x86/mm: Allow guest.enc_status_change_prepare() to fail

TDX code is going to provide guest.enc_status_change_prepare() that is
able to fail. TDX will use the call to convert the GPA range from shared
to private. This operation can fail.

Add a way to return an error from the callback.

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230606095622.1939-2-kirill.shutemov%40linux.intel.com

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h
index 88085f3..1ca9701 100644 (file)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ struct x86_init_acpi {
  * @enc_cache_flush_required   Returns true if a cache flush is needed before changing page encryption status
  */
 struct x86_guest {
-       void (*enc_status_change_prepare)(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc);
+       bool (*enc_status_change_prepare)(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc);
        bool (*enc_status_change_finish)(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc);
        bool (*enc_tlb_flush_required)(bool enc);
        bool (*enc_cache_flush_required)(void);

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c b/arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c
index d82f4fa..f230d4d 100644 (file)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ struct x86_cpuinit_ops x86_cpuinit = {
 
 static void default_nmi_init(void) { };
 
-static void enc_status_change_prepare_noop(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc) { }
+static bool enc_status_change_prepare_noop(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc) { return true; }
 static bool enc_status_change_finish_noop(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc) { return false; }
 static bool enc_tlb_flush_required_noop(bool enc) { return false; }
 static bool enc_cache_flush_required_noop(void) { return false; }

diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c
index e0b51c0..4f95c44 100644 (file)
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c
@@ -319,7 +319,7 @@ static void enc_dec_hypercall(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc)
 #endif
 }
 
-static void amd_enc_status_change_prepare(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc)
+static bool amd_enc_status_change_prepare(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc)
 {
        /*
         * To maintain the security guarantees of SEV-SNP guests, make sure
@@ -327,6 +327,8 @@ static void amd_enc_status_change_prepare(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool
         */
        if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP) && !enc)
                snp_set_memory_shared(vaddr, npages);
+
+       return true;
 }
 
 /* Return true unconditionally: return value doesn't matter for the SEV side */

diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
index 7159cf7..b8f48eb 100644 (file)
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
@@ -2151,7 +2151,8 @@ static int __set_memory_enc_pgtable(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc)
                cpa_flush(&cpa, x86_platform.guest.enc_cache_flush_required());
 
        /* Notify hypervisor that we are about to set/clr encryption attribute. */
-       x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_prepare(addr, numpages, enc);
+       if (!x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_prepare(addr, numpages, enc))
+               return -EIO;
 
        ret = __change_page_attr_set_clr(&cpa, 1);