# Check bidi
RandAL = map(stringprep.in_table_d1, label)
- for c in RandAL:
- if c:
- # There is a RandAL char in the string. Must perform further
- # tests:
- # 1) The characters in section 5.8 MUST be prohibited.
- # This is table C.8, which was already checked
- # 2) If a string contains any RandALCat character, the string
- # MUST NOT contain any LCat character.
- if filter(stringprep.in_table_d2, label):
- raise UnicodeError("Violation of BIDI requirement 2")
-
- # 3) If a string contains any RandALCat character, a
- # RandALCat character MUST be the first character of the
- # string, and a RandALCat character MUST be the last
- # character of the string.
- if not RandAL[0] or not RandAL[-1]:
- raise UnicodeError("Violation of BIDI requirement 3")
+ if any(RandAL):
+ # There is a RandAL char in the string. Must perform further
+ # tests:
+ # 1) The characters in section 5.8 MUST be prohibited.
+ # This is table C.8, which was already checked
+ # 2) If a string contains any RandALCat character, the string
+ # MUST NOT contain any LCat character.
+ if any(stringprep.in_table_d2(x) for x in label):
+ raise UnicodeError("Violation of BIDI requirement 2")
+ # 3) If a string contains any RandALCat character, a
+ # RandALCat character MUST be the first character of the
+ # string, and a RandALCat character MUST be the last
+ # character of the string.
+ if not RandAL[0] or not RandAL[-1]:
+ raise UnicodeError("Violation of BIDI requirement 3")
return label
self.assertEqual(u"pyth\xf6n.org".encode("idna"), "xn--pythn-mua.org")
self.assertEqual(u"pyth\xf6n.org.".encode("idna"), "xn--pythn-mua.org.")
+ def test_builtin_decode_length_limit(self):
+ with self.assertRaisesRegexp(UnicodeError, "too long"):
+ (b"xn--016c"+b"a"*1100).decode("idna")
+ with self.assertRaisesRegexp(UnicodeError, "too long"):
+ (b"xn--016c"+b"a"*70).decode("idna")
+
def test_stream(self):
import StringIO
r = codecs.getreader("idna")(StringIO.StringIO("abc"))
--- /dev/null
+The IDNA codec decoder used on DNS hostnames by :mod:`socket` or :mod:`asyncio`
+related name resolution functions no longer involves a quadratic algorithm.
+This prevents a potential CPU denial of service if an out-of-spec excessive
+length hostname involving bidirectional characters were decoded. Some protocols
+such as :mod:`urllib` http ``3xx`` redirects potentially allow for an attacker
+to supply such a name.