OpenSSL documentation states that for PKCS1 padding the length of encrypted
input must be less than RSA_size(rsa) - 11. In fact the code itself allows less
or equal input length. Also this is what PKCS #1 standard says.
Change-Id: Iab7c7e4b3c3c3c64854f9c9ec67f18f2d7c0b01c
*
* @remarks The @a pub_key must be #YACA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUB
*
- * @remarks The @a sym_key_bit_len must be at least 96 bits shorter than the @a pub_key bit length
+ * @remarks The @a sym_key_bit_len must be at least 88 bits shorter than the @a pub_key bit length
*
* @remarks The @a sym_key should be released using yaca_key_destroy()
*
/**
* PKCS #1 v1.5 padding. Suitable for RSA sign/verify and low-level RSA operations.
- * For low-level operations the input must be at least 12 bytes shorter than the key length.
+ * For low-level operations the input must be at least 11 bytes shorter than the key length.
*/
YACA_PADDING_PKCS1,
* turns out that both parties are using #YACA_PADDING_PKCS1_SSL23 (both are communicating
* using SSL2 and both are SSL3 capable) it is treated as a rollback attack and an error is
* returned. Suitable for low-level RSA public_encrypt/private_decrypt operations. For
- * low-level operations the input must be at least 12 bytes shorter than the key length.
+ * low-level operations the input must be at least 11 bytes shorter than the key length.
*/
YACA_PADDING_PKCS1_SSLV23,