https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commits/ and pick the appropriate
release branch.
+ Changes between 1.0.2n and 1.0.2o [27 Mar 2018]
+
+ *) Constructed ASN.1 types with a recursive definition could exceed the stack
+
+ Constructed ASN.1 types with a recursive definition (such as can be found
+ in PKCS7) could eventually exceed the stack given malicious input with
+ excessive recursion. This could result in a Denial Of Service attack. There
+ are no such structures used within SSL/TLS that come from untrusted sources
+ so this is considered safe.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 4th January 2018 by the OSS-fuzz
+ project.
+ (CVE-2018-0739)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
Changes between 1.0.2m and 1.0.2n [7 Dec 2017]
*) Read/write after SSL object in error state
to work with OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN defined.
[Steve Henson]
- *) Add SRP support.
- [Tom Wu <tjw@cs.stanford.edu> and Ben Laurie]
+ *) A long standing patch to add support for SRP from EdelWeb (Peter
+ Sylvester and Christophe Renou) was integrated.
+ [Christophe Renou <christophe.renou@edelweb.fr>, Peter Sylvester
+ <peter.sylvester@edelweb.fr>, Tom Wu <tjw@cs.stanford.edu>, and
+ Ben Laurie]
*) Add functions to copy EVP_PKEY_METHOD and retrieve flags and id.
[Steve Henson]
"hpux-gcc", "gcc:-DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W -O3::(unknown)::-Wl,+s -ldld:DES_PTR DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1:${no_asm}:dl:hpux-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.sl.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
#### HP MPE/iX http://jazz.external.hp.com/src/openssl/
-"MPE/iX-gcc", "gcc:-D_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W -O3 -D_POSIX_SOURCE -D_SOCKET_SOURCE -I/SYSLOG/PUB::(unknown):MPE:-L/SYSLOG/PUB -lsyslog -lsocket -lcurses:BN_LLONG DES_PTR DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1:::",
+"MPE/iX-gcc", "gcc:-DBN_DIV2W -O3 -D_POSIX_SOURCE -D_SOCKET_SOURCE -I/SYSLOG/PUB::(unknown):MPE:-L/SYSLOG/PUB -lsyslog -lsocket -lcurses:BN_LLONG DES_PTR DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1:::",
# DEC Alpha OSF/1/Tru64 targets.
#
if (defined($postlflags)) { $lflags=$postlflags; }
else { $lflags=$prelflags; undef $prelflags; }
-if ($target =~ /^mingw/ && `$cc --target-help 2>&1` !~ m/\-mno\-cygwin/m)
+if ($target =~ /^mingw/ && `$cross_compile_prefix$cc --target-help 2>&1` !~ m/\-mno\-cygwin/m)
{
$cflags =~ s/\-mno\-cygwin\s*//;
$shared_ldflag =~ s/\-mno\-cygwin\s*//;
$shlib_minor=$2;
}
-my $ecc = $cc;
-$ecc = "clang" if `$cc --version 2>&1` =~ /clang/;
+my %predefined;
+
+# collect compiler pre-defines from gcc or gcc-alike...
+open(PIPE, "$cross_compile_prefix$cc -dM -E -x c /dev/null 2>&1 |");
+while (<PIPE>) {
+ m/^#define\s+(\w+(?:\(\w+\))?)(?:\s+(.+))?/ or last;
+ $predefined{$1} = defined($2) ? $2 : "";
+}
+close(PIPE);
if ($strict_warnings)
{
my $wopt;
- die "ERROR --strict-warnings requires gcc or clang" unless ($ecc =~ /gcc$/ or $ecc =~ /clang$/);
+ die "ERROR --strict-warnings requires gcc or clang" unless defined($predefined{__GNUC__});
foreach $wopt (split /\s+/, $gcc_devteam_warn)
{
$cflags .= " $wopt" unless ($cflags =~ /(^|\s)$wopt(\s|$)/)
}
- if ($ecc eq "clang")
+ if (defined($predefined{__clang__}))
{
foreach $wopt (split /\s+/, $clang_devteam_warn)
{
s/^NM=\s*/NM= \$\(CROSS_COMPILE\)/;
s/^RANLIB=\s*/RANLIB= \$\(CROSS_COMPILE\)/;
s/^RC=\s*/RC= \$\(CROSS_COMPILE\)/;
- s/^MAKEDEPPROG=.*$/MAKEDEPPROG= \$\(CROSS_COMPILE\)$cc/ if $cc eq "gcc";
+ s/^MAKEDEPPROG=.*$/MAKEDEPPROG= \$\(CROSS_COMPILE\)$cc/ if $predefined{__GNUC__} >= 3;
}
else {
s/^CC=.*$/CC= $cc/;
s/^AR=\s*ar/AR= $ar/;
s/^RANLIB=.*/RANLIB= $ranlib/;
s/^RC=.*/RC= $windres/;
- s/^MAKEDEPPROG=.*$/MAKEDEPPROG= $cc/ if $cc eq "gcc";
- s/^MAKEDEPPROG=.*$/MAKEDEPPROG= $cc/ if $ecc eq "gcc" || $ecc eq "clang";
+ s/^MAKEDEPPROG=.*$/MAKEDEPPROG= $cc/ if $predefined{__GNUC__} >= 3;
}
s/^CFLAG=.*$/CFLAG= $cflags/;
s/^DEPFLAG=.*$/DEPFLAG=$depflags/;
---------------
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2017 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
if (labs (mLastMouse.h - mouseLoc.h) > kMouseResolution/2 &&
labs (mLastMouse.v - mouseLoc.v) > kMouseResolution/2)
- AddBytes (&mouseLoc, sizeof (mouseLoc),
+ AddBytes (&mouseLoc, sizeof(mouseLoc),
kMousePositionEntropy);
if (mLastMouse.h == mouseLoc.h && mLastMouse.v == mouseLoc.v)
(kTypicalMouseIdleTicks/(double)lastCheck);
if (entropy < 0.0)
entropy = 0.0;
- AddBytes (&mMouseStill, sizeof (mMouseStill), entropy);
+ AddBytes (&mMouseStill, sizeof(mMouseStill), entropy);
mMouseStill = 0;
}
mLastMouse = mouseLoc;
GetDateTime (&now);
now -= TickCount() / 60; // Time in ticks since machine
// startup
- AddBytes (&now, sizeof (now), kSysStartupEntropy);
+ AddBytes (&now, sizeof(now), kSysStartupEntropy);
}
void CRandomizer::AddTimeSinceMachineStartup (void)
ProcessSerialNumber PSN;
ProcessInfoRec ProcessInfo;
- ProcessInfo.processInfoLength = sizeof (ProcessInfoRec);
+ ProcessInfo.processInfoLength = sizeof(ProcessInfoRec);
ProcessInfo.processName = nil;
ProcessInfo.processAppSpec = nil;
// Now add the amount of time in ticks that the current process
// has been active
- AddBytes (&ProcessInfo, sizeof (ProcessInfoRec),
+ AddBytes (&ProcessInfo, sizeof(ProcessInfoRec),
kApplicationUpTimeEntropy);
}
// unpredictable, so might as well toss the whole block in. See
// comments for entropy estimate justifications.
- AddBytes (&pb, sizeof (pb),
+ AddBytes (&pb, sizeof(pb),
kVolumeBytesEntropy +
log2l (((pb.ioVTotalBytes.hi - pb.ioVFreeBytes.hi)
* 4294967296.0D +
void CRandomizer::AddNow (double millisecondUncertainty)
{
long time = SysTimer();
- AddBytes (&time, sizeof (time), log2l (millisecondUncertainty *
+ AddBytes (&time, sizeof(time), log2l (millisecondUncertainty *
mTimebaseTicksPerMillisec));
}
## Makefile for OpenSSL
##
-VERSION=1.0.2n
+VERSION=1.0.2o
MAJOR=1
MINOR=0.2
SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=1.0.0
PERL= /usr/bin/perl
TAR= tar
TARFLAGS= --no-recursion
-MAKEDEPPROG=makedepend
+MAKEDEPPROG= cc
LIBDIR=lib
# We let the C compiler driver to take care of .s files. This is done in
## Makefile for OpenSSL
##
-VERSION=1.0.2n
+VERSION=1.0.2o
MAJOR=1
MINOR=0.2
SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=1.0.0
This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL
release. For more details please read the CHANGES file.
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2n and OpenSSL 1.0.2o [27 Mar 2018]
+
+ o Constructed ASN.1 types with a recursive definition could exceed the
+ stack (CVE-2018-0739)
+
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2m and OpenSSL 1.0.2n [7 Dec 2017]
o Read/write after SSL object in error state (CVE-2017-3737)
- OpenSSL 1.0.2n 7 Dec 2017
+ OpenSSL 1.0.2o 27 Mar 2018
Copyright (c) 1998-2015 The OpenSSL Project
Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson
#endif
if (file == NULL)
- file = RAND_file_name(buffer, sizeof buffer);
+ file = RAND_file_name(buffer, sizeof(buffer));
else if (RAND_egd(file) > 0) {
/*
* we try if the given filename is an EGD socket. if it is, we don't
return 0;
if (file == NULL)
- file = RAND_file_name(buffer, sizeof buffer);
+ file = RAND_file_name(buffer, sizeof(buffer));
if (file == NULL || !RAND_write_file(file)) {
BIO_printf(bio_e, "unable to write 'random state'\n");
return 0;
BUF_strlcpy(buf[0], serialfile, BSIZE);
else {
#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
- j = BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof buf[0], "%s.%s", serialfile, suffix);
+ j = BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof(buf[0]), "%s.%s", serialfile, suffix);
#else
- j = BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof buf[0], "%s-%s", serialfile, suffix);
+ j = BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof(buf[0]), "%s-%s", serialfile, suffix);
#endif
}
#ifdef RL_DEBUG
goto err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
- j = BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof buf[0], "%s.%s", serialfile, new_suffix);
+ j = BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof(buf[0]), "%s.%s", serialfile, new_suffix);
#else
- j = BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof buf[0], "%s-%s", serialfile, new_suffix);
+ j = BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof(buf[0]), "%s-%s", serialfile, new_suffix);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
- j = BIO_snprintf(buf[1], sizeof buf[1], "%s.%s", serialfile, old_suffix);
+ j = BIO_snprintf(buf[1], sizeof(buf[1]), "%s.%s", serialfile, old_suffix);
#else
- j = BIO_snprintf(buf[1], sizeof buf[1], "%s-%s", serialfile, old_suffix);
+ j = BIO_snprintf(buf[1], sizeof(buf[1]), "%s-%s", serialfile, old_suffix);
#endif
#ifdef RL_DEBUG
BIO_printf(bio_err, "DEBUG: renaming \"%s\" to \"%s\"\n",
goto err;
#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
- BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof buf[0], "%s.attr", dbfile);
+ BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof(buf[0]), "%s.attr", dbfile);
#else
- BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof buf[0], "%s-attr", dbfile);
+ BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof(buf[0]), "%s-attr", dbfile);
#endif
dbattr_conf = NCONF_new(NULL);
if (NCONF_load(dbattr_conf, buf[0], &errorline) <= 0) {
goto err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
- j = BIO_snprintf(buf[2], sizeof buf[2], "%s.attr", dbfile);
+ j = BIO_snprintf(buf[2], sizeof(buf[2]), "%s.attr", dbfile);
#else
- j = BIO_snprintf(buf[2], sizeof buf[2], "%s-attr", dbfile);
+ j = BIO_snprintf(buf[2], sizeof(buf[2]), "%s-attr", dbfile);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
- j = BIO_snprintf(buf[1], sizeof buf[1], "%s.attr.%s", dbfile, suffix);
+ j = BIO_snprintf(buf[1], sizeof(buf[1]), "%s.attr.%s", dbfile, suffix);
#else
- j = BIO_snprintf(buf[1], sizeof buf[1], "%s-attr-%s", dbfile, suffix);
+ j = BIO_snprintf(buf[1], sizeof(buf[1]), "%s-attr-%s", dbfile, suffix);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
- j = BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof buf[0], "%s.%s", dbfile, suffix);
+ j = BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof(buf[0]), "%s.%s", dbfile, suffix);
#else
- j = BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof buf[0], "%s-%s", dbfile, suffix);
+ j = BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof(buf[0]), "%s-%s", dbfile, suffix);
#endif
#ifdef RL_DEBUG
BIO_printf(bio_err, "DEBUG: writing \"%s\"\n", buf[0]);
goto err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
- j = BIO_snprintf(buf[4], sizeof buf[4], "%s.attr", dbfile);
+ j = BIO_snprintf(buf[4], sizeof(buf[4]), "%s.attr", dbfile);
#else
- j = BIO_snprintf(buf[4], sizeof buf[4], "%s-attr", dbfile);
+ j = BIO_snprintf(buf[4], sizeof(buf[4]), "%s-attr", dbfile);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
- j = BIO_snprintf(buf[2], sizeof buf[2], "%s.attr.%s", dbfile, new_suffix);
+ j = BIO_snprintf(buf[2], sizeof(buf[2]), "%s.attr.%s", dbfile, new_suffix);
#else
- j = BIO_snprintf(buf[2], sizeof buf[2], "%s-attr-%s", dbfile, new_suffix);
+ j = BIO_snprintf(buf[2], sizeof(buf[2]), "%s-attr-%s", dbfile, new_suffix);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
- j = BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof buf[0], "%s.%s", dbfile, new_suffix);
+ j = BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof(buf[0]), "%s.%s", dbfile, new_suffix);
#else
- j = BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof buf[0], "%s-%s", dbfile, new_suffix);
+ j = BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof(buf[0]), "%s-%s", dbfile, new_suffix);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
- j = BIO_snprintf(buf[1], sizeof buf[1], "%s.%s", dbfile, old_suffix);
+ j = BIO_snprintf(buf[1], sizeof(buf[1]), "%s.%s", dbfile, old_suffix);
#else
- j = BIO_snprintf(buf[1], sizeof buf[1], "%s-%s", dbfile, old_suffix);
+ j = BIO_snprintf(buf[1], sizeof(buf[1]), "%s-%s", dbfile, old_suffix);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
- j = BIO_snprintf(buf[3], sizeof buf[3], "%s.attr.%s", dbfile, old_suffix);
+ j = BIO_snprintf(buf[3], sizeof(buf[3]), "%s.attr.%s", dbfile, old_suffix);
#else
- j = BIO_snprintf(buf[3], sizeof buf[3], "%s-attr-%s", dbfile, old_suffix);
+ j = BIO_snprintf(buf[3], sizeof(buf[3]), "%s-attr-%s", dbfile, old_suffix);
#endif
#ifdef RL_DEBUG
BIO_printf(bio_err, "DEBUG: renaming \"%s\" to \"%s\"\n", dbfile, buf[1]);
JPAKE_STEP3A_init(&s3a);
JPAKE_STEP3A_generate(&s3a, ctx);
- BIO_write(bconn, s3a.hhk, sizeof s3a.hhk);
+ BIO_write(bconn, s3a.hhk, sizeof(s3a.hhk));
(void)BIO_flush(bconn);
JPAKE_STEP3A_release(&s3a);
}
JPAKE_STEP3B_init(&s3b);
JPAKE_STEP3B_generate(&s3b, ctx);
- BIO_write(bconn, s3b.hk, sizeof s3b.hk);
+ BIO_write(bconn, s3b.hk, sizeof(s3b.hk));
(void)BIO_flush(bconn);
JPAKE_STEP3B_release(&s3b);
}
char buf[10240];
int l;
- l = BIO_gets(bconn, buf, sizeof buf);
+ l = BIO_gets(bconn, buf, sizeof(buf));
assert(l > 0);
assert(buf[l - 1] == '\n');
buf[l - 1] = '\0';
int l;
JPAKE_STEP3A_init(&s3a);
- l = BIO_read(bconn, s3a.hhk, sizeof s3a.hhk);
- assert(l == sizeof s3a.hhk);
+ l = BIO_read(bconn, s3a.hhk, sizeof(s3a.hhk));
+ assert(l == sizeof(s3a.hhk));
if (!JPAKE_STEP3A_process(ctx, &s3a)) {
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
exit(1);
int l;
JPAKE_STEP3B_init(&s3b);
- l = BIO_read(bconn, s3b.hk, sizeof s3b.hk);
- assert(l == sizeof s3b.hk);
+ l = BIO_read(bconn, s3b.hk, sizeof(s3b.hk));
+ assert(l == sizeof(s3b.hk));
if (!JPAKE_STEP3B_process(ctx, &s3b)) {
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
exit(1);
CONF *lconf, unsigned long certopt, unsigned long nameopt,
int default_op, int ext_copy, int selfsign)
{
- X509_NAME *name = NULL, *CAname = NULL, *subject = NULL, *dn_subject =
- NULL;
+ X509_NAME *name = NULL, *CAname = NULL, *subject = NULL;
ASN1_UTCTIME *tm, *tmptm;
ASN1_STRING *str, *str2;
ASN1_OBJECT *obj;
if (push != NULL) {
if (!X509_NAME_add_entry(subject, push, -1, 0)) {
- if (push != NULL)
- X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(push);
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n");
goto err;
}
goto err;
}
- if (verbose)
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "The subject name appears to be ok, checking data base for clashes\n");
-
- /* Build the correct Subject if no e-mail is wanted in the subject */
- /*
- * and add it later on because of the method extensions are added
- * (altName)
- */
-
- if (email_dn)
- dn_subject = subject;
- else {
- X509_NAME_ENTRY *tmpne;
- /*
- * Its best to dup the subject DN and then delete any email addresses
- * because this retains its structure.
- */
- if (!(dn_subject = X509_NAME_dup(subject))) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n");
- goto err;
- }
- while ((i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(dn_subject,
- NID_pkcs9_emailAddress,
- -1)) >= 0) {
- tmpne = X509_NAME_get_entry(dn_subject, i);
- X509_NAME_delete_entry(dn_subject, i);
- X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(tmpne);
- }
- }
-
- if (BN_is_zero(serial))
- row[DB_serial] = BUF_strdup("00");
- else
- row[DB_serial] = BN_bn2hex(serial);
- if (row[DB_serial] == NULL) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n");
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (db->attributes.unique_subject) {
- OPENSSL_STRING *crow = row;
-
- rrow = TXT_DB_get_by_index(db->db, DB_name, crow);
- if (rrow != NULL) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "ERROR:There is already a certificate for %s\n",
- row[DB_name]);
- }
- }
- if (rrow == NULL) {
- rrow = TXT_DB_get_by_index(db->db, DB_serial, row);
- if (rrow != NULL) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "ERROR:Serial number %s has already been issued,\n",
- row[DB_serial]);
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " check the database/serial_file for corruption\n");
- }
- }
-
- if (rrow != NULL) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "The matching entry has the following details\n");
- if (rrow[DB_type][0] == 'E')
- p = "Expired";
- else if (rrow[DB_type][0] == 'R')
- p = "Revoked";
- else if (rrow[DB_type][0] == 'V')
- p = "Valid";
- else
- p = "\ninvalid type, Data base error\n";
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Type :%s\n", p);;
- if (rrow[DB_type][0] == 'R') {
- p = rrow[DB_exp_date];
- if (p == NULL)
- p = "undef";
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Was revoked on:%s\n", p);
- }
- p = rrow[DB_exp_date];
- if (p == NULL)
- p = "undef";
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Expires on :%s\n", p);
- p = rrow[DB_serial];
- if (p == NULL)
- p = "undef";
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Serial Number :%s\n", p);
- p = rrow[DB_file];
- if (p == NULL)
- p = "undef";
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "File name :%s\n", p);
- p = rrow[DB_name];
- if (p == NULL)
- p = "undef";
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Subject Name :%s\n", p);
- ok = -1; /* This is now a 'bad' error. */
- goto err;
- }
-
/* We are now totally happy, lets make and sign the certificate */
if (verbose)
BIO_printf(bio_err,
goto err;
}
- /* Set the right value for the noemailDN option */
- if (email_dn == 0) {
- if (!X509_set_subject_name(ret, dn_subject))
+ if (verbose)
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "The subject name appears to be ok, checking data base for clashes\n");
+
+ /* Build the correct Subject if no e-mail is wanted in the subject */
+
+ if (!email_dn) {
+ X509_NAME_ENTRY *tmpne;
+ X509_NAME *dn_subject;
+
+ /*
+ * Its best to dup the subject DN and then delete any email addresses
+ * because this retains its structure.
+ */
+ if (!(dn_subject = X509_NAME_dup(subject))) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ while ((i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(dn_subject,
+ NID_pkcs9_emailAddress,
+ -1)) >= 0) {
+ tmpne = X509_NAME_get_entry(dn_subject, i);
+ X509_NAME_delete_entry(dn_subject, i);
+ X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(tmpne);
+ }
+
+ if (!X509_set_subject_name(ret, dn_subject)) {
+ X509_NAME_free(dn_subject);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ X509_NAME_free(dn_subject);
+ }
+
+ row[DB_name] = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(ret), NULL, 0);
+ if (row[DB_name] == NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (BN_is_zero(serial))
+ row[DB_serial] = BUF_strdup("00");
+ else
+ row[DB_serial] = BN_bn2hex(serial);
+ if (row[DB_serial] == NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (row[DB_name][0] == '\0') {
+ /*
+ * An empty subject! We'll use the serial number instead. If
+ * unique_subject is in use then we don't want different entries with
+ * empty subjects matching each other.
+ */
+ OPENSSL_free(row[DB_name]);
+ row[DB_name] = OPENSSL_strdup(row[DB_serial]);
+ if (row[DB_name] == NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n");
goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (db->attributes.unique_subject) {
+ OPENSSL_STRING *crow = row;
+
+ rrow = TXT_DB_get_by_index(db->db, DB_name, crow);
+ if (rrow != NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "ERROR:There is already a certificate for %s\n",
+ row[DB_name]);
+ }
+ }
+ if (rrow == NULL) {
+ rrow = TXT_DB_get_by_index(db->db, DB_serial, row);
+ if (rrow != NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "ERROR:Serial number %s has already been issued,\n",
+ row[DB_serial]);
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " check the database/serial_file for corruption\n");
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (rrow != NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "The matching entry has the following details\n");
+ if (rrow[DB_type][0] == 'E')
+ p = "Expired";
+ else if (rrow[DB_type][0] == 'R')
+ p = "Revoked";
+ else if (rrow[DB_type][0] == 'V')
+ p = "Valid";
+ else
+ p = "\ninvalid type, Data base error\n";
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Type :%s\n", p);;
+ if (rrow[DB_type][0] == 'R') {
+ p = rrow[DB_exp_date];
+ if (p == NULL)
+ p = "undef";
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Was revoked on:%s\n", p);
+ }
+ p = rrow[DB_exp_date];
+ if (p == NULL)
+ p = "undef";
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Expires on :%s\n", p);
+ p = rrow[DB_serial];
+ if (p == NULL)
+ p = "undef";
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Serial Number :%s\n", p);
+ p = rrow[DB_file];
+ if (p == NULL)
+ p = "undef";
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "File name :%s\n", p);
+ p = rrow[DB_name];
+ if (p == NULL)
+ p = "undef";
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Subject Name :%s\n", p);
+ ok = -1; /* This is now a 'bad' error. */
+ goto err;
}
if (!default_op) {
row[DB_exp_date] = OPENSSL_malloc(tm->length + 1);
row[DB_rev_date] = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
row[DB_file] = OPENSSL_malloc(8);
- row[DB_name] = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(ret), NULL, 0);
if ((row[DB_type] == NULL) || (row[DB_exp_date] == NULL) ||
(row[DB_rev_date] == NULL) ||
- (row[DB_file] == NULL) || (row[DB_name] == NULL)) {
+ (row[DB_file] == NULL)) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n");
goto err;
}
irow = NULL;
ok = 1;
err:
- if (irow != NULL) {
+ if (ok != 1) {
for (i = 0; i < DB_NUMBER; i++)
OPENSSL_free(row[i]);
- OPENSSL_free(irow);
}
+ OPENSSL_free(irow);
if (CAname != NULL)
X509_NAME_free(CAname);
if (subject != NULL)
X509_NAME_free(subject);
- if ((dn_subject != NULL) && !email_dn)
- X509_NAME_free(dn_subject);
if (tmptm != NULL)
ASN1_UTCTIME_free(tmptm);
if (ok <= 0) {
else
row[DB_serial] = BN_bn2hex(bn);
BN_free(bn);
+ if (row[DB_name] != NULL && row[DB_name][0] == '\0') {
+ /* Entries with empty Subjects actually use the serial number instead */
+ OPENSSL_free(row[DB_name]);
+ row[DB_name] = OPENSSL_strdup(row[DB_serial]);
+ }
if ((row[DB_name] == NULL) || (row[DB_serial] == NULL)) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n");
goto err;
BIO_printf(STDout, "%s - ", nm);
}
#endif
- BIO_puts(STDout, SSL_CIPHER_description(c, buf, sizeof buf));
+ BIO_puts(STDout, SSL_CIPHER_description(c, buf, sizeof(buf)));
}
}
* project.
*/
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2008 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2008-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
signer = load_cert(bio_err, signerfile, FORMAT_PEM, NULL,
e, "signer certificate");
- if (!signer)
+ if (!signer) {
+ ret = 2;
goto end;
+ }
key = load_key(bio_err, keyfile, keyform, 0, passin, e,
"signing key file");
- if (!key)
+ if (!key) {
+ ret = 2;
goto end;
+ }
for (kparam = key_first; kparam; kparam = kparam->next) {
if (kparam->idx == i) {
tflags |= CMS_KEY_PARAM;
goto end;
/* first check the program name */
- program_name(argv[0], pname, sizeof pname);
+ program_name(argv[0], pname, sizeof(pname));
md = EVP_get_digestbyname(pname);
printf("\treturn(dsa);\n\t}\n");
}
+ if (outformat == FORMAT_ASN1 && genkey)
+ noout = 1;
+
if (!noout) {
if (outformat == FORMAT_ASN1)
i = i2d_DSAparams_bio(out, dsa);
* Written by Nils Larsch for the OpenSSL project.
*/
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
BIO_printf(out, "\treturn(group);\n\t}\n");
}
+ if (outformat == FORMAT_ASN1 && genkey)
+ noout = 1;
+
if (!noout) {
if (outformat == FORMAT_ASN1)
i = i2d_ECPKParameters_bio(out, group);
if (EC_KEY_set_group(eckey, group) == 0)
goto end;
+ if (new_form)
+ EC_KEY_set_conv_form(eckey, form);
+
if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(eckey)) {
EC_KEY_free(eckey);
goto end;
int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
{
static const char magic[] = "Salted__";
- char mbuf[sizeof magic - 1];
+ char mbuf[sizeof(magic) - 1];
char *strbuf = NULL;
unsigned char *buff = NULL, *bufsize = NULL;
int bsize = BSIZE, verbose = 0;
goto end;
/* first check the program name */
- program_name(argv[0], pname, sizeof pname);
+ program_name(argv[0], pname, sizeof(pname));
if (strcmp(pname, "base64") == 0)
base64 = 1;
#ifdef ZLIB
goto bad;
}
buf[0] = '\0';
- if (!fgets(buf, sizeof buf, infile)) {
+ if (!fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), infile)) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to read key from '%s'\n", file);
goto bad;
}
for (;;) {
char buf[200];
- BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "enter %s %s password:",
+ BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "enter %s %s password:",
OBJ_nid2ln(EVP_CIPHER_nid(cipher)),
(enc) ? "encryption" : "decryption");
strbuf[0] = '\0';
else {
if (enc) {
if (hsalt) {
- if (!set_hex(hsalt, salt, sizeof salt)) {
+ if (!set_hex(hsalt, salt, sizeof(salt))) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "invalid hex salt value\n");
goto end;
}
- } else if (RAND_bytes(salt, sizeof salt) <= 0)
+ } else if (RAND_bytes(salt, sizeof(salt)) <= 0)
goto end;
/*
* If -P option then don't bother writing
*/
if ((printkey != 2)
&& (BIO_write(wbio, magic,
- sizeof magic - 1) != sizeof magic - 1
+ sizeof(magic) - 1) != sizeof(magic) - 1
|| BIO_write(wbio,
(char *)salt,
- sizeof salt) != sizeof salt)) {
+ sizeof(salt)) != sizeof(salt))) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "error writing output file\n");
goto end;
}
- } else if (BIO_read(rbio, mbuf, sizeof mbuf) != sizeof mbuf
+ } else if (BIO_read(rbio, mbuf, sizeof(mbuf)) != sizeof(mbuf)
|| BIO_read(rbio,
(unsigned char *)salt,
- sizeof salt) != sizeof salt) {
+ sizeof(salt)) != sizeof(salt)) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "error reading input file\n");
goto end;
- } else if (memcmp(mbuf, magic, sizeof magic - 1)) {
+ } else if (memcmp(mbuf, magic, sizeof(magic) - 1)) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "bad magic number\n");
goto end;
}
int siz = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
if (siz == 0) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "warning: iv not use by this cipher\n");
- } else if (!set_hex(hiv, iv, sizeof iv)) {
+ } else if (!set_hex(hiv, iv, sizeof(iv))) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "invalid hex iv value\n");
goto end;
}
for (i = 1; i < argc; i++) {
if (sscanf(argv[i], "%lx", &l)) {
- ERR_error_string_n(l, buf, sizeof buf);
+ ERR_error_string_n(l, buf, sizeof(buf));
printf("%s\n", buf);
} else {
printf("%s: bad error code\n", argv[i]);
*pcbio = cbio;
for (;;) {
- len = BIO_gets(cbio, inbuf, sizeof inbuf);
+ len = BIO_gets(cbio, inbuf, sizeof(inbuf));
if (len <= 0)
return 1;
/* Look for "POST" signalling start of query */
prog = prog_init();
/* first check the program name */
- program_name(Argv[0], pname, sizeof pname);
+ program_name(Argv[0], pname, sizeof(pname));
f.name = pname;
fp = lh_FUNCTION_retrieve(prog, &f);
for (;;) {
ret = 0;
p = buf;
- n = sizeof buf;
+ n = sizeof(buf);
i = 0;
for (;;) {
p[0] = '\0';
/* Purely so it looks nice when the user hits ? */
for (i = 0, f = functions; f->name != NULL; ++f, ++i) ;
- qsort(functions, i, sizeof *functions, SortFnByName);
+ qsort(functions, i, sizeof(*functions), SortFnByName);
if ((ret = lh_FUNCTION_new()) == NULL)
return (NULL);
/* ignore rest of line */
char trash[BUFSIZ];
do
- r = BIO_gets(in, trash, sizeof trash);
+ r = BIO_gets(in, trash, sizeof(trash));
while ((r > 0) && (!strchr(trash, '\n')));
}
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md2, passwd, passwd_len);
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md2, buf, NULL);
- for (i = passwd_len; i > sizeof buf; i -= sizeof buf)
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, buf, sizeof buf);
+ for (i = passwd_len; i > sizeof(buf); i -= sizeof(buf))
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, buf, sizeof(buf));
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, buf, i);
n = passwd_len;
for (i = 0; i < 1000; i++) {
EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md2, EVP_md5(), NULL);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md2, (i & 1) ? (unsigned const char *)passwd : buf,
- (i & 1) ? passwd_len : sizeof buf);
+ (i & 1) ? passwd_len : sizeof(buf));
if (i % 3)
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md2, salt_out, salt_len);
if (i % 7)
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md2, passwd, passwd_len);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md2, (i & 1) ? buf : (unsigned const char *)passwd,
- (i & 1) ? sizeof buf : passwd_len);
+ (i & 1) ? sizeof(buf) : passwd_len);
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md2, buf, NULL);
}
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md2);
{
/* transform buf into output string */
- unsigned char buf_perm[sizeof buf];
+ unsigned char buf_perm[sizeof(buf)];
int dest, source;
char *output;
buf_perm[15] = buf[11];
# ifndef PEDANTIC /* Unfortunately, this generates a "no
* effect" warning */
- assert(16 == sizeof buf_perm);
+ assert(16 == sizeof(buf_perm));
# endif
output = salt_out + salt_len;
CRYPTO_push_info("read MAC password");
# endif
if (EVP_read_pw_string
- (macpass, sizeof macpass, "Enter MAC Password:", export_cert)) {
+ (macpass, sizeof(macpass), "Enter MAC Password:", export_cert)) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't read Password\n");
goto end;
}
# endif
if (!noprompt &&
- EVP_read_pw_string(pass, sizeof pass, "Enter Export Password:",
+ EVP_read_pw_string(pass, sizeof(pass), "Enter Export Password:",
1)) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't read Password\n");
goto export_end;
}
if (!twopass)
- BUF_strlcpy(macpass, pass, sizeof macpass);
+ BUF_strlcpy(macpass, pass, sizeof(macpass));
# ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
CRYPTO_pop_info();
CRYPTO_push_info("read import password");
# endif
if (!noprompt
- && EVP_read_pw_string(pass, sizeof pass, "Enter Import Password:",
+ && EVP_read_pw_string(pass, sizeof(pass), "Enter Import Password:",
0)) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't read Password\n");
goto end;
# endif
if (!twopass)
- BUF_strlcpy(macpass, pass, sizeof macpass);
+ BUF_strlcpy(macpass, pass, sizeof(macpass));
if ((options & INFO) && p12->mac)
BIO_printf(bio_err, "MAC Iteration %ld\n",
else {
p8pass = pass;
if (EVP_read_pw_string
- (pass, sizeof pass, "Enter Encryption Password:", 1))
+ (pass, sizeof(pass), "Enter Encryption Password:", 1))
goto end;
}
app_RAND_load_file(NULL, bio_err, 0);
p8pass = passin;
else {
p8pass = pass;
- EVP_read_pw_string(pass, sizeof pass, "Enter Password:", 0);
+ EVP_read_pw_string(pass, sizeof(pass), "Enter Password:", 0);
}
p8inf = PKCS8_decrypt(p8, p8pass, strlen(p8pass));
}
chunk = num;
if (chunk > (int)sizeof(buf))
- chunk = sizeof buf;
+ chunk = sizeof(buf);
r = RAND_bytes(buf, chunk);
if (r <= 0)
goto err;
/* If OBJ not recognised ignore it */
if ((nid = OBJ_txt2nid(type)) == NID_undef)
goto start;
- if (BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s_default", v->name)
+ if (BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s_default", v->name)
>= (int)sizeof(buf)) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Name '%s' too long\n", v->name);
return 0;
def = "";
}
- BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s_value", v->name);
+ BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s_value", v->name);
if ((value = NCONF_get_string(req_conf, dn_sect, buf)) == NULL) {
ERR_clear_error();
value = NULL;
}
- BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s_min", v->name);
+ BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s_min", v->name);
if (!NCONF_get_number(req_conf, dn_sect, buf, &n_min)) {
ERR_clear_error();
n_min = -1;
}
- BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s_max", v->name);
+ BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s_max", v->name);
if (!NCONF_get_number(req_conf, dn_sect, buf, &n_max)) {
ERR_clear_error();
n_max = -1;
if ((nid = OBJ_txt2nid(type)) == NID_undef)
goto start2;
- if (BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s_default", type)
+ if (BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s_default", type)
>= (int)sizeof(buf)) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Name '%s' too long\n", v->name);
return 0;
def = "";
}
- BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s_value", type);
+ BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s_value", type);
if ((value = NCONF_get_string(req_conf, attr_sect, buf))
== NULL) {
ERR_clear_error();
value = NULL;
}
- BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s_min", type);
+ BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s_min", type);
if (!NCONF_get_number(req_conf, attr_sect, buf, &n_min)) {
ERR_clear_error();
n_min = -1;
}
- BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s_max", type);
+ BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s_max", type);
if (!NCONF_get_number(req_conf, attr_sect, buf, &n_max)) {
ERR_clear_error();
n_max = -1;
BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s [%s]:", text, def);
(void)BIO_flush(bio_err);
if (value != NULL) {
- BUF_strlcpy(buf, value, sizeof buf);
- BUF_strlcat(buf, "\n", sizeof buf);
+ BUF_strlcpy(buf, value, sizeof(buf));
+ BUF_strlcat(buf, "\n", sizeof(buf));
BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s\n", value);
} else {
buf[0] = '\0';
if (!batch) {
- if (!fgets(buf, sizeof buf, stdin))
+ if (!fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin))
return 0;
} else {
buf[0] = '\n';
else if (buf[0] == '\n') {
if ((def == NULL) || (def[0] == '\0'))
return (1);
- BUF_strlcpy(buf, def, sizeof buf);
- BUF_strlcat(buf, "\n", sizeof buf);
+ BUF_strlcpy(buf, def, sizeof(buf));
+ BUF_strlcat(buf, "\n", sizeof(buf));
} else if ((buf[0] == '.') && (buf[1] == '\n'))
return (1);
BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s [%s]:", text, def);
(void)BIO_flush(bio_err);
if (value != NULL) {
- BUF_strlcpy(buf, value, sizeof buf);
- BUF_strlcat(buf, "\n", sizeof buf);
+ BUF_strlcpy(buf, value, sizeof(buf));
+ BUF_strlcat(buf, "\n", sizeof(buf));
BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s\n", value);
} else {
buf[0] = '\0';
if (!batch) {
- if (!fgets(buf, sizeof buf, stdin))
+ if (!fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin))
return 0;
} else {
buf[0] = '\n';
else if (buf[0] == '\n') {
if ((def == NULL) || (def[0] == '\0'))
return (1);
- BUF_strlcpy(buf, def, sizeof buf);
- BUF_strlcat(buf, "\n", sizeof buf);
+ BUF_strlcpy(buf, def, sizeof(buf));
+ BUF_strlcat(buf, "\n", sizeof(buf));
} else if ((buf[0] == '.') && (buf[1] == '\n'))
return (1);
BIO_printf(bio, "---\nCertificate chain\n");
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(sk_X509_value(sk, i)),
- buf, sizeof buf);
+ buf, sizeof(buf));
BIO_printf(bio, "%2d s:%s\n", i, buf);
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(sk_X509_value(sk, i)),
- buf, sizeof buf);
+ buf, sizeof(buf));
BIO_printf(bio, " i:%s\n", buf);
if (c_showcerts)
PEM_write_bio_X509(bio, sk_X509_value(sk, i));
/* Redundant if we showed the whole chain */
if (!(c_showcerts && got_a_chain))
PEM_write_bio_X509(bio, peer);
- X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(peer), buf, sizeof buf);
+ X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(peer), buf, sizeof(buf));
BIO_printf(bio, "subject=%s\n", buf);
- X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(peer), buf, sizeof buf);
+ X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(peer), buf, sizeof(buf));
BIO_printf(bio, "issuer=%s\n", buf);
} else
BIO_printf(bio, "no peer certificate available\n");
} else {
BIO_printf(bio, "---\nNo client certificate CA names sent\n");
}
- p = SSL_get_shared_ciphers(s, buf, sizeof buf);
+ p = SSL_get_shared_ciphers(s, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (p != NULL) {
/*
* This works only for SSL 2. In later protocol versions, the
SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, s_server_verify, verify_callback);
SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(ctx, (void *)&s_server_session_id_context,
- sizeof s_server_session_id_context);
+ sizeof(s_server_session_id_context));
/* Set DTLS cookie generation and verification callbacks */
SSL_CTX_set_cookie_generate_cb(ctx, generate_cookie_callback);
SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx2, s_server_verify, verify_callback);
SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(ctx2,
(void *)&s_server_session_id_context,
- sizeof s_server_session_id_context);
+ sizeof(s_server_session_id_context));
tlsextcbp.biodebug = bio_s_out;
SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(ctx2, ssl_servername_cb);
if (peer != NULL) {
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Client certificate\n");
PEM_write_bio_X509(bio_s_out, peer);
- X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(peer), buf, sizeof buf);
+ X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(peer), buf, sizeof(buf));
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "subject=%s\n", buf);
- X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(peer), buf, sizeof buf);
+ X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(peer), buf, sizeof(buf));
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "issuer=%s\n", buf);
X509_free(peer);
}
- if (SSL_get_shared_ciphers(con, buf, sizeof buf) != NULL)
+ if (SSL_get_shared_ciphers(con, buf, sizeof(buf)) != NULL)
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Shared ciphers:%s\n", buf);
str = SSL_CIPHER_get_name(SSL_get_current_cipher(con));
ssl_print_sigalgs(bio_s_out, con);
{
unsigned char ip[4];
- memset(ip, '\0', sizeof ip);
+ memset(ip, '\0', sizeof(ip));
if (!host_ip(host, &(ip[0])))
return 0;
return init_client_ip(sock, ip, port, type);
# if defined SOL_SOCKET && defined SO_REUSEADDR
{
int j = 1;
- setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, (void *)&j, sizeof j);
+ setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, (void *)&j, sizeof(j));
}
# endif
if (bind(s, (struct sockaddr *)&server, sizeof(server)) == -1) {
if (ret == NULL)
return (NULL);
/* else add to cache */
- if (strlen(name) < sizeof ghbn_cache[0].name) {
+ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(ghbn_cache[0].name)) {
strcpy(ghbn_cache[lowi].name, name);
memcpy((char *)&(ghbn_cache[lowi].ent), ret,
sizeof(struct hostent));
goto end;
if (s_www_path != NULL) {
- BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "GET %s HTTP/1.0\r\n\r\n",
+ BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "GET %s HTTP/1.0\r\n\r\n",
s_www_path);
SSL_write(scon, buf, strlen(buf));
while ((i = SSL_read(scon, buf, sizeof(buf))) > 0)
}
if (s_www_path != NULL) {
- BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "GET %s HTTP/1.0\r\n\r\n", s_www_path);
+ BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "GET %s HTTP/1.0\r\n\r\n", s_www_path);
SSL_write(scon, buf, strlen(buf));
while (SSL_read(scon, buf, sizeof(buf)) > 0) ;
}
goto end;
if (s_www_path) {
- BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "GET %s HTTP/1.0\r\n\r\n",
+ BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "GET %s HTTP/1.0\r\n\r\n",
s_www_path);
SSL_write(scon, buf, strlen(buf));
while ((i = SSL_read(scon, buf, sizeof(buf))) > 0)
RAND_pseudo_bytes(buf, 20);
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
if (RAND_status() != 1) {
- RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof rnd_seed);
+ RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof(rnd_seed));
rnd_fake = 1;
}
for (j = 0; j < DSA_NUM; j++) {
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
if (RAND_status() != 1) {
- RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof rnd_seed);
+ RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof(rnd_seed));
rnd_fake = 1;
}
for (j = 0; j < EC_NUM; j++) {
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
if (RAND_status() != 1) {
- RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof rnd_seed);
+ RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof(rnd_seed));
rnd_fake = 1;
}
for (j = 0; j < EC_NUM; j++) {
if (**string == 0)
return NULL;
- memset(isdelim, 0, sizeof isdelim);
+ memset(isdelim, 0, sizeof(isdelim));
isdelim[0] = 1;
while (*delim) {
int *fds;
static char sep[] = ":";
- fds = malloc(multi * sizeof *fds);
+ fds = malloc(multi * sizeof(*fds));
if (fds == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "Out of memory in speed (do_multi)\n");
exit(1);
char *p;
f = fdopen(fds[n], "r");
- while (fgets(buf, sizeof buf, f)) {
+ while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f)) {
p = strchr(buf, '\n');
if (p)
*p = '\0';
** Process the terminal input
*/
LogMessage ("Waiting on terminal I/O ...\n");
- len = recv (TermSock, TermBuff, sizeof (TermBuff), 0) ;
+ len = recv (TermSock, TermBuff, sizeof(TermBuff), 0) ;
TermBuff[len] = '\0';
LogMessage ("Received terminal I/O [%s]", TermBuff);
TerminalDeviceAst,
0,
TerminalDeviceBuff,
- sizeof (TerminalDeviceBuff) - 2,
+ sizeof(TerminalDeviceBuff) - 2,
0, 0, 0, 0);
if (! (status & 1)) {
LogMessage ("TerminalSocket: SYS$QIO () - %08X", status);
/*
** Initialize the socket information
*/
- slen = sizeof (sin);
+ slen = sizeof(sin);
memset ((char *) &sin, 0, slen);
sin.sin_family = SocketFamily;
sin.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr (LocalHostAddr);
/*
** Now issue the connect
*/
- memset ((char *) &sin, 0, sizeof (sin)) ;
+ memset ((char *) &sin, 0, sizeof(sin)) ;
sin.sin_family = SocketFamily;
sin.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr (LocalHostAddr) ;
sin.sin_port = LocalHostPort ;
- status = connect (SockDesc2, (struct sockaddr *) &sin, sizeof (sin));
+ status = connect (SockDesc2, (struct sockaddr *) &sin, sizeof(sin));
if (status < 0 ) {
LogMessage ("CreateSocketPair: connect () - %d", errno);
sys$cantim (&sptb, 0);
TerminalDeviceAst,
0,
TerminalDeviceBuff,
- sizeof (TerminalDeviceBuff) - 1,
+ sizeof(TerminalDeviceBuff) - 1,
0, 0, 0, 0);
/*
char buffer[200];
if (cmdline[0] == '\0')
- filename = RAND_file_name(buffer, sizeof buffer);
+ filename = RAND_file_name(buffer, sizeof(buffer));
else
filename = cmdline;
char *m;
int y, z;
- X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(x), buf, sizeof buf);
+ X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(x), buf, sizeof(buf));
BIO_printf(STDout, "/* subject:%s */\n", buf);
m = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(x), buf,
- sizeof buf);
+ sizeof(buf));
BIO_printf(STDout, "/* issuer :%s */\n", buf);
z = i2d_X509(x, NULL);
ASN1_STRING tmpstr = *(ASN1_STRING *)a;
len = tmpstr.length;
- ebcdic2ascii(tmp, tmpstr.data, (len >= sizeof tmp) ? sizeof tmp : len);
+ ebcdic2ascii(tmp, tmpstr.data, (len >= sizeof(tmp)) ? sizeof(tmp) : len);
tmpstr.data = tmp;
a = (ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *)&tmpstr;
if ((minsize > 0) && (nchar < minsize)) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_MBSTRING_NCOPY, ASN1_R_STRING_TOO_SHORT);
- BIO_snprintf(strbuf, sizeof strbuf, "%ld", minsize);
+ BIO_snprintf(strbuf, sizeof(strbuf), "%ld", minsize);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "minsize=", strbuf);
return -1;
}
if ((maxsize > 0) && (nchar > maxsize)) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_MBSTRING_NCOPY, ASN1_R_STRING_TOO_LONG);
- BIO_snprintf(strbuf, sizeof strbuf, "%ld", maxsize);
+ BIO_snprintf(strbuf, sizeof(strbuf), "%ld", maxsize);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "maxsize=", strbuf);
return -1;
}
{
int i, first, len = 0, c, use_bn;
char ftmp[24], *tmp = ftmp;
- int tmpsize = sizeof ftmp;
+ int tmpsize = sizeof(ftmp);
const char *p;
unsigned long l;
BIGNUM *bl = NULL;
if ((a == NULL) || (a->data == NULL))
return (BIO_write(bp, "NULL", 4));
- i = i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(buf, sizeof buf, a);
+ i = i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(buf, sizeof(buf), a);
if (i > (int)(sizeof(buf) - 1)) {
p = OPENSSL_malloc(i + 1);
if (!p)
if (c > 0xffffffffL)
return -1;
if (c > 0xffff) {
- BIO_snprintf(tmphex, sizeof tmphex, "\\W%08lX", c);
+ BIO_snprintf(tmphex, sizeof(tmphex), "\\W%08lX", c);
if (!io_ch(arg, tmphex, 10))
return -1;
return 10;
}
if (c > 0xff) {
- BIO_snprintf(tmphex, sizeof tmphex, "\\U%04lX", c);
+ BIO_snprintf(tmphex, sizeof(tmphex), "\\U%04lX", c);
if (!io_ch(arg, tmphex, 6))
return -1;
return 6;
if (type & BUF_TYPE_CONVUTF8) {
unsigned char utfbuf[6];
int utflen;
- utflen = UTF8_putc(utfbuf, sizeof utfbuf, c);
+ utflen = UTF8_putc(utfbuf, sizeof(utfbuf), c);
for (i = 0; i < utflen; i++) {
/*
* We don't need to worry about setting orflags correctly
if (fn_opt != XN_FLAG_FN_NONE) {
int objlen, fld_len;
if ((fn_opt == XN_FLAG_FN_OID) || (fn_nid == NID_undef)) {
- OBJ_obj2txt(objtmp, sizeof objtmp, fn, 1);
+ OBJ_obj2txt(objtmp, sizeof(objtmp), fn, 1);
fld_len = 0; /* XXX: what should this be? */
objbuf = objtmp;
} else {
tmpstr = *(ASN1_STRING *)a;
len = tmpstr.length;
ebcdic2ascii(tmp, tmpstr.data,
- (len >= sizeof tmp) ? sizeof tmp : len);
+ (len >= sizeof(tmp)) ? sizeof(tmp) : len);
tmpstr.data = tmp;
a = (ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *)&tmpstr;
}
ASN1_STRING x = *(ASN1_STRING *)a;
len = x.length;
- ebcdic2ascii(tmp, x.data, (len >= sizeof tmp) ? sizeof tmp : len);
+ ebcdic2ascii(tmp, x.data, (len >= sizeof(tmp)) ? sizeof(tmp) : len);
x.data = tmp;
return i2d_ASN1_bytes(&x, pp, V_ASN1_UTCTIME, V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL);
# endif
struct tm tm;
int offset;
- memset(&tm, '\0', sizeof tm);
+ memset(&tm, '\0', sizeof(tm));
# define g2(p) (((p)[0]-'0')*10+(p)[1]-'0')
tm.tm_year = g2(s->data);
# define ASN1_R_MSTRING_NOT_UNIVERSAL 139
# define ASN1_R_MSTRING_WRONG_TAG 140
# define ASN1_R_NESTED_ASN1_STRING 197
+# define ASN1_R_NESTED_TOO_DEEP 219
# define ASN1_R_NON_HEX_CHARACTERS 141
# define ASN1_R_NOT_ASCII_FORMAT 190
# define ASN1_R_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA 142
/* crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c */
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2014 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
{ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_MSTRING_NOT_UNIVERSAL), "mstring not universal"},
{ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_MSTRING_WRONG_TAG), "mstring wrong tag"},
{ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_NESTED_ASN1_STRING), "nested asn1 string"},
+ {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_NESTED_TOO_DEEP), "nested too deep"},
{ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_NON_HEX_CHARACTERS), "non hex characters"},
{ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_NOT_ASCII_FORMAT), "not ascii format"},
{ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA), "not enough data"},
{
char buf1[DECIMAL_SIZE(address) + 1], buf2[DECIMAL_SIZE(offset) + 1];
- BIO_snprintf(buf1, sizeof buf1, "%lu", (unsigned long)address);
- BIO_snprintf(buf2, sizeof buf2, "%d", offset);
+ BIO_snprintf(buf1, sizeof(buf1), "%lu", (unsigned long)address);
+ BIO_snprintf(buf2, sizeof(buf2), "%d", offset);
ERR_add_error_data(4, "address=", buf1, " offset=", buf2);
}
p = str;
if ((xclass & V_ASN1_PRIVATE) == V_ASN1_PRIVATE)
- BIO_snprintf(str, sizeof str, "priv [ %d ] ", tag);
+ BIO_snprintf(str, sizeof(str), "priv [ %d ] ", tag);
else if ((xclass & V_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC) == V_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC)
- BIO_snprintf(str, sizeof str, "cont [ %d ]", tag);
+ BIO_snprintf(str, sizeof(str), "cont [ %d ]", tag);
else if ((xclass & V_ASN1_APPLICATION) == V_ASN1_APPLICATION)
- BIO_snprintf(str, sizeof str, "appl [ %d ]", tag);
+ BIO_snprintf(str, sizeof(str), "appl [ %d ]", tag);
else if (tag > 30)
- BIO_snprintf(str, sizeof
str, "<ASN1 %d>", tag);
+ BIO_snprintf(str, sizeof
(str), "<ASN1 %d>", tag);
else
p = ASN1_tag2str(tag);
* project.
*/
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2008 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
if (!(hdr = mime_hdr_find(headers, "content-type")) || !hdr->value) {
sk_MIME_HEADER_pop_free(headers, mime_hdr_free);
ASN1err(ASN1_F_SMIME_READ_ASN1, ASN1_R_NO_SIG_CONTENT_TYPE);
+ sk_BIO_pop_free(parts, BIO_vfree);
return NULL;
}
BIO_puts(out, ", ");
else
first = 0;
- OBJ_obj2txt(oidstr, sizeof oidstr,
+ OBJ_obj2txt(oidstr, sizeof(oidstr),
sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(aux->trust, i), 0);
BIO_puts(out, oidstr);
}
BIO_puts(out, ", ");
else
first = 0;
- OBJ_obj2txt(oidstr, sizeof oidstr,
+ OBJ_obj2txt(oidstr, sizeof(oidstr),
sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(aux->reject, i), 0);
BIO_puts(out, oidstr);
}
* 2000.
*/
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2000-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
+/*
+ * Constructed types with a recursive definition (such as can be found in PKCS7)
+ * could eventually exceed the stack given malicious input with excessive
+ * recursion. Therefore we limit the stack depth. This is the maximum number of
+ * recursive invocations of asn1_item_embed_d2i().
+ */
+#define ASN1_MAX_CONSTRUCTED_NEST 30
+
static int asn1_check_eoc(const unsigned char **in, long len);
static int asn1_find_end(const unsigned char **in, long len, char inf);
static int asn1_template_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval,
const unsigned char **in, long len,
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, char opt,
- ASN1_TLC *ctx);
+ ASN1_TLC *ctx, int depth);
static int asn1_template_noexp_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val,
const unsigned char **in, long len,
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, char opt,
- ASN1_TLC *ctx);
+ ASN1_TLC *ctx, int depth);
static int asn1_d2i_ex_primitive(ASN1_VALUE **pval,
const unsigned char **in, long len,
const ASN1_ITEM *it,
{
ASN1_TLC c;
asn1_tlc_clear_nc(&c);
- return asn1_template_ex_d2i(pval, in, len, tt, 0, &c);
+ return asn1_template_ex_d2i(pval, in, len, tt, 0, &c, 0);
}
/*
* Decode an item, taking care of IMPLICIT tagging, if any. If 'opt' set and
* tag mismatch return -1 to handle OPTIONAL
*/
-
-int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
- const ASN1_ITEM *it,
- int tag, int aclass, char opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx)
+static int asn1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in,
+ long len, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int tag, int aclass,
+ char opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx, int depth)
{
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, *errtt = NULL;
const ASN1_COMPAT_FUNCS *cf;
else
asn1_cb = 0;
+ if (++depth > ASN1_MAX_CONSTRUCTED_NEST) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_NESTED_TOO_DEEP);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
switch (it->itype) {
case ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE:
if (it->templates) {
goto err;
}
return asn1_template_ex_d2i(pval, in, len,
- it->templates, opt, ctx);
+ it->templates, opt, ctx, depth);
}
return asn1_d2i_ex_primitive(pval, in, len, it,
tag, aclass, opt, ctx);
/*
* We mark field as OPTIONAL so its absence can be recognised.
*/
- ret = asn1_template_ex_d2i(pchptr, &p, len, tt, 1, ctx);
+ ret = asn1_template_ex_d2i(pchptr, &p, len, tt, 1, ctx, depth);
/* If field not present, try the next one */
if (ret == -1)
continue;
* attempt to read in field, allowing each to be OPTIONAL
*/
- ret = asn1_template_ex_d2i(pseqval, &p, len, seqtt, isopt, ctx);
+ ret = asn1_template_ex_d2i(pseqval, &p, len, seqtt, isopt, ctx,
+ depth);
if (!ret) {
errtt = seqtt;
goto err;
return 0;
}
+int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
+ const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+ int tag, int aclass, char opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx)
+{
+ return asn1_item_ex_d2i(pval, in, len, it, tag, aclass, opt, ctx, 0);
+}
+
/*
* Templates are handled with two separate functions. One handles any
* EXPLICIT tag and the other handles the rest.
static int asn1_template_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val,
const unsigned char **in, long inlen,
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, char opt,
- ASN1_TLC *ctx)
+ ASN1_TLC *ctx, int depth)
{
int flags, aclass;
int ret;
return 0;
}
/* We've found the field so it can't be OPTIONAL now */
- ret = asn1_template_noexp_d2i(val, &p, len, tt, 0, ctx);
+ ret = asn1_template_noexp_d2i(val, &p, len, tt, 0, ctx, depth);
if (!ret) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
return 0;
}
}
} else
- return asn1_template_noexp_d2i(val, in, inlen, tt, opt, ctx);
+ return asn1_template_noexp_d2i(val, in, inlen, tt, opt, ctx, depth);
*in = p;
return 1;
static int asn1_template_noexp_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val,
const unsigned char **in, long len,
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, char opt,
- ASN1_TLC *ctx)
+ ASN1_TLC *ctx, int depth)
{
int flags, aclass;
int ret;
break;
}
skfield = NULL;
- if (!ASN1_item_ex_d2i(&skfield, &p, len,
- ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item), -1, 0, 0, ctx)) {
+ if (!asn1_item_ex_d2i(&skfield, &p, len, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item),
+ -1, 0, 0, ctx, depth)) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I,
ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
goto err;
}
} else if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_IMPTAG) {
/* IMPLICIT tagging */
- ret = ASN1_item_ex_d2i(val, &p, len,
- ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item), tt->tag, aclass, opt,
- ctx);
+ ret = asn1_item_ex_d2i(val, &p, len, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item), tt->tag,
+ aclass, opt, ctx, depth);
if (!ret) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
goto err;
return -1;
} else {
/* Nothing special */
- ret = ASN1_item_ex_d2i(val, &p, len, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item),
- -1, tt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_COMBINE, opt, ctx);
+ ret = asn1_item_ex_d2i(val, &p, len, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item),
+ -1, tt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_COMBINE, opt, ctx,
+ depth);
if (!ret) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
goto err;
ln = OBJ_nid2ln(OBJ_obj2nid(oid));
if (!ln)
ln = "";
- OBJ_obj2txt(objbuf, sizeof objbuf, oid, 1);
+ OBJ_obj2txt(objbuf, sizeof(objbuf), oid, 1);
if (BIO_printf(out, "%s (%s)", ln, objbuf) <= 0)
return 0;
return 1;
len = strlen(cbc_data) + 1;
BF_set_key(&key, 16, cbc_key);
- memset(cbc_in, 0, sizeof cbc_in);
- memset(cbc_out, 0, sizeof cbc_out);
- memcpy(iv, cbc_iv, sizeof iv);
+ memset(cbc_in, 0, sizeof(cbc_in));
+ memset(cbc_out, 0, sizeof(cbc_out));
+ memcpy(iv, cbc_iv, sizeof(iv));
BF_cbc_encrypt((unsigned char *)cbc_data, cbc_out, len,
&key, iv, BF_ENCRYPT);
if (memcmp(cbc_out, cbc_ok, 32) != 0) {
#include "cryptlib.h"
#include "bio_lcl.h"
-#define TRUNCATE
#define DUMP_WIDTH 16
#define DUMP_WIDTH_LESS_INDENT(i) (DUMP_WIDTH-((i-(i>6?6:i)+3)/4))
{
int ret = 0;
char buf[288 + 1], tmp[20], str[128 + 1];
- int i, j, rows, trc;
+ int i, j, rows;
unsigned char ch;
int dump_width;
- trc = 0;
-
-#ifdef TRUNCATE
- for (; (len > 0) && ((s[len - 1] == ' ') || (s[len - 1] == '\0')); len--)
- trc++;
-#endif
-
if (indent < 0)
indent = 0;
if (indent) {
if ((rows * dump_width) < len)
rows++;
for (i = 0; i < rows; i++) {
- BUF_strlcpy(buf, str, sizeof buf);
- BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%04x - ", i * dump_width);
- BUF_strlcat(buf, tmp, sizeof buf);
+ BUF_strlcpy(buf, str, sizeof(buf));
+ BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), "%04x - ", i * dump_width);
+ BUF_strlcat(buf, tmp, sizeof(buf));
for (j = 0; j < dump_width; j++) {
if (((i * dump_width) + j) >= len) {
- BUF_strlcat(buf, " ", sizeof buf);
+ BUF_strlcat(buf, " ", sizeof(buf));
} else {
ch = ((unsigned char)*(s + i * dump_width + j)) & 0xff;
- BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%02x%c", ch,
+ BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), "%02x%c", ch,
j == 7 ? '-' : ' ');
- BUF_strlcat(buf, tmp, sizeof buf);
+ BUF_strlcat(buf, tmp, sizeof(buf));
}
}
- BUF_strlcat(buf, " ", sizeof buf);
+ BUF_strlcat(buf, " ", sizeof(buf));
for (j = 0; j < dump_width; j++) {
if (((i * dump_width) + j) >= len)
break;
ch = ((unsigned char)*(s + i * dump_width + j)) & 0xff;
#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC
- BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%c",
+ BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), "%c",
((ch >= ' ') && (ch <= '~')) ? ch : '.');
#else
- BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%c",
+ BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), "%c",
((ch >= os_toascii[' ']) && (ch <= os_toascii['~']))
? os_toebcdic[ch]
: '.');
#endif
- BUF_strlcat(buf, tmp, sizeof buf);
+ BUF_strlcat(buf, tmp, sizeof(buf));
}
- BUF_strlcat(buf, "\n", sizeof buf);
+ BUF_strlcat(buf, "\n", sizeof(buf));
/*
* if this is the last call then update the ddt_dump thing so that we
* will move the selection point in the debug window
*/
ret += cb((void *)buf, strlen(buf), u);
}
-#ifdef TRUNCATE
- if (trc > 0) {
- BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s%04x - <SPACES/NULS>\n", str,
- len + trc);
- ret += cb((void *)buf, strlen(buf), u);
- }
-#endif
- return (ret);
+ return ret;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API
iconvert[iplace++] = "0123456789"[intpart % 10];
intpart = (intpart / 10);
} while (intpart && (iplace < (int)sizeof(iconvert)));
- if (iplace == sizeof iconvert)
+ if (iplace == sizeof(iconvert))
iplace--;
iconvert[iplace] = 0;
fconvert[fplace++] = "0123456789"[fracpart % 10];
fracpart = (fracpart / 10);
} while (fplace < max);
- if (fplace == sizeof fconvert)
+ if (fplace == sizeof(fconvert))
fplace--;
fconvert[fplace] = 0;
if (BIO_CB_RETURN & cmd)
r = ret;
- len = BIO_snprintf(buf,sizeof buf,"BIO[%p]: ",(void *)bio);
+ len = BIO_snprintf(buf,sizeof(buf),"BIO[%p]: ",(void *)bio);
/* Ignore errors and continue printing the other information. */
if (len < 0)
{
struct bio_bio_st *b;
- b = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *b);
+ b = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*b));
if (b == NULL)
return 0;
char buf[16];
unsigned char *p = ptr;
- BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%d.%d.%d.%d",
+ BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d.%d.%d.%d",
p[0], p[1], p[2], p[3]);
if (data->param_hostname != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(data->param_hostname);
} else if (num == 3) {
char buf[DECIMAL_SIZE(int) + 1];
- BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%d", *(int *)ptr);
+ BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d", *(int *)ptr);
if (data->param_port != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(data->param_port);
data->param_port = BUF_strdup(buf);
b->shutdown = (int)num & BIO_CLOSE;
if (num & BIO_FP_APPEND) {
if (num & BIO_FP_READ)
- BUF_strlcpy(p, "a+", sizeof p);
+ BUF_strlcpy(p, "a+", sizeof(p));
else
- BUF_strlcpy(p, "a", sizeof p);
+ BUF_strlcpy(p, "a", sizeof(p));
} else if ((num & BIO_FP_READ) && (num & BIO_FP_WRITE))
- BUF_strlcpy(p, "r+", sizeof p);
+ BUF_strlcpy(p, "r+", sizeof(p));
else if (num & BIO_FP_WRITE)
- BUF_strlcpy(p, "w", sizeof p);
+ BUF_strlcpy(p, "w", sizeof(p));
else if (num & BIO_FP_READ)
- BUF_strlcpy(p, "r", sizeof p);
+ BUF_strlcpy(p, "r", sizeof(p));
else {
BIOerr(BIO_F_FILE_CTRL, BIO_R_BAD_FOPEN_MODE);
ret = 0;
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
top = m->top;
- bits = BN_num_bits(p);
+ /*
+ * Use all bits stored in |p|, rather than |BN_num_bits|, so we do not leak
+ * whether the top bits are zero.
+ */
+ bits = p->top * BN_BITS2;
if (bits == 0) {
/* x**0 mod 1 is still zero. */
if (BN_is_one(m)) {
int BN_num_bits_word(BN_ULONG l)
{
- static const unsigned char bits[256] = {
- 0, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4,
- 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5,
- 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6,
- 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6,
- 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7,
- 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7,
- 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7,
- 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7,
- 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8,
- 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8,
- 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8,
- 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8,
- 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8,
- 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8,
- 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8,
- 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8,
- };
-
-#if defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG)
- if (l & 0xffffffff00000000L) {
- if (l & 0xffff000000000000L) {
- if (l & 0xff00000000000000L) {
- return (bits[(int)(l >> 56)] + 56);
- } else
- return (bits[(int)(l >> 48)] + 48);
- } else {
- if (l & 0x0000ff0000000000L) {
- return (bits[(int)(l >> 40)] + 40);
- } else
- return (bits[(int)(l >> 32)] + 32);
- }
- } else
-#else
-# ifdef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT
- if (l & 0xffffffff00000000LL) {
- if (l & 0xffff000000000000LL) {
- if (l & 0xff00000000000000LL) {
- return (bits[(int)(l >> 56)] + 56);
- } else
- return (bits[(int)(l >> 48)] + 48);
- } else {
- if (l & 0x0000ff0000000000LL) {
- return (bits[(int)(l >> 40)] + 40);
- } else
- return (bits[(int)(l >> 32)] + 32);
- }
- } else
-# endif
-#endif
- {
-#if defined(THIRTY_TWO_BIT) || defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT) || defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG)
- if (l & 0xffff0000L) {
- if (l & 0xff000000L)
- return (bits[(int)(l >> 24L)] + 24);
- else
- return (bits[(int)(l >> 16L)] + 16);
- } else
-#endif
- {
-#if defined(THIRTY_TWO_BIT) || defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT) || defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG)
- if (l & 0xff00L)
- return (bits[(int)(l >> 8)] + 8);
- else
+ BN_ULONG x, mask;
+ int bits = (l != 0);
+
+#if BN_BITS2 > 32
+ x = l >> 32;
+ mask = (0 - x) & BN_MASK2;
+ mask = (0 - (mask >> (BN_BITS2 - 1)));
+ bits += 32 & mask;
+ l ^= (x ^ l) & mask;
#endif
- return (bits[(int)(l)]);
- }
- }
+
+ x = l >> 16;
+ mask = (0 - x) & BN_MASK2;
+ mask = (0 - (mask >> (BN_BITS2 - 1)));
+ bits += 16 & mask;
+ l ^= (x ^ l) & mask;
+
+ x = l >> 8;
+ mask = (0 - x) & BN_MASK2;
+ mask = (0 - (mask >> (BN_BITS2 - 1)));
+ bits += 8 & mask;
+ l ^= (x ^ l) & mask;
+
+ x = l >> 4;
+ mask = (0 - x) & BN_MASK2;
+ mask = (0 - (mask >> (BN_BITS2 - 1)));
+ bits += 4 & mask;
+ l ^= (x ^ l) & mask;
+
+ x = l >> 2;
+ mask = (0 - x) & BN_MASK2;
+ mask = (0 - (mask >> (BN_BITS2 - 1)));
+ bits += 2 & mask;
+ l ^= (x ^ l) & mask;
+
+ x = l >> 1;
+ mask = (0 - x) & BN_MASK2;
+ mask = (0 - (mask >> (BN_BITS2 - 1)));
+ bits += 1 & mask;
+
+ return bits;
}
int BN_num_bits(const BIGNUM *a)
memcpy(a->d, b->d, sizeof(b->d[0]) * b->top);
#endif
- if (BN_get_flags(b, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0)
- BN_set_flags(a, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-
a->top = b->top;
a->neg = b->neg;
bn_check_top(a);
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
r->top = max;
n0 = mont->n0[0];
-# ifdef BN_COUNT
- fprintf(stderr, "word BN_from_montgomery_word %d * %d\n", nl, nl);
-# endif
+ /*
+ * Add multiples of |n| to |r| until R = 2^(nl * BN_BITS2) divides it. On
+ * input, we had |r| < |n| * R, so now |r| < 2 * |n| * R. Note that |r|
+ * includes |carry| which is stored separately.
+ */
for (carry = 0, i = 0; i < nl; i++, rp++) {
-# ifdef __TANDEM
- {
- long long t1;
- long long t2;
- long long t3;
- t1 = rp[0] * (n0 & 0177777);
- t2 = 037777600000l;
- t2 = n0 & t2;
- t3 = rp[0] & 0177777;
- t2 = (t3 * t2) & BN_MASK2;
- t1 = t1 + t2;
- v = bn_mul_add_words(rp, np, nl, (BN_ULONG)t1);
- }
-# else
v = bn_mul_add_words(rp, np, nl, (rp[0] * n0) & BN_MASK2);
-# endif
v = (v + carry + rp[nl]) & BN_MASK2;
carry |= (v != rp[nl]);
carry &= (v <= rp[nl]);
ret->neg = r->neg;
rp = ret->d;
- ap = &(r->d[nl]);
-# define BRANCH_FREE 1
-# if BRANCH_FREE
- {
- BN_ULONG *nrp;
- size_t m;
+ /*
+ * Shift |nl| words to divide by R. We have |ap| < 2 * |n|. Note that |ap|
+ * includes |carry| which is stored separately.
+ */
+ ap = &(r->d[nl]);
- v = bn_sub_words(rp, ap, np, nl) - carry;
- /*
- * if subtraction result is real, then trick unconditional memcpy
- * below to perform in-place "refresh" instead of actual copy.
- */
- m = (0 - (size_t)v);
- nrp =
- (BN_ULONG *)(((PTR_SIZE_INT) rp & ~m) | ((PTR_SIZE_INT) ap & m));
-
- for (i = 0, nl -= 4; i < nl; i += 4) {
- BN_ULONG t1, t2, t3, t4;
-
- t1 = nrp[i + 0];
- t2 = nrp[i + 1];
- t3 = nrp[i + 2];
- ap[i + 0] = 0;
- t4 = nrp[i + 3];
- ap[i + 1] = 0;
- rp[i + 0] = t1;
- ap[i + 2] = 0;
- rp[i + 1] = t2;
- ap[i + 3] = 0;
- rp[i + 2] = t3;
- rp[i + 3] = t4;
- }
- for (nl += 4; i < nl; i++)
- rp[i] = nrp[i], ap[i] = 0;
+ /*
+ * |v| is one if |ap| - |np| underflowed or zero if it did not. Note |v|
+ * cannot be -1. That would imply the subtraction did not fit in |nl| words,
+ * and we know at most one subtraction is needed.
+ */
+ v = bn_sub_words(rp, ap, np, nl) - carry;
+ v = 0 - v;
+ for (i = 0; i < nl; i++) {
+ rp[i] = (v & ap[i]) | (~v & rp[i]);
+ ap[i] = 0;
}
-# else
- if (bn_sub_words(rp, ap, np, nl) - carry)
- memcpy(rp, ap, nl * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
-# endif
bn_correct_top(r);
bn_correct_top(ret);
bn_check_top(ret);
R = &(mont->RR); /* grab RR as a temp */
if (!BN_copy(&(mont->N), mod))
goto err; /* Set N */
+ if (BN_get_flags(mod, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0)
+ BN_set_flags(&(mont->N), BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
mont->N.neg = 0;
#ifdef MONT_WORD
if (!init) {
init++;
#ifdef BN_LLONG
- BIO_snprintf(data, sizeof data, "bn(%d,%d)",
+ BIO_snprintf(data, sizeof(data), "bn(%d,%d)",
(int)sizeof(BN_ULLONG) * 8, (int)sizeof(BN_ULONG) * 8);
#else
- BIO_snprintf(data, sizeof data, "bn(%d,%d)",
+ BIO_snprintf(data, sizeof(data), "bn(%d,%d)",
(int)sizeof(BN_ULONG) * 8, (int)sizeof(BN_ULONG) * 8);
#endif
}
results = 0;
- RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof rnd_seed); /* or BN_generate_prime may fail */
+ RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof(rnd_seed)); /* or BN_generate_prime may fail */
argc--;
argv++;
* static int sizes[NUM_SIZES]={59,179,299,419,539};
*/
-#define RAND_SEED(string) { const char str[] = string; RAND_seed(string, sizeof str); }
+#define RAND_SEED(string) { const char str[] = string; RAND_seed(string, sizeof(str)); }
void do_mul_exp(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, BIGNUM *c, BN_CTX *ctx);
unsigned char c;
BIGNUM *r_mont, *r_mont_const, *r_recp, *r_simple, *a, *b, *m;
- RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof rnd_seed); /* or BN_rand may fail, and we
- * don't even check its return
- * value (which we should) */
+ /*
+ * Seed or BN_rand may fail, and we don't even check its return
+ * value (which we should)
+ */
+ RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof(rnd_seed));
ERR_load_BN_strings();
OPENSSL_free(section);
if (line != NULL)
*line = eline;
- BIO_snprintf(btmp, sizeof btmp, "%ld", eline);
+ BIO_snprintf(btmp, sizeof(btmp), "%ld", eline);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "line ", btmp);
if ((h != conf->data) && (conf->data != NULL)) {
CONF_free(conf->data);
if (!(flags & CONF_MFLAGS_SILENT)) {
char rcode[DECIMAL_SIZE(ret) + 1];
CONFerr(CONF_F_MODULE_RUN, CONF_R_MODULE_INITIALIZATION_ERROR);
- BIO_snprintf(rcode, sizeof rcode, "%-8d", ret);
+ BIO_snprintf(rcode, sizeof(rcode), "%-8d", ret);
ERR_add_error_data(6, "module=", name, ", value=", value,
", retcode=", rcode);
}
i = strlen((char *)cbc_data) + 1;
/* i=((i+7)/8)*8; */
memcpy(iv3, cbc_iv, sizeof(cbc_iv));
- memset(iv2, '\0', sizeof iv2);
+ memset(iv2, '\0', sizeof(iv2));
DES_ede3_cbcm_encrypt(cbc_data, cbc_out, 16L, &ks, &ks2, &ks3, &iv3, &iv2,
DES_ENCRYPT);
}
*/
memcpy(iv3, cbc_iv, sizeof(cbc_iv));
- memset(iv2, '\0', sizeof iv2);
+ memset(iv2, '\0', sizeof(iv2));
DES_ede3_cbcm_encrypt(cbc_out, cbc_in, i, &ks, &ks2, &ks3, &iv3, &iv2,
DES_DECRYPT);
if (memcmp(cbc_in, cbc_data, strlen((char *)cbc_data) + 1) != 0) {
size = "int";
else
size = "long";
- BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "des(%s,%s,%s,%s)", ptr, risc, unroll,
+ BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "des(%s,%s,%s,%s)", ptr, risc, unroll,
size);
init = 0;
}
e_salt[sizeof(e_salt) - 1] = e_buf[sizeof(e_buf) - 1] = '\0';
/* Convert the e_salt to ASCII, as that's what DES_fcrypt works on */
- ebcdic2ascii(e_salt, e_salt, sizeof e_salt);
+ ebcdic2ascii(e_salt, e_salt, sizeof(e_salt));
/* Convert the cleartext password to ASCII */
- ebcdic2ascii(e_buf, e_buf, sizeof e_buf);
+ ebcdic2ascii(e_buf, e_buf, sizeof(e_buf));
/* Encrypt it (from/to ASCII) */
ret = DES_fcrypt(e_buf, e_salt, buff);
# ifdef SIGACTION
struct sigaction sa;
- memset(&sa, 0, sizeof sa);
+ memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
sa.sa_handler = recsig;
# endif
register int i;
#ifdef OPENBSD_DEV_CRYPTO
- memcpy(schedule->key, key, sizeof schedule->key);
+ memcpy(schedule->key, key, sizeof(schedule->key));
schedule->session = NULL;
#endif
k = &schedule->ks->deslong[0];
CRYPTO_malloc_init();
# endif
- RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof rnd_seed);
+ RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof(rnd_seed));
out = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
if (out == NULL)
CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON);
ERR_load_crypto_strings();
- RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof rnd_seed);
+ RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof(rnd_seed));
BIO_printf(bio_err, "test generation of DSA parameters\n");
return NULL;
}
- ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *ret);
+ ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ret));
if (ret == NULL) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
OPENSSL_free(group->seed);
}
- OPENSSL_cleanse(group, sizeof *group);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(group, sizeof(*group));
OPENSSL_free(group);
}
/* no explicit entry needed */
return 1;
- d = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *d);
+ d = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*d));
if (d == NULL)
return 0;
return NULL;
}
- ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *ret);
+ ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ret));
if (ret == NULL) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
point->meth->point_clear_finish(point);
else if (point->meth->point_finish != 0)
point->meth->point_finish(point);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(point, sizeof *point);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(point, sizeof(*point));
OPENSSL_free(point);
}
for (p = pre->points; *p != NULL; p++) {
EC_POINT_clear_free(*p);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(p, sizeof *p);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(p, sizeof(*p));
}
OPENSSL_free(pre->points);
}
- OPENSSL_cleanse(pre, sizeof *pre);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(pre, sizeof(*pre));
OPENSSL_free(pre);
}
totalnum = num + numblocks;
- wsize = OPENSSL_malloc(totalnum * sizeof wsize[0]);
- wNAF_len = OPENSSL_malloc(totalnum * sizeof wNAF_len[0]);
- wNAF = OPENSSL_malloc((totalnum + 1) * sizeof wNAF[0]); /* includes space
- * for pivot */
- val_sub = OPENSSL_malloc(totalnum * sizeof val_sub[0]);
+ wsize = OPENSSL_malloc(totalnum * sizeof(wsize[0]));
+ wNAF_len = OPENSSL_malloc(totalnum * sizeof(wNAF_len[0]));
+ /* include space for pivot */
+ wNAF = OPENSSL_malloc((totalnum + 1) * sizeof(wNAF[0]));
+ val_sub = OPENSSL_malloc(totalnum * sizeof(val_sub[0]));
/* Ensure wNAF is initialised in case we end up going to err */
if (wNAF)
* 'val_sub[i]' is a pointer to the subarray for the i-th point, or to a
* subarray of 'pre_comp->points' if we already have precomputation.
*/
- val = OPENSSL_malloc((num_val + 1) * sizeof val[0]);
+ val = OPENSSL_malloc((num_val + 1) * sizeof(val[0]));
if (val == NULL) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
typedef uint8_t u8;
typedef uint64_t u64;
-typedef int64_t s64;
/******************************************************************************/
/*-
unsigned num_bytes;
/* BN_bn2bin eats leading zeroes */
- memset(b_out, 0, sizeof b_out);
+ memset(b_out, 0, sizeof(b_out));
num_bytes = BN_num_bytes(bn);
- if (num_bytes > sizeof b_out) {
+ if (num_bytes > sizeof(b_out)) {
ECerr(EC_F_BN_TO_FELEM, EC_R_BIGNUM_OUT_OF_RANGE);
return 0;
}
{
felem_bytearray b_in, b_out;
felem_to_bin28(b_in, in);
- flip_endian(b_out, b_in, sizeof b_out);
- return BN_bin2bn(b_out, sizeof b_out, out);
+ flip_endian(b_out, b_in, sizeof(b_out));
+ return BN_bin2bn(b_out, sizeof(b_out), out);
}
/******************************************************************************/
static NISTP224_PRE_COMP *nistp224_pre_comp_new()
{
NISTP224_PRE_COMP *ret = NULL;
- ret = (NISTP224_PRE_COMP *) OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *ret);
+ ret = (NISTP224_PRE_COMP *) OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ret));
if (!ret) {
ECerr(EC_F_NISTP224_PRE_COMP_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return ret;
if (i > 0)
return;
- OPENSSL_cleanse(pre, sizeof *pre);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(pre, sizeof(*pre));
OPENSSL_free(pre);
}
/* the scalar for the generator */
if ((scalar != NULL) && (have_pre_comp)) {
- memset(g_secret, 0, sizeof g_secret);
+ memset(g_secret, 0, sizeof(g_secret));
/* reduce scalar to 0 <= scalar < 2^224 */
if ((BN_num_bits(scalar) > 224) || (BN_is_negative(scalar))) {
/*
typedef uint8_t u8;
typedef uint32_t u32;
typedef uint64_t u64;
-typedef int64_t s64;
/*
* The underlying field. P256 operates over GF(2^256-2^224+2^192+2^96-1). We
unsigned num_bytes;
/* BN_bn2bin eats leading zeroes */
- memset(b_out, 0, sizeof b_out);
+ memset(b_out, 0, sizeof(b_out));
num_bytes = BN_num_bytes(bn);
- if (num_bytes > sizeof b_out) {
+ if (num_bytes > sizeof(b_out)) {
ECerr(EC_F_BN_TO_FELEM, EC_R_BIGNUM_OUT_OF_RANGE);
return 0;
}
{
felem_bytearray b_in, b_out;
smallfelem_to_bin32(b_in, in);
- flip_endian(b_out, b_in, sizeof b_out);
- return BN_bin2bn(b_out, sizeof b_out, out);
+ flip_endian(b_out, b_in, sizeof(b_out));
+ return BN_bin2bn(b_out, sizeof(b_out), out);
}
/*-
{
felem tmp;
u64 a, b, mask;
- s64 high, low;
+ u64 high, low;
static const u64 kPrime3Test = 0x7fffffff00000001ul; /* 2^63 - 2^32 + 1 */
/* Carry 2->3 */
* In order to make space in tmp[3] for the carry from 2 -> 3, we
* conditionally subtract kPrime if tmp[3] is large enough.
*/
- high = tmp[3] >> 64;
+ high = (u64)(tmp[3] >> 64);
/* As tmp[3] < 2^65, high is either 1 or 0 */
- high <<= 63;
- high >>= 63;
+ high = 0 - high;
/*-
* high is:
* all ones if the high word of tmp[3] is 1
- * all zeros if the high word of tmp[3] if 0 */
- low = tmp[3];
- mask = low >> 63;
+ * all zeros if the high word of tmp[3] if 0
+ */
+ low = (u64)tmp[3];
+ mask = 0 - (low >> 63);
/*-
* mask is:
* all ones if the MSB of low is 1
- * all zeros if the MSB of low if 0 */
+ * all zeros if the MSB of low if 0
+ */
low &= bottom63bits;
low -= kPrime3Test;
/* if low was greater than kPrime3Test then the MSB is zero */
low = ~low;
- low >>= 63;
+ low = 0 - (low >> 63);
/*-
* low is:
* all ones if low was > kPrime3Test
- * all zeros if low was <= kPrime3Test */
+ * all zeros if low was <= kPrime3Test
+ */
mask = (mask & low) | high;
tmp[0] -= mask & kPrime[0];
tmp[1] -= mask & kPrime[1];
equal &= equal << 4;
equal &= equal << 2;
equal &= equal << 1;
- equal = ((s64) equal) >> 63;
+ equal = 0 - (equal >> 63);
all_equal_so_far &= equal;
}
is_zero &= is_zero << 4;
is_zero &= is_zero << 2;
is_zero &= is_zero << 1;
- is_zero = ((s64) is_zero) >> 63;
+ is_zero = 0 - (is_zero >> 63);
is_p = (small[0] ^ kPrime[0]) |
(small[1] ^ kPrime[1]) |
is_p &= is_p << 4;
is_p &= is_p << 2;
is_p &= is_p << 1;
- is_p = ((s64) is_p) >> 63;
+ is_p = 0 - (is_p >> 63);
is_zero |= is_p;
static NISTP256_PRE_COMP *nistp256_pre_comp_new()
{
NISTP256_PRE_COMP *ret = NULL;
- ret = (NISTP256_PRE_COMP *) OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *ret);
+ ret = (NISTP256_PRE_COMP *) OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ret));
if (!ret) {
ECerr(EC_F_NISTP256_PRE_COMP_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return ret;
if (i > 0)
return;
- OPENSSL_cleanse(pre, sizeof *pre);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(pre, sizeof(*pre));
OPENSSL_free(pre);
}
typedef uint8_t u8;
typedef uint64_t u64;
-typedef int64_t s64;
/*
* The underlying field. P521 operates over GF(2^521-1). We can serialise an
unsigned num_bytes;
/* BN_bn2bin eats leading zeroes */
- memset(b_out, 0, sizeof b_out);
+ memset(b_out, 0, sizeof(b_out));
num_bytes = BN_num_bytes(bn);
- if (num_bytes > sizeof b_out) {
+ if (num_bytes > sizeof(b_out)) {
ECerr(EC_F_BN_TO_FELEM, EC_R_BIGNUM_OUT_OF_RANGE);
return 0;
}
{
felem_bytearray b_in, b_out;
felem_to_bin66(b_in, in);
- flip_endian(b_out, b_in, sizeof b_out);
- return BN_bin2bn(b_out, sizeof b_out, out);
+ flip_endian(b_out, b_in, sizeof(b_out));
+ return BN_bin2bn(b_out, sizeof(b_out), out);
}
/*-
* We know that ftmp[i] < 2^63, therefore the only way that the top bit
* can be set is if is_zero was 0 before the decrement.
*/
- is_zero = ((s64) is_zero) >> 63;
+ is_zero = 0 - (is_zero >> 63);
is_p = ftmp[0] ^ kPrime[0];
is_p |= ftmp[1] ^ kPrime[1];
is_p |= ftmp[8] ^ kPrime[8];
is_p--;
- is_p = ((s64) is_p) >> 63;
+ is_p = 0 - (is_p >> 63);
is_zero |= is_p;
return is_zero;
is_p &= is_p << 4;
is_p &= is_p << 2;
is_p &= is_p << 1;
- is_p = ((s64) is_p) >> 63;
+ is_p = 0 - (is_p >> 63);
is_p = ~is_p;
/* is_p is 0 iff |out| == 2^521-1 and all ones otherwise */
is_greater |= is_greater << 4;
is_greater |= is_greater << 2;
is_greater |= is_greater << 1;
- is_greater = ((s64) is_greater) >> 63;
+ is_greater = 0 - (is_greater >> 63);
out[0] -= kPrime[0] & is_greater;
out[1] -= kPrime[1] & is_greater;
32 * sizeof(unsigned char) * (1 << pre->w) * 2 * 37);
OPENSSL_free(pre->precomp_storage);
}
- OPENSSL_cleanse(pre, sizeof *pre);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(pre, sizeof(*pre));
OPENSSL_free(pre);
}
if (tmp == NULL || tmp_Z == NULL)
goto err;
- prod_Z = OPENSSL_malloc(num * sizeof prod_Z[0]);
+ prod_Z = OPENSSL_malloc(num * sizeof(prod_Z[0]));
if (prod_Z == NULL)
goto err;
for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
len =
EC_POINT_point2oct(group, Q, POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED, buf,
- sizeof buf, ctx);
+ sizeof(buf), ctx);
if (len == 0)
ABORT;
if (!EC_POINT_oct2point(group, P, buf, len, ctx))
len =
EC_POINT_point2oct(group, Q, POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, buf,
- sizeof buf, ctx);
+ sizeof(buf), ctx);
if (len == 0)
ABORT;
if (!EC_POINT_oct2point(group, P, buf, len, ctx))
fprintf(stdout, "%02X", buf[i]);
len =
- EC_POINT_point2oct(group, Q, POINT_CONVERSION_HYBRID, buf, sizeof buf,
+ EC_POINT_point2oct(group, Q, POINT_CONVERSION_HYBRID, buf, sizeof(buf),
ctx);
if (len == 0)
ABORT;
# ifdef OPENSSL_EC_BIN_PT_COMP
len =
EC_POINT_point2oct(group, Q, POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED, buf,
- sizeof buf, ctx);
+ sizeof(buf), ctx);
if (len == 0)
ABORT;
if (!EC_POINT_oct2point(group, P, buf, len, ctx))
len =
EC_POINT_point2oct(group, Q, POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, buf,
- sizeof buf, ctx);
+ sizeof(buf), ctx);
if (len == 0)
ABORT;
if (!EC_POINT_oct2point(group, P, buf, len, ctx))
/* Change test based on whether binary point compression is enabled or not. */
# ifdef OPENSSL_EC_BIN_PT_COMP
len =
- EC_POINT_point2oct(group, Q, POINT_CONVERSION_HYBRID, buf, sizeof buf,
+ EC_POINT_point2oct(group, Q, POINT_CONVERSION_HYBRID, buf, sizeof(buf),
ctx);
if (len == 0)
ABORT;
CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON);
ERR_load_crypto_strings();
- RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof rnd_seed); /* or BN_generate_prime may fail */
+ RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof(rnd_seed)); /* or BN_generate_prime may fail */
prime_field_tests();
puts("");
CRYPTO_malloc_init();
# endif
- RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof rnd_seed);
+ RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof(rnd_seed));
out = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
if (out == NULL)
return (-1);
for (i = 0; i < bytes; i++)
- pd[i] = crp->crp_p[bytes - i - 1];
+ pd[i] = ((char *)crp->crp_p)[bytes - i - 1];
BN_bin2bn(pd, bytes, a);
free(pd);
return (ret);
}
- memset(&kop, 0, sizeof kop);
+ memset(&kop, 0, sizeof(kop));
kop.crk_op = CRK_MOD_EXP;
/* inputs: a^p % m */
return (0);
}
- memset(&kop, 0, sizeof kop);
+ memset(&kop, 0, sizeof(kop));
kop.crk_op = CRK_MOD_EXP_CRT;
/* inputs: rsa->p rsa->q I rsa->dmp1 rsa->dmq1 rsa->iqmp */
if (bn2crparam(rsa->p, &kop.crk_param[0]))
goto err;
}
- memset(&kop, 0, sizeof kop);
+ memset(&kop, 0, sizeof(kop));
kop.crk_op = CRK_DSA_SIGN;
/* inputs: dgst dsa->p dsa->q dsa->g dsa->priv_key */
struct crypt_kop kop;
int dsaret = 1;
- memset(&kop, 0, sizeof kop);
+ memset(&kop, 0, sizeof(kop));
kop.crk_op = CRK_DSA_VERIFY;
/* inputs: dgst dsa->p dsa->q dsa->g dsa->pub_key sig->r sig->s */
keylen = BN_num_bits(dh->p);
- memset(&kop, 0, sizeof kop);
+ memset(&kop, 0, sizeof(kop));
kop.crk_op = CRK_DH_COMPUTE_KEY;
/* inputs: dh->priv_key pub_key dh->p key */
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
}
fnd->funct = NULL;
(void)lh_ENGINE_PILE_insert(&(*table)->piles, fnd);
+ if (lh_ENGINE_PILE_retrieve(&(*table)->piles, &tmplate) != fnd) {
+ sk_ENGINE_free(fnd->sk);
+ OPENSSL_free(fnd);
+ goto end;
+ }
}
/* A registration shouldn't add duplciate entries */
(void)sk_ENGINE_delete_ptr(fnd->sk, e);
char (*dest)[LEN_SYS_STR_REASON] = &(strerror_tab[i - 1]);
char *src = strerror(i);
if (src != NULL) {
- strncpy(*dest, src, sizeof *dest);
- (*dest)[sizeof *dest - 1] = '\0';
+ strncpy(*dest, src, sizeof(*dest));
+ (*dest)[sizeof(*dest) - 1] = '\0';
str->string = *dest;
}
}
CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur);
es = CRYPTO_THREADID_hash(&cur);
while ((l = ERR_get_error_line_data(&file, &line, &data, &flags)) != 0) {
- ERR_error_string_n(l, buf, sizeof buf);
+ ERR_error_string_n(l, buf, sizeof(buf));
BIO_snprintf(buf2, sizeof(buf2), "%lu:%s:%s:%d:%s\n", es, buf,
file, line, (flags & ERR_TXT_STRING) ? data : "");
if (cb(buf2, strlen(buf2), u) <= 0)
(unsigned char *)ctx->tmp, i);
ctx->tmp_len = 0;
}
+ /*
+ * If eof or an error was signalled, then the condition
+ * 'ctx->cont <= 0' will prevent b64_read() from reading
+ * more data on subsequent calls. This assignment was
+ * deleted accidentally in commit 5562cfaca4f3.
+ */
+ ctx->cont = i;
+
ctx->buf_off = 0;
if (i < 0) {
ret_code = 0;
void EVP_MD_CTX_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
{
- memset(ctx, '\0', sizeof *ctx);
+ memset(ctx, '\0', sizeof(*ctx));
}
EVP_MD_CTX *EVP_MD_CTX_create(void)
{
- EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *ctx);
+ EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ctx));
if (ctx)
EVP_MD_CTX_init(ctx);
} else
tmp_buf = NULL;
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(out);
- memcpy(out, in, sizeof *out);
+ memcpy(out, in, sizeof(*out));
if (in->md_data && out->digest->ctx_size) {
if (tmp_buf)
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
FIPS_md_ctx_cleanup(ctx);
#endif
- memset(ctx, '\0', sizeof *ctx);
+ memset(ctx, '\0', sizeof(*ctx));
return 1;
}
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2011 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
CRYPTO_cfb128_1_encrypt(in, out, MAXBITCHUNK * 8, &dat->ks,
ctx->iv, &ctx->num, ctx->encrypt, dat->block);
len -= MAXBITCHUNK;
+ out += MAXBITCHUNK;
+ in += MAXBITCHUNK;
}
if (len)
CRYPTO_cfb128_1_encrypt(in, out, len * 8, &dat->ks,
/* crypto/evp/e_camellia.c */
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2006-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
CRYPTO_cfb128_1_encrypt(in, out, MAXBITCHUNK * 8, &dat->ks,
ctx->iv, &ctx->num, ctx->encrypt, dat->block);
len -= MAXBITCHUNK;
+ out += MAXBITCHUNK;
+ in += MAXBITCHUNK;
}
if (len)
CRYPTO_cfb128_1_encrypt(in, out, len * 8, &dat->ks,
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(void)
{
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *ctx);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ctx));
if (ctx)
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(ctx);
return ctx;
}
b = ctx->cipher->block_size;
- OPENSSL_assert(b <= sizeof ctx->buf);
+ OPENSSL_assert(b <= sizeof(ctx->buf));
if (b == 1) {
*outl = 0;
return 1;
return EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, out, outl, in, inl);
b = ctx->cipher->block_size;
- OPENSSL_assert(b <= sizeof ctx->final);
+ OPENSSL_assert(b <= sizeof(ctx->final));
if (ctx->final_used) {
memcpy(out, ctx->final, b);
EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL_EX, EVP_R_WRONG_FINAL_BLOCK_LENGTH);
return (0);
}
- OPENSSL_assert(b <= sizeof ctx->final);
+ OPENSSL_assert(b <= sizeof(ctx->final));
/*
* The following assumes that the ciphertext has been authenticated.
#endif
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(out);
- memcpy(out, in, sizeof *out);
+ memcpy(out, in, sizeof(*out));
if (in->cipher_data && in->cipher->ctx_size) {
out->cipher_data = OPENSSL_malloc(in->cipher->ctx_size);
* 2000.
*/
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
if (inl<chunk) chunk=inl;\
while(inl && inl>=chunk)\
{\
- cprefix##_cfb##cbits##_encrypt(in, out, (long)((cbits==1) && !(ctx->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_LENGTH_BITS) ?inl*8:inl), &((kstruct *)ctx->cipher_data)->ksched, ctx->iv, &ctx->num, ctx->encrypt);\
+ cprefix##_cfb##cbits##_encrypt(in, out, (long)((cbits==1) && !(ctx->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_LENGTH_BITS) ?chunk*8:chunk), &((kstruct *)ctx->cipher_data)->ksched, ctx->iv, &ctx->num, ctx->encrypt);\
inl-=chunk;\
in +=chunk;\
out+=chunk;\
char obj_tmp[80];
EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PBE_CIPHERINIT, EVP_R_UNKNOWN_PBE_ALGORITHM);
if (!pbe_obj)
- BUF_strlcpy(obj_tmp, "NULL", sizeof obj_tmp);
+ BUF_strlcpy(obj_tmp, "NULL", sizeof(obj_tmp));
else
- i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(obj_tmp, sizeof obj_tmp, pbe_obj);
+ i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(obj_tmp, sizeof(obj_tmp), pbe_obj);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "TYPE=", obj_tmp);
return 0;
}
int an = 0;
int tn = 0;
- if (!fgets((char *)line, sizeof line, f))
+ if (!fgets((char *)line, sizeof(line), f))
break;
if (line[0] == '#' || line[0] == '\n')
continue;
close(cryptodev_fd);
}
assert(ses);
- memset(ses, '\0', sizeof *ses);
+ memset(ses, '\0', sizeof(*ses));
return 1;
}
assert(CDATA(ctx));
assert(!dev_failed);
- memset(&cryp, '\0', sizeof cryp);
+ memset(&cryp, '\0', sizeof(cryp));
cryp.ses = CDATA(ctx)->ses;
cryp.op = ctx->encrypt ? COP_ENCRYPT : COP_DECRYPT;
cryp.flags = 0;
return 1;
}
- memset(&cryp, '\0', sizeof cryp);
+ memset(&cryp, '\0', sizeof(cryp));
cryp.ses = ses;
cryp.op = COP_ENCRYPT; /* required to do the MAC rather than check
* it */
goto err;
}
keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
- OPENSSL_assert(keylen <= sizeof key);
+ OPENSSL_assert(keylen <= sizeof(key));
/* Decode parameter */
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx->i_ctx);
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx->o_ctx);
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx->md_ctx);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx, sizeof *ctx);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
}
unsigned char *HMAC(const EVP_MD *evp_md, const void *key, int key_len,
OPENSSL_free(ctx->p.peer_name);
OPENSSL_free(ctx->p.name);
- memset(ctx, '\0', sizeof *ctx);
+ memset(ctx, '\0', sizeof(*ctx));
}
JPAKE_CTX *JPAKE_CTX_new(const char *name, const char *peer_name,
const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *g, const BIGNUM *q,
const BIGNUM *secret)
{
- JPAKE_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *ctx);
+ JPAKE_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ctx));
if (ctx == NULL)
return NULL;
int JPAKE_STEP3A_generate(JPAKE_STEP3A *send, JPAKE_CTX *ctx)
{
quickhashbn(send->hhk, ctx->key);
- SHA1(send->hhk, sizeof send->hhk, send->hhk);
+ SHA1(send->hhk, sizeof(send->hhk), send->hhk);
return 1;
}
unsigned char hhk[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
quickhashbn(hhk, ctx->key);
- SHA1(hhk, sizeof hhk, hhk);
- if (memcmp(hhk, received->hhk, sizeof hhk)) {
+ SHA1(hhk, sizeof(hhk), hhk);
+ if (memcmp(hhk, received->hhk, sizeof(hhk))) {
JPAKEerr(JPAKE_F_JPAKE_STEP3A_PROCESS,
JPAKE_R_HASH_OF_HASH_OF_KEY_MISMATCH);
return 0;
unsigned char hk[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
quickhashbn(hk, ctx->key);
- if (memcmp(hk, received->hk, sizeof hk)) {
+ if (memcmp(hk, received->hk, sizeof(hk))) {
JPAKEerr(JPAKE_F_JPAKE_STEP3B_PROCESS, JPAKE_R_HASH_OF_KEY_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
fips_md_init(MD2)
{
c->num = 0;
- memset(c->state, 0, sizeof c->state);
- memset(c->cksm, 0, sizeof c->cksm);
- memset(c->data, 0, sizeof c->data);
+ memset(c->state, 0, sizeof(c->state));
+ memset(c->cksm, 0, sizeof(c->cksm));
+ memset(c->data, 0, sizeof(c->data));
return 1;
}
fd = fileno(f);
MD4_Init(&c);
for (;;) {
- i = read(fd, buf, sizeof buf);
+ i = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (i <= 0)
break;
MD4_Update(&c, buf, (unsigned long)i);
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
APP_INFO *amip;
int ami_cnt;
struct tm *lcl = NULL;
+ struct tm result = {0};
CRYPTO_THREADID ti;
-#define BUF_REMAIN (sizeof buf - (size_t)(bufp - buf))
+#define BUF_REMAIN (sizeof(buf) - (size_t)(bufp - buf))
if (m->addr == (char *)l->bio)
return;
if (options & V_CRYPTO_MDEBUG_TIME) {
+# if defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) && \
+ !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_OS2) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_SUNOS) && \
+ (!defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) || defined(localtime_r))
+ lcl = localtime_r(&m->time, &result);
+# else
lcl = localtime(&m->time);
-
+# endif
BIO_snprintf(bufp, BUF_REMAIN, "[%02d:%02d:%02d] ",
lcl->tm_hour, lcl->tm_min, lcl->tm_sec);
bufp += strlen(bufp);
ami_cnt++;
memset(buf, '>', ami_cnt);
- BIO_snprintf(buf + ami_cnt, sizeof buf - ami_cnt,
+ BIO_snprintf(buf + ami_cnt, sizeof(buf) - ami_cnt,
" thread=%lu, file=%s, line=%d, info=\"",
CRYPTO_THREADID_hash(&amip->threadid), amip->file,
amip->line);
memcpy(buf + buf_len, amip->info, 128 - buf_len - 3);
buf_len = 128 - 3;
} else {
- BUF_strlcpy(buf + buf_len, amip->info, sizeof buf - buf_len);
+ BUF_strlcpy(buf + buf_len, amip->info, sizeof(buf) - buf_len);
buf_len = strlen(buf);
}
- BIO_snprintf(buf + buf_len, sizeof buf - buf_len, "\"\n");
+ BIO_snprintf(buf + buf_len, sizeof(buf) - buf_len, "\"\n");
BIO_puts(l->bio, buf);
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
# include <openssl/fips.h>
# include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED
+/* the prototype is missing in <openssl/fips.h> */
+void FIPS_crypto_set_id_callback(unsigned long (*func)(void));
+# endif
#endif
/*
* 2008.
*/
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
{
struct tm *ts = NULL;
-#if defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_OS2) && (!defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) || defined(gmtime_r)) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MACOSX) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_SUNOS)
+#if defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_OS2) && (!defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) || defined(gmtime_r)) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_SUNOS)
if (gmtime_r(timer, result) == NULL)
return NULL;
ts = result;
pitem->ileb_64$w_mbo = 1;
pitem->ileb_64$w_code = LNM$_STRING;
pitem->ileb_64$l_mbmo = -1;
- pitem->ileb_64$q_length = sizeof (logvalue);
+ pitem->ileb_64$q_length = sizeof(logvalue);
pitem->ileb_64$pq_bufaddr = logvalue;
pitem->ileb_64$pq_retlen_addr = (unsigned __int64 *) &reslen;
pitem++;
/* Last item of the item list is null terminated */
pitem->ileb_64$q_length = pitem->ileb_64$w_code = 0;
# else
- pitem->ile3$w_length = sizeof (logvalue);
+ pitem->ile3$w_length = sizeof(logvalue);
pitem->ile3$w_code = LNM$_STRING;
pitem->ile3$ps_bufaddr = logvalue;
pitem->ile3$ps_retlen_addr = (unsigned short int *) &reslen;
d.type = type;
d.names =
- OPENSSL_malloc(lh_OBJ_NAME_num_items(names_lh) * sizeof *d.names);
+ OPENSSL_malloc(lh_OBJ_NAME_num_items(names_lh) * sizeof(*d.names));
/* Really should return an error if !d.names...but its a void function! */
if (d.names) {
d.n = 0;
OBJ_NAME_do_all(type, do_all_sorted_fn, &d);
- qsort((void *)d.names, d.n, sizeof *d.names, do_all_sorted_cmp);
+ qsort((void *)d.names, d.n, sizeof(*d.names), do_all_sorted_cmp);
for (n = 0; n < d.n; ++n)
fn(d.names[n], arg);
for (i = ADDED_DATA; i <= ADDED_NID; i++)
if (ao[i] != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(ao[i]);
- if (o != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(o);
- return (NID_undef);
+ ASN1_OBJECT_free(o);
+ return NID_undef;
}
ASN1_OBJECT *OBJ_nid2obj(int n)
n += i;
OPENSSL_free(bndec);
} else {
- BIO_snprintf(tbuf, sizeof tbuf, ".%lu", l);
+ BIO_snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), ".%lu", l);
i = strlen(tbuf);
if (buf && (buf_len > 0)) {
BUF_strlcpy(buf, tbuf, buf_len);
return (p);
}
+/*
+ * Parse a BIO sink to create some extra oid's objects.
+ * Line format:<OID:isdigit or '.']><isspace><SN><isspace><LN>
+ */
int OBJ_create_objects(BIO *in)
{
MS_STATIC char buf[512];
*(s++) = '\0';
while (isspace((unsigned char)*s))
s++;
- if (*s == '\0')
+ if (*s == '\0') {
s = NULL;
- else {
+ } else {
l = s;
while ((*l != '\0') && !isspace((unsigned char)*l))
l++;
*(l++) = '\0';
while (isspace((unsigned char)*l))
l++;
- if (*l == '\0')
+ if (*l == '\0') {
l = NULL;
- } else
+ }
+ } else {
l = NULL;
+ }
}
- } else
+ } else {
s = NULL;
- if ((o == NULL) || (*o == '\0'))
- return (num);
+ }
+ if (*o == '\0')
+ return num;
if (!OBJ_create(o, s, l))
return (num);
num++;
* (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for
* major minor fix final patch/beta)
*/
-# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x100020efL
+# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x100020ffL
# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.2n-fips 7 Dec 2017"
+# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.2o-fips 27 Mar 2018"
# else
-# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.2n 7 Dec 2017"
+# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.2o 27 Mar 2018"
# endif
# define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT " part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT
/* create the right magic header stuff */
OPENSSL_assert(strlen(objstr) + 23 + 2 * enc->iv_len + 13 <=
- sizeof buf);
+ sizeof(buf));
buf[0] = '\0';
PEM_proc_type(buf, PEM_TYPE_ENCRYPTED);
PEM_dek_info(buf, objstr, enc->iv_len, (char *)iv);
OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, PEM_BUFSIZE);
OPENSSL_assert(strlen(objstr) + 23 + 2 * enc->iv_len + 13 <=
- sizeof buf);
+ sizeof(buf));
buf[0] = '\0';
PEM_proc_type(buf, PEM_TYPE_ENCRYPTED);
}
if (bio == NULL) {
- if (PKCS7_is_detached(p7))
+ if (PKCS7_is_detached(p7)) {
bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_null());
- else if (os && os->length > 0)
+ } else if (os && os->length > 0) {
bio = BIO_new_mem_buf(os->data, os->length);
- if (bio == NULL) {
+ } else {
bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
if (bio == NULL)
goto err;
BIO_set_mem_eof_return(bio, 0);
}
+ if (bio == NULL)
+ goto err;
}
if (out)
BIO_push(out, bio);
md_c[0] = md_count[0];
md_c[1] = md_count[1];
- memcpy(local_md, md, sizeof md);
+ memcpy(local_md, md, sizeof(md));
/* state_index <= state_num <= STATE_SIZE */
state_index += num;
st_num = state_num;
md_c[0] = md_count[0];
md_c[1] = md_count[1];
- memcpy(local_md, md, sizeof md);
+ memcpy(local_md, md, sizeof(md));
state_index += num_ceil;
if (state_index > state_num)
goto err;
#ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS
if (curr_pid) { /* just in the first iteration to save time */
- if (!MD_Update(&m, (unsigned char *)&curr_pid, sizeof curr_pid))
+ if (!MD_Update(&m, (unsigned char *)&curr_pid, sizeof(curr_pid)))
goto err;
curr_pid = 0;
}
addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
if (strlen(path) >= sizeof(addr.sun_path))
return (-1);
- BUF_strlcpy(addr.sun_path, path, sizeof addr.sun_path);
+ BUF_strlcpy(addr.sun_path, path, sizeof(addr.sun_path));
len = offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) + strlen(path);
fd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
if (fd == -1)
*/
curr_gid = getgid();
- RAND_add(&curr_gid, sizeof curr_gid, 1);
+ RAND_add(&curr_gid, sizeof(curr_gid), 1);
curr_gid = 0;
curr_pid = getpid();
- RAND_add(&curr_pid, sizeof curr_pid, 1);
+ RAND_add(&curr_pid, sizeof(curr_pid), 1);
curr_pid = 0;
curr_uid = getuid();
- RAND_add(&curr_uid, sizeof curr_uid, 1);
+ RAND_add(&curr_uid, sizeof(curr_uid), 1);
curr_uid = 0;
for (i = 0; i < (ENTROPY_NEEDED * 4); i++) {
/* take 8 bits */
v = (unsigned char)(ts.tv_nsec % 256);
- RAND_add(&v, sizeof v, 1);
+ RAND_add(&v, sizeof(v), 1);
v = 0;
}
return 1;
# if defined(DEVRANDOM) || defined(DEVRANDOM_EGD)
if (n > 0) {
- RAND_add(tmpbuf, sizeof tmpbuf, (double)n);
+ RAND_add(tmpbuf, sizeof(tmpbuf), (double)n);
OPENSSL_cleanse(tmpbuf, n);
}
# endif
* if PRNG is not properly seeded, resort to secret exponent as
* unpredictable seed
*/
- RAND_add(rsa->d->d, rsa->d->dmax * sizeof rsa->d->d[0], 0.0);
+ RAND_add(rsa->d->d, rsa->d->dmax * sizeof(rsa->d->d[0]), 0.0);
}
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
BIGNUM *pr0, *d, *p;
int bitsp, bitsq, ok = -1, n = 0;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ unsigned long error = 0;
/*
* When generating ridiculously small keys, we can get stuck
if (BN_copy(rsa->e, e_value) == NULL)
goto err;
+ BN_set_flags(r2, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
/* generate p and q */
for (;;) {
if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(rsa->p, bitsp, 0, NULL, NULL, cb))
goto err;
if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->p, BN_value_one()))
goto err;
- if (!BN_gcd(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx))
- goto err;
- if (BN_is_one(r1))
+ ERR_set_mark();
+ if (BN_mod_inverse(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx) != NULL) {
+ /* GCD == 1 since inverse exists */
break;
+ }
+ error = ERR_peek_last_error();
+ if (ERR_GET_LIB(error) == ERR_LIB_BN
+ && ERR_GET_REASON(error) == BN_R_NO_INVERSE) {
+ /* GCD != 1 */
+ ERR_pop_to_mark();
+ } else {
+ goto err;
+ }
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++))
goto err;
}
} while (BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) == 0);
if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->q, BN_value_one()))
goto err;
- if (!BN_gcd(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx))
- goto err;
- if (BN_is_one(r1))
+ ERR_set_mark();
+ if (BN_mod_inverse(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx) != NULL) {
+ /* GCD == 1 since inverse exists */
break;
+ }
+ error = ERR_peek_last_error();
+ if (ERR_GET_LIB(error) == ERR_LIB_BN
+ && ERR_GET_REASON(error) == BN_R_NO_INVERSE) {
+ /* GCD != 1 */
+ ERR_pop_to_mark();
+ } else {
+ goto err;
+ }
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++))
goto err;
}
goto err;
}
if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, Hash, NULL)
- || !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, zeroes, sizeof zeroes)
+ || !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, zeroes, sizeof(zeroes))
|| !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, mHash, hLen))
goto err;
if (maskedDBLen - i) {
H = EM + maskedDBLen;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, Hash, NULL)
- || !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, zeroes, sizeof zeroes)
+ || !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, zeroes, sizeof(zeroes))
|| !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, mHash, hLen))
goto err;
if (sLen && !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, salt, sLen))
CRYPTO_dbg_set_options(V_CRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL);
CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON);
- RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof rnd_seed); /* or OAEP may fail */
+ RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof(rnd_seed)); /* or OAEP may fail */
plen = sizeof(ptext_ex) - 1;
static BIGNUM bn_group_1024 = {
bn_group_1024_value,
- (sizeof bn_group_1024_value) / sizeof(BN_ULONG),
- (sizeof bn_group_1024_value) / sizeof(BN_ULONG),
+ (sizeof(bn_group_1024_value)) / sizeof(BN_ULONG),
+ (sizeof(bn_group_1024_value)) / sizeof(BN_ULONG),
0,
BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA
};
static BIGNUM bn_group_1536 = {
bn_group_1536_value,
- (sizeof bn_group_1536_value) / sizeof(BN_ULONG),
- (sizeof bn_group_1536_value) / sizeof(BN_ULONG),
+ (sizeof(bn_group_1536_value)) / sizeof(BN_ULONG),
+ (sizeof(bn_group_1536_value)) / sizeof(BN_ULONG),
0,
BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA
};
static BIGNUM bn_group_2048 = {
bn_group_2048_value,
- (sizeof bn_group_2048_value) / sizeof(BN_ULONG),
- (sizeof bn_group_2048_value) / sizeof(BN_ULONG),
+ (sizeof(bn_group_2048_value)) / sizeof(BN_ULONG),
+ (sizeof(bn_group_2048_value)) / sizeof(BN_ULONG),
0,
BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA
};
static BIGNUM bn_group_3072 = {
bn_group_3072_value,
- (sizeof bn_group_3072_value) / sizeof(BN_ULONG),
- (sizeof bn_group_3072_value) / sizeof(BN_ULONG),
+ (sizeof(bn_group_3072_value)) / sizeof(BN_ULONG),
+ (sizeof(bn_group_3072_value)) / sizeof(BN_ULONG),
0,
BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA
};
static BIGNUM bn_group_4096 = {
bn_group_4096_value,
- (sizeof bn_group_4096_value) / sizeof(BN_ULONG),
- (sizeof bn_group_4096_value) / sizeof(BN_ULONG),
+ (sizeof(bn_group_4096_value)) / sizeof(BN_ULONG),
+ (sizeof(bn_group_4096_value)) / sizeof(BN_ULONG),
0,
BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA
};
static BIGNUM bn_group_6144 = {
bn_group_6144_value,
- (sizeof bn_group_6144_value) / sizeof(BN_ULONG),
- (sizeof bn_group_6144_value) / sizeof(BN_ULONG),
+ (sizeof(bn_group_6144_value)) / sizeof(BN_ULONG),
+ (sizeof(bn_group_6144_value)) / sizeof(BN_ULONG),
0,
BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA
};
static BIGNUM bn_group_8192 = {
bn_group_8192_value,
- (sizeof bn_group_8192_value) / sizeof(BN_ULONG),
- (sizeof bn_group_8192_value) / sizeof(BN_ULONG),
+ (sizeof(bn_group_8192_value)) / sizeof(BN_ULONG),
+ (sizeof(bn_group_8192_value)) / sizeof(BN_ULONG),
0,
BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA
};
char *ccert = TEST_CLIENT_CERT;
const SSL_METHOD *ssl_method = SSLv23_method();
- RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof rnd_seed);
+ RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof(rnd_seed));
if (bio_err == NULL)
bio_err = BIO_new_fd(2, BIO_NOCLOSE);
ts_rsp_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
ts_rsp_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/ts.h
ts_rsp_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
-ts_rsp_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/x509v3.h ../cryptlib.h ts_rsp_sign.c
+ts_rsp_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/x509v3.h ../cryptlib.h ../o_time.h
+ts_rsp_sign.o: ts_rsp_sign.c
ts_rsp_utils.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
ts_rsp_utils.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
ts_rsp_utils.o: ../../include/openssl/conf.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
* 2002.
*/
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2006-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
*/
#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include "o_time.h"
#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX)
# include <sys/time.h>
{
time_t time_sec = (time_t)sec;
struct tm *tm = NULL;
+ struct tm result = {0};
char genTime_str[17 + TS_MAX_CLOCK_PRECISION_DIGITS];
char *p = genTime_str;
char *p_end = genTime_str + sizeof(genTime_str);
if (precision > TS_MAX_CLOCK_PRECISION_DIGITS)
goto err;
- if (!(tm = gmtime(&time_sec)))
+ if (!(tm = OPENSSL_gmtime(&time_sec, &result)))
goto err;
/*
# ifdef SIGACTION
struct sigaction sa;
- memset(&sa, 0, sizeof sa);
+ memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
sa.sa_handler = recsig;
# endif
return ("proxy subject name violation");
default:
- BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "error number %ld", n);
+ BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "error number %ld", n);
return (buf);
}
}
err2:
if (new_ex != NULL)
X509_EXTENSION_free(new_ex);
- if (sk != NULL)
+ if (x != NULL && *x == NULL && sk != NULL)
sk_X509_EXTENSION_free(sk);
return (NULL);
}
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *paramid;
- param = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *param);
+ param = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*param));
if (!param)
return NULL;
memset(param, 0, sizeof(*param));
case GEN_IPADD:
p = gen->d.ip->data;
if (gen->d.ip->length == 4)
- BIO_snprintf(oline, sizeof oline,
+ BIO_snprintf(oline, sizeof(oline),
"%d.%d.%d.%d", p[0], p[1], p[2], p[3]);
else if (gen->d.ip->length == 16) {
oline[0] = 0;
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
- BIO_snprintf(htmp, sizeof htmp, "%X", p[0] << 8 | p[1]);
+ BIO_snprintf(htmp, sizeof(htmp), "%X", p[0] << 8 | p[1]);
p += 2;
strcat(oline, htmp);
if (i != 7)
* 1999.
*/
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
val = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(nval, i);
if (!(ext = X509V3_EXT_nconf(conf, ctx, val->name, val->value)))
return 0;
- if (sk)
- X509v3_add_ext(sk, ext, -1);
+ if (sk != NULL) {
+ if (X509v3_add_ext(sk, ext, -1) == NULL) {
+ X509_EXTENSION_free(ext);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
X509_EXTENSION_free(ext);
}
return 1;
goto err;
tret = tmp;
vtmp = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(tret, i);
- i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(objtmp, sizeof objtmp, desc->method);
+ i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(objtmp, sizeof(objtmp), desc->method);
nlen = strlen(objtmp) + strlen(vtmp->name) + 5;
ntmp = OPENSSL_malloc(nlen);
if (ntmp == NULL)
if (errbuf_i == 0)
return;
- assert(errbuf_i < sizeof errbuf);
+ assert(errbuf_i < sizeof(errbuf));
assert(errbuf[errbuf_i] == 0);
- if (errbuf_i == sizeof errbuf - 1) {
+ if (errbuf_i == sizeof(errbuf) - 1) {
/* make sure we have a newline, even if string has been truncated */
errbuf[errbuf_i - 1] = '\n';
}
va_list args;
int r;
- if (errbuf_i < sizeof errbuf - 1) {
+ if (errbuf_i < sizeof(errbuf) - 1) {
size_t n;
va_start(args, fmt);
- n = (sizeof errbuf) - errbuf_i;
+ n = (sizeof(errbuf)) - errbuf_i;
r = vsnprintf(errbuf + errbuf_i, n, fmt, args);
va_end(args);
if (r >= n)
if (r >= 0) {
errbuf_i += r;
} else {
- errbuf_i = sizeof errbuf - 1;
+ errbuf_i = sizeof(errbuf) - 1;
errbuf[errbuf_i] = '\0';
}
- assert(errbuf_i < sizeof errbuf);
+ assert(errbuf_i < sizeof(errbuf));
assert(errbuf[errbuf_i] == 0);
}
#ifndef TLS_CUMULATE_ERRORS
default_text = "?" "?" "?";
while ((err = ERR_get_error_line_data(&file, &line, &data, &flags)) != 0) {
- if (reasons_i < sizeof reasons) {
+ if (reasons_i < sizeof(reasons)) {
size_t n;
int r;
- n = (sizeof reasons) - reasons_i;
+ n = (sizeof(reasons)) - reasons_i;
r = snprintf(reasons + reasons_i, n, "%s%s",
(reasons_i > 0 ? ", " : ""),
ERR_reason_error_string(err));
if (r >= 0) {
reasons_i += r;
} else {
- reasons_i = sizeof reasons;
+ reasons_i = sizeof(reasons);
}
- assert(reasons_i <= sizeof reasons);
+ assert(reasons_i <= sizeof(reasons));
}
errstring = ERR_error_string(err, NULL);
if (!printed_something) {
assert(reasons_i == 0);
- snprintf(reasons, sizeof reasons, "%s", default_text);
+ snprintf(reasons, sizeof(reasons), "%s", default_text);
tls_errprintf(0, apparg, "OpenSSL error%s%s: %s\n", app_prefix_1,
app_prefix_2, default_text);
}
data.time = time(NULL);
data.stack = (void *)&data;
- RAND_seed((const void *)&data, sizeof data);
+ RAND_seed((const void *)&data, sizeof(data));
}
void tls_rand_seed(void)
data.gid = getgid();
data.egid = getegid();
- RAND_seed((const void *)&data, sizeof data);
+ RAND_seed((const void *)&data, sizeof(data));
tls_rand_seed_uniquely();
}
name = X509_get_subject_name(cert); /* does not increment any reference
* counter */
- assert(sizeof namestring->str >= 4); /* "?" or "...", plus 0 */
+ assert(sizeof(namestring->str) >= 4); /* "?" or "...", plus 0 */
if (name == NULL) {
namestring->str[0] = '?';
} else {
size_t len;
- X509_NAME_oneline(name, namestring->str, sizeof namestring->str);
+ X509_NAME_oneline(name, namestring->str, sizeof(namestring->str));
len = strlen(namestring->str);
assert(namestring->str[len] == 0);
- assert(len < sizeof namestring->str);
+ assert(len < sizeof(namestring->str));
- if (len + 1 == sizeof namestring->str) {
+ if (len + 1 == sizeof(namestring->str)) {
/*
* (Probably something was cut off.) Does not really work --
* X509_NAME_oneline truncates after name components, we cannot
tls_init(apparg);
if (i >= 0) {
- i %= sizeof seed / sizeof seed[0];
+ i %= sizeof(seed) / sizeof(seed[0]);
assert(strlen(seed[i]) == 20);
memcpy(seedbuf, seed[i], 20);
dsaparams =
if ((a.ca_file != NULL) || (a.verify_depth > 0)) {
context_num++;
r = SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(ret, (const void *)&context_num,
- (unsigned int)sizeof context_num);
+ (unsigned int)sizeof(context_num));
if (!r)
goto err;
if (tls_dhe1024 == NULL) {
int i;
- if (RAND_bytes((unsigned char *)&i, sizeof i) <= 0)
+ if (RAND_bytes((unsigned char *)&i, sizeof(i)) <= 0)
goto err_return;
/*
* make sure that i is non-negative -- pick one of the provided
/* should not happen, but make sure */
*strchr(peer.str, '\n') = '\0';
}
- r = snprintf(infobuf, sizeof infobuf, "%c:%s\n%s\n", v_ok,
+ r = snprintf(infobuf, sizeof(infobuf), "%c:%s\n%s\n", v_ok,
X509_verify_cert_error_string(v), peer.str);
DEBUG_MSG2("snprintf", r);
- if (r == -1 || r >= sizeof infobuf)
- r = sizeof infobuf - 1;
+ if (r == -1 || r >= sizeof(infobuf))
+ r = sizeof(infobuf) - 1;
write(*info_fd, infobuf, r);
close(*info_fd);
*info_fd = -1;
if (!closed) {
if (clear_to_tls.offset + clear_to_tls.len <
- sizeof clear_to_tls.buf) {
+ sizeof(clear_to_tls.buf)) {
r = read_attempt(clear_fd, &clear_to_tls, &clear_read_select,
&closed, &progress);
if (r != 0)
if (!closed && !in_handshake) {
if (tls_to_clear.offset + tls_to_clear.len <
- sizeof tls_to_clear.buf) {
+ sizeof(tls_to_clear.buf)) {
r = tls_read_attempt(ssl, &tls_to_clear, &tls_write_select,
&tls_read_select, &closed, &progress,
&err_pref_1);
DEBUG_MSG("tls_read_attempt");
total = buf->offset + buf->len;
- assert(total < sizeof buf->buf);
- n = SSL_read(ssl, buf->buf + total, (sizeof buf->buf) - total);
+ assert(total < sizeof(buf->buf));
+ n = SSL_read(ssl, buf->buf + total, sizeof(buf->buf) - total);
DEBUG_MSG2("SSL_read", n);
r = tls_get_error(ssl, n, write_select, read_select, closed, progress);
if (n > 0) {
buf->len += n;
- assert(buf->offset + buf->len <= sizeof buf->buf);
+ assert(buf->offset + buf->len <= sizeof(buf->buf));
}
if (r == -1)
*err_pref = " during SSL_read";
DEBUG_MSG("read_attempt");
total = buf->offset + buf->len;
- assert(total < sizeof buf->buf);
- n = read(fd, buf->buf + total, (sizeof buf->buf) - total);
+ assert(total < sizeof(buf->buf));
+ n = read(fd, buf->buf + total, sizeof(buf->buf) - total);
DEBUG_MSG2("read", n);
r = get_error(n, select, closed, progress);
if (n > 0) {
buf->len += n;
- assert(buf->offset + buf->len <= sizeof buf->buf);
+ assert(buf->offset + buf->len <= sizeof(buf->buf));
}
if (r == -1)
tls_errprintf(1, tls_child_apparg, "read error: %s\n",
if (client_p) {
struct sockaddr_in addr;
- size_t addr_len = sizeof addr;
+ size_t addr_len = sizeof(addr);
addr.sin_family = AF_INET;
assert(argc > 1);
{
int i = 1;
- r = setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, (void *)&i, sizeof i);
+ r = setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, (void *)&i, sizeof(i));
if (r == -1) {
perror("setsockopt");
exit(1);
{
struct sockaddr_in addr;
- size_t addr_len = sizeof addr;
+ size_t addr_len = sizeof(addr);
if (argc > 1)
sscanf(argv[1], "%d", &port);
setvbuf(conn_in, NULL, _IOLBF, 256);
setvbuf(conn_out, NULL, _IOLBF, 256);
- while (fgets(buf, sizeof buf, stdin) != NULL) {
+ while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin) != NULL) {
if (buf[0] == 'W') {
fprintf(conn_out, "%.*s\r\n", (int)(strlen(buf + 1) - 1),
buf + 1);
sscanf(buf + 1, "%d", &lines);
do {
- if (fgets(buf, sizeof buf, conn_in) == NULL) {
+ if (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), conn_in) == NULL) {
if (ferror(conn_in)) {
fprintf(stderr, "ERROR\n");
exit(1);
exit(1);
}
- r = read(infofd, infobuf, sizeof infobuf - 1);
+ r = read(infofd, infobuf, sizeof(infobuf) - 1);
if (r > 0) {
const char *info = infobuf;
const char *eol;
engine_md_cleanup, /* dev_crypto_sha_cleanup */
EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
SHA_CBLOCK,
- /* sizeof ( EVP_MD * ) + sizeof ( SHA_CTX ) */
+ /* sizeof(EVP_MD *) + sizeof(SHA_CTX) */
sizeof(ZEN_MD_DATA)
/*
- * sizeof ( MD_CTX_DATA ) The message digest data structure ...
+ * sizeof(MD_CTX_DATA) The message digest data structure ...
*/
};
engine_md_cleanup, /* dev_crypto_md5_cleanup */
EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
MD5_CBLOCK,
- /* sizeof ( EVP_MD * ) + sizeof ( MD5_CTX ) */
+ /* sizeof(EVP_MD *) + sizeof(MD5_CTX) */
sizeof(ZEN_MD_DATA)
/*
- * sizeof ( MD_CTX_DATA ) The message digest data structure ...
+ * sizeof(MD_CTX_DATA) The message digest data structure ...
*/
};
fprintf(stderr, "please enter challenge string:");
fflush(stderr);
buf[0] = '\0';
- fgets(buf, sizeof buf, stdin);
+ fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin);
i = strlen(buf);
if (i > 0)
buf[--i] = '\0';
sa_serv.sin_port = htons (1111); /* Server Port number */
err = bind(listen_sd, (struct sockaddr*) &sa_serv,
- sizeof (sa_serv)); CHK_ERR(err, "bind");
+ sizeof(sa_serv)); CHK_ERR(err, "bind");
/* Receive a TCP connection. */
while ((l = ERR_get_error())) {
char buf[1024];
- ERR_error_string_n(l, buf, sizeof buf);
+ ERR_error_string_n(l, buf, sizeof(buf));
fprintf(stderr, "Error %lx: %s\n", l, buf);
}
}
SSLStateMachine *SSLStateMachine_new(const char *szCertificateFile,
const char *szKeyFile)
{
- SSLStateMachine *pMachine = malloc(sizeof *pMachine);
+ SSLStateMachine *pMachine = malloc(sizeof(*pMachine));
int n;
die_unless(pMachine);
}
if (setsockopt
- (nSocket, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, (char *)&one, sizeof one) < 0) {
+ (nSocket, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, (char *)&one, sizeof(one)) < 0) {
perror("setsockopt");
exit(2);
}
- memset(&saServer, 0, sizeof saServer);
+ memset(&saServer, 0, sizeof(saServer));
saServer.sin_family = AF_INET;
saServer.sin_port = htons(nPort);
- nSize = sizeof saServer;
+ nSize = sizeof(saServer);
if (bind(nSocket, (struct sockaddr *)&saServer, nSize) < 0) {
perror("bind");
exit(3);
exit(4);
}
- nLen = sizeof saClient;
+ nLen = sizeof(saClient);
nFD = accept(nSocket, (struct sockaddr *)&saClient, &nLen);
if (nFD < 0) {
perror("accept");
/* Socket is ready for input */
if (FD_ISSET(nFD, &rfds)) {
- n = read(nFD, buf, sizeof buf);
+ n = read(nFD, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (n == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Got EOF on socket\n");
exit(0);
nrbuf = 0;
n = SSLStateMachine_read_extract(pMachine, buf + 1,
- sizeof buf - 1);
+ sizeof(buf) - 1);
if (n < 0) {
SSLStateMachine_print_error(pMachine, "read extract failed");
break;
if (FD_ISSET(nFD, &wfds)) {
int w;
- n = SSLStateMachine_write_extract(pMachine, buf, sizeof buf);
+ n = SSLStateMachine_write_extract(pMachine, buf, sizeof(buf));
assert(n > 0);
w = write(nFD, buf, n);
/* Stdin is ready for input */
if (FD_ISSET(0, &rfds)) {
- n = read(0, buf, sizeof buf);
+ n = read(0, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (n == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Got EOF on stdin\n");
exit(0);
it's recommended to use the value B<no>, especially if combined with
the B<-selfsign> command line option.
+Note that it is valid in some circumstances for certificates to be created
+without any subject. In the case where there are multiple certificates without
+subjects this does not count as a duplicate.
+
=item B<serial>
a text file containing the next serial number to use in hex. Mandatory.
=item B<-conv_form>
This specifies how the points on the elliptic curve are converted
-into octet strings. Possible values are: B<compressed> (the default
-value), B<uncompressed> and B<hybrid>. For more information regarding
+into octet strings. Possible values are: B<compressed>, B<uncompressed> (the
+default value) and B<hybrid>. For more information regarding
the point conversion forms please read the X9.62 standard.
B<Note> Due to patent issues the B<compressed> option is disabled
by default for binary curves and can be enabled by defining
send the protocol-specific message(s) to switch to TLS for communication.
B<protocol> is a keyword for the intended protocol. Currently, the only
-supported keywords are "smtp", "pop3", "imap", and "ftp".
+supported keywords are "smtp", "pop3", "imap", "ftp" and "xmpp".
=item B<-tlsextdebug>
[B<-ignore_critical>]
[B<-attime timestamp>]
[B<-check_ss_sig>]
-[B<-crlfile file>]
+[B<-CRLfile file>]
[B<-crl_download>]
[B<-crl_check>]
[B<-crl_check_all>]
Verify the signature on the self-signed root CA. This is disabled by default
because it doesn't add any security.
-=item B<-crlfile file>
+=item B<-CRLfile file>
File containing one or more CRL's (in PEM format) to load.
=item B<-fingerprint>
-prints out the digest of the DER encoded version of the whole certificate
-(see digest options).
+Calculates and outputs the digest of the DER encoded version of the entire
+certificate (see digest options).
+This is commonly called a "fingerprint". Because of the nature of message
+digests, the fingerprint of a certificate is unique to that certificate and
+two certificates with the same fingerprint can be considered to be the same.
=item B<-C>
openssl x509 -in cert.pem -noout -subject -nameopt oneline,-esc_msb
-Display the certificate MD5 fingerprint:
-
- openssl x509 -in cert.pem -noout -fingerprint
-
Display the certificate SHA1 fingerprint:
openssl x509 -sha1 -in cert.pem -noout -fingerprint
and MSIE do this as do many certificates. So although this is incorrect
it is more likely to display the majority of certificates correctly.
-The B<-fingerprint> option takes the digest of the DER encoded certificate.
-This is commonly called a "fingerprint". Because of the nature of message
-digests the fingerprint of a certificate is unique to that certificate and
-two certificates with the same fingerprint can be considered to be the same.
-
-The Netscape fingerprint uses MD5 whereas MSIE uses SHA1.
-
The B<-email> option searches the subject name and the subject alternative
name extension. Only unique email addresses will be printed out: it will
not print the same address more than once.
In general it cannot be assumed that the data returned by ASN1_STRING_data()
is null terminated or does not contain embedded nulls. The actual format
of the data will depend on the actual string type itself: for example
-for and IA5String the data will be ASCII, for a BMPString two bytes per
-character in big endian format, UTF8String will be in UTF8 format.
+for an IA5String the data will be ASCII, for a BMPString two bytes per
+character in big endian format, and for an UTF8String it will be in UTF8 format.
Similar care should be take to ensure the data is in the correct format
when calling ASN1_STRING_set().
flag (that is BIO_read_retry(b) is true). To avoid ambiguity with a normal
positive return value B<v> should be set to a negative value, typically -1.
-BIO_get_mem_data() sets B<pp> to a pointer to the start of the memory BIOs data
+BIO_get_mem_data() sets
*B<pp> to a pointer to the start of the memory BIOs data
and returns the total amount of data available. It is implemented as a macro.
BIO_set_mem_buf() sets the internal BUF_MEM structure to B<bm> and sets the
close flag to B<c>, that is B<c> should be either BIO_CLOSE or BIO_NOCLOSE.
It is a macro.
-BIO_get_mem_ptr() places the underlying BUF_MEM structure in B<pp>. It is
+BIO_get_mem_ptr() places the underlying BUF_MEM structure in
*B<pp>. It is
a macro.
BIO_new_mem_buf() creates a memory BIO using B<len> bytes of data at B<buf>,
const BIGNUM *BN_value_one(void);
- int BN_set_word(BIGNUM *a, unsigned long w);
- unsigned long BN_get_word(BIGNUM *a);
+ int BN_set_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w);
+ BN_ULONG BN_get_word(BIGNUM *a);
=head1 DESCRIPTION
+B<BN_ULONG> is a macro that will be an unsigned integral type optimied
+for the most efficient implementation on the local platform.
+
BN_zero(), BN_one() and BN_set_word() set B<a> to the values 0, 1 and
B<w> respectively. BN_zero() and BN_one() are macros.
BN_value_one() returns a B<BIGNUM> constant of value 1. This constant
is useful for use in comparisons and assignment.
-BN_get_word() returns B<a>, if it can be represented as an unsigned
-long.
+BN_get_word() returns B<a>, if it can be represented as a B<BN_ULONG>.
=head1 RETURN VALUES
-BN_get_word() returns the value B<a>,
and 0xffffffffL if B<a> cannot
-be represented as an unsigned long.
+BN_get_word() returns the value B<a>,
or all-bits-set if B<a> cannot
+be represented as a B<BN_ULONG>.
BN_zero(), BN_one() and BN_set_word() return 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
BN_value_one() returns the constant.
=head1 BUGS
-Someone might change the constant.
+If a B<BIGNUM> is equal to the value of all-bits-set, it will collide
+with the error condition returned by BN_get_word() which uses that
+as an error value.
-If a B<BIGNUM> is equal to 0xffffffffL it can be represented as an
-unsigned long but this value is also returned on error.
+B<BN_ULONG> should probably be a typedef.
=head1 SEE ALSO
void EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *a);
int EVP_EncryptInit_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *type,
- ENGINE *impl, unsigned char *key, unsigned char *iv);
+ ENGINE *impl, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv);
int EVP_EncryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
int *outl, const unsigned char *in, int inl);
int EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
int *outl);
int EVP_DecryptInit_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *type,
- ENGINE *impl, unsigned char *key, unsigned char *iv);
+ ENGINE *impl, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv);
int EVP_DecryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
int *outl, const unsigned char *in, int inl);
int EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *outm,
int *outl);
int EVP_CipherInit_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *type,
- ENGINE *impl, unsigned char *key, unsigned char *iv, int enc);
+ ENGINE *impl, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
int EVP_CipherUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
- int *outl, unsigned char *in, int inl);
+ int *outl, const unsigned char *in, int inl);
int EVP_CipherFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *outm,
int *outl);
int EVP_EncryptInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *type,
- unsigned char *key, unsigned char *iv);
+ const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv);
int EVP_EncryptFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
int *outl);
int EVP_DecryptInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *type,
- unsigned char *key, unsigned char *iv);
+ const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv);
int EVP_DecryptFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *outm,
int *outl);
int EVP_CipherInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *type,
- unsigned char *key, unsigned char *iv, int enc);
+ const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
int EVP_CipherFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *outm,
int *outl);
alternative chain can be found that is trusted. With this flag set the behaviour
will match that of OpenSSL versions prior to 1.0.2b.
+The B<X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST> flag causes chain construction to look for
+issuers in the trust store before looking at the untrusted certificates
+provided as part of the the peer chain.
+Though it is not on by default in OpenSSL 1.0.2, applications should generally
+set this flag.
+Local issuer certificates are often more likely to satisfy local security
+requirements and lead to a locally trusted root.
+This is especially important When some certificates in the trust store have
+explicit trust settings (see "TRUST SETTINGS" in L<x509(1)>).
+
+The B<X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN> flag causes intermediate certificates in the
+trust store to be treated as trust-anchors, in the same way as the self-signed
+root CA certificates.
+This makes it possible to trust certificates issued by an intermediate CA
+without having to trust its ancestor root CA.
+With OpenSSL 1.0.2, chain construction continues as long as there are
+additional trusted issuers in the trust store, and the last trusted issuer
+becomes the trust-anchor.
+Thus, even when an intermediate certificate is found in the trust store, the
+verified chain passed to callbacks may still be anchored by a root CA.
+
=head1 NOTES
The above functions should be used to manipulate verification parameters
L<X509_verify_cert(3)|X509_verify_cert(3)>,
L<X509_check_host(3)|X509_check_host(3)>,
L<X509_check_email(3)|X509_check_email(3)>,
-L<X509_check_ip(3)|X509_check_ip(3)>
+L<X509_check_ip(3)|X509_check_ip(3)>,
+L<x509(1)|x509(1)>
=head1 HISTORY
=head1 DESCRIPTION
-OpenSSL can safely be used in multi-threaded applications provided
-that at least two callback functions are set, locking_function and
+OpenSSL can generally be used safely in multi-threaded applications provided
+that at least two callback functions are set, the locking_function and
threadid_func.
+Note that OpenSSL is not completely thread-safe, and unfortunately not all
+global resources have the necessary locks.
+Further, the thread-safety does not extend to things like multiple threads
+using the same B<SSL> object at the same time.
locking_function(int mode, int n, const char *file, int line) is
needed to perform locking on shared data structures.
openssl dgst -mac gost-mac -macopt key:<32 bytes of key> datafile
- Note absense of an option that specifies digest algorithm. gost-mac
+ Note absence of an option that specifies digest algorithm. gost-mac
algorithm supports only one digest (which is actually part of
implementation of this mac) and OpenSSL is clever enough to find out
this.
7. Testing speed of symmetric ciphers.
To test performance of GOST symmetric ciphers you should use -evp switch
-of the openssl speed command. Engine-provided ciphers couldn't be
-accessed by cipher-specific functions, only via generic evp interface
+of the openssl speed command. Engine-provided ciphers can be accessed only via
+generic evp interface and not by cipher-specific functions.
openssl speed -evp gost89
openssl speed -evp gost89-cnt
PROGRAMMING INTERFACES DETAILS
-Applications never should access engine directly. They only use provided
+Applications should never access engine directly. They should only use provided
EVP_PKEY API. But there are some details, which should be taken into
account.
generate random UKM.
-This sources include implementation of GOST 28147-89 and GOST R 34.11-94
-which are completely indepentent from OpenSSL and can be used separately
-(files gost89.c, gost89.h, gosthash.c, gosthash.h) Utility gostsum (file
-gostsum.c) is provided as example of such separate usage. This is
-program, simular to md5sum and sha1sum utilities, but calculates GOST R
-34.11-94 hash.
+These sources include implementation of GOST 28147-89 and GOST R 34.11-94
+which are completely independent from OpenSSL and can be used separately
+(files gost89.c, gost89.h, gosthash.c, gosthash.h). Utility gostsum (file
+gostsum.c) is provided as an example of such separate usage. This program is
+similar to md5sum and sha1sum utilities, but calculates GOST R 34.11-94 hash.
Makefile doesn't include rule for compiling gostsum.
Use command
return ret;
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE
-IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_gost)
- IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN()
-#endif /* ndef OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE */
static int gost_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest,
const int **nids, int nid)
{
ENGINE_free(toadd);
ERR_clear_error();
}
+#else
+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_gost)
+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN()
#endif
goto err;
}
/* Prepare the key-data */
- memset(&keydata, 0, sizeof keydata);
+ memset(&keydata, 0, sizeof(keydata));
numbytes = BN_num_bytes(m);
memset(exponent->d, 0, numbytes);
memset(modulus->d, 0, numbytes);
Summary: Secure Sockets Layer and cryptography libraries and tools
Name: openssl
-Version: 1.0.2n
+Version: 1.0.2o
Source0: ftp://ftp.openssl.org/source/%{name}-%{version}.tar.gz
License: OpenSSL
Group: System Environment/Libraries
d1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
d1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h d1_srvr.c
d1_srvr.o: ssl_locl.h
-kssl.o: ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+kssl.o: ../crypto/o_time.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
kssl.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
kssl.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dtls1.h
kssl.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
* Note that unlike other SSL tests, we don't test against our own SSL
* server method. Firstly because we don't have one; we *only* support
* DTLS1_BAD_VER as a client. And secondly because even if that were
- * fixed up it's the wrong thing to test against — because if changes
+ * fixed up it's the wrong thing to test against - because if changes
* are made in generic DTLS code which don't take DTLS1_BAD_VER into
* account, there's plenty of scope for making those changes such that
* they break *both* the client and the server in the same way.
if (!ssl3_new(s))
return (0);
- if ((d1 = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *d1)) == NULL)
+ if ((d1 = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*d1))) == NULL)
return (0);
- memset(d1, 0, sizeof *d1);
+ memset(d1, 0, sizeof(*d1));
/* d1->handshake_epoch=0; */
* (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
*/
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
n2s(p, rr->length);
- /* Lets check version */
- if (!s->first_packet) {
+ /*
+ * Lets check the version. We tolerate alerts that don't have the exact
+ * version number (e.g. because of protocol version errors)
+ */
+ if (!s->first_packet && rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
if (version != s->version) {
/* unexpected version, silently discard */
rr->length = 0;
unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
- dest_maxlen = sizeof s->d1->handshake_fragment;
+ dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->d1->handshake_fragment);
dest = s->d1->handshake_fragment;
dest_len = &s->d1->handshake_fragment_len;
} else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
goto start;
}
+ /*
+ * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
+ * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on.
+ */
+ if (s->server
+ && SSL_is_init_finished(s)
+ && !s->s3->send_connection_binding
+ && s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
+ && s->d1->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
+ && s->s3->previous_client_finished_len != 0
+ && (s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) == 0) {
+ s->d1->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
+ rr->length = 0;
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
+ goto start;
+ }
+
+
if (s->d1->alert_fragment_len >= DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH) {
int alert_level = s->d1->alert_fragment[0];
int alert_descr = s->d1->alert_fragment[1];
s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,
SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
- BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr);
+ BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), "%d", alert_descr);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
- SSL_CTX *sctx, *cctx;
- SSL *sssl, *cssl;
+ SSL_CTX *sctx = NULL, *cctx = NULL;
+ SSL *sssl = NULL, *cssl = NULL;
const char *msg = "Dummy";
BIO *err = NULL, *wbio = NULL;
int ret = 1, len;
}
/* SSL_read()/SSL_write should fail because of a previous fatal error */
- if ((len = SSL_read(sssl, buf, sizeof(buf - 1))) > 0) {
+ if ((len = SSL_read(sssl, buf, sizeof(buf) - 1)) > 0) {
buf[len] = '\0';
printf("Unexpected success reading data: %s\n", buf);
goto err;
* 2000.
*/
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2000 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
+#include "o_time.h"
#include "kssl_lcl.h"
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
int outl, unencbufsize;
struct tm tm_time, *tm_l, *tm_g;
time_t now, tl, tg, tr, tz_offset;
+ struct tm gmt_result = {0};
+ struct tm lt_result = {0};
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
*atimep = 0;
}
# endif
enc = kssl_map_enc(enctype);
- memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
+ memset(iv, 0, sizeof(iv)); /* per RFC 1510 */
if (enc == NULL) {
/*
if (k_gmtime(auth->ctime, &tm_time) &&
((tr = mktime(&tm_time)) != (time_t)(-1))) {
now = time(&now);
+ tm_g = OPENSSL_gmtime(&now, &gmt_result);
+
+# if defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) && \
+ !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_OS2) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_SUNOS) && \
+ (!defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) || defined(localtime_r))
+ tm_l = localtime_r(&now, <_result);
+# else
tm_l = localtime(&now);
+# endif
+
tl = mktime(tm_l);
- tm_g = gmtime(&now);
tg = mktime(tm_g);
tz_offset = tg - tl;
if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
goto err;
- n = ssl23_read_bytes(s, sizeof buf_space);
- if (n != sizeof buf_space)
+ n = ssl23_read_bytes(s, sizeof(buf_space));
+ if (n != sizeof(buf_space))
return (n); /* n == -1 || n == 0 */
p = s->packet;
}
s->s2->conn_id_length = s->s2->tmp.conn_id_length;
- if (s->s2->conn_id_length > sizeof s->s2->conn_id) {
+ if (s->s2->conn_id_length > sizeof(s->s2->conn_id)) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SSL2_CONNECTION_ID_TOO_LONG);
return -1;
if (s->state == SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_FINISHED_A) {
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
*(p++) = SSL2_MT_CLIENT_FINISHED;
- if (s->s2->conn_id_length > sizeof s->s2->conn_id) {
+ if (s->s2->conn_id_length > sizeof(s->s2->conn_id)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_CLIENT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
} else {
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_SESS_ID_BUG)) {
if ((s->session->session_id_length >
- sizeof s->session->session_id)
+ sizeof(s->session->session_id))
|| (0 !=
memcmp(buf + 1, s->session->session_id,
(unsigned int)s->session->session_id_length))) {
num = c->key_len;
s->s2->key_material_length = num * 2;
- OPENSSL_assert(s->s2->key_material_length <= sizeof s->s2->key_material);
+ OPENSSL_assert(s->s2->key_material_length <= sizeof(s->s2->key_material));
if (ssl2_generate_key_material(s) <= 0)
return 0;
{
SSL2_STATE *s2;
- if ((s2 = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *s2)) == NULL)
+ if ((s2 = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*s2))) == NULL)
goto err;
- memset(s2, 0, sizeof *s2);
+ memset(s2, 0, sizeof(*s2));
# if SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER + 3 > SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER + 2
# error "assertion failed"
OPENSSL_free(s2->rbuf);
if (s2->wbuf != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(s2->wbuf);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(s2, sizeof *s2);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(s2, sizeof(*s2));
OPENSSL_free(s2);
s->s2 = NULL;
}
rbuf = s2->rbuf;
wbuf = s2->wbuf;
- memset(s2, 0, sizeof *s2);
+ memset(s2, 0, sizeof(*s2));
s2->rbuf = rbuf;
s2->wbuf = wbuf;
p += s->s2->tmp.session_id_length;
/* challenge */
- if (s->s2->challenge_length > sizeof s->s2->challenge) {
+ if (s->s2->challenge_length > sizeof(s->s2->challenge)) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
/* SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED_B */
- if (s->s2->conn_id_length > sizeof s->s2->conn_id) {
+ if (s->s2->conn_id_length > sizeof(s->s2->conn_id)) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
if (s->state == SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_VERIFY_A) {
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
*(p++) = SSL2_MT_SERVER_VERIFY;
- if (s->s2->challenge_length > sizeof s->s2->challenge) {
+ if (s->s2->challenge_length > sizeof(s->s2->challenge)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SERVER_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
*(p++) = SSL2_MT_SERVER_FINISHED;
- if (s->session->session_id_length > sizeof s->session->session_id) {
+ if (s->session->session_id_length > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SERVER_FINISH, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
/* get the session-id */
j = *(p++);
- if ((j > sizeof s->session->session_id) || (j > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE)) {
+ if ((j > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) || (j > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE)) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
tmp_buf[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
tmp_buf[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
- if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]), sizeof tmp_buf - 2) <= 0)
+ if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]), sizeof(tmp_buf) - 2) <= 0)
goto err;
- s->session->master_key_length = sizeof tmp_buf;
+ s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(tmp_buf);
q = p;
/* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
p += 2;
- n = RSA_public_encrypt(sizeof tmp_buf,
+ n = RSA_public_encrypt(sizeof(tmp_buf),
tmp_buf, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
# ifdef PKCS1_CHECK
if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1)
s->
session->master_key,
tmp_buf,
- sizeof tmp_buf);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
+ sizeof(tmp_buf));
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof(tmp_buf));
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
tmp_buf[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
tmp_buf[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
- if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]), sizeof tmp_buf - 2) <= 0)
+ if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]), sizeof(tmp_buf) - 2) <= 0)
goto err;
/*-
* EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
*/
- memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
+ memset(iv, 0, sizeof(iv)); /* per RFC 1510 */
EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv);
EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, epms, &outl, tmp_buf,
- sizeof tmp_buf);
+ sizeof(tmp_buf));
EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(epms[outl]), &padl);
outl += padl;
- if (outl > (int)sizeof epms) {
+ if (outl > (int)sizeof(epms)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
s->
session->master_key,
tmp_buf,
- sizeof tmp_buf);
+ sizeof(tmp_buf));
- OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof(tmp_buf));
OPENSSL_cleanse(epms, outl);
}
#endif
{
SSL3_STATE *s3;
- if ((s3 = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *s3)) == NULL)
+ if ((s3 = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*s3))) == NULL)
goto err;
- memset(s3, 0, sizeof *s3);
+ memset(s3, 0, sizeof(*s3));
memset(s3->rrec.seq_num, 0, sizeof(s3->rrec.seq_num));
memset(s3->wrec.seq_num, 0, sizeof(s3->wrec.seq_num));
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
SSL_SRP_CTX_free(s);
#endif
- OPENSSL_cleanse(s->s3, sizeof *s->s3);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(s->s3, sizeof(*s->s3));
OPENSSL_free(s->s3);
s->s3 = NULL;
}
s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
}
#endif
- memset(s->s3, 0, sizeof *s->s3);
+ memset(s->s3, 0, sizeof(*s->s3));
s->s3->rbuf.buf = rp;
s->s3->wbuf.buf = wp;
s->s3->rbuf.len = rlen;
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
int i;
SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &(s->s3->wbuf);
-/* XXXX */
if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
- || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
- !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
+ || (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER)
+ && (s->s3->wpend_buf != buf))
|| (s->s3->wpend_type != type)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
return (-1);
unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
- dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;
+ dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->s3->handshake_fragment);
dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
} else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
- dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;
+ dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->s3->alert_fragment);
dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
}
*/
goto start;
}
+
/*
* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
- * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. WARNING:
- * experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
+ * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on.
*/
- if (s->server &&
- SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
- !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
- (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
- (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
- (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
- (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
- !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
- /*
- * s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
- */
+ if (s->server
+ && SSL_is_init_finished(s)
+ && !s->s3->send_connection_binding
+ && s->version > SSL3_VERSION
+ && s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
+ && s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
+ && s->s3->previous_client_finished_len != 0
+ && (s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) == 0) {
+ s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
rr->length = 0;
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
goto start;
}
+
if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2) {
int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
- BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr);
+ BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), "%d", alert_descr);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
/*
* Note that the length is checked again below, ** after decryption
*/
- if (enc_pms.length > sizeof pms) {
+ if (enc_pms.length > sizeof(pms)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
if (enc == NULL)
goto err;
- memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
+ memset(iv, 0, sizeof(iv)); /* per RFC 1510 */
if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
{
SESS_CERT *ret;
- ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *ret);
+ ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ret));
if (ret == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESS_CERT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
- memset(ret, 0, sizeof *ret);
+ memset(ret, 0, sizeof(*ret));
ret->peer_key = &(ret->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
ret->references = 1;
char buf[1024];
int r;
- if (strlen(dir) + strlen(filename) + 2 > sizeof buf) {
+ if (strlen(dir) + strlen(filename) + 2 > sizeof(buf)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK,
SSL_R_PATH_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
- r = BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s%s", dir, filename);
+ r = BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s%s", dir, filename);
#else
- r = BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s/%s", dir, filename);
+ r = BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s/%s", dir, filename);
#endif
if (r <= 0 || r >= (int)sizeof(buf))
goto err;
s->verify_depth = ctx->verify_depth;
#endif
s->sid_ctx_length = ctx->sid_ctx_length;
- OPENSSL_assert(s->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof s->sid_ctx);
+ OPENSSL_assert(s->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof(s->sid_ctx));
memcpy(&s->sid_ctx, &ctx->sid_ctx, sizeof(s->sid_ctx));
s->verify_callback = ctx->default_verify_callback;
s->generate_session_id = ctx->generate_session_id;
int SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
unsigned int sid_ctx_len)
{
- if (sid_ctx_len > sizeof ctx->sid_ctx) {
+ if (sid_ctx_len > sizeof(ctx->sid_ctx)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT,
SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG);
return 0;
*/
SSL_SESSION r, *p;
- if (id_len > sizeof r.session_id)
+ if (id_len > sizeof(r.session_id))
return 0;
r.ssl_version = ssl->version;
ss->session_id_length = 0;
}
- if (s->sid_ctx_length > sizeof ss->sid_ctx) {
+ if (s->sid_ctx_length > sizeof(ss->sid_ctx)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
return 0;
CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, ss, &ss->ex_data);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->key_arg, sizeof ss->key_arg);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->master_key, sizeof ss->master_key);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->session_id, sizeof ss->session_id);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->key_arg, sizeof(ss->key_arg));
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->master_key, sizeof(ss->master_key));
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->session_id, sizeof(ss->session_id));
if (ss->sess_cert != NULL)
ssl_sess_cert_free(ss->sess_cert);
if (ss->peer != NULL)
}
CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON);
- RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof rnd_seed);
+ RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof(rnd_seed));
bio_stdout = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT);
{
int session_id_context = 0;
SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(s_ctx, (void *)&session_id_context,
- sizeof session_id_context);
+ sizeof(session_id_context));
SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(s_ctx2, (void *)&session_id_context,
- sizeof session_id_context);
+ sizeof(session_id_context));
}
/* Use PSK only if PSK key is given */
if (c_ssl && c_ssl->kssl_ctx) {
char localhost[MAXHOSTNAMELEN + 2];
- if (gethostname(localhost, sizeof localhost - 1) == 0) {
- localhost[sizeof localhost - 1] = '\0';
- if (strlen(localhost) == sizeof localhost - 1) {
+ if (gethostname(localhost, sizeof(localhost) - 1) == 0) {
+ localhost[sizeof(localhost) - 1] = '\0';
+ if (strlen(localhost) == sizeof(localhost) - 1) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "localhost name too long\n");
goto end;
}
if (cw_num > 0) {
/* Write to server. */
- if (cw_num > (long)sizeof cbuf)
- i = sizeof cbuf;
+ if (cw_num > (long)sizeof(cbuf))
+ i = sizeof(cbuf);
else
i = (int)cw_num;
r = BIO_write(c_ssl_bio, cbuf, i);
if (sw_num > 0) {
/* Write to client. */
- if (sw_num > (long)sizeof sbuf)
- i = sizeof sbuf;
+ if (sw_num > (long)sizeof(sbuf))
+ i = sizeof(sbuf);
else
i = (int)sw_num;
r = BIO_write(s_ssl_bio, sbuf, i);
char *s, buf[256];
s = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(ctx->current_cert), buf,
- sizeof buf);
+ sizeof(buf));
if (s != NULL) {
if (ok)
fprintf(stderr, "depth=%d %s\n", ctx->error_depth, buf);
int hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
EVP_MD_CTX *hdgst = s->s3->handshake_dgst[idx];
if (!hdgst || hashsize < 0
- || hashsize > (int)(sizeof buf - (size_t)(q - buf))) {
+ || hashsize > (int)(sizeof(buf) - (size_t)(q - buf))) {
/*
* internal error: 'buf' is too small for this cipersuite!
*/
if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
str, slen, buf, (int)(q - buf), NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length,
- out, buf2, sizeof buf2))
+ out, buf2, sizeof(buf2)))
err = 1;
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
if (err)
return 0;
else
- return sizeof buf2;
+ return sizeof(buf2);
}
int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
co, col,
s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
- so, sol, p, len, s->session->master_key, buff, sizeof buff);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(buff, sizeof buff);
+ so, sol, p, len, s->session->master_key, buff, sizeof(buff));
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buff, sizeof(buff));
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "Premaster Secret:\n");
BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)p, len);
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
unsigned char *sdata = data;
- int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
+ int ecpointformatlist_length;
+ if (size == 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
goto err;
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
unsigned char *sdata = data;
- int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
+ int ecpointformatlist_length;
+
+ if (size == 0) {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
+ /* Need at least keyname + iv */
+ if (eticklen < 16 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH)
+ return 2;
+
/* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
&ctx, &hctx, 0);
if (rv < 0)
- return -1;
- if (rv == 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (rv == 0) {
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return 2;
+ }
if (rv == 2)
renew_ticket = 1;
} else {
break;
case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
- if (msglen != 2)
+ if (msglen != 2) {
BIO_puts(bio, " Illegal Alert Length\n");
- else {
+ } else {
BIO_printf(bio, " Level=%s(%d), description=%s(%d)\n",
SSL_alert_type_string_long(msg[0] << 8),
msg[0], SSL_alert_desc_string_long(msg[1]), msg[1]);
}
+ break;
+
case TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT:
ssl_print_heartbeat(bio, 4, msg, msglen);
break;
assert(v->length <= MAX_VECTOR_SIZE);
if (v->encrypt == AES_ENCRYPT)
- AES_set_encrypt_key(v->key, 8 * sizeof v->key, &key);
+ AES_set_encrypt_key(v->key, 8 * sizeof(v->key), &key);
else
- AES_set_decrypt_key(v->key, 8 * sizeof v->key, &key);
- memcpy(iv, v->iv, sizeof iv);
+ AES_set_decrypt_key(v->key, 8 * sizeof(v->key), &key);
+ memcpy(iv, v->iv, sizeof(iv));
AES_ige_encrypt(v->in, buf, v->length, &key, iv, v->encrypt);
if (memcmp(v->out, buf, v->length)) {
printf("IGE test vector %d failed\n", n);
- hexdump(stdout, "key", v->key, sizeof v->key);
- hexdump(stdout, "iv", v->iv, sizeof v->iv);
+ hexdump(stdout, "key", v->key, sizeof(v->key));
+ hexdump(stdout, "iv", v->iv, sizeof(v->iv));
hexdump(stdout, "in", v->in, v->length);
hexdump(stdout, "expected", v->out, v->length);
hexdump(stdout, "got", buf, v->length);
}
/* try with in == out */
- memcpy(iv, v->iv, sizeof iv);
+ memcpy(iv, v->iv, sizeof(iv));
memcpy(buf, v->in, v->length);
AES_ige_encrypt(buf, buf, v->length, &key, iv, v->encrypt);
if (memcmp(v->out, buf, v->length)) {
printf("IGE test vector %d failed (with in == out)\n", n);
- hexdump(stdout, "key", v->key, sizeof v->key);
- hexdump(stdout, "iv", v->iv, sizeof v->iv);
+ hexdump(stdout, "key", v->key, sizeof(v->key));
+ hexdump(stdout, "iv", v->iv, sizeof(v->iv));
hexdump(stdout, "in", v->in, v->length);
hexdump(stdout, "expected", v->out, v->length);
hexdump(stdout, "got", buf, v->length);
if (memcmp(v->out, buf, v->length)) {
printf("Bidirectional IGE test vector %d failed\n", n);
- hexdump(stdout, "key 1", v->key1, sizeof v->key1);
- hexdump(stdout, "key 2", v->key2, sizeof v->key2);
- hexdump(stdout, "iv", v->iv, sizeof v->iv);
+ hexdump(stdout, "key 1", v->key1, sizeof(v->key1));
+ hexdump(stdout, "key 2", v->key2, sizeof(v->key2));
+ hexdump(stdout, "iv", v->iv, sizeof(v->iv));
hexdump(stdout, "in", v->in, v->length);
hexdump(stdout, "expected", v->out, v->length);
hexdump(stdout, "got", buf, v->length);
assert(BIG_TEST_SIZE >= TEST_SIZE);
- RAND_pseudo_bytes(rkey, sizeof rkey);
- RAND_pseudo_bytes(plaintext, sizeof plaintext);
- RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, sizeof iv);
- memcpy(saved_iv, iv, sizeof saved_iv);
+ RAND_pseudo_bytes(rkey, sizeof(rkey));
+ RAND_pseudo_bytes(plaintext, sizeof(plaintext));
+ RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, sizeof(iv));
+ memcpy(saved_iv, iv, sizeof(saved_iv));
/* Forward IGE only... */
/* Straight encrypt/decrypt */
- AES_set_encrypt_key(rkey, 8 * sizeof rkey, &key);
+ AES_set_encrypt_key(rkey, 8 * sizeof(rkey), &key);
AES_ige_encrypt(plaintext, ciphertext, TEST_SIZE, &key, iv, AES_ENCRYPT);
- AES_set_decrypt_key(rkey, 8 * sizeof rkey, &key);
- memcpy(iv, saved_iv, sizeof iv);
+ AES_set_decrypt_key(rkey, 8 * sizeof(rkey), &key);
+ memcpy(iv, saved_iv, sizeof(iv));
AES_ige_encrypt(ciphertext, checktext, TEST_SIZE, &key, iv, AES_DECRYPT);
if (memcmp(checktext, plaintext, TEST_SIZE)) {
}
/* Now check encrypt chaining works */
- AES_set_encrypt_key(rkey, 8 * sizeof rkey, &key);
- memcpy(iv, saved_iv, sizeof iv);
+ AES_set_encrypt_key(rkey, 8 * sizeof(rkey), &key);
+ memcpy(iv, saved_iv, sizeof(iv));
AES_ige_encrypt(plaintext, ciphertext, TEST_SIZE / 2, &key, iv,
AES_ENCRYPT);
AES_ige_encrypt(plaintext + TEST_SIZE / 2,
ciphertext + TEST_SIZE / 2, TEST_SIZE / 2,
&key, iv, AES_ENCRYPT);
- AES_set_decrypt_key(rkey, 8 * sizeof rkey, &key);
- memcpy(iv, saved_iv, sizeof iv);
+ AES_set_decrypt_key(rkey, 8 * sizeof(rkey), &key);
+ memcpy(iv, saved_iv, sizeof(iv));
AES_ige_encrypt(ciphertext, checktext, TEST_SIZE, &key, iv, AES_DECRYPT);
if (memcmp(checktext, plaintext, TEST_SIZE)) {
}
/* And check decrypt chaining */
- AES_set_encrypt_key(rkey, 8 * sizeof rkey, &key);
- memcpy(iv, saved_iv, sizeof iv);
+ AES_set_encrypt_key(rkey, 8 * sizeof(rkey), &key);
+ memcpy(iv, saved_iv, sizeof(iv));
AES_ige_encrypt(plaintext, ciphertext, TEST_SIZE / 2, &key, iv,
AES_ENCRYPT);
AES_ige_encrypt(plaintext + TEST_SIZE / 2,
ciphertext + TEST_SIZE / 2, TEST_SIZE / 2,
&key, iv, AES_ENCRYPT);
- AES_set_decrypt_key(rkey, 8 * sizeof rkey, &key);
- memcpy(iv, saved_iv, sizeof iv);
+ AES_set_decrypt_key(rkey, 8 * sizeof(rkey), &key);
+ memcpy(iv, saved_iv, sizeof(iv));
AES_ige_encrypt(ciphertext, checktext, TEST_SIZE / 2, &key, iv,
AES_DECRYPT);
AES_ige_encrypt(ciphertext + TEST_SIZE / 2,
}
/* make sure garble extends forwards only */
- AES_set_encrypt_key(rkey, 8 * sizeof rkey, &key);
- memcpy(iv, saved_iv, sizeof iv);
- AES_ige_encrypt(plaintext, ciphertext, sizeof plaintext, &key, iv,
+ AES_set_encrypt_key(rkey, 8 * sizeof(rkey), &key);
+ memcpy(iv, saved_iv, sizeof(iv));
+ AES_ige_encrypt(plaintext, ciphertext, sizeof(plaintext), &key, iv,
AES_ENCRYPT);
/* corrupt halfway through */
- ++ciphertext[sizeof ciphertext / 2];
- AES_set_decrypt_key(rkey, 8 * sizeof rkey, &key);
- memcpy(iv, saved_iv, sizeof iv);
- AES_ige_encrypt(ciphertext, checktext, sizeof checktext, &key, iv,
+ ++ciphertext[sizeof(ciphertext) / 2];
+ AES_set_decrypt_key(rkey, 8 * sizeof(rkey), &key);
+ memcpy(iv, saved_iv, sizeof(iv));
+ AES_ige_encrypt(ciphertext, checktext, sizeof(checktext), &key, iv,
AES_DECRYPT);
matches = 0;
- for (n = 0; n < sizeof checktext; ++n)
+ for (n = 0; n < sizeof(checktext); ++n)
if (checktext[n] == plaintext[n])
++matches;
- if (matches > sizeof checktext / 2 + sizeof checktext / 100) {
+ if (matches > sizeof(checktext) / 2 + sizeof(checktext) / 100) {
printf("More than 51%% matches after garbling\n");
++err;
}
- if (matches < sizeof checktext / 2) {
+ if (matches < sizeof(checktext) / 2) {
printf("Garble extends backwards!\n");
++err;
}
*/
/* possible with biIGE, so the IV is not updated. */
- RAND_pseudo_bytes(rkey2, sizeof rkey2);
+ RAND_pseudo_bytes(rkey2, sizeof(rkey2));
/* Straight encrypt/decrypt */
- AES_set_encrypt_key(rkey, 8 * sizeof rkey, &key);
- AES_set_encrypt_key(rkey2, 8 * sizeof rkey2, &key2);
+ AES_set_encrypt_key(rkey, 8 * sizeof(rkey), &key);
+ AES_set_encrypt_key(rkey2, 8 * sizeof(rkey2), &key2);
AES_bi_ige_encrypt(plaintext, ciphertext, TEST_SIZE, &key, &key2, iv,
AES_ENCRYPT);
- AES_set_decrypt_key(rkey, 8 * sizeof rkey, &key);
- AES_set_decrypt_key(rkey2, 8 * sizeof rkey2, &key2);
+ AES_set_decrypt_key(rkey, 8 * sizeof(rkey), &key);
+ AES_set_decrypt_key(rkey2, 8 * sizeof(rkey2), &key2);
AES_bi_ige_encrypt(ciphertext, checktext, TEST_SIZE, &key, &key2, iv,
AES_DECRYPT);
}
/* make sure garble extends both ways */
- AES_set_encrypt_key(rkey, 8 * sizeof rkey, &key);
- AES_set_encrypt_key(rkey2, 8 * sizeof rkey2, &key2);
- AES_ige_encrypt(plaintext, ciphertext, sizeof plaintext, &key, iv,
+ AES_set_encrypt_key(rkey, 8 * sizeof(rkey), &key);
+ AES_set_encrypt_key(rkey2, 8 * sizeof(rkey2), &key2);
+ AES_ige_encrypt(plaintext, ciphertext, sizeof(plaintext), &key, iv,
AES_ENCRYPT);
/* corrupt halfway through */
- ++ciphertext[sizeof ciphertext / 2];
- AES_set_decrypt_key(rkey, 8 * sizeof rkey, &key);
- AES_set_decrypt_key(rkey2, 8 * sizeof rkey2, &key2);
- AES_ige_encrypt(ciphertext, checktext, sizeof checktext, &key, iv,
+ ++ciphertext[sizeof(ciphertext) / 2];
+ AES_set_decrypt_key(rkey, 8 * sizeof(rkey), &key);
+ AES_set_decrypt_key(rkey2, 8 * sizeof(rkey2), &key2);
+ AES_ige_encrypt(ciphertext, checktext, sizeof(checktext), &key, iv,
AES_DECRYPT);
matches = 0;
- for (n = 0; n < sizeof checktext; ++n)
+ for (n = 0; n < sizeof(checktext); ++n)
if (checktext[n] == plaintext[n])
++matches;
- if (matches > sizeof checktext / 100) {
+ if (matches > sizeof(checktext) / 100) {
printf("More than 1%% matches after bidirectional garbling\n");
++err;
}
/* make sure garble extends both ways (2) */
- AES_set_encrypt_key(rkey, 8 * sizeof rkey, &key);
- AES_set_encrypt_key(rkey2, 8 * sizeof rkey2, &key2);
- AES_ige_encrypt(plaintext, ciphertext, sizeof plaintext, &key, iv,
+ AES_set_encrypt_key(rkey, 8 * sizeof(rkey), &key);
+ AES_set_encrypt_key(rkey2, 8 * sizeof(rkey2), &key2);
+ AES_ige_encrypt(plaintext, ciphertext, sizeof(plaintext), &key, iv,
AES_ENCRYPT);
/* corrupt right at the end */
- ++ciphertext[sizeof ciphertext - 1];
- AES_set_decrypt_key(rkey, 8 * sizeof rkey, &key);
- AES_set_decrypt_key(rkey2, 8 * sizeof rkey2, &key2);
- AES_ige_encrypt(ciphertext, checktext, sizeof checktext, &key, iv,
+ ++ciphertext[sizeof(ciphertext) - 1];
+ AES_set_decrypt_key(rkey, 8 * sizeof(rkey), &key);
+ AES_set_decrypt_key(rkey2, 8 * sizeof(rkey2), &key2);
+ AES_ige_encrypt(ciphertext, checktext, sizeof(checktext), &key, iv,
AES_DECRYPT);
matches = 0;
- for (n = 0; n < sizeof checktext; ++n)
+ for (n = 0; n < sizeof(checktext); ++n)
if (checktext[n] == plaintext[n])
++matches;
- if (matches > sizeof checktext / 100) {
+ if (matches > sizeof(checktext) / 100) {
printf("More than 1%% matches after bidirectional garbling (2)\n");
++err;
}
/* make sure garble extends both ways (3) */
- AES_set_encrypt_key(rkey, 8 * sizeof rkey, &key);
- AES_set_encrypt_key(rkey2, 8 * sizeof rkey2, &key2);
- AES_ige_encrypt(plaintext, ciphertext, sizeof plaintext, &key, iv,
+ AES_set_encrypt_key(rkey, 8 * sizeof(rkey), &key);
+ AES_set_encrypt_key(rkey2, 8 * sizeof(rkey2), &key2);
+ AES_ige_encrypt(plaintext, ciphertext, sizeof(plaintext), &key, iv,
AES_ENCRYPT);
/* corrupt right at the start */
++ciphertext[0];
- AES_set_decrypt_key(rkey, 8 * sizeof rkey, &key);
- AES_set_decrypt_key(rkey2, 8 * sizeof rkey2, &key2);
- AES_ige_encrypt(ciphertext, checktext, sizeof checktext, &key, iv,
+ AES_set_decrypt_key(rkey, 8 * sizeof(rkey), &key);
+ AES_set_decrypt_key(rkey2, 8 * sizeof(rkey2), &key2);
+ AES_ige_encrypt(ciphertext, checktext, sizeof(checktext), &key, iv,
AES_DECRYPT);
matches = 0;
- for (n = 0; n < sizeof checktext; ++n)
+ for (n = 0; n < sizeof(checktext); ++n)
if (checktext[n] == plaintext[n])
++matches;
- if (matches > sizeof checktext / 100) {
+ if (matches > sizeof(checktext) / 100) {
printf("More than 1%% matches after bidirectional garbling (3)\n");
++err;
}
"EVP_TEST,EVP_EXTRA_TEST,IGETEST,JPAKETEST,SRPTEST,"+ -
"ASN1TEST,V3NAMETEST,HEARTBEAT_TEST,"+ -
"CONSTANT_TIME_TEST,VERIFY_EXTRA_TEST,"+ -
- "CLIENTHELLOTEST,SSLV2CONFTEST,DTLSTEST"
-$! Should we add MTTEST,PQ_TEST,LH_TEST,DIVTEST,TABTEST as well?
+ "CLIENTHELLOTEST,SSLV2CONFTEST,DTLSTEST,"+ -
+ "BAD_DTLS_TEST,FATALERRTEST"
$!
$! Additional directory information.
$ T_D_BNTEST := [-.crypto.bn]
$ T_D_CONSTANT_TIME_TEST := [-.crypto]
$ T_D_VERIFY_EXTRA_TEST := [-.crypto.x509]
$ T_D_CLIENTHELLOTEST := [-.ssl]
+$ T_D_BAD_DTLS_TEST := [-.ssl]
$ T_D_SSLV2CONFTEST := [-.ssl]
$ T_D_DTLSTEST := [-.ssl]
+$ T_D_FATALERRTEST := [-.ssl]
$
$ EXOBJ_DTLSTEST := SSLTESTLIB
+$ EXOBJ_FATALERRTEST := SSLTESTLIB
$!
$ TCPIP_PROGRAMS = ",,"
$ IF COMPILER .EQS. "VAXC" THEN -
test_gen,test_req,test_pkcs7,test_verify,test_dh,test_dsa,-
test_ss,test_ca,test_engine,test_evp,test_evp_extra,test_ssl,test_tsa,test_ige,-
test_jpake,test_srp,test_cms,test_ocsp,test_v3name,test_heartbeat,-
- test_constant_time,test_verify_extra,test_clienthello,test_sslv2conftest,test_dtls
+ test_constant_time,test_verify_extra,test_clienthello,test_sslv2conftest,-
+ test_dtls,test_bad_dtls,test_fatalerr
$ endif
$ tests = f$edit(tests,"COLLAPSE")
$
$ CONSTTIMETEST := constant_time_test
$ VERIFYEXTRATEST := verify_extra_test
$ CLIENTHELLOTEST := clienthellotest
+$ BADDTLSTEST := bad_dtls_test
$ SSLV2CONFTEST := sslv2conftest
$ DTLSTEST := dtlstest
+$ FATALERRTEST := fatalerrtest
$!
$ tests_i = 0
$ loop_tests:
$ write sys$output "''START' test_clienthello"
$ mcr 'texe_dir''clienthellotest'
$ return
+$ test_bad_dtls:
+$ write sys$output "''START' test_bad_dtls"
+$ mcr 'texe_dir''baddtlstest'
+$ return
+$
+$ test_fatalerr:
+$ write sys$output "''START' test_fatalerrtest"
+$ mcr 'texe_dir''fatalerrtest' 'ROOT'.APPS]server.pem 'ROOT'.APPS]server.pem
+$ return
+$
$ test_sslv2conftest:
$ write sys$output "''START' test_sslv2conftest"
$ mcr 'texe_dir''sslv2conftest'
projects / platform / upstream / openssl.git / commitdiff