int
smb3_calc_signature(struct smb_rqst *rqst, struct TCP_Server_Info *server)
{
- int rc = 0;
+ int rc;
unsigned char smb3_signature[SMB2_CMACAES_SIZE];
unsigned char *sigptr = smb3_signature;
struct kvec *iov = rqst->rq_iov;
struct smb2_sync_hdr *shdr = (struct smb2_sync_hdr *)iov[0].iov_base;
struct cifs_ses *ses;
+ struct shash_desc *shash = &server->secmech.sdesccmacaes->shash;
+ struct smb_rqst drqst;
ses = smb2_find_smb_ses(server, shdr->SessionId);
if (!ses) {
memset(shdr->Signature, 0x0, SMB2_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
rc = crypto_shash_setkey(server->secmech.cmacaes,
- ses->smb3signingkey, SMB2_CMACAES_SIZE);
-
+ ses->smb3signingkey, SMB2_CMACAES_SIZE);
if (rc) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not set key for cmac aes\n", __func__);
return rc;
* so unlike smb2 case we do not have to check here if secmech are
* initialized
*/
- rc = crypto_shash_init(&server->secmech.sdesccmacaes->shash);
+ rc = crypto_shash_init(shash);
if (rc) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not init cmac aes\n", __func__);
return rc;
}
- rc = __cifs_calc_signature(rqst, server, sigptr,
- &server->secmech.sdesccmacaes->shash);
+ /*
+ * For SMB2+, __cifs_calc_signature() expects to sign only the actual
+ * data, that is, iov[0] should not contain a rfc1002 length.
+ *
+ * Sign the rfc1002 length prior to passing the data (iov[1-N]) down to
+ * __cifs_calc_signature().
+ */
+ drqst = *rqst;
+ if (drqst.rq_nvec >= 2 && iov[0].iov_len == 4) {
+ rc = crypto_shash_update(shash, iov[0].iov_base,
+ iov[0].iov_len);
+ if (rc) {
+ cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not update with payload\n",
+ __func__);
+ return rc;
+ }
+ drqst.rq_iov++;
+ drqst.rq_nvec--;
+ }
+ rc = __cifs_calc_signature(&drqst, server, sigptr, shash);
if (!rc)
memcpy(shdr->Signature, sigptr, SMB2_SIGNATURE_SIZE);