drm/i915: fix ioremap of a user address for non-root (CVE-2008-3831)

Olaf Kirch noticed that the i915_set_status_page() function of the i915
kernel driver calls ioremap with an address offset that is supplied by
userspace via ioctl. The function zeroes the mapped memory via memset
and tells the hardware about the address. Turns out that access to that
ioctl is not restricted to root so users could probably exploit that to
do nasty things. We haven't tried to write actual exploit code though.

It only affects the Intel G33 series and newer.

diff --git a/shared-core/i915_dma.c b/shared-core/i915_dma.c
index 619e6ac..93bfcba 100644 (file)
--- a/shared-core/i915_dma.c
+++ b/shared-core/i915_dma.c
@@ -1225,7 +1225,7 @@ struct drm_ioctl_desc i915_ioctls[] = {
        DRM_IOCTL_DEF(DRM_I915_GET_VBLANK_PIPE,  i915_vblank_pipe_get, DRM_AUTH ),
        DRM_IOCTL_DEF(DRM_I915_VBLANK_SWAP, i915_vblank_swap, DRM_AUTH),
        DRM_IOCTL_DEF(DRM_I915_MMIO, i915_mmio, DRM_AUTH),
-       DRM_IOCTL_DEF(DRM_I915_HWS_ADDR, i915_set_status_page, DRM_AUTH),
+       DRM_IOCTL_DEF(DRM_I915_HWS_ADDR, i915_set_status_page, DRM_AUTH|DRM_MASTER|DRM_ROOT_ONLY),
 #ifdef I915_HAVE_BUFFER
        DRM_IOCTL_DEF(DRM_I915_EXECBUFFER, i915_execbuffer, DRM_AUTH),
 #endif