net: 6pack: fix slab-out-of-bounds in decode_data

Syzbot reported slab-out-of bounds write in decode_data().
The problem was in missing validation checks.

Syzbot's reproducer generated malicious input, which caused
decode_data() to be called a lot in sixpack_decode(). Since
rx_count_cooked is only 400 bytes and noone reported before,
that 400 bytes is not enough, let's just check if input is malicious
and complain about buffer overrun.

Fail log:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c:843
Write of size 1 at addr ffff888087c5544e by task kworker/u4:0/7

CPU: 0 PID: 7 Comm: kworker/u4:0 Not tainted 5.6.0-rc3-syzkaller #0
...
Workqueue: events_unbound flush_to_ldisc
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x197/0x210 lib/dump_stack.c:118
 print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xd4/0x30b mm/kasan/report.c:374
 __kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x32 mm/kasan/report.c:506
 kasan_report+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:641
 __asan_report_store1_noabort+0x17/0x20 mm/kasan/generic_report.c:137
 decode_data.part.0+0x23b/0x270 drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c:843
 decode_data drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c:965 [inline]
 sixpack_decode drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c:968 [inline]

Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+fc8cd9a673d4577fb2e4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

diff --git a/drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c b/drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c
index fcf3af76b6d7b757ee3293df2fd7e87f2fe83cbe..8fe8887d506a3e269d34542b75486624bdc03a3e 100644 (file)
--- a/drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c
+++ b/drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c
@@ -827,6 +827,12 @@ static void decode_data(struct sixpack *sp, unsigned char inbyte)
                return;
        }
 
+       if (sp->rx_count_cooked + 2 >= sizeof(sp->cooked_buf)) {
+               pr_err("6pack: cooked buffer overrun, data loss\n");
+               sp->rx_count = 0;
+               return;
+       }
+
        buf = sp->raw_buf;
        sp->cooked_buf[sp->rx_count_cooked++] =
                buf[0] | ((buf[1] << 2) & 0xc0);