Bluetooth: stop proccessing malicious adv data

Syzbot reported slab-out-of-bounds read in hci_le_adv_report_evt(). The
problem was in missing validaion check.

We should check if data is not malicious and we can read next data block.
If we won't check ptr validness, code can read a way beyond skb->end and
it can cause problems, of course.

Fixes: e95beb414168 ("Bluetooth: hci_le_adv_report_evt code refactoring")
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+e3fcb9c4f3c2a931dc40@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
index d4b75a6..5471fbf 100644 (file)
--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
@@ -5906,7 +5906,8 @@ static void hci_le_adv_report_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb)
                struct hci_ev_le_advertising_info *ev = ptr;
                s8 rssi;
 
-               if (ev->length <= HCI_MAX_AD_LENGTH) {
+               if (ev->length <= HCI_MAX_AD_LENGTH &&
+                   ev->data + ev->length <= skb_tail_pointer(skb)) {
                        rssi = ev->data[ev->length];
                        process_adv_report(hdev, ev->evt_type, &ev->bdaddr,
                                           ev->bdaddr_type, NULL, 0, rssi,
@@ -5916,6 +5917,11 @@ static void hci_le_adv_report_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb)
                }
 
                ptr += sizeof(*ev) + ev->length + 1;
+
+               if (ptr > (void *) skb_tail_pointer(skb) - sizeof(*ev)) {
+                       bt_dev_err(hdev, "Malicious advertising data. Stopping processing");
+                       break;
+               }
        }
 
        hci_dev_unlock(hdev);