uaccess: Add speculation barrier to copy_from_user()

commit 74e19ef0ff8061ef55957c3abd71614ef0f42f47 upstream.

The results of "access_ok()" can be mis-speculated.  The result is that
you can end speculatively:

	if (access_ok(from, size))
		// Right here

even for bad from/size combinations.  On first glance, it would be ideal
to just add a speculation barrier to "access_ok()" so that its results
can never be mis-speculated.

But there are lots of system calls just doing access_ok() via
"copy_to_user()" and friends (example: fstat() and friends).  Those are
generally not problematic because they do not _consume_ data from
userspace other than the pointer.  They are also very quick and common
system calls that should not be needlessly slowed down.

"copy_from_user()" on the other hand uses a user-controller pointer and
is frequently followed up with code that might affect caches.  Take
something like this:

	if (!copy_from_user(&kernelvar, uptr, size))
		do_something_with(kernelvar);

If userspace passes in an evil 'uptr' that *actually* points to a kernel
addresses, and then do_something_with() has cache (or other)
side-effects, it could allow userspace to infer kernel data values.

Add a barrier to the common copy_from_user() code to prevent
mis-speculated values which happen after the copy.

Also add a stub for architectures that do not define barrier_nospec().
This makes the macro usable in generic code.

Since the barrier is now usable in generic code, the x86 #ifdef in the
BPF code can also go away.

Reported-by: Jordy Zomer <jordyzomer@google.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>   # BPF bits
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

diff --git a/include/linux/nospec.h b/include/linux/nospec.h
index c1e79f7..9f0af4f 100644 (file)
--- a/include/linux/nospec.h
+++ b/include/linux/nospec.h
@@ -11,6 +11,10 @@
 
 struct task_struct;
 
+#ifndef barrier_nospec
+# define barrier_nospec() do { } while (0)
+#endif
+
 /**
  * array_index_mask_nospec() - generate a ~0 mask when index < size, 0 otherwise
  * @index: array element index

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c
index 17ab3e1..3520100 100644 (file)
--- a/kernel/bpf/core.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c
@@ -1908,9 +1908,7 @@ out:
                 * reuse preexisting logic from Spectre v1 mitigation that
                 * happens to produce the required code on x86 for v4 as well.
                 */
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86
                barrier_nospec();
-#endif
                CONT;
 #define LDST(SIZEOP, SIZE)                                             \
        STX_MEM_##SIZEOP:                                               \

diff --git a/lib/usercopy.c b/lib/usercopy.c
index 1505a52..d29fe29 100644 (file)
--- a/lib/usercopy.c
+++ b/lib/usercopy.c
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
 #include <linux/fault-inject-usercopy.h>
 #include <linux/instrumented.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
 
 /* out-of-line parts */
 
@@ -12,6 +13,12 @@ unsigned long _copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n
        unsigned long res = n;
        might_fault();
        if (!should_fail_usercopy() && likely(access_ok(from, n))) {
+               /*
+                * Ensure that bad access_ok() speculation will not
+                * lead to nasty side effects *after* the copy is
+                * finished:
+                */
+               barrier_nospec();
                instrument_copy_from_user_before(to, from, n);
                res = raw_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
                instrument_copy_from_user_after(to, from, n, res);