fs: Use CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION() when kernel bugs are detected

[ Upstream commit 47d586913f2abec4d240bae33417f537fda987ec ]

Currently, filp_close() and generic_shutdown_super() use printk() to log
messages when bugs are detected. This is problematic because infrastructure
like syzkaller has no idea that this message indicates a bug.
In addition, some people explicitly want their kernels to BUG() when kernel
data corruption has been detected (CONFIG_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION).
And finally, when generic_shutdown_super() detects remaining inodes on a
system without CONFIG_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION, it would be nice if later
accesses to a busy inode would at least crash somewhat cleanly rather than
walking through freed memory.

To address all three, use CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION() when kernel bugs are
detected.

Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c
index 9d0197d..20717ec 100644 (file)
--- a/fs/open.c
+++ b/fs/open.c
@@ -1411,8 +1411,9 @@ int filp_close(struct file *filp, fl_owner_t id)
 {
        int retval = 0;
 
-       if (!file_count(filp)) {
-               printk(KERN_ERR "VFS: Close: file count is 0\n");
+       if (CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(file_count(filp) == 0,
+                       "VFS: Close: file count is 0 (f_op=%ps)",
+                       filp->f_op)) {
                return 0;
        }
 

diff --git a/fs/super.c b/fs/super.c
index 8d39e4f..4f8a626 100644 (file)
--- a/fs/super.c
+++ b/fs/super.c
@@ -491,10 +491,23 @@ void generic_shutdown_super(struct super_block *sb)
                if (sop->put_super)
                        sop->put_super(sb);
 
-               if (!list_empty(&sb->s_inodes)) {
-                       printk("VFS: Busy inodes after unmount of %s. "
-                          "Self-destruct in 5 seconds.  Have a nice day...\n",
-                          sb->s_id);
+               if (CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(!list_empty(&sb->s_inodes),
+                               "VFS: Busy inodes after unmount of %s (%s)",
+                               sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name)) {
+                       /*
+                        * Adding a proper bailout path here would be hard, but
+                        * we can at least make it more likely that a later
+                        * iput_final() or such crashes cleanly.
+                        */
+                       struct inode *inode;
+
+                       spin_lock(&sb->s_inode_list_lock);
+                       list_for_each_entry(inode, &sb->s_inodes, i_sb_list) {
+                               inode->i_op = VFS_PTR_POISON;
+                               inode->i_sb = VFS_PTR_POISON;
+                               inode->i_mapping = VFS_PTR_POISON;
+                       }
+                       spin_unlock(&sb->s_inode_list_lock);
                }
        }
        spin_lock(&sb_lock);

diff --git a/include/linux/poison.h b/include/linux/poison.h
index 2d3249e..0e8a1f2 100644 (file)
--- a/include/linux/poison.h
+++ b/include/linux/poison.h
@@ -84,4 +84,7 @@
 /********** kernel/bpf/ **********/
 #define BPF_PTR_POISON ((void *)(0xeB9FUL + POISON_POINTER_DELTA))
 
+/********** VFS **********/
+#define VFS_PTR_POISON ((void *)(0xF5 + POISON_POINTER_DELTA))
+
 #endif