[UTC][yaca][Non-ACR] Fix for new OpenSSL handling of PADDING_PKCS1_SSLV23

Newly released OpenSSL 1.0.2s requires RSA API to get the same padding
for decryption like in encryption. This commit modifies one test
that was not modified in 287fdad529e2d8aa053c327feb2160ec6bb22b47

Change-Id: I2ce070ce4c9a94c9352c1819fd09dd61f2a56c80

diff --git a/src/utc/yaca/utc-yaca-rsa.c b/src/utc/yaca/utc-yaca-rsa.c
index e7c30c91209142143d528bc3d519dc00ab47d425..2ca6b8cb715aaa8a3f22cb88ce6da9ea091baaf7 100755 (executable)
--- a/src/utc/yaca/utc-yaca-rsa.c
+++ b/src/utc/yaca/utc-yaca-rsa.c
@@ -170,12 +170,7 @@ int utc_yaca_rsa_private_decrypt_p(void)
                                                                  &ciphertext, &ciphertext_len);
        assert_eq(ret, YACA_ERROR_NONE);
 
-       /*
-        * YACA_PADDING_PKCS1_SSLV23 is compatible with YACA_PADDING_PKCS1. It is used to detect if
-        * both the encrypting and decrypting side used YACA_PADDING_PKCS1_SSLV23, that is, both are
-        * SSL3 capable but use the SSL2 (rollback attack detection).
-        */
-       ret = yaca_rsa_private_decrypt(YACA_PADDING_PKCS1_SSLV23, prv_key,
+       ret = yaca_rsa_private_decrypt(YACA_PADDING_PKCS1, prv_key,
                                                                   ciphertext, ciphertext_len,
                                                                   &plaintext, &plaintext_len);
        assert_eq(ret, YACA_ERROR_NONE);
@@ -230,23 +225,23 @@ int utc_yaca_rsa_private_decrypt_n(void)
                                                                   &plaintext, &plaintext_len);
        assert_eq(ret, YACA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER);
 
-       ret = yaca_rsa_private_decrypt(YACA_PADDING_PKCS1_SSLV23, NULL, ciphertext, ciphertext_len,
+       ret = yaca_rsa_private_decrypt(YACA_PADDING_PKCS1, NULL, ciphertext, ciphertext_len,
                                                                   &plaintext, &plaintext_len);
        assert_eq(ret, YACA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER);
 
-       ret = yaca_rsa_private_decrypt(YACA_PADDING_PKCS1_SSLV23, prv_key, NULL, ciphertext_len,
+       ret = yaca_rsa_private_decrypt(YACA_PADDING_PKCS1, prv_key, NULL, ciphertext_len,
                                                                   &plaintext, &plaintext_len);
        assert_eq(ret, YACA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER);
 
-       ret = yaca_rsa_private_decrypt(YACA_PADDING_PKCS1_SSLV23, prv_key, ciphertext, 0,
+       ret = yaca_rsa_private_decrypt(YACA_PADDING_PKCS1, prv_key, ciphertext, 0,
                                                                   &plaintext, &plaintext_len);
        assert_eq(ret, YACA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER);
 
-       ret = yaca_rsa_private_decrypt(YACA_PADDING_PKCS1_SSLV23, prv_key, ciphertext, ciphertext_len,
+       ret = yaca_rsa_private_decrypt(YACA_PADDING_PKCS1, prv_key, ciphertext, ciphertext_len,
                                                                   NULL, &plaintext_len);
        assert_eq(ret, YACA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER);
 
-       ret = yaca_rsa_private_decrypt(YACA_PADDING_PKCS1_SSLV23, prv_key, ciphertext, ciphertext_len,
+       ret = yaca_rsa_private_decrypt(YACA_PADDING_PKCS1, prv_key, ciphertext, ciphertext_len,
                                                                   &plaintext, NULL);
        assert_eq(ret, YACA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER);