/* high level check about policy management - fine grained in
* below after unpack
*/
- error = aa_may_manage_policy(label, ns, mask);
+ error = aa_may_manage_policy(current_cred(), label, ns, mask);
if (error)
goto end_section;
/* high level check about policy management - fine grained in
* below after unpack
*/
- error = aa_may_manage_policy(label, ns, AA_MAY_REMOVE_POLICY);
+ error = aa_may_manage_policy(current_cred(), label, ns,
+ AA_MAY_REMOVE_POLICY);
if (error)
goto out;
int error;
label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
- error = aa_may_manage_policy(label, NULL, AA_MAY_LOAD_POLICY);
+ error = aa_may_manage_policy(current_cred(), label, NULL,
+ AA_MAY_LOAD_POLICY);
end_current_label_crit_section(label);
if (error)
return error;
int error;
label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
- error = aa_may_manage_policy(label, NULL, AA_MAY_LOAD_POLICY);
+ error = aa_may_manage_policy(current_cred(), label, NULL,
+ AA_MAY_LOAD_POLICY);
end_current_label_crit_section(label);
if (error)
return error;
/**
* aa_capable - test permission to use capability
+ * @subj_cread: cred we are testing capability against
* @label: label being tested for capability (NOT NULL)
* @cap: capability to be tested
* @opts: CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT bit determines whether audit record is generated
*
* Returns: 0 on success, or else an error code.
*/
-int aa_capable(struct aa_label *label, int cap, unsigned int opts)
+int aa_capable(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
+ int cap, unsigned int opts)
{
struct aa_profile *profile;
int error = 0;
DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP, AA_CLASS_CAP, OP_CAPABLE);
+ ad.subj_cred = subj_cred;
ad.common.u.cap = cap;
error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
profile_capable(profile, cap, opts, &ad));
/**
* may_change_ptraced_domain - check if can change profile on ptraced task
+ * @cred: cred of task changing domain
* @to_label: profile to change to (NOT NULL)
* @info: message if there is an error
*
*
* Returns: %0 or error if change not allowed
*/
-static int may_change_ptraced_domain(struct aa_label *to_label,
+static int may_change_ptraced_domain(const struct cred *to_cred,
+ struct aa_label *to_label,
const char **info)
{
struct task_struct *tracer;
struct aa_label *tracerl = NULL;
+ const struct cred *tracer_cred = NULL;
+
int error = 0;
rcu_read_lock();
tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
- if (tracer)
+ if (tracer) {
/* released below */
tracerl = aa_get_task_label(tracer);
-
+ tracer_cred = get_task_cred(tracer);
+ }
/* not ptraced */
if (!tracer || unconfined(tracerl))
goto out;
- error = aa_may_ptrace(tracerl, to_label, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);
+ error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer_cred, tracerl, to_cred, to_label,
+ PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);
out:
rcu_read_unlock();
aa_put_label(tracerl);
+ put_cred(tracer_cred);
if (error)
*info = "ptrace prevents transition";
return new;
}
-static struct aa_label *profile_transition(struct aa_profile *profile,
+static struct aa_label *profile_transition(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+ struct aa_profile *profile,
const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
char *buffer, struct path_cond *cond,
bool *secure_exec)
}
audit:
- aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, OP_EXEC, MAY_EXEC, name, target, new,
+ aa_audit_file(subj_cred, profile, &perms, OP_EXEC, MAY_EXEC, name,
+ target, new,
cond->uid, info, error);
if (!new || nonewprivs) {
aa_put_label(new);
return new;
}
-static int profile_onexec(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_label *onexec,
+static int profile_onexec(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+ struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_label *onexec,
bool stack, const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
char *buffer, struct path_cond *cond,
bool *secure_exec)
}
audit:
- return aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, OP_EXEC, AA_MAY_ONEXEC, xname,
+ return aa_audit_file(subj_cred, profile, &perms, OP_EXEC,
+ AA_MAY_ONEXEC, xname,
NULL, onexec, cond->uid, info, error);
}
/* ensure none ns domain transitions are correctly applied with onexec */
-static struct aa_label *handle_onexec(struct aa_label *label,
+static struct aa_label *handle_onexec(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+ struct aa_label *label,
struct aa_label *onexec, bool stack,
const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
char *buffer, struct path_cond *cond,
if (!stack) {
error = fn_for_each_in_ns(label, profile,
- profile_onexec(profile, onexec, stack,
+ profile_onexec(subj_cred, profile, onexec, stack,
bprm, buffer, cond, unsafe));
if (error)
return ERR_PTR(error);
new = fn_label_build_in_ns(label, profile, GFP_KERNEL,
aa_get_newest_label(onexec),
- profile_transition(profile, bprm, buffer,
+ profile_transition(subj_cred, profile, bprm,
+ buffer,
cond, unsafe));
} else {
/* TODO: determine how much we want to loosen this */
error = fn_for_each_in_ns(label, profile,
- profile_onexec(profile, onexec, stack, bprm,
+ profile_onexec(subj_cred, profile, onexec, stack, bprm,
buffer, cond, unsafe));
if (error)
return ERR_PTR(error);
new = fn_label_build_in_ns(label, profile, GFP_KERNEL,
aa_label_merge(&profile->label, onexec,
GFP_KERNEL),
- profile_transition(profile, bprm, buffer,
+ profile_transition(subj_cred, profile, bprm,
+ buffer,
cond, unsafe));
}
/* TODO: get rid of GLOBAL_ROOT_UID */
error = fn_for_each_in_ns(label, profile,
- aa_audit_file(profile, &nullperms, OP_CHANGE_ONEXEC,
+ aa_audit_file(subj_cred, profile, &nullperms,
+ OP_CHANGE_ONEXEC,
AA_MAY_ONEXEC, bprm->filename, NULL,
onexec, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
"failed to build target label", -ENOMEM));
{
struct aa_task_ctx *ctx;
struct aa_label *label, *new = NULL;
+ const struct cred *subj_cred;
struct aa_profile *profile;
char *buffer = NULL;
const char *info = NULL;
file_inode(bprm->file)->i_mode
};
+ subj_cred = current_cred();
ctx = task_ctx(current);
AA_BUG(!cred_label(bprm->cred));
AA_BUG(!ctx);
/* Test for onexec first as onexec override other x transitions. */
if (ctx->onexec)
- new = handle_onexec(label, ctx->onexec, ctx->token,
+ new = handle_onexec(subj_cred, label, ctx->onexec, ctx->token,
bprm, buffer, &cond, &unsafe);
else
new = fn_label_build(label, profile, GFP_KERNEL,
- profile_transition(profile, bprm, buffer,
+ profile_transition(subj_cred, profile, bprm,
+ buffer,
&cond, &unsafe));
AA_BUG(!new);
if (bprm->unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE)) {
/* TODO: test needs to be profile of label to new */
- error = may_change_ptraced_domain(new, &info);
+ error = may_change_ptraced_domain(bprm->cred, new, &info);
if (error)
goto audit;
}
audit:
error = fn_for_each(label, profile,
- aa_audit_file(profile, &nullperms, OP_EXEC, MAY_EXEC,
+ aa_audit_file(current_cred(), profile, &nullperms,
+ OP_EXEC, MAY_EXEC,
bprm->filename, NULL, new,
vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid), info, error));
aa_put_label(new);
*
* Returns: label for hat transition OR ERR_PTR. Does NOT return NULL
*/
-static struct aa_label *build_change_hat(struct aa_profile *profile,
+static struct aa_label *build_change_hat(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+ struct aa_profile *profile,
const char *name, bool sibling)
{
struct aa_profile *root, *hat = NULL;
aa_put_profile(root);
audit:
- aa_audit_file(profile, &nullperms, OP_CHANGE_HAT, AA_MAY_CHANGEHAT,
+ aa_audit_file(subj_cred, profile, &nullperms, OP_CHANGE_HAT,
+ AA_MAY_CHANGEHAT,
name, hat ? hat->base.hname : NULL,
hat ? &hat->label : NULL, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, info,
error);
*
* Returns: label for hat transition or ERR_PTR. Does not return NULL
*/
-static struct aa_label *change_hat(struct aa_label *label, const char *hats[],
+static struct aa_label *change_hat(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+ struct aa_label *label, const char *hats[],
int count, int flags)
{
struct aa_profile *profile, *root, *hat = NULL;
*/
/* TODO: get rid of GLOBAL_ROOT_UID */
if (count > 1 || COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) {
- aa_audit_file(profile, &nullperms, OP_CHANGE_HAT,
+ aa_audit_file(subj_cred, profile, &nullperms,
+ OP_CHANGE_HAT,
AA_MAY_CHANGEHAT, name, NULL, NULL,
GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, info, error);
}
build:
new = fn_label_build_in_ns(label, profile, GFP_KERNEL,
- build_change_hat(profile, name, sibling),
+ build_change_hat(subj_cred, profile, name,
+ sibling),
aa_get_label(&profile->label));
if (!new) {
info = "label build failed";
*/
int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, int flags)
{
- const struct cred *cred;
+ const struct cred *subj_cred;
struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current);
struct aa_label *label, *previous, *new = NULL, *target = NULL;
struct aa_profile *profile;
int error = 0;
/* released below */
- cred = get_current_cred();
- label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred);
+ subj_cred = get_current_cred();
+ label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(subj_cred);
previous = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->previous);
/*
}
if (count) {
- new = change_hat(label, hats, count, flags);
+ new = change_hat(subj_cred, label, hats, count, flags);
AA_BUG(!new);
if (IS_ERR(new)) {
error = PTR_ERR(new);
goto out;
}
- error = may_change_ptraced_domain(new, &info);
+ /* target cred is the same as current except new label */
+ error = may_change_ptraced_domain(subj_cred, new, &info);
if (error)
goto fail;
aa_put_label(new);
aa_put_label(previous);
aa_put_label(label);
- put_cred(cred);
+ put_cred(subj_cred);
return error;
fail:
fn_for_each_in_ns(label, profile,
- aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, OP_CHANGE_HAT,
+ aa_audit_file(subj_cred, profile, &perms, OP_CHANGE_HAT,
AA_MAY_CHANGEHAT, NULL, NULL, target,
GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, info, error));
static int change_profile_perms_wrapper(const char *op, const char *name,
+ const struct cred *subj_cred,
struct aa_profile *profile,
struct aa_label *target, bool stack,
u32 request, struct aa_perms *perms)
rules->file.start[AA_CLASS_FILE],
perms);
if (error)
- error = aa_audit_file(profile, perms, op, request, name,
+ error = aa_audit_file(subj_cred, profile, perms, op, request,
+ name,
NULL, target, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, info,
error);
const char *auditname = fqname; /* retain leading & if stack */
bool stack = flags & AA_CHANGE_STACK;
struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current);
+ const struct cred *subj_cred = get_current_cred();
int error = 0;
char *op;
u32 request;
*/
error = fn_for_each_in_ns(label, profile,
change_profile_perms_wrapper(op, auditname,
+ subj_cred,
profile, target, stack,
request, &perms));
if (error)
check:
/* check if tracing task is allowed to trace target domain */
- error = may_change_ptraced_domain(target, &info);
+ error = may_change_ptraced_domain(subj_cred, target, &info);
if (error && !fn_for_each_in_ns(label, profile,
COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)))
goto audit;
audit:
error = fn_for_each_in_ns(label, profile,
- aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, op, request, auditname,
+ aa_audit_file(subj_cred,
+ profile, &perms, op, request, auditname,
NULL, new ? new : target,
GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, info, error));
aa_put_label(new);
aa_put_label(target);
aa_put_label(label);
+ put_cred(subj_cred);
return error;
}
{
struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
struct apparmor_audit_data *ad = aad(sa);
- kuid_t fsuid = current_fsuid();
+ kuid_t fsuid = ad->subj_cred ? ad->subj_cred->fsuid : current_fsuid();
char str[10];
if (ad->request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) {
/**
* aa_audit_file - handle the auditing of file operations
+ * @subj_cred: cred of the subject
* @profile: the profile being enforced (NOT NULL)
* @perms: the permissions computed for the request (NOT NULL)
* @op: operation being mediated
*
* Returns: %0 or error on failure
*/
-int aa_audit_file(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_perms *perms,
+int aa_audit_file(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+ struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_perms *perms,
const char *op, u32 request, const char *name,
const char *target, struct aa_label *tlabel,
kuid_t ouid, const char *info, int error)
int type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK, AA_CLASS_FILE, op);
+ ad.subj_cred = subj_cred;
ad.request = request;
ad.name = name;
ad.fs.target = target;
return aa_audit(type, profile, &ad, file_audit_cb);
}
-static int path_name(const char *op, struct aa_label *label,
+/**
+ * is_deleted - test if a file has been completely unlinked
+ * @dentry: dentry of file to test for deletion (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: true if deleted else false
+ */
+static inline bool is_deleted(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ if (d_unlinked(dentry) && d_backing_inode(dentry)->i_nlink == 0)
+ return true;
+ return false;
+}
+
+static int path_name(const char *op, const struct cred *subj_cred,
+ struct aa_label *label,
const struct path *path, int flags, char *buffer,
const char **name, struct path_cond *cond, u32 request)
{
labels_profile(label)->disconnected);
if (error) {
fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
- aa_audit_file(profile, &nullperms, op, request, *name,
+ aa_audit_file(subj_cred,
+ profile, &nullperms, op, request, *name,
NULL, NULL, cond->uid, info, error));
return error;
}
return state;
}
-static int __aa_path_perm(const char *op, struct aa_profile *profile,
- const char *name, u32 request,
- struct path_cond *cond, int flags,
+static int __aa_path_perm(const char *op, const struct cred *subj_cred,
+ struct aa_profile *profile, const char *name,
+ u32 request, struct path_cond *cond, int flags,
struct aa_perms *perms)
{
struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
name, cond, perms);
if (request & ~perms->allow)
e = -EACCES;
- return aa_audit_file(profile, perms, op, request, name, NULL, NULL,
+ return aa_audit_file(subj_cred,
+ profile, perms, op, request, name, NULL, NULL,
cond->uid, NULL, e);
}
-static int profile_path_perm(const char *op, struct aa_profile *profile,
+static int profile_path_perm(const char *op, const struct cred *subj_cred,
+ struct aa_profile *profile,
const struct path *path, char *buffer, u32 request,
struct path_cond *cond, int flags,
struct aa_perms *perms)
if (profile_unconfined(profile))
return 0;
- error = path_name(op, &profile->label, path,
+ error = path_name(op, subj_cred, &profile->label, path,
flags | profile->path_flags, buffer, &name, cond,
request);
if (error)
return error;
- return __aa_path_perm(op, profile, name, request, cond, flags,
- perms);
+ return __aa_path_perm(op, subj_cred, profile, name, request, cond,
+ flags, perms);
}
/**
* aa_path_perm - do permissions check & audit for @path
* @op: operation being checked
+ * @subj_cred: subject cred
* @label: profile being enforced (NOT NULL)
* @path: path to check permissions of (NOT NULL)
* @flags: any additional path flags beyond what the profile specifies
*
* Returns: %0 else error if access denied or other error
*/
-int aa_path_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label,
+int aa_path_perm(const char *op, const struct cred *subj_cred,
+ struct aa_label *label,
const struct path *path, int flags, u32 request,
struct path_cond *cond)
{
if (!buffer)
return -ENOMEM;
error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
- profile_path_perm(op, profile, path, buffer, request,
- cond, flags, &perms));
+ profile_path_perm(op, subj_cred, profile, path, buffer,
+ request, cond, flags, &perms));
aa_put_buffer(buffer);
return true;
}
-static int profile_path_link(struct aa_profile *profile,
+static int profile_path_link(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+ struct aa_profile *profile,
const struct path *link, char *buffer,
const struct path *target, char *buffer2,
struct path_cond *cond)
aa_state_t state;
int error;
- error = path_name(OP_LINK, &profile->label, link, profile->path_flags,
+ error = path_name(OP_LINK, subj_cred, &profile->label, link,
+ profile->path_flags,
buffer, &lname, cond, AA_MAY_LINK);
if (error)
goto audit;
/* buffer2 freed below, tname is pointer in buffer2 */
- error = path_name(OP_LINK, &profile->label, target, profile->path_flags,
+ error = path_name(OP_LINK, subj_cred, &profile->label, target,
+ profile->path_flags,
buffer2, &tname, cond, AA_MAY_LINK);
if (error)
goto audit;
error = 0;
audit:
- return aa_audit_file(profile, &lperms, OP_LINK, request, lname, tname,
+ return aa_audit_file(subj_cred,
+ profile, &lperms, OP_LINK, request, lname, tname,
NULL, cond->uid, info, error);
}
/**
* aa_path_link - Handle hard link permission check
+ * @subj_cred: subject cred
* @label: the label being enforced (NOT NULL)
* @old_dentry: the target dentry (NOT NULL)
* @new_dir: directory the new link will be created in (NOT NULL)
*
* Returns: %0 if allowed else error
*/
-int aa_path_link(struct aa_label *label, struct dentry *old_dentry,
+int aa_path_link(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+ struct aa_label *label, struct dentry *old_dentry,
const struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
{
struct path link = { .mnt = new_dir->mnt, .dentry = new_dentry };
goto out;
error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
- profile_path_link(profile, &link, buffer, &target,
- buffer2, &cond));
+ profile_path_link(subj_cred, profile, &link, buffer,
+ &target, buffer2, &cond));
out:
aa_put_buffer(buffer);
aa_put_buffer(buffer2);
spin_unlock(&fctx->lock);
}
-static int __file_path_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label,
+static int __file_path_perm(const char *op, const struct cred *subj_cred,
+ struct aa_label *label,
struct aa_label *flabel, struct file *file,
u32 request, u32 denied, bool in_atomic)
{
/* check every profile in task label not in current cache */
error = fn_for_each_not_in_set(flabel, label, profile,
- profile_path_perm(op, profile, &file->f_path, buffer,
+ profile_path_perm(op, subj_cred, profile,
+ &file->f_path, buffer,
request, &cond, flags, &perms));
if (denied && !error) {
/*
*/
if (label == flabel)
error = fn_for_each(label, profile,
- profile_path_perm(op, profile, &file->f_path,
+ profile_path_perm(op, subj_cred,
+ profile, &file->f_path,
buffer, request, &cond, flags,
&perms));
else
error = fn_for_each_not_in_set(label, flabel, profile,
- profile_path_perm(op, profile, &file->f_path,
+ profile_path_perm(op, subj_cred,
+ profile, &file->f_path,
buffer, request, &cond, flags,
&perms));
}
return error;
}
-static int __file_sock_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label,
+static int __file_sock_perm(const char *op, const struct cred *subj_cred,
+ struct aa_label *label,
struct aa_label *flabel, struct file *file,
u32 request, u32 denied)
{
return 0;
/* TODO: improve to skip profiles cached in flabel */
- error = aa_sock_file_perm(label, op, request, sock);
+ error = aa_sock_file_perm(subj_cred, label, op, request, sock);
if (denied) {
/* TODO: improve to skip profiles checked above */
/* check every profile in file label to is cached */
- last_error(error, aa_sock_file_perm(flabel, op, request, sock));
+ last_error(error, aa_sock_file_perm(subj_cred, flabel, op,
+ request, sock));
}
if (!error)
update_file_ctx(file_ctx(file), label, request);
/**
* aa_file_perm - do permission revalidation check & audit for @file
* @op: operation being checked
+ * @subj_cred: subject cred
* @label: label being enforced (NOT NULL)
* @file: file to revalidate access permissions on (NOT NULL)
* @request: requested permissions
*
* Returns: %0 if access allowed else error
*/
-int aa_file_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label, struct file *file,
+int aa_file_perm(const char *op, const struct cred *subj_cred,
+ struct aa_label *label, struct file *file,
u32 request, bool in_atomic)
{
struct aa_file_ctx *fctx;
/* TODO: label cross check */
if (file->f_path.mnt && path_mediated_fs(file->f_path.dentry))
- error = __file_path_perm(op, label, flabel, file, request,
- denied, in_atomic);
+ error = __file_path_perm(op, subj_cred, label, flabel, file,
+ request, denied, in_atomic);
else if (S_ISSOCK(file_inode(file)->i_mode))
- error = __file_sock_perm(op, label, flabel, file, request,
- denied);
+ error = __file_sock_perm(op, subj_cred, label, flabel, file,
+ request, denied);
aa_put_label(flabel);
done:
return error;
}
-static void revalidate_tty(struct aa_label *label)
+static void revalidate_tty(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label)
{
struct tty_struct *tty;
int drop_tty = 0;
struct tty_file_private, list);
file = file_priv->file;
- if (aa_file_perm(OP_INHERIT, label, file, MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE,
- IN_ATOMIC))
+ if (aa_file_perm(OP_INHERIT, subj_cred, label, file,
+ MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE, IN_ATOMIC))
drop_tty = 1;
}
spin_unlock(&tty->files_lock);
no_tty();
}
+struct cred_label {
+ const struct cred *cred;
+ struct aa_label *label;
+};
+
static int match_file(const void *p, struct file *file, unsigned int fd)
{
- struct aa_label *label = (struct aa_label *)p;
+ struct cred_label *cl = (struct cred_label *)p;
- if (aa_file_perm(OP_INHERIT, label, file, aa_map_file_to_perms(file),
- IN_ATOMIC))
+ if (aa_file_perm(OP_INHERIT, cl->cred, cl->label, file,
+ aa_map_file_to_perms(file), IN_ATOMIC))
return fd + 1;
return 0;
}
void aa_inherit_files(const struct cred *cred, struct files_struct *files)
{
struct aa_label *label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred);
+ struct cred_label cl = {
+ .cred = cred,
+ .label = label,
+ };
struct file *devnull = NULL;
unsigned int n;
- revalidate_tty(label);
+ revalidate_tty(cred, label);
/* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
- n = iterate_fd(files, 0, match_file, label);
+ n = iterate_fd(files, 0, match_file, &cl);
if (!n) /* none found? */
goto out;
/* replace all the matching ones with this */
do {
replace_fd(n - 1, devnull, 0);
- } while ((n = iterate_fd(files, n, match_file, label)) != 0);
+ } while ((n = iterate_fd(files, n, match_file, &cl)) != 0);
if (devnull)
fput(devnull);
out:
int type;
u16 class;
const char *op;
+ const struct cred *subj_cred;
struct aa_label *subj_label;
const char *name;
const char *info;
extern struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_caps[];
-int aa_capable(struct aa_label *label, int cap, unsigned int opts);
+int aa_capable(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
+ int cap, unsigned int opts);
static inline void aa_free_cap_rules(struct aa_caps *caps)
{
#define COMBINED_PERM_MASK(X) ((X).allow | (X).audit | (X).quiet | (X).kill)
-int aa_audit_file(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_perms *perms,
+int aa_audit_file(const struct cred *cred,
+ struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_perms *perms,
const char *op, u32 request, const char *name,
const char *target, struct aa_label *tlabel, kuid_t ouid,
const char *info, int error);
const char *name, struct path_cond *cond,
struct aa_perms *perms);
-int aa_path_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label,
- const struct path *path, int flags, u32 request,
- struct path_cond *cond);
+int aa_path_perm(const char *op, const struct cred *subj_cred,
+ struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
+ int flags, u32 request, struct path_cond *cond);
-int aa_path_link(struct aa_label *label, struct dentry *old_dentry,
- const struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry);
+int aa_path_link(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
+ struct dentry *old_dentry, const struct path *new_dir,
+ struct dentry *new_dentry);
-int aa_file_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label, struct file *file,
+int aa_file_perm(const char *op, const struct cred *subj_cred,
+ struct aa_label *label, struct file *file,
u32 request, bool in_atomic);
void aa_inherit_files(const struct cred *cred, struct files_struct *files);
#include <linux/sched.h>
-int aa_may_signal(struct aa_label *sender, struct aa_label *target, int sig);
+int aa_may_signal(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *sender,
+ const struct cred *target_cred, struct aa_label *target,
+ int sig);
#endif /* __AA_IPC_H */
#define AA_MS_IGNORE_MASK (MS_KERNMOUNT | MS_NOSEC | MS_ACTIVE | MS_BORN)
-int aa_remount(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
+int aa_remount(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+ struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
unsigned long flags, void *data);
-int aa_bind_mount(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
+int aa_bind_mount(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+ struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
const char *old_name, unsigned long flags);
-int aa_mount_change_type(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
+int aa_mount_change_type(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+ struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
unsigned long flags);
-int aa_move_mount(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
+int aa_move_mount(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+ struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
const char *old_name);
-int aa_new_mount(struct aa_label *label, const char *dev_name,
+int aa_new_mount(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+ struct aa_label *label, const char *dev_name,
const struct path *path, const char *type, unsigned long flags,
void *data);
-int aa_umount(struct aa_label *label, struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags);
+int aa_umount(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+ struct aa_label *label, struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags);
-int aa_pivotroot(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *old_path,
+int aa_pivotroot(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+ struct aa_label *label, const struct path *old_path,
const struct path *new_path);
#endif /* __AA_MOUNT_H */
int aa_profile_af_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
struct apparmor_audit_data *ad,
u32 request, u16 family, int type);
-int aa_af_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, u16 family,
+int aa_af_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
+ const char *op, u32 request, u16 family,
int type, int protocol);
static inline int aa_profile_af_sk_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
struct apparmor_audit_data *ad,
}
int aa_sk_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct sock *sk);
-int aa_sock_file_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request,
+int aa_sock_file_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
+ const char *op, u32 request,
struct socket *sock);
int apparmor_secmark_check(struct aa_label *label, char *op, u32 request,
return profile->audit;
}
-bool aa_policy_view_capable(struct aa_label *label, struct aa_ns *ns);
-bool aa_policy_admin_capable(struct aa_label *label, struct aa_ns *ns);
-int aa_may_manage_policy(struct aa_label *label, struct aa_ns *ns,
+bool aa_policy_view_capable(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+ struct aa_label *label, struct aa_ns *ns);
+bool aa_policy_admin_capable(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+ struct aa_label *label, struct aa_ns *ns);
+int aa_may_manage_policy(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+ struct aa_label *label, struct aa_ns *ns,
u32 mask);
bool aa_current_policy_view_capable(struct aa_ns *ns);
bool aa_current_policy_admin_capable(struct aa_ns *ns);
extern struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_rlimit[];
int aa_map_resource(int resource);
-int aa_task_setrlimit(struct aa_label *label, struct task_struct *task,
+int aa_task_setrlimit(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
+ struct task_struct *task,
unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim);
void __aa_transition_rlimits(struct aa_label *old, struct aa_label *new);
"segv usr2 pipe alrm term stkflt chld cont stop stp ttin ttou urg " \
"xcpu xfsz vtalrm prof winch io pwr sys emt lost"
-int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_label *tracer, struct aa_label *tracee,
+int aa_may_ptrace(const struct cred *tracer_cred, struct aa_label *tracer,
+ const struct cred *tracee_cred, struct aa_label *tracee,
u32 request);
FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
}
-static int profile_signal_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
+static int profile_signal_perm(const struct cred *cred,
+ struct aa_profile *profile,
struct aa_label *peer, u32 request,
struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
{
!ANY_RULE_MEDIATES(&profile->rules, AA_CLASS_SIGNAL))
return 0;
+ ad->subj_cred = cred;
ad->peer = peer;
/* TODO: secondary cache check <profile, profile, perm> */
state = aa_dfa_next(rules->policy.dfa,
return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, ad, audit_signal_cb);
}
-int aa_may_signal(struct aa_label *sender, struct aa_label *target, int sig)
+int aa_may_signal(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *sender,
+ const struct cred *target_cred, struct aa_label *target,
+ int sig)
{
struct aa_profile *profile;
DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_SIGNAL, OP_SIGNAL);
ad.signal = map_signal_num(sig);
ad.unmappedsig = sig;
return xcheck_labels(sender, target, profile,
- profile_signal_perm(profile, target, MAY_WRITE, &ad),
- profile_signal_perm(profile, sender, MAY_READ, &ad));
+ profile_signal_perm(subj_cred, profile, target,
+ MAY_WRITE, &ad),
+ profile_signal_perm(target_cred, profile, sender,
+ MAY_READ, &ad));
}
unsigned int mode)
{
struct aa_label *tracer, *tracee;
+ const struct cred *cred;
int error;
+ cred = get_task_cred(child);
+ tracee = cred_label(cred); /* ref count on cred */
tracer = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
- tracee = aa_get_task_label(child);
- error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer, tracee,
+ error = aa_may_ptrace(current_cred(), tracer, cred, tracee,
(mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ) ? AA_PTRACE_READ
: AA_PTRACE_TRACE);
- aa_put_label(tracee);
__end_current_label_crit_section(tracer);
+ put_cred(cred);
return error;
}
static int apparmor_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
{
struct aa_label *tracer, *tracee;
+ const struct cred *cred;
int error;
tracee = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
- tracer = aa_get_task_label(parent);
- error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer, tracee, AA_PTRACE_TRACE);
- aa_put_label(tracer);
+ cred = get_task_cred(parent);
+ tracer = cred_label(cred); /* ref count on cred */
+ error = aa_may_ptrace(cred, tracer, current_cred(), tracee,
+ AA_PTRACE_TRACE);
+ put_cred(cred);
__end_current_label_crit_section(tracee);
return error;
label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred);
if (!unconfined(label))
- error = aa_capable(label, cap, opts);
+ error = aa_capable(cred, label, cap, opts);
aa_put_label(label);
return error;
label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
if (!unconfined(label))
- error = aa_path_perm(op, label, path, 0, mask, cond);
+ error = aa_path_perm(op, current_cred(), label, path, 0, mask,
+ cond);
__end_current_label_crit_section(label);
return error;
label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
if (!unconfined(label))
- error = aa_path_link(label, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry);
+ error = aa_path_link(current_cred(), label, old_dentry, new_dir,
+ new_dentry);
end_current_label_crit_section(label);
return error;
vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, d_backing_inode(old_dentry));
cond_exchange.uid = vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid);
- error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_SRC, label, &new_path, 0,
+ error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_SRC, current_cred(),
+ label, &new_path, 0,
MAY_READ | AA_MAY_GETATTR | MAY_WRITE |
AA_MAY_SETATTR | AA_MAY_DELETE,
&cond_exchange);
if (!error)
- error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_DEST, label, &old_path,
+ error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_DEST, current_cred(),
+ label, &old_path,
0, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_SETATTR |
AA_MAY_CREATE, &cond_exchange);
}
if (!error)
- error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_SRC, label, &old_path, 0,
+ error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_SRC, current_cred(),
+ label, &old_path, 0,
MAY_READ | AA_MAY_GETATTR | MAY_WRITE |
AA_MAY_SETATTR | AA_MAY_DELETE,
&cond);
if (!error)
- error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_DEST, label, &new_path,
+ error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_DEST, current_cred(),
+ label, &new_path,
0, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_SETATTR |
AA_MAY_CREATE, &cond);
vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, inode);
cond.uid = vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid);
- error = aa_path_perm(OP_OPEN, label, &file->f_path, 0,
+ error = aa_path_perm(OP_OPEN, file->f_cred,
+ label, &file->f_path, 0,
aa_map_file_to_perms(file), &cond);
/* todo cache full allowed permissions set and state */
fctx->allow = aa_map_file_to_perms(file);
return -EACCES;
label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
- error = aa_file_perm(op, label, file, mask, in_atomic);
+ error = aa_file_perm(op, current_cred(), label, file, mask, in_atomic);
__end_current_label_crit_section(label);
return error;
label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
if (!unconfined(label)) {
if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
- error = aa_remount(label, path, flags, data);
+ error = aa_remount(current_cred(), label, path, flags,
+ data);
else if (flags & MS_BIND)
- error = aa_bind_mount(label, path, dev_name, flags);
+ error = aa_bind_mount(current_cred(), label, path,
+ dev_name, flags);
else if (flags & (MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE |
MS_UNBINDABLE))
- error = aa_mount_change_type(label, path, flags);
+ error = aa_mount_change_type(current_cred(), label,
+ path, flags);
else if (flags & MS_MOVE)
- error = aa_move_mount(label, path, dev_name);
+ error = aa_move_mount(current_cred(), label, path,
+ dev_name);
else
- error = aa_new_mount(label, dev_name, path, type,
- flags, data);
+ error = aa_new_mount(current_cred(), label, dev_name,
+ path, type, flags, data);
}
__end_current_label_crit_section(label);
label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
if (!unconfined(label))
- error = aa_umount(label, mnt, flags);
+ error = aa_umount(current_cred(), label, mnt, flags);
__end_current_label_crit_section(label);
return error;
label = aa_get_current_label();
if (!unconfined(label))
- error = aa_pivotroot(label, old_path, new_path);
+ error = aa_pivotroot(current_cred(), label, old_path, new_path);
aa_put_label(label);
return error;
int error = 0;
if (!unconfined(label))
- error = aa_task_setrlimit(label, task, resource, new_rlim);
+ error = aa_task_setrlimit(current_cred(), label, task,
+ resource, new_rlim);
__end_current_label_crit_section(label);
return error;
static int apparmor_task_kill(struct task_struct *target, struct kernel_siginfo *info,
int sig, const struct cred *cred)
{
+ const struct cred *tc;
struct aa_label *cl, *tl;
int error;
+ tc = get_task_cred(target);
+ tl = aa_get_newest_cred_label(tc);
if (cred) {
/*
* Dealing with USB IO specific behavior
*/
cl = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred);
- tl = aa_get_task_label(target);
- error = aa_may_signal(cl, tl, sig);
+ error = aa_may_signal(cred, cl, tc, tl, sig);
aa_put_label(cl);
- aa_put_label(tl);
return error;
+ } else {
+ cl = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
+ error = aa_may_signal(current_cred(), cl, tc, tl, sig);
+ __end_current_label_crit_section(cl);
}
-
- cl = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
- tl = aa_get_task_label(target);
- error = aa_may_signal(cl, tl, sig);
aa_put_label(tl);
- __end_current_label_crit_section(cl);
+ put_cred(tc);
return error;
}
if (!(kern || unconfined(label)))
error = af_select(family,
create_perm(label, family, type, protocol),
- aa_af_perm(label, OP_CREATE, AA_MAY_CREATE,
+ aa_af_perm(current_cred(), label,
+ OP_CREATE, AA_MAY_CREATE,
family, type, protocol));
end_current_label_crit_section(label);
/**
* audit_mount - handle the auditing of mount operations
+ * @subj_cred: cred of the subject
* @profile: the profile being enforced (NOT NULL)
* @op: operation being mediated (NOT NULL)
* @name: name of object being mediated (MAYBE NULL)
*
* Returns: %0 or error on failure
*/
-static int audit_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *op,
+static int audit_mount(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+ struct aa_profile *profile, const char *op,
const char *name, const char *src_name,
const char *type, const char *trans,
unsigned long flags, const void *data, u32 request,
return error;
}
+ ad.subj_cred = subj_cred;
ad.name = name;
ad.mnt.src_name = src_name;
ad.mnt.type = type;
/**
* match_mnt_path_str - handle path matching for mount
+ * @subj_cred: cred of confined subject
* @profile: the confining profile
* @mntpath: for the mntpnt (NOT NULL)
* @buffer: buffer to be used to lookup mntpath
*
* Returns: 0 on success else error
*/
-static int match_mnt_path_str(struct aa_profile *profile,
+static int match_mnt_path_str(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+ struct aa_profile *profile,
const struct path *mntpath, char *buffer,
const char *devname, const char *type,
unsigned long flags, void *data, bool binary,
error = 0;
audit:
- return audit_mount(profile, OP_MOUNT, mntpnt, devname, type, NULL,
+ return audit_mount(subj_cred, profile, OP_MOUNT, mntpnt, devname,
+ type, NULL,
flags, data, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms, info, error);
}
/**
* match_mnt - handle path matching for mount
+ * @subj_cred: cred of the subject
* @profile: the confining profile
* @path: for the mntpnt (NOT NULL)
* @buffer: buffer to be used to lookup mntpath
*
* Returns: 0 on success else error
*/
-static int match_mnt(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
+static int match_mnt(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+ struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
char *buffer, const struct path *devpath, char *devbuffer,
const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data,
bool binary)
devname = ERR_PTR(error);
}
- return match_mnt_path_str(profile, path, buffer, devname, type, flags,
- data, binary, info);
+ return match_mnt_path_str(subj_cred, profile, path, buffer, devname,
+ type, flags, data, binary, info);
}
-int aa_remount(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
+int aa_remount(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+ struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
unsigned long flags, void *data)
{
struct aa_profile *profile;
if (!buffer)
return -ENOMEM;
error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
- match_mnt(profile, path, buffer, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ match_mnt(subj_cred, profile, path, buffer, NULL,
+ NULL, NULL,
flags, data, binary));
aa_put_buffer(buffer);
return error;
}
-int aa_bind_mount(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
+int aa_bind_mount(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+ struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
const char *dev_name, unsigned long flags)
{
struct aa_profile *profile;
goto out;
error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
- match_mnt(profile, path, buffer, &old_path, old_buffer,
- NULL, flags, NULL, false));
+ match_mnt(subj_cred, profile, path, buffer, &old_path,
+ old_buffer, NULL, flags, NULL, false));
out:
aa_put_buffer(buffer);
aa_put_buffer(old_buffer);
return error;
}
-int aa_mount_change_type(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
+int aa_mount_change_type(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+ struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
unsigned long flags)
{
struct aa_profile *profile;
if (!buffer)
return -ENOMEM;
error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
- match_mnt(profile, path, buffer, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ match_mnt(subj_cred, profile, path, buffer, NULL,
+ NULL, NULL,
flags, NULL, false));
aa_put_buffer(buffer);
return error;
}
-int aa_move_mount(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
+int aa_move_mount(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+ struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
const char *orig_name)
{
struct aa_profile *profile;
if (!buffer || !old_buffer)
goto out;
error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
- match_mnt(profile, path, buffer, &old_path, old_buffer,
+ match_mnt(subj_cred, profile, path, buffer, &old_path,
+ old_buffer,
NULL, MS_MOVE, NULL, false));
out:
aa_put_buffer(buffer);
return error;
}
-int aa_new_mount(struct aa_label *label, const char *dev_name,
- const struct path *path, const char *type, unsigned long flags,
- void *data)
+int aa_new_mount(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
+ const char *dev_name, const struct path *path,
+ const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data)
{
struct aa_profile *profile;
char *buffer = NULL, *dev_buffer = NULL;
goto out;
}
error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
- match_mnt(profile, path, buffer, dev_path, dev_buffer,
+ match_mnt(subj_cred, profile, path, buffer,
+ dev_path, dev_buffer,
type, flags, data, binary));
} else {
error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
- match_mnt_path_str(profile, path, buffer, dev_name,
- type, flags, data, binary, NULL));
+ match_mnt_path_str(subj_cred, profile, path,
+ buffer, dev_name,
+ type, flags, data, binary, NULL));
}
out:
return error;
}
-static int profile_umount(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
+static int profile_umount(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+ struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
char *buffer)
{
struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
error = -EACCES;
audit:
- return audit_mount(profile, OP_UMOUNT, name, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL,
+ return audit_mount(subj_cred, profile, OP_UMOUNT, name, NULL, NULL,
+ NULL, 0, NULL,
AA_MAY_UMOUNT, &perms, info, error);
}
-int aa_umount(struct aa_label *label, struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
+int aa_umount(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
+ struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
{
struct aa_profile *profile;
char *buffer = NULL;
return -ENOMEM;
error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
- profile_umount(profile, &path, buffer));
+ profile_umount(subj_cred, profile, &path, buffer));
aa_put_buffer(buffer);
return error;
*
* Returns: label for transition or ERR_PTR. Does not return NULL
*/
-static struct aa_label *build_pivotroot(struct aa_profile *profile,
+static struct aa_label *build_pivotroot(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+ struct aa_profile *profile,
const struct path *new_path,
char *new_buffer,
const struct path *old_path,
error = 0;
audit:
- error = audit_mount(profile, OP_PIVOTROOT, new_name, old_name,
+ error = audit_mount(subj_cred, profile, OP_PIVOTROOT, new_name,
+ old_name,
NULL, trans_name, 0, NULL, AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT,
&perms, info, error);
if (error)
return aa_get_newest_label(&profile->label);
}
-int aa_pivotroot(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *old_path,
+int aa_pivotroot(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
+ const struct path *old_path,
const struct path *new_path)
{
struct aa_profile *profile;
if (!old_buffer || !new_buffer)
goto out;
target = fn_label_build(label, profile, GFP_KERNEL,
- build_pivotroot(profile, new_path, new_buffer,
+ build_pivotroot(subj_cred, profile, new_path,
+ new_buffer,
old_path, old_buffer));
if (!target) {
info = "label build failed";
fail:
/* TODO: add back in auditing of new_name and old_name */
error = fn_for_each(label, profile,
- audit_mount(profile, OP_PIVOTROOT, NULL /*new_name */,
+ audit_mount(subj_cred, profile, OP_PIVOTROOT,
+ NULL /*new_name */,
NULL /* old_name */,
NULL, NULL,
0, NULL, AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT, &nullperms, info,
return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, ad, audit_net_cb);
}
-int aa_af_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, u16 family,
- int type, int protocol)
+int aa_af_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
+ const char *op, u32 request, u16 family, int type, int protocol)
{
struct aa_profile *profile;
DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(ad, op, NULL, family, type, protocol);
type));
}
-static int aa_label_sk_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request,
+static int aa_label_sk_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+ struct aa_label *label,
+ const char *op, u32 request,
struct sock *sk)
{
struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
struct aa_profile *profile;
DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(ad, op, sk);
+ ad.subj_cred = subj_cred;
error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, &ad, request, sk));
}
/* TODO: switch to begin_current_label ???? */
label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
- error = aa_label_sk_perm(label, op, request, sk);
+ error = aa_label_sk_perm(current_cred(), label, op, request, sk);
end_current_label_crit_section(label);
return error;
}
-int aa_sock_file_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request,
- struct socket *sock)
+int aa_sock_file_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
+ const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock)
{
AA_BUG(!label);
AA_BUG(!sock);
AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
- return aa_label_sk_perm(label, op, request, sock->sk);
+ return aa_label_sk_perm(subj_cred, label, op, request, sock->sk);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
/* don't call out to other LSMs in the stack for apparmor policy admin
* permissions
*/
-static int policy_ns_capable(struct aa_label *label,
+static int policy_ns_capable(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+ struct aa_label *label,
struct user_namespace *userns, int cap)
{
int err;
/* check for MAC_ADMIN cap in cred */
- err = cap_capable(current_cred(), userns, cap, CAP_OPT_NONE);
+ err = cap_capable(subj_cred, userns, cap, CAP_OPT_NONE);
if (!err)
- err = aa_capable(label, cap, CAP_OPT_NONE);
+ err = aa_capable(subj_cred, label, cap, CAP_OPT_NONE);
return err;
}
/**
* aa_policy_view_capable - check if viewing policy in at @ns is allowed
+ * @subj_cred: cred of subject
* @label: label that is trying to view policy in ns
* @ns: namespace being viewed by @label (may be NULL if @label's ns)
*
* If @ns is NULL then the namespace being viewed is assumed to be the
* tasks current namespace.
*/
-bool aa_policy_view_capable(struct aa_label *label, struct aa_ns *ns)
+bool aa_policy_view_capable(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+ struct aa_label *label, struct aa_ns *ns)
{
- struct user_namespace *user_ns = current_user_ns();
+ struct user_namespace *user_ns = subj_cred->user_ns;
struct aa_ns *view_ns = labels_view(label);
bool root_in_user_ns = uid_eq(current_euid(), make_kuid(user_ns, 0)) ||
in_egroup_p(make_kgid(user_ns, 0));
return response;
}
-bool aa_policy_admin_capable(struct aa_label *label, struct aa_ns *ns)
+bool aa_policy_admin_capable(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+ struct aa_label *label, struct aa_ns *ns)
{
- struct user_namespace *user_ns = current_user_ns();
- bool capable = policy_ns_capable(label, user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN) == 0;
+ struct user_namespace *user_ns = subj_cred->user_ns;
+ bool capable = policy_ns_capable(subj_cred, label, user_ns,
+ CAP_MAC_ADMIN) == 0;
AA_DEBUG("cap_mac_admin? %d\n", capable);
AA_DEBUG("policy locked? %d\n", aa_g_lock_policy);
- return aa_policy_view_capable(label, ns) && capable &&
+ return aa_policy_view_capable(subj_cred, label, ns) && capable &&
!aa_g_lock_policy;
}
bool res;
label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
- res = aa_policy_view_capable(label, ns);
+ res = aa_policy_view_capable(current_cred(), label, ns);
__end_current_label_crit_section(label);
return res;
bool res;
label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
- res = aa_policy_admin_capable(label, ns);
+ res = aa_policy_admin_capable(current_cred(), label, ns);
__end_current_label_crit_section(label);
return res;
/**
* aa_may_manage_policy - can the current task manage policy
+ * @subj_cred; subjects cred
* @label: label to check if it can manage policy
* @ns: namespace being managed by @label (may be NULL if @label's ns)
* @mask: contains the policy manipulation operation being done
*
* Returns: 0 if the task is allowed to manipulate policy else error
*/
-int aa_may_manage_policy(struct aa_label *label, struct aa_ns *ns, u32 mask)
+int aa_may_manage_policy(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
+ struct aa_ns *ns, u32 mask)
{
const char *op;
return audit_policy(label, op, NULL, NULL, "policy_locked",
-EACCES);
- if (!aa_policy_admin_capable(label, ns))
+ if (!aa_policy_admin_capable(subj_cred, label, ns))
return audit_policy(label, op, NULL, NULL, "not policy admin",
-EACCES);
/**
* audit_resource - audit setting resource limit
+ * @subj_cred: cred setting the resource
* @profile: profile being enforced (NOT NULL)
* @resource: rlimit being auditing
* @value: value being set
*
* Returns: 0 or ad->error else other error code on failure
*/
-static int audit_resource(struct aa_profile *profile, unsigned int resource,
+static int audit_resource(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+ struct aa_profile *profile, unsigned int resource,
unsigned long value, struct aa_label *peer,
const char *info, int error)
{
DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_RLIMITS,
OP_SETRLIMIT);
+ ad.subj_cred = subj_cred;
ad.rlim.rlim = resource;
ad.rlim.max = value;
ad.peer = peer;
return rlim_map[resource];
}
-static int profile_setrlimit(struct aa_profile *profile, unsigned int resource,
+static int profile_setrlimit(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+ struct aa_profile *profile, unsigned int resource,
struct rlimit *new_rlim)
{
struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
if (rules->rlimits.mask & (1 << resource) && new_rlim->rlim_max >
rules->rlimits.limits[resource].rlim_max)
e = -EACCES;
- return audit_resource(profile, resource, new_rlim->rlim_max, NULL, NULL,
- e);
+ return audit_resource(subj_cred, profile, resource, new_rlim->rlim_max,
+ NULL, NULL, e);
}
/**
* aa_task_setrlimit - test permission to set an rlimit
+ * @subj_cred: cred setting the limit
* @label: label confining the task (NOT NULL)
* @task: task the resource is being set on
* @resource: the resource being set
*
* Returns: 0 or error code if setting resource failed
*/
-int aa_task_setrlimit(struct aa_label *label, struct task_struct *task,
+int aa_task_setrlimit(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
+ struct task_struct *task,
unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
{
struct aa_profile *profile;
*/
if (label != peer &&
- aa_capable(label, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE, CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT) != 0)
+ aa_capable(subj_cred, label, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE, CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT) != 0)
error = fn_for_each(label, profile,
- audit_resource(profile, resource,
+ audit_resource(subj_cred, profile, resource,
new_rlim->rlim_max, peer,
"cap_sys_resource", -EACCES));
else
error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
- profile_setrlimit(profile, resource, new_rlim));
+ profile_setrlimit(subj_cred, profile, resource,
+ new_rlim));
aa_put_label(peer);
return error;
/* assumes check for RULE_MEDIATES is already done */
/* TODO: conditionals */
-static int profile_ptrace_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
- struct aa_label *peer, u32 request,
- struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
+static int profile_ptrace_perm(const struct cred *cred,
+ struct aa_profile *profile,
+ struct aa_label *peer, u32 request,
+ struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
{
struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
typeof(*rules), list);
struct aa_perms perms = { };
+ ad->subj_cred = cred;
ad->peer = peer;
aa_profile_match_label(profile, rules, peer, AA_CLASS_PTRACE, request,
&perms);
return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, ad, audit_ptrace_cb);
}
-static int profile_tracee_perm(struct aa_profile *tracee,
+static int profile_tracee_perm(const struct cred *cred,
+ struct aa_profile *tracee,
struct aa_label *tracer, u32 request,
struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
{
!ANY_RULE_MEDIATES(&tracee->rules, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
return 0;
- return profile_ptrace_perm(tracee, tracer, request, ad);
+ return profile_ptrace_perm(cred, tracee, tracer, request, ad);
}
-static int profile_tracer_perm(struct aa_profile *tracer,
+static int profile_tracer_perm(const struct cred *cred,
+ struct aa_profile *tracer,
struct aa_label *tracee, u32 request,
struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
{
return 0;
if (ANY_RULE_MEDIATES(&tracer->rules, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
- return profile_ptrace_perm(tracer, tracee, request, ad);
+ return profile_ptrace_perm(cred, tracer, tracee, request, ad);
/* profile uses the old style capability check for ptrace */
if (&tracer->label == tracee)
ad->subj_label = &tracer->label;
ad->peer = tracee;
ad->request = 0;
- ad->error = aa_capable(&tracer->label, CAP_SYS_PTRACE,
- CAP_OPT_NONE);
+ ad->error = aa_capable(cred, &tracer->label, CAP_SYS_PTRACE,
+ CAP_OPT_NONE);
return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO, tracer, ad, audit_ptrace_cb);
}
*
* Returns: %0 else error code if permission denied or error
*/
-int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_label *tracer, struct aa_label *tracee,
+int aa_may_ptrace(const struct cred *tracer_cred, struct aa_label *tracer,
+ const struct cred *tracee_cred, struct aa_label *tracee,
u32 request)
{
struct aa_profile *profile;
DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_PTRACE, OP_PTRACE);
return xcheck_labels(tracer, tracee, profile,
- profile_tracer_perm(profile, tracee, request, &sa),
- profile_tracee_perm(profile, tracer, xrequest, &sa));
+ profile_tracer_perm(tracer_cred, profile, tracee,
+ request, &sa),
+ profile_tracee_perm(tracee_cred, profile, tracer,
+ xrequest, &sa));
}
projects / platform / kernel / linux-starfive.git / commitdiff