arm64: entry: Apply BP hardening for suspicious interrupts from EL0
authorWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Fri, 2 Feb 2018 17:31:40 +0000 (17:31 +0000)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Fri, 16 Feb 2018 19:22:53 +0000 (20:22 +0100)
Commit 30d88c0e3ace upstream.

It is possible to take an IRQ from EL0 following a branch to a kernel
address in such a way that the IRQ is prioritised over the instruction
abort. Whilst an attacker would need to get the stars to align here,
it might be sufficient with enough calibration so perform BP hardening
in the rare case that we see a kernel address in the ELR when handling
an IRQ from EL0.

Reported-by: Dan Hettena <dhettena@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
arch/arm64/mm/fault.c

index ac7df45..93958d1 100644 (file)
@@ -821,6 +821,11 @@ el0_irq_naked:
 #endif
 
        ct_user_exit
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
+       tbz     x22, #55, 1f
+       bl      do_el0_irq_bp_hardening
+1:
+#endif
        irq_handler
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS
index 5899246..5edb706 100644 (file)
@@ -751,6 +751,12 @@ asmlinkage void __exception do_mem_abort(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr,
        arm64_notify_die("", regs, &info, esr);
 }
 
+asmlinkage void __exception do_el0_irq_bp_hardening(void)
+{
+       /* PC has already been checked in entry.S */
+       arm64_apply_bp_hardening();
+}
+
 asmlinkage void __exception do_el0_ia_bp_hardening(unsigned long addr,
                                                   unsigned int esr,
                                                   struct pt_regs *regs)