Remove always undefined FEATURE_APTCA

diff --git a/src/debug/daccess/nidump.cpp b/src/debug/daccess/nidump.cpp
index 7a2a62f..91dff84 100644 (file)
--- a/src/debug/daccess/nidump.cpp
+++ b/src/debug/daccess/nidump.cpp
@@ -621,10 +621,6 @@ const NativeImageDumper::EnumMnemonics s_CorCompileDependencyInfoFlags[] =
 {
 #define CMDI_ENTRY(f) NativeImageDumper::EnumMnemonics(CORCOMPILE_DEPENDENCY_ ## f, W(#f))
 
-#ifdef FEATURE_APTCA
-    CMDI_ENTRY(IS_APTCA),
-    CMDI_ENTRY(IS_CAPTCA),
-#endif //FEATURE_APTCA
 #undef CMDI_ENTRY
 };
 
@@ -3741,9 +3737,6 @@ const NativeImageDumper::EnumMnemonics s_MSDFlags[] =
 {
 #define MSD_ENTRY(f) NativeImageDumper::EnumMnemonics(ModuleSecurityDescriptorFlags_ ## f, W(#f))
     MSD_ENTRY(IsComputed),
-#ifdef FEATURE_APTCA
-    MSD_ENTRY(IsAPTCA),
-#endif // FEATURE_APTCA
     MSD_ENTRY(IsAllCritical),
     MSD_ENTRY(IsAllTransparent),
     MSD_ENTRY(IsTreatAsSafe),

diff --git a/src/dlls/mscorrc/mscorrc.rc b/src/dlls/mscorrc/mscorrc.rc
index 138db55..5385327 100644 (file)
--- a/src/dlls/mscorrc/mscorrc.rc
+++ b/src/dlls/mscorrc/mscorrc.rc
@@ -1591,10 +1591,6 @@ STRINGTABLE DISCARDABLE
 BEGIN
     IDS_ACCESS_EXCEPTION_CONTEXT_LEVEL2_APTCA           "Assembly '%1' is marked with the AllowPartiallyTrustedCallersAttribute, and uses the level 2 security transparency model.  Level 2 transparency causes all methods in AllowPartiallyTrustedCallers assemblies to become security transparent by default, which may be the cause of this exception."
     IDS_ACCESS_EXCEPTION_CONTEXT_PT_TRANSPARENT         "Assembly '%1' is partially trusted, which causes the CLR to make it entirely security transparent regardless of any transparency annotations in the assembly itself.  In order to access security critical code, this assembly must be fully trusted."
-#ifdef FEATURE_APTCA
-    IDS_ACCESS_EXCEPTION_CONTEXT_APTCA_KILLBIT          "Assembly '%1' has had an APTCA killbit set for it, which prevents it from being used by partial trust or security transparent code."
-    IDS_ACCESS_EXCEPTION_CONTEXT_CONDITIONAL_APTCA      "Assembly '%1' is a conditionally APTCA assembly which is not enabled in the current AppDomain.  To enable this assembly to be used by partial trust or security transparent code, please add assembly name '%2' to the the PartialTrustVisibleAssemblies list when creating the AppDomain."
-#endif // FEATURE_APTCA
 END
 
 // These strings are generated from within the EE for streams

diff --git a/src/inc/corcompile.h b/src/inc/corcompile.h
index 9cd0720..6b1fdb7 100644 (file)
--- a/src/inc/corcompile.h
+++ b/src/inc/corcompile.h
@@ -897,10 +897,6 @@ struct CORCOMPILE_VERSION_INFO
 #ifndef FEATURE_CORECLR
 enum CorCompileDependencyInfo
 {
-#ifdef FEATURE_APTCA
-    CORCOMPILE_DEPENDENCY_IS_APTCA          = 0x1,
-    CORCOMPILE_DEPENDENCY_IS_CAPTCA         = 0x2,
-#endif //FEATURE_APTCA
 
     CORCOMPILE_DEPENDENCY_PEKIND_MASK       = 0xff00,
     CORCOMPILE_DEPENDENCY_PEKIND_SHIFT      = 8,
@@ -919,10 +915,6 @@ struct CORCOMPILE_DEPENDENCY
 
     CORCOMPILE_NGEN_SIGNATURE       signNativeImage;    // INVALID_NGEN_SIGNATURE if this a soft-bound dependency
 
-#ifdef FEATURE_APTCA
-    // Win32 version info for tracking dependency references to strong-named assemblies with APTCA
-    ULARGE_INTEGER                  uliFileVersion; // OS file version ~ NOT assembly version
-#endif //FEATURE_APTCA
 
 #ifndef FEATURE_CORECLR
     CorCompileDependencyInfo        dependencyInfo;  //Flags about the dependency

diff --git a/src/vm/appdomainnative.cpp b/src/vm/appdomainnative.cpp
index 3935cb5..9266849 100644 (file)
--- a/src/vm/appdomainnative.cpp
+++ b/src/vm/appdomainnative.cpp
@@ -902,25 +902,6 @@ BOOL QCALLTYPE AppDomainNative::IsLegacyCasPolicyEnabled(QCall::AppDomainHandle
 
 #endif // FEATURE_CAS_POLICY
 
-#ifdef FEATURE_APTCA
-
-// static
-void QCALLTYPE AppDomainNative::SetCanonicalConditionalAptcaList(QCall::AppDomainHandle adhTarget,
-                                                                 LPCWSTR wszCanonicalConditionalAptcaList)
-{
-    QCALL_CONTRACT;
-
-    BEGIN_QCALL;
-
-    IApplicationSecurityDescriptor *pAppSecDesc = adhTarget->GetSecurityDescriptor();
-
-    GCX_COOP();
-    pAppSecDesc->SetCanonicalConditionalAptcaList(wszCanonicalConditionalAptcaList);
-
-    END_QCALL;
-}
-
-#endif // FEATURE_APTCA
 
 FCIMPL1(Object*, AppDomainNative::GetFriendlyName, AppDomainBaseObject* refThisUNSAFE)
 {

diff --git a/src/vm/appdomainnative.hpp b/src/vm/appdomainnative.hpp
index cb0c364..dff8434 100644 (file)
--- a/src/vm/appdomainnative.hpp
+++ b/src/vm/appdomainnative.hpp
@@ -129,11 +129,6 @@ public:
     BOOL QCALLTYPE IsLegacyCasPolicyEnabled(QCall::AppDomainHandle adhTarget);
 #endif // FEATURE_CAS_POLICY
 
-#ifdef FEATURE_APTCA
-    static
-    void QCALLTYPE SetCanonicalConditionalAptcaList(QCall::AppDomainHandle adhTarget,
-                                                    LPCWSTR wszCanonicalConditionalAptcaList);
-#endif // FEATURE_APTCA
 
 #ifdef FEATURE_APPDOMAINMANAGER_INITOPTIONS
     static

diff --git a/src/vm/aptca.h b/src/vm/aptca.h
index 3d590a0..5825eb7 100644 (file)
--- a/src/vm/aptca.h
+++ b/src/vm/aptca.h
@@ -37,9 +37,7 @@
 #ifndef __APTCA_H__
 #define __APTCA_H__
 
-#ifndef FEATURE_APTCA
 #error FEATURE_APTCA is required for this file
-#endif // FEATURE_APTCA
 
 #include "securitymeta.h"
 

diff --git a/src/vm/assembly.cpp b/src/vm/assembly.cpp
index 08792c9..eb4c2e5 100644 (file)
--- a/src/vm/assembly.cpp
+++ b/src/vm/assembly.cpp
@@ -991,14 +991,6 @@ Assembly *Assembly::CreateDynamic(AppDomain *pDomain, CreateDynamicAssemblyArgs
         if (args->flags & kTreatAsSafeAssembly)
             tokenFlags |= TokenSecurityDescriptorFlags_TreatAsSafe;
 
-#ifdef FEATURE_APTCA
-        if (args->aptcaBlob != NULL)
-        {
-            tokenFlags |= ParseAptcaAttribute(args->aptcaBlob->GetDirectPointerToNonObjectElements(),
-                                              args->aptcaBlob->GetNumComponents());
-        }
-
-#endif // FEATURE_APTCA
 
 #ifndef FEATURE_CORECLR
         // Use the security rules given to us if the emitting code has selected a specific one. Otherwise,

diff --git a/src/vm/assembly.hpp b/src/vm/assembly.hpp
index 54bb03d..7466903 100644 (file)
--- a/src/vm/assembly.hpp
+++ b/src/vm/assembly.hpp
@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ public:
 
     BOOL GetModuleZapFile(LPCWSTR name, SString &path);
 
-#if defined(FEATURE_APTCA) || defined(FEATURE_CORESYSTEM)
+#if defined(FEATURE_CORESYSTEM)
     BOOL AllowUntrustedCaller();
 #endif // defined(FEATURE_APTCA) || defined(FEATURE_CORESYSTEM)
     

diff --git a/src/vm/clsload.cpp b/src/vm/clsload.cpp
index fe74bf8..fd7644c 100644 (file)
--- a/src/vm/clsload.cpp
+++ b/src/vm/clsload.cpp
@@ -5369,21 +5369,6 @@ void GetAccessExceptionAdditionalContextForSecurity(Assembly *pAccessingAssembly
     }
 #endif // FEATURE_CORECLR
 
-#if defined(FEATURE_APTCA) && !defined(CROSSGEN_COMPILE)
-    // If the target assembly is conditionally APTCA, then it may needed to have been enabled in the domain
-    SString conditionalAptcaContext = Security::GetConditionalAptcaAccessExceptionContext(pTargetAssembly);
-    if (!conditionalAptcaContext.IsEmpty())
-    {
-        pContextInformation->Append(conditionalAptcaContext);
-    }
-
-    // If the target assembly is APTCA killbitted, then indicate that as well
-    SString aptcaKillBitContext = Security::GetAptcaKillBitAccessExceptionContext(pTargetAssembly);
-    if (!aptcaKillBitContext.IsEmpty())
-    {
-        pContextInformation->Append(aptcaKillBitContext);
-    }
-#endif // FEATURE_APTCA && !CROSSGEN_COMPILE
 }
 
 // Generate additional context about the root cause of an access exception which may help in debugging it (for

diff --git a/src/vm/compile.cpp b/src/vm/compile.cpp
index 8710715..724dd31 100644 (file)
--- a/src/vm/compile.cpp
+++ b/src/vm/compile.cpp
@@ -7374,9 +7374,6 @@ HRESULT CompilationDomain::AddDependencyEntry(PEAssembly *pFile,
     pDependency->dwAssemblyDef = def;
 
     pDependency->signNativeImage = INVALID_NGEN_SIGNATURE;
-#ifdef FEATURE_APTCA
-    pDependency->dependencyInfo = CorCompileDependencyInfo(0);
-#endif //FEATURE_APTCA
 
     if (pFile)
     {
@@ -7384,47 +7381,10 @@ HRESULT CompilationDomain::AddDependencyEntry(PEAssembly *pFile,
         // Note that this can trigger an assembly load (of mscorlib)
         pAssembly->GetOptimizedIdentitySignature(&pDependency->signAssemblyDef);
 
-#if defined(FEATURE_APTCA) || !defined(FEATURE_CORECLR)
+#if !defined(FEATURE_CORECLR)
         ReleaseHolder<IMDInternalImport> pAssemblyMD(pFile->GetMDImportWithRef());
 #endif
 
-#ifdef FEATURE_APTCA
-        // determine if there's an APTCA reference, before we retrieve the target file version (for killbit)
-        TokenSecurityDescriptorFlags assemblySecurityAttributes =
-            TokenSecurityDescriptor::ReadSecurityAttributes(pAssemblyMD, TokenFromRid(1, mdtAssembly));
-
-        pFile->AddRef();
-
-        BOOL fIsAptca = assemblySecurityAttributes & (TokenSecurityDescriptorFlags_APTCA
-                                                      | TokenSecurityDescriptorFlags_ConditionalAPTCA);
-        if (fIsAptca)
-        {
-            //  get the file path
-            LPCWSTR pwszPath = pFile->GetPath().GetUnicode();
-            if (pwszPath == NULL)
-            {
-                return E_FAIL;
-            }
-            // retrieve the file version based on the file path (using Watson OS wrapper)
-            if (FAILED(GetFileVersion(pwszPath, &pDependency->uliFileVersion)))
-                // ignore failures (e.g. platform doesn't support file version, or version info missing
-
-            {
-                fIsAptca = FALSE;
-            }
-        }
-        if (fIsAptca)
-        {
-            pDependency->dependencyInfo = CorCompileDependencyInfo(pDependency->dependencyInfo
-                                                                   | CORCOMPILE_DEPENDENCY_IS_APTCA);
-            }
-
-        if (assemblySecurityAttributes & TokenSecurityDescriptorFlags_ConditionalAPTCA)
-        {
-            pDependency->dependencyInfo = CorCompileDependencyInfo(pDependency->dependencyInfo
-                                                                   | CORCOMPILE_DEPENDENCY_IS_CAPTCA);
-        }
-#endif //FEATURE_APTCA
 
 #ifdef FEATURE_CORECLR // hardbinding
         //

diff --git a/src/vm/corhost.cpp b/src/vm/corhost.cpp
index 369d6fc..e004821 100644 (file)
--- a/src/vm/corhost.cpp
+++ b/src/vm/corhost.cpp
@@ -5542,92 +5542,6 @@ public:
 static CCLRAppDomainResourceMonitor s_Arm;
 #endif //FEATURE_APPDOMAIN_RESOURCE_MONITORING
 
-#ifdef FEATURE_APTCA
-class CLRDomainManager : public ICLRDomainManager
-{
-public:
-    virtual HRESULT STDMETHODCALLTYPE SetAppDomainManagerType(__in LPCWSTR wszAppDomainManagerAssembly,
-                                                              __in LPCWSTR wszAppDomainManagerType,
-                                                              EInitializeNewDomainFlags dwInitializeDomainFlags)
-    {
-        CONTRACTL
-        {
-            NOTHROW;
-            GC_NOTRIGGER;
-            ENTRY_POINT;
-        }
-        CONTRACTL_END;
-
-        HRESULT hr = S_OK;
-        BEGIN_ENTRYPOINT_NOTHROW;
-
-        hr = CorHost2::SetAppDomainManagerType(wszAppDomainManagerAssembly,
-                                               wszAppDomainManagerType,
-                                               dwInitializeDomainFlags);
-        END_ENTRYPOINT_NOTHROW;
-        return hr;
-    }
-
-    virtual HRESULT STDMETHODCALLTYPE SetPropertiesForDefaultAppDomain(DWORD nProperties,
-                                                                       __in_ecount(nProperties) LPCWSTR *pwszPropertyNames,
-                                                                       __in_ecount(nProperties) LPCWSTR *pwszPropertyValues)
-    {
-        CONTRACTL
-        {
-            NOTHROW;
-            GC_NOTRIGGER;
-        }
-        CONTRACTL_END;
-
-        HRESULT hr = S_OK;
-        BEGIN_ENTRYPOINT_NOTHROW;
-
-        hr = CorHost2::SetPropertiesForDefaultAppDomain(nProperties, pwszPropertyNames, pwszPropertyValues);
-
-        END_ENTRYPOINT_NOTHROW;
-        return hr;
-    }
-
-    virtual ULONG STDMETHODCALLTYPE AddRef()
-    {
-        LIMITED_METHOD_CONTRACT;
-        return 1;
-    }
-
-    virtual ULONG STDMETHODCALLTYPE Release()
-    {
-        LIMITED_METHOD_CONTRACT;
-        return 1;
-    }
-
-    virtual HRESULT STDMETHODCALLTYPE QueryInterface(__in REFIID riid, __out LPVOID *ppvObject)
-    {
-        LIMITED_METHOD_CONTRACT;
-
-        if (ppvObject == NULL)
-            return E_POINTER;
-
-        *ppvObject = NULL;
-
-        if (riid == IID_ICLRDomainManager)
-        {
-            *ppvObject = this;
-        }
-        else if (riid == IID_IUnknown)
-        {
-            *ppvObject = static_cast<IUnknown *>(this);
-        }
-
-        if (*ppvObject == NULL)
-            return E_NOINTERFACE;
-
-        AddRef();
-        return S_OK;
-    }
-};
-
-static CLRDomainManager s_CLRDomainManager;
-#endif // FEATURE_APTCA
 
 BOOL g_CLRPolicyRequested = FALSE;
 
@@ -5724,13 +5638,6 @@ public:
             return S_OK;
         }
 #endif //FEATURE_APPDOMAIN_RESOURCE_MONITORING
-#ifdef FEATURE_APTCA
-        else if (riid == IID_ICLRDomainManager)
-        {
-            *ppObject = &s_CLRDomainManager;
-            return S_OK;
-        }
-#endif // FEATURE_APTCA
         else
             return (E_NOINTERFACE);
     }

diff --git a/src/vm/domainfile.cpp b/src/vm/domainfile.cpp
index 9a3b902..6842acc 100644 (file)
--- a/src/vm/domainfile.cpp
+++ b/src/vm/domainfile.cpp
@@ -3537,12 +3537,6 @@ BOOL DomainAssembly::CheckZapSecurity(PEImage *pNativeImage)
     return TRUE;
 #else
 
-#ifdef FEATURE_APTCA
-    if (!Security::NativeImageHasValidAptcaDependencies(pNativeImage, this))
-    {
-        return FALSE;
-    }
-#endif // !FEATURE_APTCA
 
     GCX_COOP();
 

diff --git a/src/vm/ecalllist.h b/src/vm/ecalllist.h
index a5031f3..587f6f9 100644 (file)
--- a/src/vm/ecalllist.h
+++ b/src/vm/ecalllist.h
@@ -704,9 +704,6 @@ FCFuncStart(gAppDomainFuncs)
     FCFuncElement("nIsDefaultAppDomainForEvidence", AppDomainNative::IsDefaultAppDomainForEvidence)
     FCFuncElement("nGetAssemblies", AppDomainNative::GetAssemblies)
 #endif
-#ifdef FEATURE_APTCA
-    QCFuncElement("SetCanonicalConditionalAptcaList", AppDomainNative::SetCanonicalConditionalAptcaList)
-#endif // FEATURE_ATPCA
     QCFuncElement("SetSecurityHomogeneousFlag", AppDomainNative::SetSecurityHomogeneousFlag)
     QCFuncElement("SetupDomainSecurity", AppDomainNative::SetupDomainSecurity)
     FCFuncElement("nSetupFriendlyName", AppDomainNative::SetupFriendlyName)
@@ -839,9 +836,6 @@ FCFuncStart(gAssemblyFuncs)
     FCFuncElement("IsReflectionOnly", AssemblyNative::IsReflectionOnly)
     FCFuncElement("GetManifestModule", AssemblyHandle::GetManifestModule)
     FCFuncElement("GetToken", AssemblyHandle::GetToken)
-#ifdef FEATURE_APTCA
-    FCFuncElement("AptcaCheck", AssemblyHandle::AptcaCheck)
-#endif // FEATURE_APTCA
 FCFuncEnd()
 
 #ifdef FEATURE_CORECLR

diff --git a/src/vm/invokeutil.cpp b/src/vm/invokeutil.cpp
index 42e5a86..f53c8fe 100644 (file)
--- a/src/vm/invokeutil.cpp
+++ b/src/vm/invokeutil.cpp
@@ -1610,25 +1610,6 @@ void InvokeUtil::CanAccessMethod(MethodDesc*    pMeth,
         // stack walks in order to close security holes in poorly written
         // reflection users.
 
-#ifdef FEATURE_APTCA
-        if (Security::IsUntrustedCallerCheckNeeded(pMeth))
-        {
-            if (pSCtx->GetCallerMT()) 
-            { 
-                // Check for untrusted caller
-                // It is possible that wrappers like VBHelper libraries that are
-                // fully trusted, make calls to public methods that do not have
-                // safe for Untrusted caller custom attribute set.
-                // Like all other link demand that gets transformed to a full stack 
-                // walk for reflection, calls to public methods also gets 
-                // converted to full stack walk
-    
-                Security::DoUntrustedCallerChecks(
-                    pSCtx->GetCallerMT()->GetAssembly(), pMeth,
-                    TRUE);
-            }
-        }
-#endif // FEATURE_APTCA
 
         struct _gc
         {

diff --git a/src/vm/metasig.h b/src/vm/metasig.h
index 5df7038..d4443e9 100644 (file)
--- a/src/vm/metasig.h
+++ b/src/vm/metasig.h
@@ -564,9 +564,6 @@ DEFINE_METASIG_T(SM(Str_Evidence_AppDomainSetup_RetAppDomain, s C(EVIDENCE) C(AP
 DEFINE_METASIG_T(SM(Str_Evidence_Str_Str_Bool_RetAppDomain, s C(EVIDENCE) s s F, C(APP_DOMAIN)))
 DEFINE_METASIG_T(SM(Str_RetAppDomain, s, C(APP_DOMAIN)))
 DEFINE_METASIG_T(SM(Str_AppDomainSetup_Evidence_Evidence_IntPtr_Str_ArrStr_ArrStr_RetObj, s C(APPDOMAIN_SETUP) C(EVIDENCE) C(EVIDENCE) I s a(s) a(s), j))
-#ifdef FEATURE_APTCA
-DEFINE_METASIG(IM(PtrChar_Int_PtrByte_Int_RetBool, P(u) i P(b) i, F))
-#endif //FEATURE_APTCA
 #ifdef FEATURE_COMINTEROP
 // System.AppDomain.OnReflectionOnlyNamespaceResolveEvent
 DEFINE_METASIG_T(IM(Assembly_Str_RetArrAssembly, C(ASSEMBLY) s, a(C(ASSEMBLY))))

diff --git a/src/vm/object.h b/src/vm/object.h
index cb11789..f45cdbd 100644 (file)
--- a/src/vm/object.h
+++ b/src/vm/object.h
@@ -2402,9 +2402,6 @@ class AppDomainBaseObject : public MarshalByRefObjectBaseObject
     OBJECTREF    m_pProcessExitEventHandler; // Delegate for 'process exit' event.  Only used in Default appdomain.
     OBJECTREF    m_pDomainUnloadEventHandler; // Delegate for 'about to unload domain' event
     OBJECTREF    m_pUnhandledExceptionEventHandler; // Delegate for 'unhandled exception' event
-#ifdef FEATURE_APTCA
-    OBJECTREF    m_aptcaVisibleAssemblies;  // array of conditional APTCA assembly names that should be APTCA visible
-#endif
 
     OBJECTREF    m_compatFlags;
 
@@ -2461,13 +2458,6 @@ class AppDomainBaseObject : public MarshalByRefObjectBaseObject
         return !!m_bIsFastFullTrustDomain;
     }
 
-#ifdef FEATURE_APTCA
-    OBJECTREF GetPartialTrustVisibleAssemblies()
-    {
-        LIMITED_METHOD_CONTRACT
-        return m_aptcaVisibleAssemblies;
-    }
-#endif // FEATURE_APTCA
 
     // Ref needs to be a PTRARRAYREF
     void SetPolicies(OBJECTREF ref)
@@ -2565,9 +2555,6 @@ class AppDomainSetupObject : public Object
     I1ARRAYREF m_ConfigurationBytes;
     STRINGREF m_AppDomainManagerAssembly;
     STRINGREF m_AppDomainManagerType;
-#if FEATURE_APTCA
-    PTRARRAYREF m_AptcaVisibleAssemblies;
-#endif
     OBJECTREF m_CompatFlags;
     STRINGREF m_TargetFrameworkName;
 #ifndef FEATURE_CORECLR

diff --git a/src/vm/peimage.cpp b/src/vm/peimage.cpp
index 583c5e3..09b4176 100644 (file)
--- a/src/vm/peimage.cpp
+++ b/src/vm/peimage.cpp
@@ -1444,9 +1444,6 @@ PEImage::PEImage():
     m_dwPEKind(0),
     m_dwMachine(0),
     m_fCachedKindAndMachine(FALSE)
-#ifdef FEATURE_APTCA
-    , m_fMayBeConditionalAptca(TRUE)
-#endif // FEATURE_APTCA
 #ifdef FEATURE_LAZY_COW_PAGES
     ,m_bAllocatedLazyCOWPages(FALSE)
 #endif // FEATURE_LAZY_COW_PAGES

diff --git a/src/vm/peimage.h b/src/vm/peimage.h
index 12a4dd7..a7fe50e 100644 (file)
--- a/src/vm/peimage.h
+++ b/src/vm/peimage.h
@@ -463,9 +463,6 @@ private:
     DWORD m_dwMachine;
     BOOL  m_fCachedKindAndMachine;
 
-#ifdef FEATURE_APTCA
-    BOOL  m_fMayBeConditionalAptca;
-#endif // FEATURE_APTCA
 
 #ifdef FEATURE_FUSION
     PEFingerprint *m_pILFingerprint; // has to be the real type (as opposed to an interface) so we can delete it
@@ -478,10 +475,6 @@ public:
     PEKIND GetFusionProcessorArchitecture();
 #endif
 
-#ifdef FEATURE_APTCA
-    inline BOOL MayBeConditionalAptca();
-    inline void SetIsNotConditionalAptca();
-#endif // FEATURE_APTCA
 };
 
 FORCEINLINE void PEImageRelease(PEImage *i)

diff --git a/src/vm/peimage.inl b/src/vm/peimage.inl
index 2f4d7d4..4d913ea 100644 (file)
--- a/src/vm/peimage.inl
+++ b/src/vm/peimage.inl
@@ -873,19 +873,6 @@ inline void  PEImage::GetPEKindAndMachine(DWORD* pdwKind, DWORD* pdwMachine)
         *pdwMachine = m_dwMachine;
 }
 
-#ifdef FEATURE_APTCA
-inline BOOL PEImage::MayBeConditionalAptca()
-{
-    LIMITED_METHOD_CONTRACT;
-    return m_fMayBeConditionalAptca;
-}
-
-inline void PEImage::SetIsNotConditionalAptca()
-{
-    LIMITED_METHOD_CONTRACT;
-    m_fMayBeConditionalAptca = FALSE;
-}
-#endif // FEATURE_APTCA
 
 #ifndef FEATURE_CORECLR
 inline BOOL PEImage::IsReportedToUsageLog()

diff --git a/src/vm/runtimehandles.cpp b/src/vm/runtimehandles.cpp
index 68ad24c..65aeb45 100644 (file)
--- a/src/vm/runtimehandles.cpp
+++ b/src/vm/runtimehandles.cpp
@@ -3263,36 +3263,6 @@ FCIMPL1(INT32, AssemblyHandle::GetToken, AssemblyBaseObject* pAssemblyUNSAFE) {
 }
 FCIMPLEND
 
-#ifdef FEATURE_APTCA
-FCIMPL2(FC_BOOL_RET, AssemblyHandle::AptcaCheck, AssemblyBaseObject* pTargetAssemblyUNSAFE,  AssemblyBaseObject* pSourceAssemblyUNSAFE) 
-{
-    FCALL_CONTRACT;
-
-    ASSEMBLYREF refTargetAssembly = (ASSEMBLYREF)ObjectToOBJECTREF(pTargetAssemblyUNSAFE);
-    ASSEMBLYREF refSourceAssembly = (ASSEMBLYREF)ObjectToOBJECTREF(pSourceAssemblyUNSAFE);
-    
-    if ((refTargetAssembly == NULL) || (refSourceAssembly == NULL))
-        FCThrowRes(kArgumentNullException, W("Arg_InvalidHandle"));
-
-    DomainAssembly *pTargetAssembly = refTargetAssembly->GetDomainAssembly();
-    DomainAssembly *pSourceAssembly = refSourceAssembly->GetDomainAssembly();
-    
-    if (pTargetAssembly == pSourceAssembly)
-        FC_RETURN_BOOL(TRUE);
-
-    BOOL bResult = TRUE;
-    
-    HELPER_METHOD_FRAME_BEGIN_RET_2(refSourceAssembly, refTargetAssembly);
-    {
-        bResult = ( pTargetAssembly->GetAssembly()->AllowUntrustedCaller() || // target assembly allows untrusted callers unconditionally
-                    pSourceAssembly->GetSecurityDescriptor()->IsFullyTrusted());
-    }
-    HELPER_METHOD_FRAME_END();
-
-    FC_RETURN_BOOL(bResult);
-}
-FCIMPLEND
-#endif // FEATURE_APTCA
     
 void QCALLTYPE ModuleHandle::GetPEKind(QCall::ModuleHandle pModule, DWORD* pdwPEKind, DWORD* pdwMachine)
 {

diff --git a/src/vm/runtimehandles.h b/src/vm/runtimehandles.h
index afe1902..e203bd0 100644 (file)
--- a/src/vm/runtimehandles.h
+++ b/src/vm/runtimehandles.h
@@ -462,9 +462,6 @@ public:
     static FCDECL1(ReflectModuleBaseObject*, GetManifestModule, AssemblyBaseObject *pAssemblyUNSAFE);
 
     static FCDECL1(INT32, GetToken, AssemblyBaseObject *pAssemblyUNSAFE);   
-#ifdef FEATURE_APTCA
-    static FCDECL2(FC_BOOL_RET, AptcaCheck, AssemblyBaseObject *pTargetAssemblyUNSAFE, AssemblyBaseObject *pSourceAssemblyUNSAFE);
-#endif // FEATURE_APTCA
 };
 
 class SignatureNative;

diff --git a/src/vm/security.h b/src/vm/security.h
index 3f3cb38..9b87d98 100644 (file)
--- a/src/vm/security.h
+++ b/src/vm/security.h
@@ -16,9 +16,6 @@
 #include "securitydeclarative.h"
 #include "securitytransparentassembly.h"
 
-#ifdef FEATURE_APTCA
-#include "aptca.h"
-#endif
 
 class IAssemblySecurityDescriptor;
 class IApplicationSecurityDescriptor;
@@ -224,15 +221,6 @@ namespace Security
     // security enforcement
     inline BOOL ContainsBuiltinCASPermsOnly(CORSEC_ATTRSET* pAttrSet);
 
-#ifdef FEATURE_APTCA
-    inline BOOL IsUntrustedCallerCheckNeeded(MethodDesc *pCalleeMD, Assembly *pCallerAssem = NULL) ;
-    inline void DoUntrustedCallerChecks(Assembly *pCaller, MethodDesc *pCalee, BOOL fFullStackWalk) ;
-
-    inline bool NativeImageHasValidAptcaDependencies(PEImage *pNativeImage, DomainAssembly *pDomainAssembly);
-
-    inline SString GetAptcaKillBitAccessExceptionContext(Assembly *pTargetAssembly);
-    inline SString GetConditionalAptcaAccessExceptionContext(Assembly *pTargetAssembly);
-#endif // FEATURE_APTCA
 
     inline bool SecurityCalloutQuickCheck(MethodDesc *pCallerMD);
 
@@ -305,10 +293,6 @@ public:
     virtual BOOL AllowsLoadsFromRemoteSources() = 0;
 #endif // FEATURE_CAS_POLICY
 
-#ifdef FEATURE_APTCA
-    virtual ConditionalAptcaCache *GetConditionalAptcaCache() = 0;
-    virtual void SetCanonicalConditionalAptcaList(LPCWSTR wszCanonicalConditionalAptcaList) = 0;
-#endif // FEATURE_APTCA
 #endif // !DACCESS_COMPILE
 };
 

diff --git a/src/vm/security.inl b/src/vm/security.inl
index fe11589..aa8c570 100644 (file)
--- a/src/vm/security.inl
+++ b/src/vm/security.inl
@@ -603,38 +603,6 @@ inline BOOL Security::ContainsBuiltinCASPermsOnly(CORSEC_ATTRSET* pAttrSet)
     return SecurityAttributes::ContainsBuiltinCASPermsOnly(pAttrSet); 
 }
 
-#ifdef FEATURE_APTCA
-inline BOOL Security::IsUntrustedCallerCheckNeeded(MethodDesc *pCalleeMD, Assembly *pCallerAssem)
-{ 
-    WRAPPER_NO_CONTRACT; 
-    return SecurityDeclarative::IsUntrustedCallerCheckNeeded(pCalleeMD, pCallerAssem); 
-}
- 
-inline void Security::DoUntrustedCallerChecks(Assembly *pCaller, MethodDesc *pCalee, BOOL fFullStackWalk) 
-{
-    WRAPPER_NO_CONTRACT;
-    SecurityDeclarative::DoUntrustedCallerChecks(pCaller, pCalee, fFullStackWalk); 
-}
-
-inline bool Security::NativeImageHasValidAptcaDependencies(PEImage *pNativeImage, DomainAssembly *pDomainAssembly)
-{
-    WRAPPER_NO_CONTRACT;
-    return ::NativeImageHasValidAptcaDependencies(pNativeImage, pDomainAssembly);
-}
-
-inline SString Security::GetAptcaKillBitAccessExceptionContext(Assembly *pTargetAssembly)
-{
-    WRAPPER_NO_CONTRACT;
-    return ::GetAptcaKillBitAccessExceptionContext(pTargetAssembly);
-}
-
-inline SString Security::GetConditionalAptcaAccessExceptionContext(Assembly *pTargetAssembly)
-{
-    WRAPPER_NO_CONTRACT;
-    return ::GetConditionalAptcaAccessExceptionContext(pTargetAssembly);
-}
-
-#endif // FEATURE_APTCA
 
 inline bool Security::SecurityCalloutQuickCheck(MethodDesc *pCallerMD)
 {
@@ -646,12 +614,6 @@ inline bool Security::CanShareAssembly(DomainAssembly *pAssembly)
 {
     WRAPPER_NO_CONTRACT;
 
-#ifdef FEATURE_APTCA
-    if (!DomainCanShareAptcaAssembly(pAssembly))
-    {
-        return false;
-    }
-#endif // FEATURE_APTCA
 
     return true;
 }

diff --git a/src/vm/securitydeclarative.cpp b/src/vm/securitydeclarative.cpp
index 10abd55..0cff572 100644 (file)
--- a/src/vm/securitydeclarative.cpp
+++ b/src/vm/securitydeclarative.cpp
@@ -605,35 +605,6 @@ void SecurityDeclarative::MethodInheritanceCheck(MethodDesc *pMethod, MethodDesc
 //
 //-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
-#ifdef FEATURE_APTCA
-void DECLSPEC_NORETURN SecurityDeclarative::ThrowAPTCAException(Assembly *pCaller, MethodDesc *pCallee)
-{
-    CONTRACTL {
-        THROWS;
-        GC_TRIGGERS;
-        MODE_COOPERATIVE;
-        INJECT_FAULT(COMPlusThrowOM(););
-    } CONTRACTL_END;
-
-        MethodDescCallSite throwSecurityException(METHOD__SECURITY_ENGINE__THROW_SECURITY_EXCEPTION);
-
-        OBJECTREF callerObj = NULL;
-        if (pCaller != NULL && pCaller->GetDomain() == GetAppDomain())
-            callerObj = pCaller->GetExposedObject();
-
-        ARG_SLOT args[7];
-        args[0] = ObjToArgSlot(callerObj);
-        args[1] = ObjToArgSlot(NULL);
-        args[2] = ObjToArgSlot(NULL);
-        args[3] = PtrToArgSlot(pCallee);
-        args[4] = (ARG_SLOT)dclLinktimeCheck;
-        args[5] = ObjToArgSlot(NULL);
-        args[6] = ObjToArgSlot(NULL);
-        throwSecurityException.Call(args);
-
-    UNREACHABLE();
-}
-#endif // FEATURE_APTCA
 
 #ifdef FEATURE_CAS_POLICY
 void DECLSPEC_NORETURN SecurityDeclarative::ThrowHPException(EApiCategories protectedCategories, EApiCategories demandedCategories)
@@ -667,113 +638,8 @@ void DECLSPEC_NORETURN SecurityDeclarative::ThrowHPException(EApiCategories prot
 }
 #endif // FEATURE_CAS_POLICY
 
-#ifdef FEATURE_APTCA
-BOOL SecurityDeclarative::IsUntrustedCallerCheckNeeded(MethodDesc *pCalleeMD, Assembly *pCallerAssem)
-{
-    CONTRACTL
-    {
-        THROWS;
-        GC_TRIGGERS;
-        MODE_ANY;
-    }
-    CONTRACTL_END;
-
-    Assembly *pCalleeAssembly = pCalleeMD->GetAssembly();
-    _ASSERTE(pCalleeAssembly != NULL);
-
-    // ATPCA is only enforced for cross-assembly calls, so if the target is not accessable from outside
-    // the assembly, or if the caller and callee are both within the same assembly, we do not need to
-    // do any APTCA checks
-    if (pCallerAssem == pCalleeAssembly)
-    {
-        return FALSE;
-    }
-
-    if (!MethodIsVisibleOutsideItsAssembly(pCalleeMD))
-    {
-        return FALSE;
-    }
-
-    // If the target assembly allows untrusted callers unconditionally, then the call should be allowed
-    if (pCalleeAssembly->AllowUntrustedCaller())
-    {
-        return FALSE;
-    }
-
-    // Otherwise, we need to ensure the caller is fully trusted
-    return TRUE;
-}
-#endif // FEATURE_APTCA
-
-
-#ifdef FEATURE_APTCA
-// Do a fulltrust check on the caller if the callee is fully trusted and
-// callee did not enable AllowUntrustedCallerChecks
-/*static*/
-void SecurityDeclarative::DoUntrustedCallerChecks(
-        Assembly *pCaller, MethodDesc *pCallee, 
-        BOOL fFullStackWalk)
-{
-    CONTRACTL {
-        THROWS;
-        GC_TRIGGERS;
-        MODE_COOPERATIVE;
-        INJECT_FAULT(COMPlusThrowOM(););
-    } CONTRACTL_END;
-
-    BOOL fRet = TRUE;
-
-#ifdef _DEBUG
-    if (!g_pConfig->Do_AllowUntrustedCaller_Checks())
-        return;
-#endif
-
-    if (!IsUntrustedCallerCheckNeeded(pCallee, pCaller))
-        return;
 
-    // Expensive calls after this point, this could end up resolving policy
-
-    if (fFullStackWalk)
-    {
-        // It is possible that wrappers like VBHelper libraries that are
-        // fully trusted, make calls to public methods that do not have
-        // safe for Untrusted caller custom attribute set.
-        // Like all other link demand that gets transformed to a full stack
-        // walk for reflection, calls to public methods also gets
-        // converted to full stack walk
-
-        OBJECTREF permSet = NULL;
-        GCPROTECT_BEGIN(permSet);
-
-        GetPermissionInstance(&permSet, SECURITY_FULL_TRUST);
-        EX_TRY
-        {
-            SecurityStackWalk::DemandSet(SSWT_LATEBOUND_LINKDEMAND, permSet);
-        }
-        EX_CATCH
-        {
-            fRet = FALSE;
-        }
-        EX_END_CATCH(RethrowTerminalExceptions);
-
-        GCPROTECT_END();
-    }
-    else
-    {
-        _ASSERTE(pCaller);
-
-        // Link Demand only, no full stack walk here
-        if (!pCaller->GetSecurityDescriptor()->IsFullyTrusted())
-            fRet = FALSE;
-    }
-
-    if (!fRet)
-    {
-        ThrowAPTCAException(pCaller, pCallee);
-    }
-}
 
-#endif // FEATURE_APTCA
 
 // Retrieve all linktime demands sets for a method. This includes both CAS and
 // non-CAS sets for LDs at the class and the method level, so we could get up to
@@ -1135,12 +1001,6 @@ void SecurityDeclarative::CheckLinkDemandAgainstAppDomain(MethodDesc *pMD)
 
     GCPROTECT_BEGIN(gc);
 
-#ifdef FEATURE_APTCA
-    // Do a fulltrust check on the caller if the callee did not enable
-    // AllowUntrustedCallerChecks. Pass a NULL caller assembly:
-    // DoUntrustedCallerChecks needs to be able to cope with this.
-    SecurityDeclarative::DoUntrustedCallerChecks(NULL, pMD, TRUE);
-#endif // FEATURE_APTCA
 
     // Fetch link demand sets from all the places in metadata where we might
     // find them (class and method). These might be split into CAS and non-CAS

diff --git a/src/vm/securitydeclarative.h b/src/vm/securitydeclarative.h
index 151d094..f2b6b1f 100644 (file)
--- a/src/vm/securitydeclarative.h
+++ b/src/vm/securitydeclarative.h
@@ -126,20 +126,6 @@ namespace SecurityDeclarative
     inline BOOL FullTrustCheckForLinkOrInheritanceDemand(Assembly *pAssembly);
 
 
-#ifdef FEATURE_APTCA
-    // Returns TRUE if an APTCA check is necessary
-    //   Callers:
-    //     CanAccess
-    BOOL IsUntrustedCallerCheckNeeded(MethodDesc *pCalleeMD, Assembly *pCallerAssem = NULL);
-
-    // Perform the APTCA check
-    //   Callers:
-    //     CanAccess
-    //     Security::CheckLinkDemandAgainstAppDomain
-    void DoUntrustedCallerChecks(
-        Assembly *pCaller, MethodDesc *pCalee,
-        BOOL fFullStackWalk);
-#endif // FEATURE_APTCA
 
 #ifndef DACCESS_COMPILE
     // Calls PermissionSet.Demand
@@ -166,12 +152,6 @@ namespace SecurityDeclarative
 
     inline BOOL ClassIsVisibleOutsideItsAssembly(DWORD dwClassAttr, BOOL fIsGlobalClass);
 
-#ifdef FEATURE_APTCA
-    // Returns an instance of a SecurityException with the message "This method doesn't allow partially trusted callers"
-    //   Callers:
-    //     DoUntrustedCallerChecks
-    void DECLSPEC_NORETURN ThrowAPTCAException(Assembly *pCaller, MethodDesc *pCallee);
-#endif // FEATURE_APTCA
 #ifdef FEATURE_CAS_POLICY
     void DECLSPEC_NORETURN ThrowHPException(EApiCategories protectedCategories, EApiCategories demandedCategories);
 #endif // FEATURE_CAS_POLICY

diff --git a/src/vm/securitydescriptorappdomain.cpp b/src/vm/securitydescriptorappdomain.cpp
index fecb6a5..a09276b 100644 (file)
--- a/src/vm/securitydescriptorappdomain.cpp
+++ b/src/vm/securitydescriptorappdomain.cpp
@@ -355,19 +355,6 @@ BOOL ApplicationSecurityDescriptor::DomainMayContainPartialTrustCode()
     return !m_fHomogeneous || !IsFullyTrusted();
 }
 
-#ifdef FEATURE_APTCA
-ConditionalAptcaCache *ApplicationSecurityDescriptor::GetConditionalAptcaCache()
-{
-    LIMITED_METHOD_CONTRACT;
-    return m_pConditionalAptcaCache;
-}
-
-void ApplicationSecurityDescriptor::SetCanonicalConditionalAptcaList(LPCWSTR wszCanonicalConditionalAptcaList)
-{
-    WRAPPER_NO_CONTRACT;
-    return this->GetConditionalAptcaCache()->SetCanonicalConditionalAptcaList(wszCanonicalConditionalAptcaList);
-}
-#endif // FEATURE_APTCA
 
 #endif // !DACCESS_COMPILE
 

diff --git a/src/vm/securitydescriptorappdomain.h b/src/vm/securitydescriptorappdomain.h
index ff5bbda..b3f862b 100644 (file)
--- a/src/vm/securitydescriptorappdomain.h
+++ b/src/vm/securitydescriptorappdomain.h
@@ -86,9 +86,6 @@ private:
     BOOL m_fPreResolutionFullTrust;     // Was the domain pre-resolved to be full trust
     BOOL m_fPreResolutionHomogeneous;   // Was the domain pre-resolved to be homogenous
     
-#ifdef FEATURE_APTCA
-    ConditionalAptcaCache*   m_pConditionalAptcaCache;    // Cache of known conditional APTCA assemblies in this domain
-#endif // FEATURE_APTCA
 
 #ifndef DACCESS_COMPILE
 public:
@@ -100,9 +97,6 @@ public:
     //--------------------
     // Destructor
     //--------------------
-#ifdef FEATURE_APTCA  //  The destructor only deletes the ConditionalAptcaCache
-    inline ~ApplicationSecurityDescriptor();
-#endif // FEATURE_APTCA
 
 public:
     // Indicates whether the initialization phase is in progress.
@@ -174,10 +168,6 @@ public:
 
     BOOL QuickIsFullyTrusted();
 
-#ifdef FEATURE_APTCA
-    virtual ConditionalAptcaCache *GetConditionalAptcaCache();
-    virtual void SetCanonicalConditionalAptcaList(LPCWSTR wszCanonicalConditionalAptcaList);
-#endif // FEATURE_APTCA
 #endif // #ifndef DACCESS_COMPILE
 };
 

diff --git a/src/vm/securitydescriptorappdomain.inl b/src/vm/securitydescriptorappdomain.inl
index fdb8b3f..13fccf3 100644 (file)
--- a/src/vm/securitydescriptorappdomain.inl
+++ b/src/vm/securitydescriptorappdomain.inl
@@ -29,9 +29,6 @@ inline ApplicationSecurityDescriptor::ApplicationSecurityDescriptor(AppDomain *p
     m_fIsPreResolved(FALSE),
     m_fPreResolutionFullTrust(FALSE),
     m_fPreResolutionHomogeneous(FALSE)
-#ifdef FEATURE_APTCA
-    ,m_pConditionalAptcaCache(new ConditionalAptcaCache(pAppDomain))
-#endif // FEATURE_APTCA
 {
     CONTRACTL
     {
@@ -45,20 +42,6 @@ inline ApplicationSecurityDescriptor::ApplicationSecurityDescriptor(AppDomain *p
     return;
 }
 
-#ifdef FEATURE_APTCA
-inline ApplicationSecurityDescriptor::~ApplicationSecurityDescriptor()
-{
-    CONTRACTL
-    {
-        NOTHROW;
-        MODE_ANY;
-        GC_TRIGGERS;
-    }
-    CONTRACTL_END;
-
-    delete m_pConditionalAptcaCache;
-}
-#endif // FEATURE_APTCA
 
 inline void ApplicationSecurityDescriptor::ResetInitializationInProgress()
 {

diff --git a/src/vm/securitydescriptorassembly.h b/src/vm/securitydescriptorassembly.h
index 4ba65eb..1db30bb 100644 (file)
--- a/src/vm/securitydescriptorassembly.h
+++ b/src/vm/securitydescriptorassembly.h
@@ -141,12 +141,6 @@ private:
     inline void SetSignatureLoaded();
 #endif
 
-#ifdef FEATURE_APTCA
-    // If you think you need to call this method, you're probably wrong.  We shouldn't be making any
-    // security enforcement decisions based upon this result -- it's strictly for ensuring that we load
-    // conditional APTCA assemblies correctly.
-    inline BOOL IsConditionalAptca();
-#endif // FEATURE_APTCA
 
 #endif // #ifndef DACCESS_COMPILE
 };

diff --git a/src/vm/securitydescriptorassembly.inl b/src/vm/securitydescriptorassembly.inl
index 44b49a3..b923100 100644 (file)
--- a/src/vm/securitydescriptorassembly.inl
+++ b/src/vm/securitydescriptorassembly.inl
@@ -57,16 +57,6 @@ inline void AssemblySecurityDescriptor::SetSignatureLoaded()
 
 #endif // FEATURE_CAS_POLICY
 
-#ifdef FEATURE_APTCA
-
-inline BOOL AssemblySecurityDescriptor::IsConditionalAptca()
-{
-    WRAPPER_NO_CONTRACT;
-    ModuleSecurityDescriptor *pMSD = ModuleSecurityDescriptor::GetModuleSecurityDescriptor(m_pAssem->GetAssembly());
-    return (pMSD->GetTokenFlags() & TokenSecurityDescriptorFlags_ConditionalAPTCA) == TokenSecurityDescriptorFlags_ConditionalAPTCA;
-}
-
-#endif // FEATURE_APTCA
 
 #endif // !DACCESS_COMPILE
 

diff --git a/src/vm/securitymeta.cpp b/src/vm/securitymeta.cpp
index cc2f10a..3101416 100644 (file)
--- a/src/vm/securitymeta.cpp
+++ b/src/vm/securitymeta.cpp
@@ -1583,12 +1583,6 @@ void ModuleSecurityDescriptor::VerifyDataComputed()
     // choosing.
     TokenSecurityDescriptorFlags tokenFlags = GetTokenFlags();
 
-#ifdef FEATURE_APTCA
-    // We need to post-process the APTCA bits on the token security descriptor to handle:
-    //  1. Conditional APTCA assemblies, which should appear as either APTCA-enabled or APTCA-disabled
-    //  2. APTCA killbitted assemblies, which should appear as APTCA-disabled
-    tokenFlags = ProcessAssemblyAptcaFlags(pAssembly->GetDomainAssembly(), tokenFlags);
-#endif // FEATURE_APTCA
 
 #ifndef FEATURE_CORECLR
     // Make sure we understand the security rule set being asked for
@@ -1691,14 +1685,6 @@ void ModuleSecurityDescriptor::VerifyDataComputed()
         }
     }
 
-#ifdef FEATURE_APTCA
-    // If the security model implies that unsigned assemblies are APTCA, then check to see if we're unsigned
-    // and set the APTCA bit.
-    if (pTransparencyBehavior->DoesUnsignedImplyAPTCA() && !pAssembly->IsStrongNamed())
-    {
-        moduleFlags |= ModuleSecurityDescriptorFlags_IsAPTCA;
-    }
-#endif // FEATURE_APTCA
 
 #ifdef _DEBUG
     // If we're being forced to generate native code for this assembly which can be used in a partial trust

diff --git a/src/vm/securitymeta.h b/src/vm/securitymeta.h
index dae8f73..d2e3743 100644 (file)
--- a/src/vm/securitymeta.h
+++ b/src/vm/securitymeta.h
@@ -158,10 +158,6 @@ inline SecurityRuleSet GetSecurityRuleSet(TokenSecurityDescriptorFlags flags);
 // Encode a security rule set into token flags - this reverses GetSecurityRuleSet
 inline TokenSecurityDescriptorFlags EncodeSecurityRuleSet(SecurityRuleSet ruleSet);
 
-#ifdef FEATURE_APTCA
-TokenSecurityDescriptorFlags ParseAptcaAttribute(const BYTE *pbAptcaBlob,
-                                                 DWORD cbAptcaBlob);
-#endif // FEATURE_APTCA
 
 TokenSecurityDescriptorFlags ParseSecurityRulesAttribute(const BYTE *pbSecurityRulesBlob,
                                                          DWORD cbSecurityRulesBlob);
@@ -575,9 +571,6 @@ inline ModuleSecurityDescriptorFlags operator&=(ModuleSecurityDescriptorFlags& l
 
 inline ModuleSecurityDescriptorFlags operator~(ModuleSecurityDescriptorFlags flags);
 
-#ifdef FEATURE_APTCA
-BOOL CheckAssemblyHasBeenKillBitted(LPASSEMBLYNAME pAssemblyName, ULARGE_INTEGER uliFileVersion);
-#endif
 
 // Module security descriptor, this class contains static security information about the module
 // this information will get persisted in the NGen image

diff --git a/src/vm/securitymeta.inl b/src/vm/securitymeta.inl
index adb6faa..6eb488d 100644 (file)
--- a/src/vm/securitymeta.inl
+++ b/src/vm/securitymeta.inl
@@ -1112,7 +1112,7 @@ inline BOOL ModuleSecurityDescriptor::CanTransparentCodeSkipVerification()
 
 #endif // !FEATURE_CORECLR
 
-#if defined(FEATURE_APTCA) || defined(FEATURE_CORESYSTEM)
+#if defined(FEATURE_CORESYSTEM)
 inline BOOL ModuleSecurityDescriptor::IsAPTCA()
 {
     WRAPPER_NO_CONTRACT;

diff --git a/src/vm/securitystackwalk.h b/src/vm/securitystackwalk.h
index aa6c1c1..a4ee28a 100644 (file)
--- a/src/vm/securitystackwalk.h
+++ b/src/vm/securitystackwalk.h
@@ -169,9 +169,6 @@ public:
     //   Callers:
     //     CanAccess (ReflectionInvocation)
     //     ReflectionSerialization::GetSafeUninitializedObject
-#ifdef FEATURE_APTCA
-    //     SecurityDeclarative::DoUntrustedCallerChecks
-#endif // FEATURE_APTCA
     static void DemandSet(SecurityStackWalkType eType, OBJECTREF demand);
 
     // Native version of PermissionSet.Demand() that delays instantiating the PermissionSet object

diff --git a/src/vm/securitytransparentassembly.cpp b/src/vm/securitytransparentassembly.cpp
index 3f3bef6..f798df1 100644 (file)
--- a/src/vm/securitytransparentassembly.cpp
+++ b/src/vm/securitytransparentassembly.cpp
@@ -812,44 +812,6 @@ static void ConvertLinkDemandToFullDemand(MethodDesc* pCallerMD, MethodDesc* pCa
                                                                                &gc.refMethodCasDemands,
                                                                                &gc.refMethodNonCasDemands);
 
-#ifdef FEATURE_APTCA
-    BOOL fCallerIsAPTCA = pCallerMD->GetAssembly()->AllowUntrustedCaller();
-
-    if ((linktimeCheckReason & LinktimeCheckReason_AptcaCheck))
-    {
-        if (fCallerIsAPTCA &&    
-            Security::IsUntrustedCallerCheckNeeded(pCalleeMD, pCallerMD->GetAssembly()))
-        {
-#ifdef _DEBUG
-            if (g_pConfig->LogTransparencyErrors())
-            {
-                SecurityTransparent::LogTransparencyError(pCallerMD, "Transparent method calling an APTCA protected assembly", pCalleeMD);
-            }
-            if (!g_pConfig->DisableTransparencyEnforcement())
-#endif // _DEBUG
-            {
-                // Depending on the transparency model, we need to either fail the attempt to call a method
-                // protected with the APTCA link demand, or conver it to a full demand.  Note that we need to
-                // upgrade to a full demand if either the caller of callee are in v2 mode, the APTCA check is
-                // conceptually a link demand, and for link demands we do the conversion if either assembly is
-                // using the v2 rules.
-                if (pCallerMD->GetAssembly()->GetSecurityTransparencyBehavior()->CanTransparentCodeCallLinkDemandMethods() ||
-                    pCalleeMD->GetAssembly()->GetSecurityTransparencyBehavior()->CanTransparentCodeCallLinkDemandMethods())
-                {
-                    OBJECTREF permSet = NULL;
-                    GCPROTECT_BEGIN(permSet);
-                    Security::GetPermissionInstance(&permSet, SECURITY_FULL_TRUST);
-                    Security::DemandSet(SSWT_LATEBOUND_LINKDEMAND, permSet);
-                    GCPROTECT_END();
-                }
-                else
-                {
-                    ::ThrowMethodAccessException(pCallerMD, pCalleeMD, FALSE, IDS_E_TRANSPARENT_CALL_LINKDEMAND);
-                }
-            }
-        }
-    }
-#endif // FEATURE_APTCA
 
             
     // The following logic turns link demands on the target method into full stack walks
@@ -905,15 +867,6 @@ static void ConvertLinkDemandToFullDemand(MethodDesc* pCallerMD, MethodDesc* pCa
 
         if (pCallerMD->GetAssembly()->GetSecurityTransparencyBehavior()->CanTransparentCodeCallUnmanagedCode())
         {
-#ifdef FEATURE_APTCA
-            if (fCallerIsAPTCA)
-            {
-                // if the caller assembly is APTCA, then only inject this demand, for NON-APTCA we will allow
-                // calls to native code
-                // NOTE: the JIT would have already performed the LinkDemand for this anyways
-                Security::SpecialDemand(SSWT_LATEBOUND_LINKDEMAND, SECURITY_UNMANAGED_CODE);        
-            }
-#endif // FEATURE_APTCA
         }
         else
         {