staging: rtl8723bs: Fix potential security hole
authorLarry Finger <Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net>
Mon, 10 Feb 2020 18:02:31 +0000 (12:02 -0600)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Fri, 28 Feb 2020 16:22:17 +0000 (17:22 +0100)
commit ac33597c0c0d1d819dccfe001bcd0acef7107e7c upstream.

In routine rtw_hostapd_ioctl(), the user-controlled p->length is assumed
to be at least the size of struct ieee_param size, but this assumption is
never checked. This could result in out-of-bounds read/write on kernel
heap in case a p->length less than the size of struct ieee_param is
specified by the user. If p->length is allowed to be greater than the size
of the struct, then a malicious user could be wasting kernel memory.
Fixes commit 554c0a3abf216 ("0taging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver").

Reported by: Pietro Oliva <pietroliva@gmail.com>
Cc: Pietro Oliva <pietroliva@gmail.com>
Cc: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes 554c0a3abf216 ("0taging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver").
Signed-off-by: Larry Finger <Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200210180235.21691-3-Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c

index d1b199e3e5bdb9ebb4acc88ea86eb0288e583aa8..82cc385358b41c7cad11c7d0023021f19cde6118 100644 (file)
@@ -4213,7 +4213,7 @@ static int rtw_hostapd_ioctl(struct net_device *dev, struct iw_point *p)
 
 
        /* if (p->length < sizeof(struct ieee_param) || !p->pointer) { */
-       if (!p->pointer) {
+       if (!p->pointer || p->length != sizeof(*param)) {
                ret = -EINVAL;
                goto out;
        }