random: fix crash on multiple early calls to add_bootloader_randomness()

commit f7e67b8e803185d0aabe7f29d25a35c8be724a78 upstream.

Currently, if CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is enabled, multiple calls
to add_bootloader_randomness() are broken and can cause a NULL pointer
dereference, as noted by Ivan T. Ivanov. This is not only a hypothetical
problem, as qemu on arm64 may provide bootloader entropy via EFI and via
devicetree.

On the first call to add_hwgenerator_randomness(), crng_fast_load() is
executed, and if the seed is long enough, crng_init will be set to 1.
On subsequent calls to add_bootloader_randomness() and then to
add_hwgenerator_randomness(), crng_fast_load() will be skipped. Instead,
wait_event_interruptible() and then credit_entropy_bits() will be called.
If the entropy count for that second seed is large enough, that proceeds
to crng_reseed().

However, both wait_event_interruptible() and crng_reseed() depends
(at least in numa_crng_init()) on workqueues. Therefore, test whether
system_wq is already initialized, which is a sufficient indicator that
workqueue_init_early() has progressed far enough.

If we wind up hitting the !system_wq case, we later want to do what
would have been done there when wqs are up, so set a flag, and do that
work later from the rand_initialize() call.

Reported-by: Ivan T. Ivanov <iivanov@suse.de>
Fixes: 18b915ac6b0a ("efi/random: Treat EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL output as bootloader randomness")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
[Jason: added crng_need_done state and related logic.]
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 1a7bb66d6a583498812e60b2aea97eeacc835a6b..7470ee24db2f9f16f3e8b5ef9beebfb89cb226df 100644 (file)
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -461,6 +461,7 @@ static struct crng_state primary_crng = {
  * its value (from 0->1->2).
  */
 static int crng_init = 0;
+static bool crng_need_final_init = false;
 #define crng_ready() (likely(crng_init > 1))
 static int crng_init_cnt = 0;
 static unsigned long crng_global_init_time = 0;
@@ -828,6 +829,36 @@ static void __init crng_initialize_primary(struct crng_state *crng)
        crng->init_time = jiffies - CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL - 1;
 }
 
+static void crng_finalize_init(struct crng_state *crng)
+{
+       if (crng != &primary_crng || crng_init >= 2)
+               return;
+       if (!system_wq) {
+               /* We can't call numa_crng_init until we have workqueues,
+                * so mark this for processing later. */
+               crng_need_final_init = true;
+               return;
+       }
+
+       invalidate_batched_entropy();
+       numa_crng_init();
+       crng_init = 2;
+       process_random_ready_list();
+       wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait);
+       kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
+       pr_notice("crng init done\n");
+       if (unseeded_warning.missed) {
+               pr_notice("%d get_random_xx warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting\n",
+                         unseeded_warning.missed);
+               unseeded_warning.missed = 0;
+       }
+       if (urandom_warning.missed) {
+               pr_notice("%d urandom warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting\n",
+                         urandom_warning.missed);
+               urandom_warning.missed = 0;
+       }
+}
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
 static void do_numa_crng_init(struct work_struct *work)
 {
@@ -982,25 +1013,7 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r)
        memzero_explicit(&buf, sizeof(buf));
        WRITE_ONCE(crng->init_time, jiffies);
        spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags);
-       if (crng == &primary_crng && crng_init < 2) {
-               invalidate_batched_entropy();
-               numa_crng_init();
-               crng_init = 2;
-               process_random_ready_list();
-               wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait);
-               kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
-               pr_notice("crng init done\n");
-               if (unseeded_warning.missed) {
-                       pr_notice("%d get_random_xx warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting\n",
-                                 unseeded_warning.missed);
-                       unseeded_warning.missed = 0;
-               }
-               if (urandom_warning.missed) {
-                       pr_notice("%d urandom warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting\n",
-                                 urandom_warning.missed);
-                       urandom_warning.missed = 0;
-               }
-       }
+       crng_finalize_init(crng);
 }
 
 static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng,
@@ -1780,6 +1793,8 @@ static void __init init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r)
 int __init rand_initialize(void)
 {
        init_std_data(&input_pool);
+       if (crng_need_final_init)
+               crng_finalize_init(&primary_crng);
        crng_initialize_primary(&primary_crng);
        crng_global_init_time = jiffies;
        if (ratelimit_disable) {
@@ -2288,7 +2303,8 @@ void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const char *buffer, size_t count,
         * We'll be woken up again once below random_write_wakeup_thresh,
         * or when the calling thread is about to terminate.
         */
-       wait_event_interruptible(random_write_wait, kthread_should_stop() ||
+       wait_event_interruptible(random_write_wait,
+                       !system_wq || kthread_should_stop() ||
                        ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool) <= random_write_wakeup_bits);
        mix_pool_bytes(poolp, buffer, count);
        credit_entropy_bits(poolp, entropy);