We're already well protected against module unloads because module
unload uses stop_machine(). The only exception is NMIs, but other
users already risk lockless accesses here.
This avoids some hackery in lockdep and also a potential deadlock
This matches what i386 does.
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de>
#define HANDLE_STACK(cond) \
do while (cond) { \
unsigned long addr = *stack++; \
- if (oops_in_progress ? \
- __kernel_text_address(addr) : \
- kernel_text_address(addr)) { \
+ /* Use unlocked access here because except for NMIs \
+ we should be already protected against module unloads */ \
+ if (__kernel_text_address(addr)) { \
/* \
* If the address is either in the text segment of the \
* kernel, or in the region which contains vmalloc'ed \