* cache sd_event_now() result from before the first iteration...
+* remove Capabilities=, after all AmbientCapabilities= and CapabilityBoundingSet= should be enough.
+
* add systemctl stop --job-mode=triggering that follows TRIGGERED_BY deps and adds them to the same transaction
* Maybe add a way how users can "pin" units into memory, so that they are not subject to automatic GC?
For processes that are not part of a session, returns -ENXIO.
</para>
- <para><function>sd_bus_creds_has_effective_cap()</function> will check whether the capability specified by
- <parameter>capability</parameter> was set in the effective capabilities mask. A positive return value means that it
- was set, zero means that it was not set, and a negative return value indicates an error. See <citerefentry
- project='man-pages'><refentrytitle>capabilities</refentrytitle><manvolnum>7</manvolnum></citerefentry> and the
- <varname>AmbientCapabilities=</varname> and <varname>CapabilityBoundingSet=</varname> settings in
+ <para><function>sd_bus_creds_has_effective_cap()</function> will
+ check whether the capability specified by
+ <parameter>capability</parameter> was set in the effective
+ capabilities mask. A positive return value means that is was
+ set, zero means that it was not set, and a negative return
+ value indicates an error. See
+ <citerefentry project='man-pages'><refentrytitle>capabilities</refentrytitle><manvolnum>7</manvolnum></citerefentry>
+ and <varname>Capabilities=</varname> and
+ <varname>CapabilityBoundingSet=</varname> settings in
<citerefentry><refentrytitle>systemd.exec</refentrytitle><manvolnum>5</manvolnum></citerefentry>.
</para>
<varlistentry>
<term><varname>CapabilityBoundingSet=</varname></term>
- <listitem><para>Controls which capabilities to include in the capability bounding set for the executed
- process. See <citerefentry
- project='man-pages'><refentrytitle>capabilities</refentrytitle><manvolnum>7</manvolnum></citerefentry> for
- details. Takes a whitespace-separated list of capability names as read by <citerefentry
- project='mankier'><refentrytitle>cap_from_name</refentrytitle><manvolnum>3</manvolnum></citerefentry>,
- e.g. <constant>CAP_SYS_ADMIN</constant>, <constant>CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE</constant>,
- <constant>CAP_SYS_PTRACE</constant>. Capabilities listed will be included in the bounding set, all others are
- removed. If the list of capabilities is prefixed with <literal>~</literal>, all but the listed capabilities
- will be included, the effect of the assignment inverted. Note that this option also affects the respective
- capabilities in the effective, permitted and inheritable capability sets. If this option is not used, the
- capability bounding set is not modified on process execution, hence no limits on the capabilities of the
- process are enforced. This option may appear more than once, in which case the bounding sets are merged. If the
- empty string is assigned to this option, the bounding set is reset to the empty capability set, and all prior
- settings have no effect. If set to <literal>~</literal> (without any further argument), the bounding set is
- reset to the full set of available capabilities, also undoing any previous settings. This does not affect
- commands prefixed with <literal>+</literal>.</para></listitem>
+ <listitem><para>Controls which capabilities to include in the
+ capability bounding set for the executed process. See
+ <citerefentry project='man-pages'><refentrytitle>capabilities</refentrytitle><manvolnum>7</manvolnum></citerefentry>
+ for details. Takes a whitespace-separated list of capability
+ names as read by
+ <citerefentry project='mankier'><refentrytitle>cap_from_name</refentrytitle><manvolnum>3</manvolnum></citerefentry>,
+ e.g. <constant>CAP_SYS_ADMIN</constant>,
+ <constant>CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE</constant>,
+ <constant>CAP_SYS_PTRACE</constant>. Capabilities listed will
+ be included in the bounding set, all others are removed. If
+ the list of capabilities is prefixed with
+ <literal>~</literal>, all but the listed capabilities will be
+ included, the effect of the assignment inverted. Note that
+ this option also affects the respective capabilities in the
+ effective, permitted and inheritable capability sets, on top
+ of what <varname>Capabilities=</varname> does. If this option
+ is not used, the capability bounding set is not modified on
+ process execution, hence no limits on the capabilities of the
+ process are enforced. This option may appear more than once, in
+ which case the bounding sets are merged. If the empty string
+ is assigned to this option, the bounding set is reset to the
+ empty capability set, and all prior settings have no effect.
+ If set to <literal>~</literal> (without any further argument),
+ the bounding set is reset to the full set of available
+ capabilities, also undoing any previous
+ settings.</para></listitem>
</varlistentry>
<varlistentry>
</varlistentry>
<varlistentry>
+ <term><varname>Capabilities=</varname></term>
+ <listitem><para>Controls the
+ <citerefentry project='man-pages'><refentrytitle>capabilities</refentrytitle><manvolnum>7</manvolnum></citerefentry>
+ set for the executed process. Take a capability string
+ describing the effective, permitted and inherited capability
+ sets as documented in
+ <citerefentry project='mankier'><refentrytitle>cap_from_text</refentrytitle><manvolnum>3</manvolnum></citerefentry>.
+ Note that these capability sets are usually influenced (and
+ filtered) by the capabilities attached to the executed file.
+ Due to that <varname>CapabilityBoundingSet=</varname> is
+ probably a much more useful setting.</para></listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
+ <varlistentry>
<term><varname>ReadWritePaths=</varname></term>
<term><varname>ReadOnlyPaths=</varname></term>
<term><varname>InaccessiblePaths=</varname></term>
return sd_bus_message_append(reply, "t", c->capability_ambient_set);
}
+#if 0
static int property_get_empty_string(
sd_bus *bus,
const char *path,
return sd_bus_message_append(reply, "s", "");
}
+#else
+static int property_get_capabilities(
+ sd_bus *bus,
+ const char *path,
+ const char *interface,
+ const char *property,
+ sd_bus_message *reply,
+ void *userdata,
+ sd_bus_error *error) {
+
+ ExecContext *c = userdata;
+ _cleanup_cap_free_charp_ char *t = NULL;
+ const char *s;
+
+ assert(bus);
+ assert(reply);
+ assert(c);
+
+ if (c->capabilities)
+ s = t = cap_to_text(c->capabilities, NULL);
+ else
+ s = "";
+
+ if (!s)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ return sd_bus_message_append(reply, "s", s);
+}
+#endif
static int property_get_syscall_filter(
sd_bus *bus,
SD_BUS_PROPERTY("SyslogLevelPrefix", "b", bus_property_get_bool, offsetof(ExecContext, syslog_level_prefix), SD_BUS_VTABLE_PROPERTY_CONST),
SD_BUS_PROPERTY("SyslogLevel", "i", property_get_syslog_level, 0, SD_BUS_VTABLE_PROPERTY_CONST),
SD_BUS_PROPERTY("SyslogFacility", "i", property_get_syslog_facility, 0, SD_BUS_VTABLE_PROPERTY_CONST),
- SD_BUS_PROPERTY("Capabilities", "s", property_get_empty_string, 0, SD_BUS_VTABLE_PROPERTY_CONST|SD_BUS_VTABLE_HIDDEN),
+ SD_BUS_PROPERTY("Capabilities", "s", property_get_capabilities, 0, SD_BUS_VTABLE_PROPERTY_CONST),
SD_BUS_PROPERTY("SecureBits", "i", bus_property_get_int, offsetof(ExecContext, secure_bits), SD_BUS_VTABLE_PROPERTY_CONST),
SD_BUS_PROPERTY("CapabilityBoundingSet", "t", property_get_capability_bounding_set, 0, SD_BUS_VTABLE_PROPERTY_CONST),
SD_BUS_PROPERTY("AmbientCapabilities", "t", property_get_ambient_capabilities, 0, SD_BUS_VTABLE_PROPERTY_CONST),
/* Sets (but doesn't look up) the uid and make sure we keep the
* capabilities while doing so. */
- if (context->capability_ambient_set != 0) {
+ if (context->capabilities || context->capability_ambient_set != 0) {
/* First step: If we need to keep capabilities but
* drop privileges we need to make sure we keep our
if (prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, sb) < 0)
return -errno;
}
+ /* Second step: set the capabilities. This will reduce
+ * the capabilities to the minimum we need. */
+
+ if (context->capabilities) {
+ _cleanup_cap_free_ cap_t d = NULL;
+ static const cap_value_t bits[] = {
+ CAP_SETUID, /* Necessary so that we can run setresuid() below */
+ CAP_SETPCAP /* Necessary so that we can set PR_SET_SECUREBITS later on */
+ };
+
+ d = cap_dup(context->capabilities);
+ if (!d)
+ return -errno;
+
+ if (cap_set_flag(d, CAP_EFFECTIVE, ELEMENTSOF(bits), bits, CAP_SET) < 0 ||
+ cap_set_flag(d, CAP_PERMITTED, ELEMENTSOF(bits), bits, CAP_SET) < 0)
+ return -errno;
+
+ if (cap_set_proc(d) < 0)
+ return -errno;
+ }
}
- /* Second step: actually set the uids */
+ /* Third step: actually set the uids */
if (setresuid(uid, uid, uid) < 0)
return -errno;
*exit_status = EXIT_CAPABILITIES;
return r;
}
+
+ if (context->capabilities) {
+
+ /* The capabilities in ambient set need to be also in the inherited
+ * set. If they aren't, trying to get them will fail. Add the ambient
+ * set inherited capabilities to the capability set in the context.
+ * This is needed because if capabilities are set (using "Capabilities="
+ * keyword), they will override whatever we set now. */
+
+ r = capability_update_inherited_set(context->capabilities, context->capability_ambient_set);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_CAPABILITIES;
+ return r;
+ }
+ }
+
}
if (context->user) {
return -errno;
}
+ if (context->capabilities)
+ if (cap_set_proc(context->capabilities) < 0) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_CAPABILITIES;
+ return -errno;
+ }
+
if (context->no_new_privileges ||
(!have_effective_cap(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && (use_address_families || context->memory_deny_write_execute || context->restrict_realtime || use_syscall_filter)))
if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) < 0) {
c->pam_name = mfree(c->pam_name);
+ if (c->capabilities) {
+ cap_free(c->capabilities);
+ c->capabilities = NULL;
+ }
+
c->read_only_paths = strv_free(c->read_only_paths);
c->read_write_paths = strv_free(c->read_write_paths);
c->inaccessible_paths = strv_free(c->inaccessible_paths);
prefix, strna(lvl_str));
}
+ if (c->capabilities) {
+ _cleanup_cap_free_charp_ char *t;
+
+ t = cap_to_text(c->capabilities, NULL);
+ if (t)
+ fprintf(f, "%sCapabilities: %s\n", prefix, t);
+ }
+
if (c->secure_bits)
fprintf(f, "%sSecure Bits:%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
prefix,
uint64_t capability_bounding_set;
uint64_t capability_ambient_set;
+
+ cap_t capabilities;
int secure_bits;
int syslog_priority;
$1.SyslogFacility, config_parse_log_facility, 0, offsetof($1, exec_context.syslog_priority)
$1.SyslogLevel, config_parse_log_level, 0, offsetof($1, exec_context.syslog_priority)
$1.SyslogLevelPrefix, config_parse_bool, 0, offsetof($1, exec_context.syslog_level_prefix)
-$1.Capabilities, config_parse_warn_compat, DISABLED_LEGACY, offsetof($1, exec_context)
+$1.Capabilities, config_parse_exec_capabilities, 0, offsetof($1, exec_context)
$1.SecureBits, config_parse_exec_secure_bits, 0, offsetof($1, exec_context)
$1.CapabilityBoundingSet, config_parse_capability_set, 0, offsetof($1, exec_context.capability_bounding_set)
$1.AmbientCapabilities, config_parse_capability_set, 0, offsetof($1, exec_context.capability_ambient_set)
return 0;
}
+int config_parse_exec_capabilities(const char *unit,
+ const char *filename,
+ unsigned line,
+ const char *section,
+ unsigned section_line,
+ const char *lvalue,
+ int ltype,
+ const char *rvalue,
+ void *data,
+ void *userdata) {
+
+ ExecContext *c = data;
+ cap_t cap;
+
+ assert(filename);
+ assert(lvalue);
+ assert(rvalue);
+ assert(data);
+
+ cap = cap_from_text(rvalue);
+ if (!cap) {
+ log_syntax(unit, LOG_ERR, filename, line, errno, "Failed to parse capabilities, ignoring: %s", rvalue);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (c->capabilities)
+ cap_free(c->capabilities);
+ c->capabilities = cap;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
int config_parse_exec_secure_bits(const char *unit,
const char *filename,
unsigned line,
{ config_parse_input, "INPUT" },
{ config_parse_log_facility, "FACILITY" },
{ config_parse_log_level, "LEVEL" },
+ { config_parse_exec_capabilities, "CAPABILITIES" },
{ config_parse_exec_secure_bits, "SECUREBITS" },
{ config_parse_capability_set, "BOUNDINGSET" },
{ config_parse_limit, "LIMIT" },
int config_parse_exec_cpu_sched_policy(const char *unit, const char *filename, unsigned line, const char *section, unsigned section_line, const char *lvalue, int ltype, const char *rvalue, void *data, void *userdata);
int config_parse_exec_cpu_sched_prio(const char *unit, const char *filename, unsigned line, const char *section, unsigned section_line, const char *lvalue, int ltype, const char *rvalue, void *data, void *userdata);
int config_parse_exec_cpu_affinity(const char *unit, const char *filename, unsigned line, const char *section, unsigned section_line, const char *lvalue, int ltype, const char *rvalue, void *data, void *userdata);
+int config_parse_exec_capabilities(const char *unit, const char *filename, unsigned line, const char *section, unsigned section_line, const char *lvalue, int ltype, const char *rvalue, void *data, void *userdata);
int config_parse_exec_secure_bits(const char *unit, const char *filename, unsigned line, const char *section, unsigned section_line, const char *lvalue, int ltype, const char *rvalue, void *data, void *userdata);
int config_parse_capability_set(const char *unit, const char *filename, unsigned line, const char *section, unsigned section_line, const char *lvalue, int ltype, const char *rvalue, void *data, void *userdata);
int config_parse_limit(const char *unit, const char *filename, unsigned line, const char *section, unsigned section_line, const char *lvalue, int ltype, const char *rvalue, void *data, void *userdata);
projects / platform / upstream / systemd.git / commitdiff