+++ /dev/null
-Name: openssl
-URL: http://openssl.org/source/
-Version: 1.0.0f
-License: BSDish
-License File: openssl/LICENSE
-
-Description:
-This is OpenSSL, the standard SSL/TLS library, which is used only in Android.
-
-It's an unmodified, upstream source except for the patches listed below.
-
-
-********************************************************************************
-The following patches are taken from Android Open Source Project.
-
-
-progs.patch:
-
-Fixup sources under the apps/ directory that are not built under the android environment.
-
-
-small_records.patch:
-
-Reduce OpenSSL memory consumption.
-SSL records may be as large as 16K, but are typically < 2K. In
-addition, a historic bug in Windows allowed records to be as large
-32K. OpenSSL statically allocates read and write buffers (34K and
-18K respectively) used for processing records.
-With this patch, OpenSSL statically allocates 4K + 4K buffers, with
-the option of dynamically growing buffers to 34K + 4K, which is a
-saving of 44K per connection for the typical case.
-
-
-handshake_cutthrough.patch
-
-Enables SSL3+ clients to send application data immediately following the
-Finished message even when negotiating full-handshakes. With this patch,
-clients can negotiate SSL connections in 1-RTT even when performing
-full-handshakes.
-
-
-jsse.patch
-
-Support for JSSE implementation based on OpenSSL.
-
-
-npn.patch
-
-Transport Layer Security (TLS) Next Protocol Negotiation Extension
-
-
-sha1_armv4_large.patch
-
-This patch eliminates memory stores to addresses below SP.
-
-
-openssl_no_dtls1.patch
-
-Add missing #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
-
-
-********************************************************************************
-The following patches are needed to compile this openssl on Chromium and pass
-the related net unit tests.
-
-
-empty_OPENSSL_cpuid_setup.patch
-
-Use a empty implementation for function OPENSSL_cpuid_setup to resolve link
-error. We should figure out how to geenrate platform specific implementation
-of OPENSSL_cpuid_setup by leveraging crypto/*cpuid.pl.
-
-
-x509_hash_name_algorithm_change.patch
-
-There are many symbolic links under /etc/ssl/certs created by using hash of
-the pem certificates in order for OpenSSL to find those certificate.
-Openssl has a tool to help you create hash symbolic links. (See tools/c_rehash)
-However the new openssl changed the hash algorithm, Unless you compile/install
-the latest openssl library and re-create all related symbolic links, the new
-openssl can not find some certificates because the links of those certificates
-were created by using old hash algorithm, which causes some tests failed.
-This patch gives a way to find a certificate according to its hash by using both
-new algorithm and old algorithm.
-crbug.com/111045 is used to track this issue.
-
-
-tls_exporter.patch
-
-Keying Material Exporters for Transport Layer Security (RFC 5705).
-
-
-Android platform support
-
-Copy config/android/openssl/opensslconf.h from Android's
-external/openssl/include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+++ /dev/null
---- openssl-1.0.0f-origin/crypto/cryptlib.c 2011-06-22 23:39:00.000000000 +0800
-+++ openssl-1.0.0f/crypto/cryptlib.c 2012-01-19 02:17:50.261681856 +0800
-@@ -690,7 +690,7 @@
- unsigned long *OPENSSL_ia32cap_loc(void) { return NULL; }
- #endif
- int OPENSSL_NONPIC_relocated = 0;
--#if !defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_SETUP) && !defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ)
-+#if !defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_SETUP)
- void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void) {}
- #endif
-
+++ /dev/null
-diff -uarp openssl-1.0.0.orig/apps/s_client.c openssl-1.0.0/apps/s_client.c
---- openssl-1.0.0.orig/apps/s_client.c 2009-12-16 15:28:28.000000000 -0500
-+++ openssl-1.0.0/apps/s_client.c 2010-04-21 14:39:49.000000000 -0400
-@@ -248,6 +248,7 @@ static void sc_usage(void)
- BIO_printf(bio_err," -tlsextdebug - hex dump of all TLS extensions received\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err," -status - request certificate status from server\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err," -no_ticket - disable use of RFC4507bis session tickets\n");
-+ BIO_printf(bio_err," -cutthrough - enable 1-RTT full-handshake for strong ciphers\n");
- #endif
- }
-
-@@ -304,6 +305,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
- EVP_PKEY *key = NULL;
- char *CApath=NULL,*CAfile=NULL,*cipher=NULL;
- int reconnect=0,badop=0,verify=SSL_VERIFY_NONE,bugs=0;
-+ int cutthrough=0;
- int crlf=0;
- int write_tty,read_tty,write_ssl,read_ssl,tty_on,ssl_pending;
- SSL_CTX *ctx=NULL;
-@@ -533,6 +535,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
- else if (strcmp(*argv,"-no_ticket") == 0)
- { off|=SSL_OP_NO_TICKET; }
- #endif
-+ else if (strcmp(*argv,"-cutthrough") == 0)
-+ cutthrough=1;
- else if (strcmp(*argv,"-serverpref") == 0)
- off|=SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE;
- else if (strcmp(*argv,"-cipher") == 0)
-@@ -714,6 +718,15 @@ bad:
- */
- if (sock_type == SOCK_DGRAM) SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(ctx, 1);
-
-+ /* Enable handshake cutthrough for client connections using
-+ * strong ciphers. */
-+ if (cutthrough)
-+ {
-+ int ssl_mode = SSL_CTX_get_mode(ctx);
-+ ssl_mode |= SSL_MODE_HANDSHAKE_CUTTHROUGH;
-+ SSL_CTX_set_mode(ctx, ssl_mode);
-+ }
-+
- if (state) SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ctx,apps_ssl_info_callback);
- if (cipher != NULL)
- if(!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx,cipher)) {
-diff -uarp openssl-1.0.0.orig/ssl/s3_clnt.c openssl-1.0.0/ssl/s3_clnt.c
---- openssl-1.0.0.orig/ssl/s3_clnt.c 2010-02-27 19:24:24.000000000 -0500
-+++ openssl-1.0.0/ssl/s3_clnt.c 2010-04-21 14:39:49.000000000 -0400
-@@ -186,6 +186,18 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
-
- s->in_handshake++;
- if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
-+#if 0 /* Send app data in separate packet, otherwise, some particular site
-+ * (only one site so far) closes the socket.
-+ * Note: there is a very small chance that two TCP packets
-+ * could be arriving at server combined into a single TCP packet,
-+ * then trigger that site to break. We haven't encounter that though.
-+ */
-+ if (SSL_get_mode(s) & SSL_MODE_HANDSHAKE_CUTTHROUGH)
-+ {
-+ /* Send app data along with CCS/Finished */
-+ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED;
-+ }
-+#endif
-
- for (;;)
- {
-@@ -454,14 +468,31 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
- }
- else
- {
--#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-- /* Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected */
-- if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
-- s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
-+ if ((SSL_get_mode(s) & SSL_MODE_HANDSHAKE_CUTTHROUGH) && SSL_get_cipher_bits(s, NULL) >= 128
-+ && s->s3->previous_server_finished_len == 0 /* no cutthrough on renegotiation (would complicate the state machine) */
-+ )
-+ {
-+ if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED)
-+ {
-+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CUTTHROUGH_COMPLETE;
-+ s->s3->flags|=SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
-+ s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret=0;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CUTTHROUGH_COMPLETE;
-+ }
-+ }
- else
-+ {
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-+ /* Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected */
-+ if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
-+ s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
-+ else
- #endif
--
-- s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
-+ s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
-+ }
- }
- s->init_num=0;
- break;
-@@ -512,6 +541,24 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
- s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
- break;
-
-+ case SSL3_ST_CUTTHROUGH_COMPLETE:
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-+ /* Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected */
-+ if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
-+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
-+ else
-+#endif
-+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
-+
-+ /* SSL_write() will take care of flushing buffered data if
-+ * DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED is set.
-+ */
-+ if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED))
-+ ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
-+ ret = 1;
-+ goto end;
-+ /* break; */
-+
- case SSL_ST_OK:
- /* clean a few things up */
- ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
-diff -uarp openssl-1.0.0.orig/ssl/s3_lib.c openssl-1.0.0/ssl/s3_lib.c
--- openssl-1.0.0.orig/ssl/s3_lib.c 2009-10-16 11:24:19.000000000 -0400
-+++ openssl-1.0.0/ssl/s3_lib.c 2010-04-21 14:39:49.000000000 -0400
-@@ -2551,9 +2551,22 @@ int ssl3_write(SSL *s, const void *buf,
-
- static int ssl3_read_internal(SSL *s, void *buf, int len, int peek)
- {
-- int ret;
-+ int n,ret;
-
- clear_sys_error();
-+ if ((s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER) && (s->wbio == s->bbio))
-+ {
-+ /* Deal with an application that calls SSL_read() when handshake data
-+ * is yet to be written.
-+ */
-+ if (BIO_wpending(s->wbio) > 0)
-+ {
-+ s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
-+ n=BIO_flush(s->wbio);
-+ if (n <= 0) return(n);
-+ s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
-+ }
-+ }
- if (s->s3->renegotiate) ssl3_renegotiate_check(s);
- s->s3->in_read_app_data=1;
- ret=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA,buf,len,peek);
-diff -uarp openssl-1.0.0.orig/ssl/ssl.h openssl-1.0.0/ssl/ssl.h
---- openssl-1.0.0.orig/ssl/ssl.h 2010-01-06 12:37:38.000000000 -0500
-+++ openssl-1.0.0/ssl/ssl.h 2010-04-21 16:57:49.000000000 -0400
-@@ -605,6 +605,10 @@ typedef struct ssl_session_st
- /* Use small read and write buffers: (a) lazy allocate read buffers for
- * large incoming records, and (b) limit the size of outgoing records. */
- #define SSL_MODE_SMALL_BUFFERS 0x00000020L
-+/* When set, clients may send application data before receipt of CCS
-+ * and Finished. This mode enables full-handshakes to 'complete' in
-+ * one RTT. */
-+#define SSL_MODE_HANDSHAKE_CUTTHROUGH 0x00000040L
-
- /* Note: SSL[_CTX]_set_{options,mode} use |= op on the previous value,
- * they cannot be used to clear bits. */
-@@ -1097,10 +1101,12 @@ extern "C" {
- /* Is the SSL_connection established? */
- #define SSL_get_state(a) SSL_state(a)
- #define SSL_is_init_finished(a) (SSL_state(a) == SSL_ST_OK)
--#define SSL_in_init(a) (SSL_state(a)&SSL_ST_INIT)
-+#define SSL_in_init(a) ((SSL_state(a)&SSL_ST_INIT) && \
-+ !SSL_cutthrough_complete(a))
- #define SSL_in_before(a) (SSL_state(a)&SSL_ST_BEFORE)
- #define SSL_in_connect_init(a) (SSL_state(a)&SSL_ST_CONNECT)
- #define SSL_in_accept_init(a) (SSL_state(a)&SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-+int SSL_cutthrough_complete(const SSL *s);
-
- /* The following 2 states are kept in ssl->rstate when reads fail,
- * you should not need these */
-Only in openssl-1.0.0/ssl: ssl.h.orig
-diff -uarp openssl-1.0.0.orig/ssl/ssl3.h openssl-1.0.0/ssl/ssl3.h
--- openssl-1.0.0.orig/ssl/ssl3.h 2010-01-06 12:37:38.000000000 -0500
-+++ openssl-1.0.0/ssl/ssl3.h 2010-04-21 14:39:49.000000000 -0400
-@@ -456,6 +456,7 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st
- /*client */
- /* extra state */
- #define SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH (0x100|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-+#define SSL3_ST_CUTTHROUGH_COMPLETE (0x101|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
- /* write to server */
- #define SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A (0x110|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
- #define SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B (0x111|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-diff -uarp openssl-1.0.0.orig/ssl/ssl_lib.c openssl-1.0.0/ssl/ssl_lib.c
---- openssl-1.0.0.orig/ssl/ssl_lib.c 2010-02-17 14:43:46.000000000 -0500
-+++ openssl-1.0.0/ssl/ssl_lib.c 2010-04-21 17:02:45.000000000 -0400
-@@ -3031,6 +3031,19 @@ void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl, void
- SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb);
- }
-
-+int SSL_cutthrough_complete(const SSL *s)
-+ {
-+ return (!s->server && /* cutthrough only applies to clients */
-+ !s->hit && /* full-handshake */
-+ s->version >= SSL3_VERSION &&
-+ s->s3->in_read_app_data == 0 && /* cutthrough only applies to write() */
-+ (SSL_get_mode((SSL*)s) & SSL_MODE_HANDSHAKE_CUTTHROUGH) && /* cutthrough enabled */
-+ SSL_get_cipher_bits(s, NULL) >= 128 && /* strong cipher choosen */
-+ s->s3->previous_server_finished_len == 0 && /* not a renegotiation handshake */
-+ (s->state == SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A || /* ready to write app-data*/
-+ s->state == SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A));
-+ }
-+
- /* Allocates new EVP_MD_CTX and sets pointer to it into given pointer
- * vairable, freeing EVP_MD_CTX previously stored in that variable, if
- * any. If EVP_MD pointer is passed, initializes ctx with this md
-diff -uarp openssl-1.0.0.orig/ssl/ssltest.c openssl-1.0.0/ssl/ssltest.c
---- openssl-1.0.0.orig/ssl/ssltest.c 2010-01-24 11:57:38.000000000 -0500
-+++ openssl-1.0.0/ssl/ssltest.c 2010-04-21 17:06:35.000000000 -0400
-@@ -279,6 +279,7 @@ static void sv_usage(void)
- fprintf(stderr," -test_cipherlist - verifies the order of the ssl cipher lists\n");
- fprintf(stderr," -c_small_records - enable client side use of small SSL record buffers\n");
- fprintf(stderr," -s_small_records - enable server side use of small SSL record buffers\n");
-+ fprintf(stderr," -cutthrough - enable 1-RTT full-handshake for strong ciphers\n");
- }
-
- static void print_details(SSL *c_ssl, const char *prefix)
-@@ -436,6 +437,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
- int ssl_mode = 0;
- int c_small_records=0;
- int s_small_records=0;
-+ int cutthrough = 0;
-
- verbose = 0;
- debug = 0;
-@@ -632,6 +634,10 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
- {
- s_small_records = 1;
- }
-+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-cutthrough") == 0)
-+ {
-+ cutthrough = 1;
-+ }
- else
- {
- fprintf(stderr,"unknown option %s\n",*argv);
-@@ -782,6 +788,13 @@ bad:
- ssl_mode |= SSL_MODE_SMALL_BUFFERS;
- SSL_CTX_set_mode(s_ctx, ssl_mode);
- }
-+ ssl_mode = 0;
-+ if (cutthrough)
-+ {
-+ ssl_mode = SSL_CTX_get_mode(c_ctx);
-+ ssl_mode = SSL_MODE_HANDSHAKE_CUTTHROUGH;
-+ SSL_CTX_set_mode(c_ctx, ssl_mode);
-+ }
-
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- if (!no_dhe)
-diff -uarp openssl-1.0.0.orig/test/testssl openssl-1.0.0/test/testssl
---- openssl-1.0.0.orig/test/testssl 2006-03-10 18:06:27.000000000 -0500
-+++ openssl-1.0.0/test/testssl 2010-04-21 16:50:13.000000000 -0400
-@@ -79,6 +79,8 @@ $ssltest -server_auth -client_auth -s_sm
- echo test sslv2/sslv3 with both client and server authentication and small client and server buffers
- $ssltest -server_auth -client_auth -c_small_records -s_small_records $CA $extra || exit 1
-
-+echo test sslv2/sslv3 with both client and server authentication and handshake cutthrough
-+$ssltest -server_auth -client_auth -cutthrough $CA $extra || exit 1
-
- echo test sslv2 via BIO pair
- $ssltest -bio_pair -ssl2 $extra || exit 1
+++ /dev/null
---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/ssl.h 2010-11-30 00:03:46.000000000 +0000
-+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/ssl.h 2010-11-30 00:03:47.000000000 +0000
-@@ -1133,6 +1133,9 @@ struct ssl_st
- /* This can also be in the session once a session is established */
- SSL_SESSION *session;
-
-+ /* This can be disabled to prevent the use of uncached sessions */
-+ int session_creation_enabled;
-+
- /* Default generate session ID callback. */
- GEN_SESSION_CB generate_session_id;
-
-@@ -1546,6 +1549,7 @@ const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_current_cipher
- int SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(const SSL_CIPHER *c,int *alg_bits);
- char * SSL_CIPHER_get_version(const SSL_CIPHER *c);
- const char * SSL_CIPHER_get_name(const SSL_CIPHER *c);
-+const char * SSL_CIPHER_authentication_method(const SSL_CIPHER *c);
-
- int SSL_get_fd(const SSL *s);
- int SSL_get_rfd(const SSL *s);
-@@ -1554,6 +1558,7 @@ const char * SSL_get_cipher_list(const
- char * SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s, char *buf, int len);
- int SSL_get_read_ahead(const SSL * s);
- int SSL_pending(const SSL *s);
-+const char * SSL_authentication_method(const SSL *c);
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
- int SSL_set_fd(SSL *s, int fd);
- int SSL_set_rfd(SSL *s, int fd);
-@@ -1565,6 +1570,7 @@ BIO * SSL_get_rbio(const SSL *s);
- BIO * SSL_get_wbio(const SSL *s);
- #endif
- int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *s, const char *str);
-+int SSL_set_cipher_lists(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk);
- void SSL_set_read_ahead(SSL *s, int yes);
- int SSL_get_verify_mode(const SSL *s);
- int SSL_get_verify_depth(const SSL *s);
-@@ -1580,6 +1586,8 @@ int SSL_use_PrivateKey(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKE
- int SSL_use_PrivateKey_ASN1(int pk,SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *d, long len);
- int SSL_use_certificate(SSL *ssl, X509 *x);
- int SSL_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *d, int len);
-+int SSL_use_certificate_chain(SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(X509) *cert_chain);
-+STACK_OF(X509) * SSL_get_certificate_chain(SSL *ssl, X509 *x);
-
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
- int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type);
-@@ -1615,6 +1623,7 @@ void SSL_copy_session_id(SSL *to,const S
- SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void);
- const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *s,
- unsigned int *len);
-+const char * SSL_SESSION_get_version(const SSL_SESSION *s);
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API
- int SSL_SESSION_print_fp(FILE *fp,const SSL_SESSION *ses);
- #endif
-@@ -1624,6 +1633,7 @@ int SSL_SESSION_print(BIO *fp,const SSL_
- void SSL_SESSION_free(SSL_SESSION *ses);
- int i2d_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION *in,unsigned char **pp);
- int SSL_set_session(SSL *to, SSL_SESSION *session);
-+void SSL_set_session_creation_enabled(SSL *, int);
- int SSL_CTX_add_session(SSL_CTX *s, SSL_SESSION *c);
- int SSL_CTX_remove_session(SSL_CTX *,SSL_SESSION *c);
- int SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(SSL_CTX *, GEN_SESSION_CB);
-@@ -2066,6 +2076,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
- #define SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_VOID_FUNCTION 244
- #define SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE 198
- #define SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_ASN1 199
-+#define SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN 2000
- #define SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE 200
- #define SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY 201
- #define SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY_ASN1 202
-@@ -2272,6 +2283,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
- #define SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING 345
- #define SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 275
- #define SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED 277
-+#define SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED 2000
- #define SSL_R_SHORT_READ 219
- #define SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE 220
- #define SSL_R_SSL23_DOING_SESSION_ID_REUSE 221
---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/d1_clnt.c 2010-01-26 19:46:29.000000000 +0000
-+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/d1_clnt.c 2010-11-30 00:03:47.000000000 +0000
-@@ -613,6 +613,12 @@ int dtls1_client_hello(SSL *s)
- #endif
- (s->session->not_resumable))
- {
-+ if (!s->session_creation_enabled)
-+ {
-+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
- if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0))
- goto err;
- }
---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/s23_clnt.c 2010-02-16 14:20:40.000000000 +0000
-+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/s23_clnt.c 2010-11-30 00:03:47.000000000 +0000
-@@ -687,6 +687,13 @@ static int ssl23_get_server_hello(SSL *s
-
- /* Since, if we are sending a ssl23 client hello, we are not
- * reusing a session-id */
-+ if (!s->session_creation_enabled)
-+ {
-+ if (!(s->client_version == SSL2_VERSION))
-+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
- if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0))
- goto err;
-
---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/s3_both.c 2010-11-30 00:03:46.000000000 +0000
-+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/s3_both.c 2010-11-30 00:03:47.000000000 +0000
-@@ -347,8 +347,11 @@ unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL
- unsigned long l=7;
- BUF_MEM *buf;
- int no_chain;
-+ STACK_OF(X509) *cert_chain;
-
-- if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || s->ctx->extra_certs)
-+ cert_chain = SSL_get_certificate_chain(s, x);
-+
-+ if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || s->ctx->extra_certs || cert_chain)
- no_chain = 1;
- else
- no_chain = 0;
-@@ -400,6 +403,10 @@ unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL
- return(0);
- }
-
-+ for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(cert_chain); i++)
-+ if (ssl3_add_cert_to_buf(buf, &l, sk_X509_value(cert_chain,i)))
-+ return(0);
-+
- l-=7;
- p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
- l2n3(l,p);
---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/s3_clnt.c 2010-11-30 00:03:46.000000000 +0000
-+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/s3_clnt.c 2010-11-30 00:03:47.000000000 +0000
-@@ -686,6 +686,12 @@ int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
- #endif
- (sess->not_resumable))
- {
-+ if (!s->session_creation_enabled)
-+ {
-+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
- if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0))
- goto err;
- }
-@@ -894,6 +900,12 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
- s->hit=0;
- if (s->session->session_id_length > 0)
- {
-+ if (!s->session_creation_enabled)
-+ {
-+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
- if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0))
- {
- al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/s3_srvr.c 2010-11-30 00:03:46.000000000 +0000
-+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/s3_srvr.c 2010-11-30 00:03:47.000000000 +0000
-@@ -902,6 +902,12 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
- */
- if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
- {
-+ if (!s->session_creation_enabled)
-+ {
-+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
- if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
- goto err;
- }
-@@ -916,6 +922,12 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
- goto err;
- else /* i == 0 */
- {
-+ if (!s->session_creation_enabled)
-+ {
-+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
- if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
- goto err;
- }
---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/ssl_ciph.c 2010-06-15 17:25:14.000000000 +0000
-+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/ssl_ciph.c 2010-11-30 00:03:47.000000000 +0000
-@@ -1652,6 +1652,52 @@ int SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(const SSL_CIPHER
- return(ret);
- }
-
-+/* return string version of key exchange algorithm */
-+const char* SSL_CIPHER_authentication_method(const SSL_CIPHER* cipher)
-+ {
-+ switch (cipher->algorithm_mkey)
-+ {
-+ case SSL_kRSA:
-+ return SSL_TXT_RSA;
-+ case SSL_kDHr:
-+ return SSL_TXT_DH "_" SSL_TXT_RSA;
-+ case SSL_kDHd:
-+ return SSL_TXT_DH "_" SSL_TXT_DSS;
-+ case SSL_kEDH:
-+ switch (cipher->algorithm_auth)
-+ {
-+ case SSL_aDSS:
-+ return "DHE_" SSL_TXT_DSS;
-+ case SSL_aRSA:
-+ return "DHE_" SSL_TXT_RSA;
-+ case SSL_aNULL:
-+ return SSL_TXT_DH "_anon";
-+ default:
-+ return "UNKNOWN";
-+ }
-+ case SSL_kKRB5:
-+ return SSL_TXT_KRB5;
-+ case SSL_kECDHr:
-+ return SSL_TXT_ECDH "_" SSL_TXT_RSA;
-+ case SSL_kECDHe:
-+ return SSL_TXT_ECDH "_" SSL_TXT_ECDSA;
-+ case SSL_kEECDH:
-+ switch (cipher->algorithm_auth)
-+ {
-+ case SSL_aECDSA:
-+ return "ECDHE_" SSL_TXT_ECDSA;
-+ case SSL_aRSA:
-+ return "ECDHE_" SSL_TXT_RSA;
-+ case SSL_aNULL:
-+ return SSL_TXT_ECDH "_anon";
-+ default:
-+ return "UNKNOWN";
-+ }
-+ default:
-+ return "UNKNOWN";
-+ }
-+ }
-+
- SSL_COMP *ssl3_comp_find(STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *sk, int n)
- {
- SSL_COMP *ctmp;
---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/ssl_err.c 2010-11-30 00:03:46.000000000 +0000
-+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/ssl_err.c 2010-11-30 00:03:47.000000000 +0000
-@@ -465,6 +465,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING),"scsv received when renegotiating"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT) ,"serverhello tlsext"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED),"session id context uninitialized"},
-+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED),"session may not be created"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SHORT_READ) ,"short read"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE),"signature for non signing certificate"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL23_DOING_SESSION_ID_REUSE),"ssl23 doing session id reuse"},
---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/ssl_lib.c 2010-11-30 00:03:46.000000000 +0000
-+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/ssl_lib.c 2010-11-30 00:03:47.000000000 +0000
-@@ -326,6 +326,7 @@ SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx)
- OPENSSL_assert(s->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof s->sid_ctx);
- memcpy(&s->sid_ctx,&ctx->sid_ctx,sizeof(s->sid_ctx));
- s->verify_callback=ctx->default_verify_callback;
-+ s->session_creation_enabled=1;
- s->generate_session_id=ctx->generate_session_id;
-
- s->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
-@@ -1311,6 +1312,32 @@ int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *s,const cha
- return 1;
- }
-
-+/** specify the ciphers to be used by the SSL */
-+int SSL_set_cipher_lists(SSL *s,STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk)
-+ {
-+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *tmp_cipher_list;
-+
-+ if (sk == NULL)
-+ return 0;
-+
-+ /* Based on end of ssl_create_cipher_list */
-+ tmp_cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(sk);
-+ if (tmp_cipher_list == NULL)
-+ {
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+ if (s->cipher_list != NULL)
-+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
-+ s->cipher_list = sk;
-+ if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)
-+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
-+ s->cipher_list_by_id = tmp_cipher_list;
-+ (void)sk_SSL_CIPHER_set_cmp_func(s->cipher_list_by_id,ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp);
-+
-+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_sort(s->cipher_list_by_id);
-+ return 1;
-+ }
-+
- /* works well for SSLv2, not so good for SSLv3 */
- char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s,char *buf,int len)
- {
-@@ -2551,18 +2578,45 @@ SSL_METHOD *ssl_bad_method(int ver)
- return(NULL);
- }
-
--const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *s)
-+static const char *ssl_get_version(int version)
- {
-- if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
-+ if (version == TLS1_VERSION)
- return("TLSv1");
-- else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
-+ else if (version == SSL3_VERSION)
- return("SSLv3");
-- else if (s->version == SSL2_VERSION)
-+ else if (version == SSL2_VERSION)
- return("SSLv2");
- else
- return("unknown");
- }
-
-+const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *s)
-+ {
-+ return ssl_get_version(s->version);
-+ }
-+
-+const char *SSL_SESSION_get_version(const SSL_SESSION *s)
-+ {
-+ return ssl_get_version(s->ssl_version);
-+ }
-+
-+const char* SSL_authentication_method(const SSL* ssl)
-+ {
-+ if (ssl->cert != NULL && ssl->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL)
-+ return SSL_TXT_RSA "_" SSL_TXT_EXPORT;
-+ switch (ssl->version)
-+ {
-+ case SSL2_VERSION:
-+ return SSL_TXT_RSA;
-+ case SSL3_VERSION:
-+ case TLS1_VERSION:
-+ case DTLS1_VERSION:
-+ return SSL_CIPHER_authentication_method(ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
-+ default:
-+ return "UNKNOWN";
-+ }
-+ }
-+
- SSL *SSL_dup(SSL *s)
- {
- STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk;
---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/ssl_locl.h 2010-11-30 00:03:46.000000000 +0000
-+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/ssl_locl.h 2010-11-30 00:03:47.000000000 +0000
-@@ -456,6 +456,7 @@
- typedef struct cert_pkey_st
- {
- X509 *x509;
-+ STACK_OF(X509) *cert_chain;
- EVP_PKEY *privatekey;
- } CERT_PKEY;
-
---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/ssl_rsa.c 2009-09-12 23:09:26.000000000 +0000
-+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/ssl_rsa.c 2010-11-30 00:03:47.000000000 +0000
-@@ -697,6 +697,42 @@ int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_ASN1(int type
- }
-
-
-+int SSL_use_certificate_chain(SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(X509) *cert_chain)
-+ {
-+ if (ssl == NULL)
-+ {
-+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN,ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
-+ return(0);
-+ }
-+ if (ssl->cert == NULL)
-+ {
-+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
-+ return(0);
-+ }
-+ if (ssl->cert->key == NULL)
-+ {
-+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
-+ return(0);
-+ }
-+ ssl->cert->key->cert_chain = cert_chain;
-+ return(1);
-+ }
-+
-+STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get_certificate_chain(SSL *ssl, X509 *x)
-+ {
-+ int i;
-+ if (x == NULL)
-+ return NULL;
-+ if (ssl == NULL)
-+ return NULL;
-+ if (ssl->cert == NULL)
-+ return NULL;
-+ for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
-+ if (ssl->cert->pkeys[i].x509 == x)
-+ return ssl->cert->pkeys[i].cert_chain;
-+ return NULL;
-+ }
-+
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
- /* Read a file that contains our certificate in "PEM" format,
- * possibly followed by a sequence of CA certificates that should be
---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/ssl_sess.c 2010-02-01 16:49:42.000000000 +0000
-+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/ssl_sess.c 2010-11-30 00:03:47.000000000 +0000
-@@ -261,6 +261,11 @@ static int def_generate_session_id(const
- return 0;
- }
-
-+void SSL_set_session_creation_enabled (SSL *s, int creation_enabled)
-+ {
-+ s->session_creation_enabled = creation_enabled;
-+ }
-+
- int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session)
- {
- /* This gets used by clients and servers. */
-@@ -269,6 +274,8 @@ int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int sess
- SSL_SESSION *ss=NULL;
- GEN_SESSION_CB cb = def_generate_session_id;
-
-+ /* caller should check this if they can do better error handling */
-+ if (!s->session_creation_enabled) return(0);
- if ((ss=SSL_SESSION_new()) == NULL) return(0);
-
- /* If the context has a default timeout, use it */
+++ /dev/null
---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/apps/apps.c 2010-11-11 14:42:19.000000000 +0000
-+++ openssl-1.0.0b/apps/apps.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.902465346 +0000
-@@ -3012,3 +3012,46 @@ int raw_write_stdout(const void *buf,int
- int raw_write_stdout(const void *buf,int siz)
- { return write(fileno(stdout),buf,siz); }
- #endif
-+
-+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
-+/* next_protos_parse parses a comma separated list of strings into a string
-+ * in a format suitable for passing to SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised.
-+ * outlen: (output) set to the length of the resulting buffer on success.
-+ * in: a NUL termianted string like "abc,def,ghi"
-+ *
-+ * returns: a malloced buffer or NULL on failure.
-+ */
-+unsigned char *next_protos_parse(unsigned short *outlen, const char *in)
-+ {
-+ size_t len;
-+ unsigned char *out;
-+ size_t i, start = 0;
-+
-+ len = strlen(in);
-+ if (len >= 65535)
-+ return NULL;
-+
-+ out = OPENSSL_malloc(strlen(in) + 1);
-+ if (!out)
-+ return NULL;
-+
-+ for (i = 0; i <= len; ++i)
-+ {
-+ if (i == len || in[i] == ',')
-+ {
-+ if (i - start > 255)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_free(out);
-+ return NULL;
-+ }
-+ out[start] = i - start;
-+ start = i + 1;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ out[i+1] = in[i];
-+ }
-+
-+ *outlen = len + 1;
-+ return out;
-+ }
-+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT && !OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG */
---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/apps/apps.h 2009-10-31 13:34:19.000000000 +0000
-+++ openssl-1.0.0b/apps/apps.h 2010-11-29 19:56:04.902465346 +0000
-@@ -358,3 +358,7 @@ int raw_write_stdout(const void *,int);
- #define TM_STOP 1
- double app_tminterval (int stop,int usertime);
- #endif
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+unsigned char *next_protos_parse(unsigned short *outlen, const char *in);
-+#endif
---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/apps/s_client.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.832465351 +0000
-+++ openssl-1.0.0b/apps/s_client.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.902465346 +0000
-@@ -342,6 +342,9 @@ static void sc_usage(void)
- BIO_printf(bio_err," -tlsextdebug - hex dump of all TLS extensions received\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err," -status - request certificate status from server\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err," -no_ticket - disable use of RFC4507bis session tickets\n");
-+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+ BIO_printf(bio_err," -nextprotoneg arg - enable NPN extension, considering named protocols supported (comma-separated list)\n");
-+# endif
- BIO_printf(bio_err," -cutthrough - enable 1-RTT full-handshake for strong ciphers\n");
- #endif
- BIO_printf(bio_err," -legacy_renegotiation - enable use of legacy renegotiation (dangerous)\n");
-@@ -367,6 +370,40 @@ static int MS_CALLBACK ssl_servername_cb
-
- return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
- }
-+
-+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+/* This the context that we pass to next_proto_cb */
-+typedef struct tlsextnextprotoctx_st {
-+ unsigned char *data;
-+ unsigned short len;
-+ int status;
-+} tlsextnextprotoctx;
-+
-+static tlsextnextprotoctx next_proto;
-+
-+static int next_proto_cb(SSL *s, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg)
-+ {
-+ tlsextnextprotoctx *ctx = arg;
-+
-+ if (!c_quiet)
-+ {
-+ /* We can assume that |in| is syntactically valid. */
-+ unsigned i;
-+ BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "Protocols advertised by server: ");
-+ for (i = 0; i < inlen; )
-+ {
-+ if (i)
-+ BIO_write(bio_c_out, ", ", 2);
-+ BIO_write(bio_c_out, &in[i + 1], in[i]);
-+ i += in[i] + 1;
-+ }
-+ BIO_write(bio_c_out, "\n", 1);
-+ }
-+
-+ ctx->status = SSL_select_next_proto(out, outlen, in, inlen, ctx->data, ctx->len);
-+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
-+ }
-+# endif /* ndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG */
- #endif
-
- enum
-@@ -431,6 +468,9 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
- char *servername = NULL;
- tlsextctx tlsextcbp =
- {NULL,0};
-+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+ const char *next_proto_neg_in = NULL;
-+# endif
- #endif
- char *sess_in = NULL;
- char *sess_out = NULL;
-@@ -658,6 +698,13 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- else if (strcmp(*argv,"-no_ticket") == 0)
- { off|=SSL_OP_NO_TICKET; }
-+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+ else if (strcmp(*argv,"-nextprotoneg") == 0)
-+ {
-+ if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
-+ next_proto_neg_in = *(++argv);
-+ }
-+# endif
- #endif
- else if (strcmp(*argv,"-cutthrough") == 0)
- cutthrough=1;
-@@ -766,6 +813,21 @@ bad:
- OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms();
- SSL_load_error_strings();
-
-+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
-+ next_proto.status = -1;
-+ if (next_proto_neg_in)
-+ {
-+ next_proto.data = next_protos_parse(&next_proto.len, next_proto_neg_in);
-+ if (next_proto.data == NULL)
-+ {
-+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error parsing -nextprotoneg argument\n");
-+ goto end;
-+ }
-+ }
-+ else
-+ next_proto.data = NULL;
-+#endif
-+
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
- e = setup_engine(bio_err, engine_id, 1);
- if (ssl_client_engine_id)
-@@ -896,6 +958,11 @@ bad:
- SSL_CTX_set_mode(ctx, ssl_mode);
- }
-
-+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
-+ if (next_proto.data)
-+ SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(ctx, next_proto_cb, &next_proto);
-+#endif
-+
- if (state) SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ctx,apps_ssl_info_callback);
- if (cipher != NULL)
- if(!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx,cipher)) {
-@@ -1755,6 +1822,18 @@ static void print_stuff(BIO *bio, SSL *s
- BIO_printf(bio,"Expansion: %s\n",
- expansion ? SSL_COMP_get_name(expansion) : "NONE");
- #endif
-+
-+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
-+ if (next_proto.status != -1) {
-+ const unsigned char *proto;
-+ unsigned int proto_len;
-+ SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(s, &proto, &proto_len);
-+ BIO_printf(bio, "Next protocol: (%d) ", next_proto.status);
-+ BIO_write(bio, proto, proto_len);
-+ BIO_write(bio, "\n", 1);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
- SSL_SESSION_print(bio,SSL_get_session(s));
- BIO_printf(bio,"---\n");
- if (peer != NULL)
---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/apps/s_server.c 2010-06-15 17:25:02.000000000 +0000
-+++ openssl-1.0.0b/apps/s_server.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.902465346 +0000
-@@ -492,6 +492,9 @@ static void sv_usage(void)
- BIO_printf(bio_err," -tlsextdebug - hex dump of all TLS extensions received\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err," -no_ticket - disable use of RFC4507bis session tickets\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err," -legacy_renegotiation - enable use of legacy renegotiation (dangerous)\n");
-+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+ BIO_printf(bio_err," -nextprotoneg arg - set the advertised protocols for the NPN extension (comma-separated list)\n");
-+# endif
- #endif
- }
-
-@@ -826,6 +829,24 @@ BIO_printf(err, "cert_status: received %
- ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
- goto done;
- }
-+
-+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+/* This is the context that we pass to next_proto_cb */
-+typedef struct tlsextnextprotoctx_st {
-+ unsigned char *data;
-+ unsigned int len;
-+} tlsextnextprotoctx;
-+
-+static int next_proto_cb(SSL *s, const unsigned char **data, unsigned int *len, void *arg)
-+ {
-+ tlsextnextprotoctx *next_proto = arg;
-+
-+ *data = next_proto->data;
-+ *len = next_proto->len;
-+
-+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
-+ }
-+# endif /* ndef OPENSSL_NO_NPN */
- #endif
-
- int MAIN(int, char **);
-@@ -867,6 +888,10 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char *argv[])
- #endif
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- tlsextctx tlsextcbp = {NULL, NULL, SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING};
-+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+ const char *next_proto_neg_in = NULL;
-+ tlsextnextprotoctx next_proto;
-+# endif
- #endif
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- /* by default do not send a PSK identity hint */
-@@ -1191,7 +1216,13 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char *argv[])
- if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
- s_key_file2= *(++argv);
- }
--
-+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+ else if (strcmp(*argv,"-nextprotoneg") == 0)
-+ {
-+ if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
-+ next_proto_neg_in = *(++argv);
-+ }
-+# endif
- #endif
- #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_PSK)
- else if (strcmp(*argv,"-jpake") == 0)
-@@ -1476,6 +1507,11 @@ bad:
- if (vpm)
- SSL_CTX_set1_param(ctx2, vpm);
- }
-+
-+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+ if (next_proto.data)
-+ SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(ctx, next_proto_cb, &next_proto);
-+# endif
- #endif
-
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-@@ -1617,6 +1653,21 @@ bad:
- goto end;
- }
- }
-+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+ if (next_proto_neg_in)
-+ {
-+ unsigned short len;
-+ next_proto.data = next_protos_parse(&len,
-+ next_proto_neg_in);
-+ if (next_proto.data == NULL)
-+ goto end;
-+ next_proto.len = len;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ next_proto.data = NULL;
-+ }
-+# endif
- #endif
- RSA_free(rsa);
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out,"\n");
-@@ -2159,6 +2210,10 @@ static int init_ssl_connection(SSL *con)
- X509 *peer;
- long verify_error;
- MS_STATIC char buf[BUFSIZ];
-+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
-+ const unsigned char *next_proto_neg;
-+ unsigned next_proto_neg_len;
-+#endif
-
- if ((i=SSL_accept(con)) <= 0)
- {
-@@ -2198,6 +2253,15 @@ static int init_ssl_connection(SSL *con)
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out,"Shared ciphers:%s\n",buf);
- str=SSL_CIPHER_get_name(SSL_get_current_cipher(con));
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out,"CIPHER is %s\n",(str != NULL)?str:"(NONE)");
-+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
-+ SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(con, &next_proto_neg, &next_proto_neg_len);
-+ if (next_proto_neg)
-+ {
-+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out,"NEXTPROTO is ");
-+ BIO_write(bio_s_out, next_proto_neg, next_proto_neg_len);
-+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "\n");
-+ }
-+#endif
- if (con->hit) BIO_printf(bio_s_out,"Reused session-id\n");
- if (SSL_ctrl(con,SSL_CTRL_GET_FLAGS,0,NULL) &
- TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG)
---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/include/openssl/ssl.h 2010-11-29 19:56:04.846517045 +0000
-+++ openssl-1.0.0b/include/openssl/ssl.h 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000
-@@ -857,6 +857,25 @@ struct ssl_ctx_st
- /* draft-rescorla-tls-opaque-prf-input-00.txt information */
- int (*tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback)(SSL *, void *peerinput, size_t len, void *arg);
- void *tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg;
-+
-+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+ /* Next protocol negotiation information */
-+ /* (for experimental NPN extension). */
-+
-+ /* For a server, this contains a callback function by which the set of
-+ * advertised protocols can be provided. */
-+ int (*next_protos_advertised_cb)(SSL *s, const unsigned char **buf,
-+ unsigned int *len, void *arg);
-+ void *next_protos_advertised_cb_arg;
-+ /* For a client, this contains a callback function that selects the
-+ * next protocol from the list provided by the server. */
-+ int (*next_proto_select_cb)(SSL *s, unsigned char **out,
-+ unsigned char *outlen,
-+ const unsigned char *in,
-+ unsigned int inlen,
-+ void *arg);
-+ void *next_proto_select_cb_arg;
-+# endif
- #endif
-
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-@@ -928,6 +947,30 @@ int SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(SSL_C
- #endif
- void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_generate_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*app_gen_cookie_cb)(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int *cookie_len));
- void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_verify_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*app_verify_cookie_cb)(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int cookie_len));
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(SSL_CTX *s,
-+ int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
-+ const unsigned char **out,
-+ unsigned int *outlen,
-+ void *arg), void *arg);
-+void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(SSL_CTX *s,
-+ int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, unsigned char **out,
-+ unsigned char *outlen,
-+ const unsigned char *in,
-+ unsigned int inlen, void *arg),
-+ void *arg);
-+
-+int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen,
-+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen,
-+ const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len);
-+void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const unsigned char **data,
-+ unsigned *len);
-+
-+#define OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED 0
-+#define OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED 1
-+#define OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP 2
-+
-+#endif
-
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- /* the maximum length of the buffer given to callbacks containing the
-@@ -1187,6 +1230,19 @@ struct ssl_st
- void *tls_session_secret_cb_arg;
-
- SSL_CTX * initial_ctx; /* initial ctx, used to store sessions */
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+ /* Next protocol negotiation. For the client, this is the protocol that
-+ * we sent in NextProtocol and is set when handling ServerHello
-+ * extensions.
-+ *
-+ * For a server, this is the client's selected_protocol from
-+ * NextProtocol and is set when handling the NextProtocol message,
-+ * before the Finished message. */
-+ unsigned char *next_proto_negotiated;
-+ unsigned char next_proto_negotiated_len;
-+#endif
-+
- #define session_ctx initial_ctx
- #else
- #define session_ctx ctx
-@@ -1919,6 +1975,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
- #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE 141
- #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE 142
- #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET 283
-+#define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO 304
- #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD 143
- #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE 144
- #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE 145
-@@ -2117,6 +2174,8 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
- #define SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE 152
- #define SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE 153
- #define SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS 154
-+#define SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS 346
-+#define SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION 347
- #define SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST 155
- #define SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST 156
- #define SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING 283
---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/include/openssl/ssl3.h 2010-11-29 19:56:04.832465351 +0000
-+++ openssl-1.0.0b/include/openssl/ssl3.h 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000
-@@ -465,6 +465,12 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st
- void *server_opaque_prf_input;
- size_t server_opaque_prf_input_len;
-
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+ /* Set if we saw the Next Protocol Negotiation extension from
-+ our peer. */
-+ int next_proto_neg_seen;
-+#endif
-+
- struct {
- /* actually only needs to be 16+20 */
- unsigned char cert_verify_md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*2];
-@@ -557,6 +563,10 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st
- #define SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B (0x191|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
- #define SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A (0x1A0|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
- #define SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B (0x1A1|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+#define SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A (0x200|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-+#define SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B (0x201|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-+#endif
- #define SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A (0x1B0|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
- #define SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B (0x1B1|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
- /* read from server */
-@@ -602,6 +612,10 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st
- #define SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B (0x1A1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
- #define SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_A (0x1B0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
- #define SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_B (0x1B1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+#define SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A (0x210|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-+#define SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B (0x211|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-+#endif
- #define SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A (0x1C0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
- #define SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B (0x1C1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
- /* write to client */
-@@ -626,6 +640,9 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st
- #define SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE 16
- #define SSL3_MT_FINISHED 20
- #define SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS 22
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+#define SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO 67
-+#endif
- #define DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST 3
-
-
---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/include/openssl/tls1.h 2009-11-11 14:51:29.000000000 +0000
-+++ openssl-1.0.0b/include/openssl/tls1.h 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000
-@@ -204,6 +204,11 @@ extern "C" {
- /* Temporary extension type */
- #define TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate 0xff01
-
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+/* This is not an IANA defined extension number */
-+#define TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg 13172
-+#endif
-+
- /* NameType value from RFC 3546 */
- #define TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name 0
- /* status request value from RFC 3546 */
---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/s3_both.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.846517045 +0000
-+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/s3_both.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000
-@@ -202,15 +202,40 @@ int ssl3_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, in
- return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
- }
-
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+/* ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen to far. */
-+static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s)
-+ {
-+ const char *sender;
-+ int slen;
-+
-+ if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-+ {
-+ sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
-+ slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
-+ slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
-+ }
-+
-+ s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
-+ sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
- int ssl3_get_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b)
- {
- int al,i,ok;
- long n;
- unsigned char *p;
-
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- /* the mac has already been generated when we received the
- * change cipher spec message and is in s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md
- */
-+#endif
-
- n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
- a,
-@@ -521,6 +546,15 @@ long ssl3_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, i
- s->init_num += i;
- n -= i;
- }
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+ /* If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
-+ * Finished verification. */
-+ if (*s->init_buf->data == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
-+ ssl3_take_mac(s);
-+#endif
-+
-+ /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
- ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, s->init_num + 4);
- if (s->msg_callback)
- s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data, (size_t)s->init_num + 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/s3_clnt.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.846517045 +0000
-+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/s3_clnt.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000
-@@ -435,7 +435,16 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
- ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
- SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B);
- if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-+
-+#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
- s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
-+#else
-+ if (s->next_proto_negotiated)
-+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A;
-+ else
-+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
-+#endif
-+
- s->init_num=0;
-
- s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
-@@ -463,6 +472,15 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
-
- break;
-
-+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
-+ case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A:
-+ case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B:
-+ ret=ssl3_send_next_proto(s);
-+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
-+ break;
-+#endif
-+
- case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A:
- case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B:
- ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
-@@ -3060,6 +3078,32 @@ err:
- */
-
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s)
-+ {
-+ unsigned int len, padding_len;
-+ unsigned char *d;
-+
-+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A)
-+ {
-+ len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
-+ padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
-+ d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-+ d[4] = len;
-+ memcpy(d + 5, s->next_proto_negotiated, len);
-+ d[5 + len] = padding_len;
-+ memset(d + 6 + len, 0, padding_len);
-+ *(d++)=SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
-+ l2n3(2 + len + padding_len, d);
-+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B;
-+ s->init_num = 4 + 2 + len + padding_len;
-+ s->init_off = 0;
-+ }
-+
-+ return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
-+ }
-+# endif
-+
- int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s)
- {
- int ok;
---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/s3_lib.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.832465351 +0000
-+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/s3_lib.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000
-@@ -2230,6 +2230,15 @@ void ssl3_clear(SSL *s)
- s->s3->num_renegotiations=0;
- s->s3->in_read_app_data=0;
- s->version=SSL3_VERSION;
-+
-+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
-+ if (s->next_proto_negotiated)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
-+ s->next_proto_negotiated = NULL;
-+ s->next_proto_negotiated_len = 0;
-+ }
-+#endif
- }
-
- long ssl3_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/s3_pkt.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.832465351 +0000
-+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/s3_pkt.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000
-@@ -1394,8 +1394,10 @@ err:
- int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
- {
- int i;
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- const char *sender;
- int slen;
-+#endif
-
- if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
- i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
-@@ -1418,6 +1420,7 @@ int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
- if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i))
- return(0);
-
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- /* we have to record the message digest at
- * this point so we can get it before we read
- * the finished message */
-@@ -1434,6 +1437,7 @@ int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
-
- s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
- sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
-+#endif
-
- return(1);
- }
---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/s3_srvr.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.846517045 +0000
-+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/s3_srvr.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000
-@@ -538,7 +538,14 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
- * the client uses its key from the certificate
- * for key exchange.
- */
-+#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-+#else
-+ if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
-+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
-+ else
-+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-+#endif
- s->init_num = 0;
- }
- else
-@@ -581,10 +588,27 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
- ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
- if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-
-+#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-+#else
-+ if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
-+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
-+ else
-+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-+#endif
- s->init_num=0;
- break;
-
-+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
-+ case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
-+ case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
-+ ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
-+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-+ s->init_num = 0;
-+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-+ break;
-+#endif
-+
- case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
- ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
-@@ -655,7 +679,16 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
- if (ret <= 0) goto end;
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
- if (s->hit)
-+ {
-+#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
- s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-+#else
-+ if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
-+ s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
-+ else
-+ s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-+#endif
-+ }
- else
- s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
- s->init_num=0;
-@@ -3196,4 +3229,72 @@ int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
- /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
- return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
- }
-+
-+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NPN
-+/* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
-+ * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
-+int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
-+ {
-+ int ok;
-+ unsigned proto_len, padding_len;
-+ long n;
-+ const unsigned char *p;
-+
-+ /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
-+ * extension in their ClientHello */
-+ if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
-+ {
-+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
-+ return -1;
-+ }
-+
-+ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
-+ SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
-+ SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
-+ SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO,
-+ 514, /* See the payload format below */
-+ &ok);
-+
-+ if (!ok)
-+ return((int)n);
-+
-+ /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
-+ * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
-+ * by ssl3_get_finished). */
-+ if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
-+ {
-+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
-+ return -1;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (n < 2)
-+ return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
-+
-+ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
-+
-+ /* The payload looks like:
-+ * uint8 proto_len;
-+ * uint8 proto[proto_len];
-+ * uint8 padding_len;
-+ * uint8 padding[padding_len];
-+ */
-+ proto_len = p[0];
-+ if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
-+ return 0;
-+ padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
-+ if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
-+ return 0;
-+
-+ s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
-+ if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
-+ {
-+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+ memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
-+ s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;
-+
-+ return 1;
-+ }
-+# endif
- #endif
---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/ssl.h 2010-11-29 19:56:04.846517045 +0000
-+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/ssl.h 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000
-@@ -857,6 +857,25 @@ struct ssl_ctx_st
- /* draft-rescorla-tls-opaque-prf-input-00.txt information */
- int (*tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback)(SSL *, void *peerinput, size_t len, void *arg);
- void *tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg;
-+
-+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+ /* Next protocol negotiation information */
-+ /* (for experimental NPN extension). */
-+
-+ /* For a server, this contains a callback function by which the set of
-+ * advertised protocols can be provided. */
-+ int (*next_protos_advertised_cb)(SSL *s, const unsigned char **buf,
-+ unsigned int *len, void *arg);
-+ void *next_protos_advertised_cb_arg;
-+ /* For a client, this contains a callback function that selects the
-+ * next protocol from the list provided by the server. */
-+ int (*next_proto_select_cb)(SSL *s, unsigned char **out,
-+ unsigned char *outlen,
-+ const unsigned char *in,
-+ unsigned int inlen,
-+ void *arg);
-+ void *next_proto_select_cb_arg;
-+# endif
- #endif
-
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-@@ -928,6 +947,30 @@ int SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(SSL_C
- #endif
- void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_generate_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*app_gen_cookie_cb)(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int *cookie_len));
- void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_verify_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*app_verify_cookie_cb)(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int cookie_len));
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(SSL_CTX *s,
-+ int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
-+ const unsigned char **out,
-+ unsigned int *outlen,
-+ void *arg), void *arg);
-+void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(SSL_CTX *s,
-+ int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, unsigned char **out,
-+ unsigned char *outlen,
-+ const unsigned char *in,
-+ unsigned int inlen, void *arg),
-+ void *arg);
-+
-+int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen,
-+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen,
-+ const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len);
-+void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const unsigned char **data,
-+ unsigned *len);
-+
-+#define OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED 0
-+#define OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED 1
-+#define OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP 2
-+
-+#endif
-
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- /* the maximum length of the buffer given to callbacks containing the
-@@ -1187,6 +1230,19 @@ struct ssl_st
- void *tls_session_secret_cb_arg;
-
- SSL_CTX * initial_ctx; /* initial ctx, used to store sessions */
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+ /* Next protocol negotiation. For the client, this is the protocol that
-+ * we sent in NextProtocol and is set when handling ServerHello
-+ * extensions.
-+ *
-+ * For a server, this is the client's selected_protocol from
-+ * NextProtocol and is set when handling the NextProtocol message,
-+ * before the Finished message. */
-+ unsigned char *next_proto_negotiated;
-+ unsigned char next_proto_negotiated_len;
-+#endif
-+
- #define session_ctx initial_ctx
- #else
- #define session_ctx ctx
-@@ -1919,6 +1975,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
- #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE 141
- #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE 142
- #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET 283
-+#define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO 304
- #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD 143
- #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE 144
- #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE 145
-@@ -2117,6 +2174,8 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
- #define SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE 152
- #define SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE 153
- #define SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS 154
-+#define SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS 346
-+#define SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION 347
- #define SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST 155
- #define SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST 156
- #define SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING 283
---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/ssl3.h 2010-11-29 19:56:04.832465351 +0000
-+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/ssl3.h 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000
-@@ -465,6 +465,12 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st
- void *server_opaque_prf_input;
- size_t server_opaque_prf_input_len;
-
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+ /* Set if we saw the Next Protocol Negotiation extension from
-+ our peer. */
-+ int next_proto_neg_seen;
-+#endif
-+
- struct {
- /* actually only needs to be 16+20 */
- unsigned char cert_verify_md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*2];
-@@ -557,6 +563,10 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st
- #define SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B (0x191|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
- #define SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A (0x1A0|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
- #define SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B (0x1A1|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+#define SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A (0x200|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-+#define SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B (0x201|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-+#endif
- #define SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A (0x1B0|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
- #define SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B (0x1B1|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
- /* read from server */
-@@ -602,6 +612,10 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st
- #define SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B (0x1A1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
- #define SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_A (0x1B0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
- #define SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_B (0x1B1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+#define SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A (0x210|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-+#define SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B (0x211|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-+#endif
- #define SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A (0x1C0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
- #define SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B (0x1C1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
- /* write to client */
-@@ -626,6 +640,9 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st
- #define SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE 16
- #define SSL3_MT_FINISHED 20
- #define SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS 22
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+#define SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO 67
-+#endif
- #define DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST 3
-
-
---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/ssl_err.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.846517045 +0000
-+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/ssl_err.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000
-@@ -155,6 +155,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[]=
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE), "SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE), "SSL3_GET_MESSAGE"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET), "SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET"},
-+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO), "SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD), "SSL3_GET_RECORD"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE), "SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE), "SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE"},
-@@ -355,6 +356,8 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE),"excessive message size"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE) ,"extra data in message"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS),"got a fin before a ccs"},
-+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS),"got next proto before a ccs"},
-+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION),"got next proto without seeing extension"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST) ,"https proxy request"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST) ,"http request"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING) ,"illegal padding"},
---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/ssl_lib.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.846517045 +0000
-+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/ssl_lib.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000
-@@ -354,6 +354,9 @@ SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx)
- s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
- CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- s->initial_ctx=ctx;
-+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+ s->next_proto_negotiated = NULL;
-+# endif
- #endif
-
- s->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
-@@ -587,6 +590,11 @@ void SSL_free(SSL *s)
- kssl_ctx_free(s->kssl_ctx);
- #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
-
-+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
-+ if (s->next_proto_negotiated)
-+ OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
-+#endif
-+
- OPENSSL_free(s);
- }
-
-@@ -1503,6 +1511,124 @@ int SSL_get_servername_type(const SSL *s
- return TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
- return -1;
- }
-+
-+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+/* SSL_select_next_proto implements the standard protocol selection. It is
-+ * expected that this function is called from the callback set by
-+ * SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb.
-+ *
-+ * The protocol data is assumed to be a vector of 8-bit, length prefixed byte
-+ * strings. The length byte itself is not included in the length. A byte
-+ * string of length 0 is invalid. No byte string may be truncated.
-+ *
-+ * The current, but experimental algorithm for selecting the protocol is:
-+ *
-+ * 1) If the server doesn't support NPN then this is indicated to the
-+ * callback. In this case, the client application has to abort the connection
-+ * or have a default application level protocol.
-+ *
-+ * 2) If the server supports NPN, but advertises an empty list then the
-+ * client selects the first protcol in its list, but indicates via the
-+ * API that this fallback case was enacted.
-+ *
-+ * 3) Otherwise, the client finds the first protocol in the server's list
-+ * that it supports and selects this protocol. This is because it's
-+ * assumed that the server has better information about which protocol
-+ * a client should use.
-+ *
-+ * 4) If the client doesn't support any of the server's advertised
-+ * protocols, then this is treated the same as case 2.
-+ *
-+ * It returns either
-+ * OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED if a common protocol was found, or
-+ * OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP if the fallback case was reached.
-+ */
-+int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *server, unsigned int server_len, const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len)
-+ {
-+ unsigned int i, j;
-+ const unsigned char *result;
-+ int status = OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED;
-+
-+ /* For each protocol in server preference order, see if we support it. */
-+ for (i = 0; i < server_len; )
-+ {
-+ for (j = 0; j < client_len; )
-+ {
-+ if (server[i] == client[j] &&
-+ memcmp(&server[i+1], &client[j+1], server[i]) == 0)
-+ {
-+ /* We found a match */
-+ result = &server[i];
-+ status = OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED;
-+ goto found;
-+ }
-+ j += client[j];
-+ j++;
-+ }
-+ i += server[i];
-+ i++;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. */
-+ result = client;
-+ status = OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
-+
-+ found:
-+ *out = (unsigned char *) result + 1;
-+ *outlen = result[0];
-+ return status;
-+ }
-+
-+/* SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated sets *data and *len to point to the client's
-+ * requested protocol for this connection and returns 0. If the client didn't
-+ * request any protocol, then *data is set to NULL.
-+ *
-+ * Note that the client can request any protocol it chooses. The value returned
-+ * from this function need not be a member of the list of supported protocols
-+ * provided by the callback.
-+ */
-+void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const unsigned char **data, unsigned *len)
-+ {
-+ *data = s->next_proto_negotiated;
-+ if (!*data) {
-+ *len = 0;
-+ } else {
-+ *len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
-+ }
-+}
-+
-+/* SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb sets a callback that is called when a
-+ * TLS server needs a list of supported protocols for Next Protocol
-+ * Negotiation. The returned list must be in wire format. The list is returned
-+ * by setting |out| to point to it and |outlen| to its length. This memory will
-+ * not be modified, but one should assume that the SSL* keeps a reference to
-+ * it.
-+ *
-+ * The callback should return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK if it wishes to advertise. Otherwise, no
-+ * such extension will be included in the ServerHello. */
-+void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **out, unsigned int *outlen, void *arg), void *arg)
-+ {
-+ ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb = cb;
-+ ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg = arg;
-+ }
-+
-+/* SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb sets a callback that is called when a
-+ * client needs to select a protocol from the server's provided list. |out|
-+ * must be set to point to the selected protocol (which may be within |in|).
-+ * The length of the protocol name must be written into |outlen|. The server's
-+ * advertised protocols are provided in |in| and |inlen|. The callback can
-+ * assume that |in| is syntactically valid.
-+ *
-+ * The client must select a protocol. It is fatal to the connection if this
-+ * callback returns a value other than SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK.
-+ */
-+void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *s, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg), void *arg)
-+ {
-+ ctx->next_proto_select_cb = cb;
-+ ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg = arg;
-+ }
-+
-+# endif
- #endif
-
- static unsigned long ssl_session_hash(const SSL_SESSION *a)
-@@ -1667,6 +1793,10 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *m
- ret->tlsext_status_cb = 0;
- ret->tlsext_status_arg = NULL;
-
-+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+ ret->next_protos_advertised_cb = 0;
-+ ret->next_proto_select_cb = 0;
-+# endif
- #endif
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- ret->psk_identity_hint=NULL;
---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/ssl_locl.h 2010-11-29 19:56:04.846517045 +0000
-+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/ssl_locl.h 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000
-@@ -968,6 +968,9 @@ int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s);
- int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s);
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s);
-+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s);
-+# endif
- #endif
-
- int dtls1_client_hello(SSL *s);
-@@ -986,6 +989,9 @@ int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s);
- int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s);
- int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s);
- int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s);
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s);
-+#endif
-
- int dtls1_send_hello_request(SSL *s);
- int dtls1_send_server_hello(SSL *s);
---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/t1_lib.c 2010-11-16 13:26:24.000000000 +0000
-+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/t1_lib.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000
-@@ -494,6 +494,18 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsex
- i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
- }
-
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+ if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
-+ {
-+ /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
-+ * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
-+ if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
-+ return NULL;
-+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
-+ s2n(0,ret);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
- if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
- return p;
-
-@@ -505,6 +517,9 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsex
- {
- int extdatalen=0;
- unsigned char *ret = p;
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+ int next_proto_neg_seen;
-+#endif
-
- /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
- if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
-@@ -618,6 +633,28 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsex
-
- }
-
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+ next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
-+ s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
-+ if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
-+ {
-+ const unsigned char *npa;
-+ unsigned int npalen;
-+ int r;
-+
-+ r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
-+ if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
-+ {
-+ if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
-+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
-+ s2n(npalen,ret);
-+ memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
-+ ret += npalen;
-+ s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
-+ }
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
- if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
- return p;
-
-@@ -982,6 +1019,28 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s,
- else
- s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
- }
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
-+ s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
-+ {
-+ /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
-+ * renegotiation.
-+ *
-+ * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
-+ * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
-+ * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
-+ * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
-+ * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
-+ * anything like that, but this might change).
-+
-+ * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
-+ * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
-+ * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
-+ * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
-+ * Finished message could have been computed.) */
-+ s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
-+ }
-+#endif
-
- /* session ticket processed earlier */
- data+=size;
-@@ -1005,6 +1064,26 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s,
- return 1;
- }
-
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+/* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
-+ * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
-+ * the length of the block. */
-+static int ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
-+ {
-+ unsigned int off = 0;
-+
-+ while (off < len)
-+ {
-+ if (d[off] == 0)
-+ return 0;
-+ off += d[off];
-+ off++;
-+ }
-+
-+ return off == len;
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
- int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
- {
- unsigned short length;
-@@ -1139,6 +1218,39 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s,
- /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
- s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
- }
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
-+ {
-+ unsigned char *selected;
-+ unsigned char selected_len;
-+
-+ /* We must have requested it. */
-+ if ((s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL))
-+ {
-+ *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+ /* The data must be valid */
-+ if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
-+ {
-+ *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+ if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
-+ {
-+ *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+ s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
-+ if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
-+ {
-+ *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+ memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
-+ s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
-+ }
-+#endif
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
- {
- if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/tls1.h 2009-11-11 14:51:29.000000000 +0000
-+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/tls1.h 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000
-@@ -204,6 +204,11 @@ extern "C" {
- /* Temporary extension type */
- #define TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate 0xff01
-
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+/* This is not an IANA defined extension number */
-+#define TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg 13172
-+#endif
-+
- /* NameType value from RFC 3546 */
- #define TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name 0
- /* status request value from RFC 3546 */
+++ /dev/null
---- openssl-1.0.0f.orig/ssl/ssl_lib.c 2012-01-04 22:13:21.000000000 +0000
-+++ openssl-1.0.0f/ssl/ssl_lib.c 2012-01-04 22:13:21.000000000 +0000
-@@ -1063,8 +1063,10 @@ long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s,int cmd,long larg,v
- s->max_cert_list=larg;
- return(l);
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU:
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
- if (larg < (long)dtls1_min_mtu())
- return 0;
-+#endif
-
- if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION ||
- SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+++ /dev/null
---- openssl-1.0.0.orig/apps/openssl.c 2009-10-04 09:43:21.000000000 -0700
-+++ openssl-1.0.0/apps/openssl.c 2010-05-18 14:05:14.000000000 -0700
-@@ -275,8 +275,10 @@ int main(int Argc, char *Argv[])
- if (ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_last_error())
- == CONF_R_NO_SUCH_FILE)
- {
-+#if 0 /* ANDROID */
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "WARNING: can't open config file: %s\n",p);
-+#endif
- ERR_clear_error();
- NCONF_free(config);
- config = NULL;
---- openssl-1.0.0.orig/apps/progs.h 2009-06-30 08:08:38.000000000 -0700
-+++ openssl-1.0.0/apps/progs.h 2010-05-18 14:05:38.000000000 -0700
-@@ -146,7 +152,9 @@ FUNCTION functions[] = {
- {FUNC_TYPE_GENERAL,"ocsp",ocsp_main},
- #endif
- {FUNC_TYPE_GENERAL,"prime",prime_main},
-+#if 0 /* ANDROID */
- {FUNC_TYPE_GENERAL,"ts",ts_main},
-+#endif
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD2
- {FUNC_TYPE_MD,"md2",dgst_main},
- #endif
---- openssl-1.0.0.orig/apps/speed.c 2010-03-03 11:56:17.000000000 -0800
-+++ openssl-1.0.0/apps/speed.c 2010-05-18 14:05:57.000000000 -0700
-@@ -1718,6 +1718,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
- }
- }
-
-+#if 0 /* ANDROID */
- if (doit[D_IGE_128_AES])
- {
- for (j=0; j<SIZE_NUM; j++)
-@@ -1763,6 +1764,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
-
-
- #endif
-+#endif
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA
- if (doit[D_CBC_128_CML])
- {
---- openssl-1.0.0.orig/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c 2009-10-04 09:43:21.000000000 -0700
-+++ openssl-1.0.0/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c 2010-05-18 13:36:26.000000000 -0700
-@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@
- # undef SGTTY
- #endif
-
--#if defined(linux) && !defined(TERMIO)
-+#if defined(linux) && !defined(TERMIO) && !defined(__ANDROID__)
- # undef TERMIOS
- # define TERMIO
- # undef SGTTY
+++ /dev/null
-diff --git a/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-armv4-large.pl b/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-armv4-large.pl
-index 6e65fe3..79e3f61 100644
---- a/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-armv4-large.pl
-+++ b/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-armv4-large.pl
-@@ -161,6 +161,7 @@ for($i=0;$i<5;$i++) {
- $code.=<<___;
- teq $Xi,sp
- bne .L_00_15 @ [((11+4)*5+2)*3]
-+ sub sp,sp,#5*4
- ___
- &BODY_00_15(@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V));
- &BODY_16_19(@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V));
-@@ -170,7 +171,7 @@ ___
- $code.=<<___;
-
- ldr $K,.LK_20_39 @ [+15+16*4]
-- sub sp,sp,#25*4
-+ sub sp,sp,#20*4
- cmn sp,#0 @ [+3], clear carry to denote 20_39
- .L_20_39_or_60_79:
- ___
+++ /dev/null
---- openssl-1.0.0a.orig/ssl/d1_pkt.c 2010-04-14 00:09:55.000000000 +0000
-+++ openssl-1.0.0a/ssl/d1_pkt.c 2010-08-25 21:12:39.000000000 +0000
-@@ -608,6 +608,24 @@ again:
- goto again;
- }
-
-+ /* If we receive a valid record larger than the current buffer size,
-+ * allocate some memory for it.
-+ */
-+ if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
-+ {
-+ unsigned char *pp;
-+ unsigned int newlen = rr->length + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
-+ if ((pp=OPENSSL_realloc(s->s3->rbuf.buf, newlen))==NULL)
-+ {
-+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_RECORD,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ return(-1);
-+ }
-+ p = pp + (p - s->s3->rbuf.buf);
-+ s->s3->rbuf.buf=pp;
-+ s->s3->rbuf.len=newlen;
-+ s->packet= &(s->s3->rbuf.buf[0]);
-+ }
-+
- /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
- }
-
-@@ -1342,6 +1360,7 @@ int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, con
- SSL3_BUFFER *wb;
- SSL_SESSION *sess;
- int bs;
-+ unsigned int len_with_overhead = len + SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_WRITE_OVERHEAD;
-
- /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
- * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
-@@ -1351,6 +1370,16 @@ int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, con
- return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
- }
-
-+ if (s->s3->wbuf.len < len_with_overhead)
-+ {
-+ if ((p=OPENSSL_realloc(s->s3->wbuf.buf, len_with_overhead)) == NULL) {
-+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ s->s3->wbuf.buf = p;
-+ s->s3->wbuf.len = len_with_overhead;
-+ }
-+
- /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
- if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
- {
---- openssl-1.0.0a.orig/ssl/s23_srvr.c 2010-02-16 14:20:40.000000000 +0000
-+++ openssl-1.0.0a/ssl/s23_srvr.c 2010-08-25 21:12:39.000000000 +0000
-@@ -403,8 +403,13 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
- v[0] = p[3]; /* == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR */
- v[1] = p[4];
-
-+/* The SSL2 protocol allows n to be larger, just pick
-+ * a reasonable buffer size. */
-+#if SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_PACKET_SIZE < 1024*4 - SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_WRITE_OVERHEAD
-+#error "SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_PACKET_SIZE is too small."
-+#endif
- n=((p[0]&0x7f)<<8)|p[1];
-- if (n > (1024*4))
-+ if (n > SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_PACKET_SIZE - 2)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE);
- goto err;
---- openssl-1.0.0a.orig/ssl/s3_both.c 2010-03-24 23:16:49.000000000 +0000
-+++ openssl-1.0.0a/ssl/s3_both.c 2010-08-25 21:12:39.000000000 +0000
-@@ -715,13 +722,20 @@ int ssl3_setup_read_buffer(SSL *s)
-
- if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL)
- {
-- len = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
-- + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD
-- + headerlen + align;
-- if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
-+ if (SSL_get_mode(s) & SSL_MODE_SMALL_BUFFERS)
- {
-- s->s3->init_extra = 1;
-- len += SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
-+ len = SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_PACKET_SIZE;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ len = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
-+ + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD
-+ + headerlen + align;
-+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
-+ {
-+ s->s3->init_extra = 1;
-+ len += SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
-+ }
- }
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION))
-@@ -757,7 +771,15 @@ int ssl3_setup_write_buffer(SSL *s)
-
- if (s->s3->wbuf.buf == NULL)
- {
-- len = s->max_send_fragment
-+ if (SSL_get_mode(s) & SSL_MODE_SMALL_BUFFERS)
-+ {
-+ len = SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_PACKET_SIZE;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ len = s->max_send_fragment;
-+ }
-+ len += 0
- + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD
- + headerlen + align;
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-@@ -767,7 +789,6 @@ int ssl3_setup_write_buffer(SSL *s)
- if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS))
- len += headerlen + align
- + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD;
--
- if ((p=freelist_extract(s->ctx, 0, len)) == NULL)
- goto err;
- s->s3->wbuf.buf = p;
-@@ -810,4 +831,3 @@ int ssl3_release_read_buffer(SSL *s)
- }
- return 1;
- }
--
---- openssl-1.0.0a.orig/ssl/s3_pkt.c 2010-03-25 11:22:42.000000000 +0000
-+++ openssl-1.0.0a/ssl/s3_pkt.c 2010-08-25 21:12:39.000000000 +0000
-@@ -293,6 +293,11 @@ static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
- size_t extra;
- int decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 0;
- unsigned char *mac = NULL;
-+#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
-+ long align=SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD;
-+#else
-+ long align=0;
-+#endif
-
- rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
- sess=s->session;
-@@ -301,7 +306,8 @@ static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
- extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
- else
- extra=0;
-- if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra)
-+ if (!(SSL_get_mode(s) & SSL_MODE_SMALL_BUFFERS) &&
-+ extra && !s->s3->init_extra)
- {
- /* An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
- * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */
-@@ -350,6 +356,21 @@ fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=
- goto err;
- }
-
-+ /* If we receive a valid record larger than the current buffer size,
-+ * allocate some memory for it.
-+ */
-+ if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - align)
-+ {
-+ if ((p=OPENSSL_realloc(s->s3->rbuf.buf, rr->length + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + align))==NULL)
-+ {
-+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ s->s3->rbuf.buf=p;
-+ s->s3->rbuf.len=rr->length + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + align;
-+ s->packet= &(s->s3->rbuf.buf[0]);
-+ }
-+
- if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
- {
- al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
-@@ -576,6 +597,7 @@ int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, c
- const unsigned char *buf=buf_;
- unsigned int tot,n,nw;
- int i;
-+ unsigned int max_plain_length;
-
- s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
- tot=s->s3->wnum;
-@@ -595,8 +617,13 @@ int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, c
- n=(len-tot);
- for (;;)
- {
-- if (n > s->max_send_fragment)
-- nw=s->max_send_fragment;
-+ if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && (SSL_get_mode(s) & SSL_MODE_SMALL_BUFFERS))
-+ max_plain_length = SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_PLAIN_LENGTH;
-+ else
-+ max_plain_length = s->max_send_fragment;
-+
-+ if (n > max_plain_length)
-+ nw = max_plain_length;
- else
- nw=n;
-
-@@ -727,6 +727,18 @@ static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
- s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
- }
-
-+ /* resize if necessary to hold the data. */
-+ if (len + SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_WRITE_OVERHEAD > wb->len)
-+ {
-+ if ((p=OPENSSL_realloc(wb->buf, len + SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_WRITE_OVERHEAD))==NULL)
-+ {
-+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ wb->buf = p;
-+ wb->len = len + SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_WRITE_OVERHEAD;
-+ }
-+
- if (create_empty_fragment)
- {
- #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
---- openssl-1.0.0a.orig/ssl/ssl.h 2010-01-06 17:37:38.000000000 +0000
-+++ openssl-1.0.0a/ssl/ssl.h 2010-08-25 21:12:39.000000000 +0000
-@@ -602,6 +602,9 @@ typedef struct ssl_session_st
- * TLS only.) "Released" buffers are put onto a free-list in the context
- * or just freed (depending on the context's setting for freelist_max_len). */
- #define SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS 0x00000010L
-+/* Use small read and write buffers: (a) lazy allocate read buffers for
-+ * large incoming records, and (b) limit the size of outgoing records. */
-+#define SSL_MODE_SMALL_BUFFERS 0x00000020L
-
- /* Note: SSL[_CTX]_set_{options,mode} use |= op on the previous value,
- * they cannot be used to clear bits. */
---- openssl-1.0.0a.orig/ssl/ssl3.h 2010-01-06 17:37:38.000000000 +0000
-+++ openssl-1.0.0a/ssl/ssl3.h 2010-08-25 21:12:39.000000000 +0000
-@@ -280,6 +280,9 @@ extern "C" {
-
- #define SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA (16384)
-
-+/* Default buffer length used for writen records. Thus a generated record
-+ * will contain plaintext no larger than this value. */
-+#define SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_PLAIN_LENGTH 2048
- /* Maximum plaintext length: defined by SSL/TLS standards */
- #define SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH 16384
- /* Maximum compression overhead: defined by SSL/TLS standards */
-@@ -311,6 +314,13 @@ extern "C" {
- #define SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE \
- (SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
-
-+/* Extra space for empty fragment, headers, MAC, and padding. */
-+#define SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_WRITE_OVERHEAD 256
-+#define SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_PACKET_SIZE 4096 - SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_WRITE_OVERHEAD
-+#if SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_PLAIN_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_WRITE_OVERHEAD > SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_PACKET_SIZE
-+#error "Insufficient space allocated for write buffers."
-+#endif
-+
- #define SSL3_MD_CLIENT_FINISHED_CONST "\x43\x4C\x4E\x54"
- #define SSL3_MD_SERVER_FINISHED_CONST "\x53\x52\x56\x52"
-
-@@ -634,4 +645,3 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st
- }
- #endif
- #endif
--
---- openssl-1.0.0a.orig/ssl/ssltest.c 2010-01-24 16:57:38.000000000 +0000
-+++ openssl-1.0.0a/ssl/ssltest.c 2010-08-25 21:12:39.000000000 +0000
-@@ -316,6 +316,8 @@ static void sv_usage(void)
- " (default is sect163r2).\n");
- #endif
- fprintf(stderr," -test_cipherlist - verifies the order of the ssl cipher lists\n");
-+ fprintf(stderr," -c_small_records - enable client side use of small SSL record buffers\n");
-+ fprintf(stderr," -s_small_records - enable server side use of small SSL record buffers\n");
- }
-
- static void print_details(SSL *c_ssl, const char *prefix)
-@@ -444,6 +447,9 @@ int opaque_prf_input_cb(SSL *ssl, void *
- return arg->ret;
- }
- #endif
-+ int ssl_mode = 0;
-+ int c_small_records=0;
-+ int s_small_records=0;
-
- int main(int argc, char *argv[])
- {
-@@ -680,6 +687,14 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
- {
- test_cipherlist = 1;
- }
-+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-c_small_records") == 0)
-+ {
-+ c_small_records = 1;
-+ }
-+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-s_small_records") == 0)
-+ {
-+ s_small_records = 1;
-+ }
- else
- {
- fprintf(stderr,"unknown option %s\n",*argv);
-@@ -802,6 +821,21 @@ bad:
- SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(s_ctx,cipher);
- }
-
-+ ssl_mode = 0;
-+ if (c_small_records)
-+ {
-+ ssl_mode = SSL_CTX_get_mode(c_ctx);
-+ ssl_mode |= SSL_MODE_SMALL_BUFFERS;
-+ SSL_CTX_set_mode(c_ctx, ssl_mode);
-+ }
-+ ssl_mode = 0;
-+ if (s_small_records)
-+ {
-+ ssl_mode = SSL_CTX_get_mode(s_ctx);
-+ ssl_mode |= SSL_MODE_SMALL_BUFFERS;
-+ SSL_CTX_set_mode(s_ctx, ssl_mode);
-+ }
-+
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- if (!no_dhe)
- {
---- openssl-1.0.0.orig/test/testssl 2006-03-10 15:06:27.000000000 -0800
-+++ openssl-1.0.0/test/testssl 2010-04-26 10:24:55.000000000 -0700
-@@ -70,6 +70,16 @@ $ssltest -client_auth $CA $extra || exit
- echo test sslv2/sslv3 with both client and server authentication
- $ssltest -server_auth -client_auth $CA $extra || exit 1
-
-+echo test sslv2/sslv3 with both client and server authentication and small client buffers
-+$ssltest -server_auth -client_auth -c_small_records $CA $extra || exit 1
-+
-+echo test sslv2/sslv3 with both client and server authentication and small server buffers
-+$ssltest -server_auth -client_auth -s_small_records $CA $extra || exit 1
-+
-+echo test sslv2/sslv3 with both client and server authentication and small client and server buffers
-+$ssltest -server_auth -client_auth -c_small_records -s_small_records $CA $extra || exit 1
-+
-+
- echo test sslv2 via BIO pair
- $ssltest -bio_pair -ssl2 $extra || exit 1
-
+++ /dev/null
-diff --git a/ssl/d1_lib.c b/ssl/d1_lib.c
-index c3b77c8..a94290a 100644
---- a/ssl/d1_lib.c
-+++ b/ssl/d1_lib.c
-@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ SSL3_ENC_METHOD DTLSv1_enc_data={
- TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
- TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
- tls1_alert_code,
-+ tls1_export_keying_material,
- };
-
- long dtls1_default_timeout(void)
-diff --git a/ssl/s3_lib.c b/ssl/s3_lib.c
-index c19538a..1fecbbc 100644
---- a/ssl/s3_lib.c
-+++ b/ssl/s3_lib.c
-@@ -2087,6 +2087,9 @@ SSL3_ENC_METHOD SSLv3_enc_data={
- SSL3_MD_CLIENT_FINISHED_CONST,4,
- SSL3_MD_SERVER_FINISHED_CONST,4,
- ssl3_alert_code,
-+ (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, size_t, const char *,
-+ size_t, const unsigned char *, size_t,
-+ int use_context)) ssl_undefined_function,
- };
-
- long ssl3_default_timeout(void)
-diff --git a/ssl/ssl.h b/ssl/ssl.h
-index 9336af8..be4af2f 100644
---- a/ssl/ssl.h
-+++ b/ssl/ssl.h
-@@ -2116,6 +2116,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
- #define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT 301
- #define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 303
- #define SSL_F_SSL_PEEK 270
-+#define SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL 312
- #define SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT 281
- #define SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 282
- #define SSL_F_SSL_READ 223
-@@ -2394,6 +2395,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
- #define SSL_R_TLSV1_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME 1112
- #define SSL_R_TLSV1_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION 1110
- #define SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER 232
-+#define SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL 367
- #define SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST 157
- #define SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST 233
- #define SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG 234
-diff --git a/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
-index 17d2cde..d6ad3c1 100644
---- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c
-+++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
-@@ -3127,6 +3127,18 @@ void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *s, unsigned
- }
- #endif
-
-+int SSL_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
-+ const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *p, size_t plen,
-+ int use_context)
-+ {
-+ if (s->version < TLS1_VERSION)
-+ return -1;
-+
-+ return s->method->ssl3_enc->export_keying_material(s, out, olen, label,
-+ llen, p, plen,
-+ use_context);
-+ }
-+
- int SSL_cutthrough_complete(const SSL *s)
- {
- return (!s->server && /* cutthrough only applies to clients */
-diff --git a/ssl/ssl_locl.h b/ssl/ssl_locl.h
-index 146c89c..e7c6b9a 100644
---- a/ssl/ssl_locl.h
-+++ b/ssl/ssl_locl.h
-@@ -557,6 +557,10 @@ typedef struct ssl3_enc_method
- const char *server_finished_label;
- int server_finished_label_len;
- int (*alert_value)(int);
-+ int (*export_keying_material)(SSL *, unsigned char *, size_t,
-+ const char *, size_t,
-+ const unsigned char *, size_t,
-+ int use_context);
- } SSL3_ENC_METHOD;
-
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-@@ -1041,6 +1045,9 @@ int tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *p);
- int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int snd);
- int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
- unsigned char *p, int len);
-+int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
-+ const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *p,
-+ size_t plen, int use_context);
- int tls1_alert_code(int code);
- int ssl3_alert_code(int code);
- int ssl_ok(SSL *s);
-diff --git a/ssl/t1_enc.c b/ssl/t1_enc.c
-index 793ea43..b1d5b28 100644
---- a/ssl/t1_enc.c
-+++ b/ssl/t1_enc.c
-@@ -1001,6 +1001,95 @@ int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p,
- return(SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
- }
-
-+int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
-+ const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *context,
-+ size_t contextlen, int use_context)
-+ {
-+ unsigned char *buff;
-+ unsigned char *val = NULL;
-+ size_t vallen, currentvalpos;
-+ int rv;
-+
-+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-+ printf ("tls1_export_keying_material(%p,%p,%d,%s,%d,%p,%d)\n", s, out, olen, label, llen, p, plen);
-+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-+
-+ buff = OPENSSL_malloc(olen);
-+ if (buff == NULL) goto err2;
-+
-+ /* construct PRF arguments
-+ * we construct the PRF argument ourself rather than passing separate
-+ * values into the TLS PRF to ensure that the concatenation of values
-+ * does not create a prohibited label.
-+ */
-+ vallen = llen + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2;
-+ if (use_context)
-+ {
-+ vallen += 2 + contextlen;
-+ }
-+
-+ val = OPENSSL_malloc(vallen);
-+ if (val == NULL) goto err2;
-+ currentvalpos = 0;
-+ memcpy(val + currentvalpos, (unsigned char *) label, llen);
-+ currentvalpos += llen;
-+ memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-+ currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
-+ memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-+ currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
-+
-+ if (use_context)
-+ {
-+ val[currentvalpos] = (contextlen >> 8) & 0xff;
-+ currentvalpos++;
-+ val[currentvalpos] = contextlen & 0xff;
-+ currentvalpos++;
-+ if ((contextlen > 0) || (context != NULL))
-+ {
-+ memcpy(val + currentvalpos, context, contextlen);
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ /* disallow prohibited labels
-+ * note that SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE > max(prohibited label len) =
-+ * 15, so size of val > max(prohibited label len) = 15 and the
-+ * comparisons won't have buffer overflow
-+ */
-+ if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,
-+ TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
-+ if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,
-+ TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
-+ if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
-+ TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
-+ if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,
-+ TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
-+
-+ rv = tls1_PRF(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2,
-+ val, vallen,
-+ NULL, 0,
-+ NULL, 0,
-+ NULL, 0,
-+ NULL, 0,
-+ s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length,
-+ out,buff,olen);
-+
-+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-+ printf ("tls1_export_keying_material() complete\n");
-+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-+ goto ret;
-+err1:
-+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL);
-+ rv = 0;
-+ goto ret;
-+err2:
-+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ rv = 0;
-+ret:
-+ if (buff != NULL) OPENSSL_free(buff);
-+ if (val != NULL) OPENSSL_free(val);
-+ return(rv);
-+ }
-+
- int tls1_alert_code(int code)
- {
- switch (code)
-diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
-index daa65c9..c094471 100644
---- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
-+++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
-@@ -209,6 +209,7 @@ SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
- TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
- TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
- tls1_alert_code,
-+ tls1_export_keying_material,
- };
-
- long tls1_default_timeout(void)
-diff --git a/ssl/tls1.h b/ssl/tls1.h
-index 1fa96e5..7bbb875 100644
---- a/ssl/tls1.h
-+++ b/ssl/tls1.h
-@@ -231,6 +231,9 @@ extern "C" {
-
- const char *SSL_get_servername(const SSL *s, const int type) ;
- int SSL_get_servername_type(const SSL *s) ;
-+int SSL_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
-+ const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *p, size_t plen,
-+ int use_context);
-
- #define SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(s,name) \
- SSL_ctrl(s,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME,TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name,(char *)name)
\ No newline at end of file
+++ /dev/null
---- openssl-1.0.0f-origin/crypto/x509/by_dir.c 2012-01-19 02:20:24.821550944 +0800
-+++ openssl-1.0.0f/crypto/x509/by_dir.c 2012-01-19 23:36:53.597870429 +0800
-@@ -287,6 +287,8 @@
- int ok=0;
- int i,j,k;
- unsigned long h;
-+ unsigned long hash_array[2];
-+ int hash_index;
- BUF_MEM *b=NULL;
- X509_OBJECT stmp,*tmp;
- const char *postfix="";
-@@ -323,6 +325,11 @@
- ctx=(BY_DIR *)xl->method_data;
-
- h=X509_NAME_hash(name);
-+ hash_array[0]=h;
-+ hash_array[1]=X509_NAME_hash_old(name);
-+ for (hash_index=0; hash_index < 2; hash_index++)
-+ {
-+ h=hash_array[hash_index];
- for (i=0; i < sk_BY_DIR_ENTRY_num(ctx->dirs); i++)
- {
- BY_DIR_ENTRY *ent;
-@@ -476,6 +483,7 @@
- goto finish;
- }
- }
-+ }
- finish:
- if (b != NULL) BUF_MEM_free(b);
- return(ok);