Patch series "Command line randomness", v3.
A series to add the kernel command line as a source of randomness.
This patch (of 2):
Stack canary intialization involves getting a random number. Getting this
random number may involve accessing caches or other architectural specific
features which are not available until after the architecture is setup.
Move the stack canary initialization later to accommodate this.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170816231458.2299-2-labbott@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <lauraa@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
Cc: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
smp_setup_processor_id();
debug_objects_early_init();
- /*
- * Set up the initial canary ASAP:
- */
- add_latent_entropy();
- boot_init_stack_canary();
-
cgroup_init_early();
local_irq_disable();
page_address_init();
pr_notice("%s", linux_banner);
setup_arch(&command_line);
+ /*
+ * Set up the the initial canary and entropy after arch
+ */
+ add_latent_entropy();
+ boot_init_stack_canary();
mm_init_cpumask(&init_mm);
setup_command_line(command_line);
setup_nr_cpu_ids();