selinux: restrict kernel module loading
authorJeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Tue, 5 Apr 2016 20:06:27 +0000 (13:06 -0700)
committerPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Tue, 5 Apr 2016 20:11:56 +0000 (16:11 -0400)
Utilize existing kernel_read_file hook on kernel module load.
Add module_load permission to the system class.

Enforces restrictions on kernel module origin when calling the
finit_module syscall. The hook checks that source type has
permission module_load for the target type.
Example for finit_module:

allow foo bar_file:system module_load;

Similarly restrictions are enforced on kernel module loading when
calling the init_module syscall. The hook checks that source
type has permission module_load with itself as the target object
because the kernel module is sourced from the calling process.
Example for init_module:

allow foo foo:system module_load;

Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
[PM: fixed return value of selinux_kernel_read_file()]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
security/selinux/hooks.c
security/selinux/include/classmap.h

index 5003b5a..fce7dc8 100644 (file)
@@ -3722,6 +3722,52 @@ static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
                            SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
 }
 
+static int selinux_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
+{
+       struct common_audit_data ad;
+       struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+       struct file_security_struct *fsec;
+       u32 sid = current_sid();
+       int rc;
+
+       /* init_module */
+       if (file == NULL)
+               return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
+                                       SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, NULL);
+
+       /* finit_module */
+       ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
+       ad.u.path = file->f_path;
+
+       isec = inode_security(file_inode(file));
+       fsec = file->f_security;
+
+       if (sid != fsec->sid) {
+               rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid, SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, &ad);
+               if (rc)
+                       return rc;
+       }
+
+       return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
+                               SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_kernel_read_file(struct file *file,
+                                   enum kernel_read_file_id id)
+{
+       int rc = 0;
+
+       switch (id) {
+       case READING_MODULE:
+               rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(file);
+               break;
+       default:
+               break;
+       }
+
+       return rc;
+}
+
 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
 {
        return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
@@ -6018,6 +6064,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] = {
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, selinux_kernel_act_as),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, selinux_kernel_create_files_as),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, selinux_kernel_module_request),
+       LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, selinux_kernel_read_file),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, selinux_task_setpgid),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, selinux_task_getpgid),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, selinux_task_getsid),
index ef83c4b..8fbd138 100644 (file)
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
            "setsockcreate", NULL } },
        { "system",
          { "ipc_info", "syslog_read", "syslog_mod",
-           "syslog_console", "module_request", NULL } },
+           "syslog_console", "module_request", "module_load", NULL } },
        { "capability",
          { "chown", "dac_override", "dac_read_search",
            "fowner", "fsetid", "kill", "setgid", "setuid", "setpcap",