conn = None
+ # Merge the proxy headers. Only do this in HTTP. We have to copy the
+ # headers dict so we can safely change it without those changes being
+ # reflected in anyone else's copy.
+ if self.scheme == 'http':
+ headers = headers.copy()
+ headers.update(self.proxy_headers)
+
try:
# Request a connection from the queue
conn = self._get_conn(timeout=pool_timeout)
import select
from cStringIO import StringIO
-from .. import connectionpool
+from .. import connection
from .. import util
__all__ = ['inject_into_urllib3', 'extract_from_urllib3']
orig_util_HAS_SNI = util.HAS_SNI
-orig_connectionpool_ssl_wrap_socket = connectionpool.ssl_wrap_socket
+orig_connection_ssl_wrap_socket = connection.ssl_wrap_socket
def inject_into_urllib3():
'Monkey-patch urllib3 with PyOpenSSL-backed SSL-support.'
- connectionpool.ssl_wrap_socket = ssl_wrap_socket
+ connection.ssl_wrap_socket = ssl_wrap_socket
util.HAS_SNI = HAS_SNI
def extract_from_urllib3():
'Undo monkey-patching by :func:`inject_into_urllib3`.'
- connectionpool.ssl_wrap_socket = orig_connectionpool_ssl_wrap_socket
+ connection.ssl_wrap_socket = orig_connection_ssl_wrap_socket
util.HAS_SNI = orig_util_HAS_SNI
-"""The match_hostname() function from Python 3.2, essential when using SSL."""
-
-import re
-
-__version__ = '3.2.2'
-
-class CertificateError(ValueError):
- pass
-
-def _dnsname_match(dn, hostname, max_wildcards=1):
- """Matching according to RFC 6125, section 6.4.3
-
- http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6125#section-6.4.3
- """
- pats = []
- if not dn:
- return False
-
- parts = dn.split(r'.')
- leftmost = parts[0]
-
- wildcards = leftmost.count('*')
- if wildcards > max_wildcards:
- # Issue #17980: avoid denials of service by refusing more
- # than one wildcard per fragment. A survery of established
- # policy among SSL implementations showed it to be a
- # reasonable choice.
- raise CertificateError(
- "too many wildcards in certificate DNS name: " + repr(dn))
-
- # speed up common case w/o wildcards
- if not wildcards:
- return dn.lower() == hostname.lower()
-
- # RFC 6125, section 6.4.3, subitem 1.
- # The client SHOULD NOT attempt to match a presented identifier in which
- # the wildcard character comprises a label other than the left-most label.
- if leftmost == '*':
- # When '*' is a fragment by itself, it matches a non-empty dotless
- # fragment.
- pats.append('[^.]+')
- elif leftmost.startswith('xn--') or hostname.startswith('xn--'):
- # RFC 6125, section 6.4.3, subitem 3.
- # The client SHOULD NOT attempt to match a presented identifier
- # where the wildcard character is embedded within an A-label or
- # U-label of an internationalized domain name.
- pats.append(re.escape(leftmost))
- else:
- # Otherwise, '*' matches any dotless string, e.g. www*
- pats.append(re.escape(leftmost).replace(r'\*', '[^.]*'))
-
- # add the remaining fragments, ignore any wildcards
- for frag in parts[1:]:
- pats.append(re.escape(frag))
-
- pat = re.compile(r'\A' + r'\.'.join(pats) + r'\Z', re.IGNORECASE)
- return pat.match(hostname)
-
-
-def match_hostname(cert, hostname):
- """Verify that *cert* (in decoded format as returned by
- SSLSocket.getpeercert()) matches the *hostname*. RFC 2818 and RFC 6125
- rules are followed, but IP addresses are not accepted for *hostname*.
-
- CertificateError is raised on failure. On success, the function
- returns nothing.
- """
- if not cert:
- raise ValueError("empty or no certificate")
- dnsnames = []
- san = cert.get('subjectAltName', ())
- for key, value in san:
- if key == 'DNS':
- if _dnsname_match(value, hostname):
- return
- dnsnames.append(value)
- if not dnsnames:
- # The subject is only checked when there is no dNSName entry
- # in subjectAltName
- for sub in cert.get('subject', ()):
- for key, value in sub:
- # XXX according to RFC 2818, the most specific Common Name
- # must be used.
- if key == 'commonName':
- if _dnsname_match(value, hostname):
- return
- dnsnames.append(value)
- if len(dnsnames) > 1:
- raise CertificateError("hostname %r "
- "doesn't match either of %s"
- % (hostname, ', '.join(map(repr, dnsnames))))
- elif len(dnsnames) == 1:
- raise CertificateError("hostname %r "
- "doesn't match %r"
- % (hostname, dnsnames[0]))
- else:
- raise CertificateError("no appropriate commonName or "
- "subjectAltName fields were found")
+try:
+ # Python 3.2+
+ from ssl import CertificateError, match_hostname
+except ImportError:
+ try:
+ # Backport of the function from a pypi module
+ from backports.ssl_match_hostname import CertificateError, match_hostname
+ except ImportError:
+ # Our vendored copy
+ from _implementation import CertificateError, match_hostname
+
+# Not needed, but documenting what we provide.
+__all__ = ('CertificateError', 'match_hostname')
--- /dev/null
+"""The match_hostname() function from Python 3.3.3, essential when using SSL."""
+
+# Note: This file is under the PSF license as the code comes from the python
+# stdlib. http://docs.python.org/3/license.html
+
+import re
+
+__version__ = '3.4.0.2'
+
+class CertificateError(ValueError):
+ pass
+
+
+def _dnsname_match(dn, hostname, max_wildcards=1):
+ """Matching according to RFC 6125, section 6.4.3
+
+ http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6125#section-6.4.3
+ """
+ pats = []
+ if not dn:
+ return False
+
+ # Ported from python3-syntax:
+ # leftmost, *remainder = dn.split(r'.')
+ parts = dn.split(r'.')
+ leftmost = parts[0]
+ remainder = parts[1:]
+
+ wildcards = leftmost.count('*')
+ if wildcards > max_wildcards:
+ # Issue #17980: avoid denials of service by refusing more
+ # than one wildcard per fragment. A survey of established
+ # policy among SSL implementations showed it to be a
+ # reasonable choice.
+ raise CertificateError(
+ "too many wildcards in certificate DNS name: " + repr(dn))
+
+ # speed up common case w/o wildcards
+ if not wildcards:
+ return dn.lower() == hostname.lower()
+
+ # RFC 6125, section 6.4.3, subitem 1.
+ # The client SHOULD NOT attempt to match a presented identifier in which
+ # the wildcard character comprises a label other than the left-most label.
+ if leftmost == '*':
+ # When '*' is a fragment by itself, it matches a non-empty dotless
+ # fragment.
+ pats.append('[^.]+')
+ elif leftmost.startswith('xn--') or hostname.startswith('xn--'):
+ # RFC 6125, section 6.4.3, subitem 3.
+ # The client SHOULD NOT attempt to match a presented identifier
+ # where the wildcard character is embedded within an A-label or
+ # U-label of an internationalized domain name.
+ pats.append(re.escape(leftmost))
+ else:
+ # Otherwise, '*' matches any dotless string, e.g. www*
+ pats.append(re.escape(leftmost).replace(r'\*', '[^.]*'))
+
+ # add the remaining fragments, ignore any wildcards
+ for frag in remainder:
+ pats.append(re.escape(frag))
+
+ pat = re.compile(r'\A' + r'\.'.join(pats) + r'\Z', re.IGNORECASE)
+ return pat.match(hostname)
+
+
+def match_hostname(cert, hostname):
+ """Verify that *cert* (in decoded format as returned by
+ SSLSocket.getpeercert()) matches the *hostname*. RFC 2818 and RFC 6125
+ rules are followed, but IP addresses are not accepted for *hostname*.
+
+ CertificateError is raised on failure. On success, the function
+ returns nothing.
+ """
+ if not cert:
+ raise ValueError("empty or no certificate")
+ dnsnames = []
+ san = cert.get('subjectAltName', ())
+ for key, value in san:
+ if key == 'DNS':
+ if _dnsname_match(value, hostname):
+ return
+ dnsnames.append(value)
+ if not dnsnames:
+ # The subject is only checked when there is no dNSName entry
+ # in subjectAltName
+ for sub in cert.get('subject', ()):
+ for key, value in sub:
+ # XXX according to RFC 2818, the most specific Common Name
+ # must be used.
+ if key == 'commonName':
+ if _dnsname_match(value, hostname):
+ return
+ dnsnames.append(value)
+ if len(dnsnames) > 1:
+ raise CertificateError("hostname %r "
+ "doesn't match either of %s"
+ % (hostname, ', '.join(map(repr, dnsnames))))
+ elif len(dnsnames) == 1:
+ raise CertificateError("hostname %r "
+ "doesn't match %r"
+ % (hostname, dnsnames[0]))
+ else:
+ raise CertificateError("no appropriate commonName or "
+ "subjectAltName fields were found")
u = parse_url(url)
if u.scheme == "http":
- # It's too late to set proxy headers on per-request basis for
- # tunnelled HTTPS connections, should use
- # constructor's proxy_headers instead.
+ # For proxied HTTPS requests, httplib sets the necessary headers
+ # on the CONNECT to the proxy. For HTTP, we'll definitely
+ # need to set 'Host' at the very least.
kw['headers'] = self._set_proxy_headers(url, kw.get('headers',
self.headers))
- kw['headers'].update(self.proxy_headers)
return super(ProxyManager, self).urlopen(method, url, redirect, **kw)
self._body = body if body and isinstance(body, basestring) else None
self._fp = None
self._original_response = original_response
+ self._fp_bytes_read = 0
self._pool = pool
self._connection = connection
if self._fp:
return self.read(cache_content=True)
+ def tell(self):
+ """
+ Obtain the number of bytes pulled over the wire so far. May differ from
+ the amount of content returned by :meth:``HTTPResponse.read`` if bytes
+ are encoded on the wire (e.g, compressed).
+ """
+ return self._fp_bytes_read
+
def read(self, amt=None, decode_content=None, cache_content=False):
"""
Similar to :meth:`httplib.HTTPResponse.read`, but with two additional
self._fp.close()
flush_decoder = True
+ self._fp_bytes_read += len(data)
+
try:
if decode_content and self._decoder:
data = self._decoder.decompress(data)
def make_headers(keep_alive=None, accept_encoding=None, user_agent=None,
- basic_auth=None):
+ basic_auth=None, proxy_basic_auth=None):
"""
Shortcuts for generating request headers.
Colon-separated username:password string for 'authorization: basic ...'
auth header.
+ :param proxy_basic_auth:
+ Colon-separated username:password string for 'proxy-authorization: basic ...'
+ auth header.
+
Example: ::
>>> make_headers(keep_alive=True, user_agent="Batman/1.0")
headers['authorization'] = 'Basic ' + \
b64encode(six.b(basic_auth)).decode('utf-8')
+ if proxy_basic_auth:
+ headers['proxy-authorization'] = 'Basic ' + \
+ b64encode(six.b(proxy_basic_auth)).decode('utf-8')
+
return headers
projects / platform / upstream / python-requests.git / commitdiff