IMA: limit critical data measurement based on a label

Integrity critical data may belong to a single subsystem or it may
arise from cross subsystem interaction.  Currently there is no mechanism
to group or limit the data based on certain label.  Limiting and
grouping critical data based on a label would make it flexible and
configurable to measure.

Define "label:=", a new IMA policy condition, for the IMA func
CRITICAL_DATA to allow grouping and limiting measurement of integrity
critical data.

Limit the measurement to the labels that are specified in the IMA
policy - CRITICAL_DATA+"label:=".  If "label:=" is not provided with
the func CRITICAL_DATA, measure all the input integrity critical data.

Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>

diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
index 6ec7daa..54fe1c1 100644 (file)
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
@@ -52,6 +52,8 @@ Description:
                        template:= name of a defined IMA template type
                        (eg, ima-ng). Only valid when action is "measure".
                        pcr:= decimal value
+                       label:= [data_label]
+                       data_label:= a unique string used for grouping and limiting critical data.
 
                  default policy:
                        # PROC_SUPER_MAGIC

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 96ba427..2c9db2d 100644 (file)
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
 #define IMA_PCR                0x0100
 #define IMA_FSNAME     0x0200
 #define IMA_KEYRINGS   0x0400
+#define IMA_LABEL      0x0800
 
 #define UNKNOWN                0
 #define MEASURE                0x0001  /* same as IMA_MEASURE */
@@ -85,6 +86,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
        } lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES];
        char *fsname;
        struct ima_rule_opt_list *keyrings; /* Measure keys added to these keyrings */
+       struct ima_rule_opt_list *label; /* Measure data grouped under this label */
        struct ima_template_desc *template;
 };
 
@@ -479,7 +481,11 @@ static bool ima_match_rule_data(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
                opt_list = rule->keyrings;
                break;
        case CRITICAL_DATA:
-               return true;
+               if (!rule->label)
+                       return true;
+
+               opt_list = rule->label;
+               break;
        default:
                return false;
        }
@@ -924,7 +930,7 @@ enum {
        Opt_uid_lt, Opt_euid_lt, Opt_fowner_lt,
        Opt_appraise_type, Opt_appraise_flag,
        Opt_permit_directio, Opt_pcr, Opt_template, Opt_keyrings,
-       Opt_err
+       Opt_label, Opt_err
 };
 
 static const match_table_t policy_tokens = {
@@ -961,6 +967,7 @@ static const match_table_t policy_tokens = {
        {Opt_pcr, "pcr=%s"},
        {Opt_template, "template=%s"},
        {Opt_keyrings, "keyrings=%s"},
+       {Opt_label, "label=%s"},
        {Opt_err, NULL}
 };
 
@@ -1128,7 +1135,8 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
                if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE | DONT_MEASURE))
                        return false;
 
-               if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_UID | IMA_PCR))
+               if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_UID | IMA_PCR |
+                                    IMA_LABEL))
                        return false;
 
                if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(entry))
@@ -1338,6 +1346,23 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 
                        entry->flags |= IMA_KEYRINGS;
                        break;
+               case Opt_label:
+                       ima_log_string(ab, "label", args[0].from);
+
+                       if (entry->label) {
+                               result = -EINVAL;
+                               break;
+                       }
+
+                       entry->label = ima_alloc_rule_opt_list(args);
+                       if (IS_ERR(entry->label)) {
+                               result = PTR_ERR(entry->label);
+                               entry->label = NULL;
+                               break;
+                       }
+
+                       entry->flags |= IMA_LABEL;
+                       break;
                case Opt_fsuuid:
                        ima_log_string(ab, "fsuuid", args[0].from);
 
@@ -1718,6 +1743,12 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
                seq_puts(m, " ");
        }
 
+       if (entry->flags & IMA_LABEL) {
+               seq_puts(m, "label=");
+               ima_show_rule_opt_list(m, entry->label);
+               seq_puts(m, " ");
+       }
+
        if (entry->flags & IMA_PCR) {
                snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", entry->pcr);
                seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_pcr), tbuf);