-Woo Kim <sw0312.kim@samsung.com>
Change-Id: Ibed9ae4f05963e29c0b79b48a86ffa3c1f229b38

net/packet/af_packet.c

index 519749c..afde201 100644 (file)
@@ -3677,6 +3677,8 @@ static int packet_set_ring(struct sock *sk, union tpacket_req_u *req_u,
                rb->frames_per_block = req->tp_block_size/req->tp_frame_size;
                if (unlikely(rb->frames_per_block <= 0))
                        goto out;
+               if (unlikely(req->tp_block_size > UINT_MAX / req->tp_block_nr))
+                       goto out;
                if (unlikely((rb->frames_per_block * req->tp_block_nr) !=
                                        req->tp_frame_nr))
                        goto out;