af_unix: dont send SCM_CREDENTIALS by default
authorEric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Mon, 19 Sep 2011 05:52:27 +0000 (05:52 +0000)
committerDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Wed, 28 Sep 2011 17:29:50 +0000 (13:29 -0400)
Since commit 7361c36c5224 (af_unix: Allow credentials to work across
user and pid namespaces) af_unix performance dropped a lot.

This is because we now take a reference on pid and cred in each write(),
and release them in read(), usually done from another process,
eventually from another cpu. This triggers false sharing.

# Events: 154K cycles
#
# Overhead  Command       Shared Object        Symbol
# ........  .......  ..................  .........................
#
    10.40%  hackbench  [kernel.kallsyms]   [k] put_pid
     8.60%  hackbench  [kernel.kallsyms]   [k] unix_stream_recvmsg
     7.87%  hackbench  [kernel.kallsyms]   [k] unix_stream_sendmsg
     6.11%  hackbench  [kernel.kallsyms]   [k] do_raw_spin_lock
     4.95%  hackbench  [kernel.kallsyms]   [k] unix_scm_to_skb
     4.87%  hackbench  [kernel.kallsyms]   [k] pid_nr_ns
     4.34%  hackbench  [kernel.kallsyms]   [k] cred_to_ucred
     2.39%  hackbench  [kernel.kallsyms]   [k] unix_destruct_scm
     2.24%  hackbench  [kernel.kallsyms]   [k] sub_preempt_count
     1.75%  hackbench  [kernel.kallsyms]   [k] fget_light
     1.51%  hackbench  [kernel.kallsyms]   [k]
__mutex_lock_interruptible_slowpath
     1.42%  hackbench  [kernel.kallsyms]   [k] sock_alloc_send_pskb

This patch includes SCM_CREDENTIALS information in a af_unix message/skb
only if requested by the sender, [man 7 unix for details how to include
ancillary data using sendmsg() system call]

Note: This might break buggy applications that expected SCM_CREDENTIAL
from an unaware write() system call, and receiver not using SO_PASSCRED
socket option.

If SOCK_PASSCRED is set on source or destination socket, we still
include credentials for mere write() syscalls.

Performance boost in hackbench : more than 50% gain on a 16 thread
machine (2 quad-core cpus, 2 threads per core)

hackbench 20 thread 2000

4.228 sec instead of 9.102 sec

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
include/net/scm.h
net/core/scm.c
net/netlink/af_netlink.c
net/unix/af_unix.c

index 745460f..d456f4c 100644 (file)
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ static __inline__ void scm_set_cred(struct scm_cookie *scm,
                                    struct pid *pid, const struct cred *cred)
 {
        scm->pid  = get_pid(pid);
-       scm->cred = get_cred(cred);
+       scm->cred = cred ? get_cred(cred) : NULL;
        cred_to_ucred(pid, cred, &scm->creds);
 }
 
@@ -73,8 +73,7 @@ static __inline__ void scm_destroy(struct scm_cookie *scm)
 static __inline__ int scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
                               struct scm_cookie *scm)
 {
-       scm_set_cred(scm, task_tgid(current), current_cred());
-       scm->fp = NULL;
+       memset(scm, 0, sizeof(*scm));
        unix_get_peersec_dgram(sock, scm);
        if (msg->msg_controllen <= 0)
                return 0;
index 811b53f..ff52ad0 100644 (file)
@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ int __scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *p)
                        if (err)
                                goto error;
 
-                       if (pid_vnr(p->pid) != p->creds.pid) {
+                       if (!p->pid || pid_vnr(p->pid) != p->creds.pid) {
                                struct pid *pid;
                                err = -ESRCH;
                                pid = find_get_pid(p->creds.pid);
@@ -183,8 +183,9 @@ int __scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *p)
                                p->pid = pid;
                        }
 
-                       if ((p->cred->euid != p->creds.uid) ||
-                               (p->cred->egid != p->creds.gid)) {
+                       if (!p->cred ||
+                           (p->cred->euid != p->creds.uid) ||
+                           (p->cred->egid != p->creds.gid)) {
                                struct cred *cred;
                                err = -ENOMEM;
                                cred = prepare_creds();
@@ -193,7 +194,8 @@ int __scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *p)
 
                                cred->uid = cred->euid = p->creds.uid;
                                cred->gid = cred->egid = p->creds.gid;
-                               put_cred(p->cred);
+                               if (p->cred)
+                                       put_cred(p->cred);
                                p->cred = cred;
                        }
                        break;
index 4330db9..1201b6d 100644 (file)
@@ -1324,10 +1324,9 @@ static int netlink_sendmsg(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct socket *sock,
        if (msg->msg_flags&MSG_OOB)
                return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
-       if (NULL == siocb->scm) {
+       if (NULL == siocb->scm)
                siocb->scm = &scm;
-               memset(&scm, 0, sizeof(scm));
-       }
+
        err = scm_send(sock, msg, siocb->scm);
        if (err < 0)
                return err;
index ec68e1c..466fbcc 100644 (file)
@@ -1381,8 +1381,10 @@ static int unix_attach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
 static int unix_scm_to_skb(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb, bool send_fds)
 {
        int err = 0;
+
        UNIXCB(skb).pid  = get_pid(scm->pid);
-       UNIXCB(skb).cred = get_cred(scm->cred);
+       if (scm->cred)
+               UNIXCB(skb).cred = get_cred(scm->cred);
        UNIXCB(skb).fp = NULL;
        if (scm->fp && send_fds)
                err = unix_attach_fds(scm, skb);
@@ -1392,6 +1394,24 @@ static int unix_scm_to_skb(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb, bool sen
 }
 
 /*
+ * Some apps rely on write() giving SCM_CREDENTIALS
+ * We include credentials if source or destination socket
+ * asserted SOCK_PASSCRED.
+ */
+static void maybe_add_creds(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct socket *sock,
+                           const struct sock *other)
+{
+       if (UNIXCB(skb).cred)
+               return;
+       if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &sock->flags) ||
+           !other->sk_socket ||
+           test_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &other->sk_socket->flags)) {
+               UNIXCB(skb).pid  = get_pid(task_tgid(current));
+               UNIXCB(skb).cred = get_current_cred();
+       }
+}
+
+/*
  *     Send AF_UNIX data.
  */
 
@@ -1538,6 +1558,7 @@ restart:
 
        if (sock_flag(other, SOCK_RCVTSTAMP))
                __net_timestamp(skb);
+       maybe_add_creds(skb, sock, other);
        skb_queue_tail(&other->sk_receive_queue, skb);
        if (max_level > unix_sk(other)->recursion_level)
                unix_sk(other)->recursion_level = max_level;
@@ -1652,6 +1673,7 @@ static int unix_stream_sendmsg(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct socket *sock,
                    (other->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN))
                        goto pipe_err_free;
 
+               maybe_add_creds(skb, sock, other);
                skb_queue_tail(&other->sk_receive_queue, skb);
                if (max_level > unix_sk(other)->recursion_level)
                        unix_sk(other)->recursion_level = max_level;