arm64: use RET instruction for exiting the trampoline

Commit be04a6d1126b upstream.

Speculation attacks against the entry trampoline can potentially resteer
the speculative instruction stream through the indirect branch and into
arbitrary gadgets within the kernel.

This patch defends against these attacks by forcing a misprediction
through the return stack: a dummy BL instruction loads an entry into
the stack, so that the predicted program flow of the subsequent RET
instruction is to a branch-to-self instruction which is finally resolved
as a branch to the kernel vectors with speculation suppressed.

Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
index d3551e5..b32ba03 100644 (file)
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
@@ -981,6 +981,14 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif
        .if     \regsize == 64
        msr     tpidrro_el0, x30        // Restored in kernel_ventry
        .endif
+       /*
+        * Defend against branch aliasing attacks by pushing a dummy
+        * entry onto the return stack and using a RET instruction to
+        * enter the full-fat kernel vectors.
+        */
+       bl      2f
+       b       .
+2:
        tramp_map_kernel        x30
 #ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE
        adr     x30, tramp_vectors + PAGE_SIZE
@@ -993,7 +1001,7 @@ alternative_insn isb, nop, ARM64_WORKAROUND_QCOM_FALKOR_E1003
        msr     vbar_el1, x30
        add     x30, x30, #(1b - tramp_vectors)
        isb
-       br      x30
+       ret
        .endm
 
        .macro tramp_exit, regsize = 64