--- /dev/null
+// Regression test for https://crbug.com/502974, where ASan was unable to read
+// the binary name because of sandbox restrictions.
+// This test uses seccomp-BPF to restrict the readlink() system call and makes
+// sure ASan is still able to
+// RUN: %clang_asan %s -o %t && not %run %t 2>&1 | FileCheck %s
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <sys/prctl.h>
+#include <sys/syscall.h>
+#include <linux/filter.h>
+#include <linux/seccomp.h>
+
+#define syscall_nr (offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr))
+
+void corrupt() {
+ void *p = malloc(10);
+ free(p);
+ free(p);
+}
+
+int main() {
+ prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
+
+ struct sock_filter filter[] = {
+ /* Grab the system call number */
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD + BPF_W + BPF_ABS, syscall_nr),
+ // If this is __NR_readlink,
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP + BPF_JEQ + BPF_K, __NR_readlink, 0, 1),
+ // return with EPERM,
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET + BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO | EPERM),
+ // otherwise allow the syscall.
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET + BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW)
+ };
+ struct sock_fprog prog;
+ prog.len = (unsigned short)(sizeof(filter)/sizeof(filter[0]));
+ prog.filter = filter;
+
+ int res = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog, 0, 0);
+ if (res != 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "PR_SET_SECCOMP unsupported!\n");
+ }
+ corrupt();
+ // CHECK: AddressSanitizer
+ // CHECK-NOT: reading executable name failed
+ return 0;
+}