vhost: Fix Spectre V1 vulnerability
authorJason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Tue, 30 Oct 2018 06:10:49 +0000 (14:10 +0800)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Sun, 4 Nov 2018 13:50:51 +0000 (14:50 +0100)
[ Upstream commit ff002269a4ee9c769dbf9365acef633ebcbd6cbe ]

The idx in vhost_vring_ioctl() was controlled by userspace, hence a
potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

Fixing this by sanitizing idx before using it to index d->vqs.

Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
drivers/vhost/vhost.c

index b13c6b4..eb95daa 100644 (file)
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
 #include <linux/sched/mm.h>
 #include <linux/sched/signal.h>
 #include <linux/interval_tree_generic.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
 
 #include "vhost.h"
 
@@ -1397,6 +1398,7 @@ long vhost_vring_ioctl(struct vhost_dev *d, unsigned int ioctl, void __user *arg
        if (idx >= d->nvqs)
                return -ENOBUFS;
 
+       idx = array_index_nospec(idx, d->nvqs);
        vq = d->vqs[idx];
 
        mutex_lock(&vq->mutex);