If an (emulated) usb-device tries to write more data to a packet then
its iov len, this will trigger an assert in usb_packet_copy(), and if
a driver somehow circumvents that check and writes more data to the
iov then there is space, we have a much bigger problem then not correctly
reporting babble to the guest.
In practice babble will only happen with (real) redirected devices, and there
both the usb-host os and the qemu usb-device code already check for it.
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
assert(0);
break;
}
- } else if ((p->usb_status > p->tbytes) && (p->pid == USB_TOKEN_IN)) {
- p->usb_status = USB_RET_BABBLE;
- q->qh.token |= (QTD_TOKEN_HALT | QTD_TOKEN_BABBLE);
- ehci_raise_irq(q->ehci, USBSTS_ERRINT);
} else {
// TODO check 4.12 for splits
*int_mask |= 0x01;
if (pid == USB_TOKEN_IN) {
- if (len > max_len) {
- ret = USB_RET_BABBLE;
- goto out;
- }
-
if ((td->ctrl & TD_CTRL_SPD) && len < max_len) {
*int_mask |= 0x02;
/* short packet: do not update QH */