* **BPF_F_INVALIDATE_HASH** (set *skb*\ **->hash**, *skb*\
* **->swhash** and *skb*\ **->l4hash** to 0).
*
- * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlaying
+ * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlying
* packet buffer. Therefore, at load time, all checks on pointers
* previously done by the verifier are invalidated and must be
* performed again, if the helper is used in combination with
* flexibility and can handle sizes larger than 2 or 4 for the
* checksum to update.
*
- * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlaying
+ * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlying
* packet buffer. Therefore, at load time, all checks on pointers
* previously done by the verifier are invalidated and must be
* performed again, if the helper is used in combination with
* flexibility and can handle sizes larger than 2 or 4 for the
* checksum to update.
*
- * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlaying
+ * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlying
* packet buffer. Therefore, at load time, all checks on pointers
* previously done by the verifier are invalidated and must be
* performed again, if the helper is used in combination with
* efficient, but it is handled through an action code where the
* redirection happens only after the eBPF program has returned.
*
- * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlaying
+ * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlying
* packet buffer. Therefore, at load time, all checks on pointers
* previously done by the verifier are invalidated and must be
* performed again, if the helper is used in combination with
* **ETH_P_8021Q** and **ETH_P_8021AD**, it is considered to
* be **ETH_P_8021Q**.
*
- * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlaying
+ * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlying
* packet buffer. Therefore, at load time, all checks on pointers
* previously done by the verifier are invalidated and must be
* performed again, if the helper is used in combination with
* Description
* Pop a VLAN header from the packet associated to *skb*.
*
- * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlaying
+ * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlying
* packet buffer. Therefore, at load time, all checks on pointers
* previously done by the verifier are invalidated and must be
* performed again, if the helper is used in combination with
* All values for *flags* are reserved for future usage, and must
* be left at zero.
*
- * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlaying
+ * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlying
* packet buffer. Therefore, at load time, all checks on pointers
* previously done by the verifier are invalidated and must be
* performed again, if the helper is used in combination with
* implicitly linearizes, unclones and drops offloads from the
* *skb*.
*
- * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlaying
+ * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlying
* packet buffer. Therefore, at load time, all checks on pointers
* previously done by the verifier are invalidated and must be
* performed again, if the helper is used in combination with
* **bpf_skb_pull_data()** to effectively unclone the *skb* from
* the very beginning in case it is indeed cloned.
*
- * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlaying
+ * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlying
* packet buffer. Therefore, at load time, all checks on pointers
* previously done by the verifier are invalidated and must be
* performed again, if the helper is used in combination with
* All values for *flags* are reserved for future usage, and must
* be left at zero.
*
- * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlaying
+ * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlying
* packet buffer. Therefore, at load time, all checks on pointers
* previously done by the verifier are invalidated and must be
* performed again, if the helper is used in combination with
* can be used to prepare the packet for pushing or popping
* headers.
*
- * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlaying
+ * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlying
* packet buffer. Therefore, at load time, all checks on pointers
* previously done by the verifier are invalidated and must be
* performed again, if the helper is used in combination with
* Use with ENCAP_L3/L4 flags to further specify the tunnel
* type; **len** is the length of the inner MAC header.
*
- * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlaying
+ * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlying
* packet buffer. Therefore, at load time, all checks on pointers
* previously done by the verifier are invalidated and must be
* performed again, if the helper is used in combination with
* more flexibility as the user is free to store whatever meta
* data they need.
*
- * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlaying
+ * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlying
* packet buffer. Therefore, at load time, all checks on pointers
* previously done by the verifier are invalidated and must be
* performed again, if the helper is used in combination with
* copied if necessary (i.e. if data was not linear and if start
* and end pointers do not point to the same chunk).
*
- * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlaying
+ * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlying
* packet buffer. Therefore, at load time, all checks on pointers
* previously done by the verifier are invalidated and must be
* performed again, if the helper is used in combination with
* only possible to shrink the packet as of this writing,
* therefore *delta* must be a negative integer.
*
- * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlaying
+ * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlying
* packet buffer. Therefore, at load time, all checks on pointers
* previously done by the verifier are invalidated and must be
* performed again, if the helper is used in combination with
* by bpf programs of types BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_IN and
* BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_XMIT.
*
- * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlaying
+ * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlying
* packet buffer. Therefore, at load time, all checks on pointers
* previously done by the verifier are invalidated and must be
* performed again, if the helper is used in combination with
* inside the outermost IPv6 Segment Routing Header can be
* modified through this helper.
*
- * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlaying
+ * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlying
* packet buffer. Therefore, at load time, all checks on pointers
* previously done by the verifier are invalidated and must be
* performed again, if the helper is used in combination with
* after the segments are accepted. *delta* can be as well
* positive (growing) as negative (shrinking).
*
- * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlaying
+ * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlying
* packet buffer. Therefore, at load time, all checks on pointers
* previously done by the verifier are invalidated and must be
* performed again, if the helper is used in combination with
* encapsulation policy.
* Type of param: **struct ipv6_sr_hdr**.
*
- * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlaying
+ * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlying
* packet buffer. Therefore, at load time, all checks on pointers
* previously done by the verifier are invalidated and must be
* performed again, if the helper is used in combination with