* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: (33 commits)
AppArmor: kill unused macros in lsm.c
AppArmor: cleanup generated files correctly
KEYS: Add an iovec version of KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE
KEYS: Add a new keyctl op to reject a key with a specified error code
KEYS: Add a key type op to permit the key description to be vetted
KEYS: Add an RCU payload dereference macro
AppArmor: Cleanup make file to remove cruft and make it easier to read
SELinux: implement the new sb_remount LSM hook
LSM: Pass -o remount options to the LSM
SELinux: Compute SID for the newly created socket
SELinux: Socket retains creator role and MLS attribute
SELinux: Auto-generate security_is_socket_class
TOMOYO: Fix memory leak upon file open.
Revert "selinux: simplify ioctl checking"
selinux: drop unused packet flow permissions
selinux: Fix packet forwarding checks on postrouting
selinux: Fix wrong checks for selinux_policycap_netpeer
selinux: Fix check for xfrm selinux context algorithm
ima: remove unnecessary call to ima_must_measure
IMA: remove IMA imbalance checking
...
select HAVE_TEXT_POKE_SMP
select HAVE_GENERIC_HARDIRQS
select HAVE_SPARSE_IRQ
+ select GENERIC_FIND_FIRST_BIT
+ select GENERIC_FIND_NEXT_BIT
select GENERIC_IRQ_PROBE
select GENERIC_PENDING_IRQ if SMP
+ select GENERIC_IRQ_SHOW
+ select IRQ_FORCED_THREADING
select USE_GENERIC_SMP_HELPERS if SMP
config INSTRUCTION_DECODER
depends on X86_32
depends on X86_EXTENDED_PLATFORM
select X86_REBOOTFIXUPS
+ select OF
+ select OF_EARLY_FLATTREE
---help---
Select for the Intel CE media processor (CE4100) SOC.
This option compiles in support for the CE4100 SOC for settop
config X86_IO_APIC
def_bool y
- depends on X86_64 || SMP || X86_32_NON_STANDARD || X86_UP_APIC
+ depends on X86_64 || SMP || X86_32_NON_STANDARD || X86_UP_IOAPIC
config X86_VISWS_APIC
def_bool y
depends on NUMA
config USE_PERCPU_NUMA_NODE_ID
- def_bool X86_64
+ def_bool y
depends on NUMA
menu "Power management and ACPI options"
config OLPC
bool "One Laptop Per Child support"
+ depends on !X86_PAE
select GPIOLIB
- select OLPC_OPENFIRMWARE
- depends on !X86_64 && !X86_PAE
+ select OF
+ select OF_PROMTREE if PROC_DEVICETREE
---help---
Add support for detecting the unique features of the OLPC
XO hardware.
---help---
Add support for non-essential features of the OLPC XO-1 laptop.
-config OLPC_OPENFIRMWARE
- bool "Support for OLPC's Open Firmware"
- depends on !X86_64 && !X86_PAE
- default n
- select OF
- help
- This option adds support for the implementation of Open Firmware
- that is used on the OLPC XO-1 Children's Machine.
- If unsure, say N here.
-
-config OLPC_OPENFIRMWARE_DT
- bool
- default y if OLPC_OPENFIRMWARE && PROC_DEVICETREE
- select OF_PROMTREE
-
endif # X86_32
config AMD_NB
def_bool y
depends on COMPAT && SYSVIPC
+ config KEYS_COMPAT
+ bool
+ depends on COMPAT && KEYS
+ default y
+
endmenu
unsigned long *nr_written, int unlock);
static int btrfs_init_inode_security(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
- struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir)
+ struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
+ const struct qstr *qstr)
{
int err;
err = btrfs_init_acl(trans, inode, dir);
if (!err)
- err = btrfs_xattr_security_init(trans, inode, dir);
+ err = btrfs_xattr_security_init(trans, inode, dir, qstr);
return err;
}
if (IS_ERR(inode))
goto out_unlock;
- err = btrfs_init_inode_security(trans, inode, dir);
+ err = btrfs_init_inode_security(trans, inode, dir, &dentry->d_name);
if (err) {
drop_inode = 1;
goto out_unlock;
if (IS_ERR(inode))
goto out_unlock;
- err = btrfs_init_inode_security(trans, inode, dir);
+ err = btrfs_init_inode_security(trans, inode, dir, &dentry->d_name);
if (err) {
drop_inode = 1;
goto out_unlock;
int err;
int drop_inode = 0;
- if (inode->i_nlink == 0)
- return -ENOENT;
-
/* do not allow sys_link's with other subvols of the same device */
if (root->objectid != BTRFS_I(inode)->root->objectid)
return -EPERM;
drop_on_err = 1;
- err = btrfs_init_inode_security(trans, inode, dir);
+ err = btrfs_init_inode_security(trans, inode, dir, &dentry->d_name);
if (err)
goto out_fail;
if (IS_ERR(inode))
goto out_unlock;
- err = btrfs_init_inode_security(trans, inode, dir);
+ err = btrfs_init_inode_security(trans, inode, dir, &dentry->d_name);
if (err) {
drop_inode = 1;
goto out_unlock;
if (IS_DIRSYNC(dir))
handle->h_sync = 1;
- inode = ext3_new_inode (handle, dir, mode);
+ inode = ext3_new_inode (handle, dir, &dentry->d_name, mode);
err = PTR_ERR(inode);
if (!IS_ERR(inode)) {
inode->i_op = &ext3_file_inode_operations;
if (IS_DIRSYNC(dir))
handle->h_sync = 1;
- inode = ext3_new_inode (handle, dir, mode);
+ inode = ext3_new_inode (handle, dir, &dentry->d_name, mode);
err = PTR_ERR(inode);
if (!IS_ERR(inode)) {
init_special_inode(inode, inode->i_mode, rdev);
if (IS_DIRSYNC(dir))
handle->h_sync = 1;
- inode = ext3_new_inode (handle, dir, S_IFDIR | mode);
+ inode = ext3_new_inode (handle, dir, &dentry->d_name, S_IFDIR | mode);
err = PTR_ERR(inode);
if (IS_ERR(inode))
goto out_stop;
if (IS_DIRSYNC(dir))
handle->h_sync = 1;
- inode = ext3_new_inode (handle, dir, S_IFLNK|S_IRWXUGO);
+ inode = ext3_new_inode (handle, dir, &dentry->d_name, S_IFLNK|S_IRWXUGO);
err = PTR_ERR(inode);
if (IS_ERR(inode))
goto out_stop;
dquot_initialize(dir);
- /*
- * Return -ENOENT if we've raced with unlink and i_nlink is 0. Doing
- * otherwise has the potential to corrupt the orphan inode list.
- */
- if (inode->i_nlink == 0)
- return -ENOENT;
-
retry:
handle = ext3_journal_start(dir, EXT3_DATA_TRANS_BLOCKS(dir->i_sb) +
EXT3_INDEX_EXTRA_TRANS_BLOCKS);
file_take_write(file);
WARN_ON(mnt_clone_write(path->mnt));
}
- ima_counts_get(file);
+ if ((mode & (FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE)) == FMODE_READ)
+ i_readcount_inc(path->dentry->d_inode);
return file;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(alloc_file);
fops_put(file->f_op);
put_pid(file->f_owner.pid);
file_sb_list_del(file);
+ if ((file->f_mode & (FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE)) == FMODE_READ)
+ i_readcount_dec(inode);
if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
drop_file_write_access(file);
file->f_path.dentry = NULL;
rcu_read_lock();
file = fcheck_files(files, fd);
if (file) {
- if (!atomic_long_inc_not_zero(&file->f_count)) {
- /* File object ref couldn't be taken */
- rcu_read_unlock();
- return NULL;
- }
+ /* File object ref couldn't be taken */
+ if (file->f_mode & FMODE_PATH ||
+ !atomic_long_inc_not_zero(&file->f_count))
+ file = NULL;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
EXPORT_SYMBOL(fget);
+struct file *fget_raw(unsigned int fd)
+{
+ struct file *file;
+ struct files_struct *files = current->files;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ file = fcheck_files(files, fd);
+ if (file) {
+ /* File object ref couldn't be taken */
+ if (!atomic_long_inc_not_zero(&file->f_count))
+ file = NULL;
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ return file;
+}
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(fget_raw);
+
/*
* Lightweight file lookup - no refcnt increment if fd table isn't shared.
*
*fput_needed = 0;
if (atomic_read(&files->count) == 1) {
file = fcheck_files(files, fd);
+ if (file && (file->f_mode & FMODE_PATH))
+ file = NULL;
+ } else {
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ file = fcheck_files(files, fd);
+ if (file) {
+ if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_PATH) &&
+ atomic_long_inc_not_zero(&file->f_count))
+ *fput_needed = 1;
+ else
+ /* Didn't get the reference, someone's freed */
+ file = NULL;
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ }
+
+ return file;
+}
+
+struct file *fget_raw_light(unsigned int fd, int *fput_needed)
+{
+ struct file *file;
+ struct files_struct *files = current->files;
+
+ *fput_needed = 0;
+ if (atomic_read(&files->count) == 1) {
+ file = fcheck_files(files, fd);
} else {
rcu_read_lock();
file = fcheck_files(files, fd);
if (rc)
goto out3;
- rc = jfs_init_security(tid, ip, dip);
+ rc = jfs_init_security(tid, ip, dip, &dentry->d_name);
if (rc) {
txAbort(tid, 0);
goto out3;
if (rc)
goto out3;
- rc = jfs_init_security(tid, ip, dip);
+ rc = jfs_init_security(tid, ip, dip, &dentry->d_name);
if (rc) {
txAbort(tid, 0);
goto out3;
if (ip->i_nlink == JFS_LINK_MAX)
return -EMLINK;
- if (ip->i_nlink == 0)
- return -ENOENT;
-
dquot_initialize(dir);
tid = txBegin(ip->i_sb, 0);
mutex_lock_nested(&JFS_IP(dip)->commit_mutex, COMMIT_MUTEX_PARENT);
mutex_lock_nested(&JFS_IP(ip)->commit_mutex, COMMIT_MUTEX_CHILD);
- rc = jfs_init_security(tid, ip, dip);
+ rc = jfs_init_security(tid, ip, dip, &dentry->d_name);
if (rc)
goto out3;
if (rc)
goto out3;
- rc = jfs_init_security(tid, ip, dir);
+ rc = jfs_init_security(tid, ip, dir, &dentry->d_name);
if (rc) {
txAbort(tid, 0);
goto out3;
.show = show_vfsmnt
};
+static int uuid_is_nil(u8 *uuid)
+{
+ int i;
+ u8 *cp = (u8 *)uuid;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
+ if (*cp++)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
static int show_mountinfo(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
{
struct proc_mounts *p = m->private;
if (IS_MNT_UNBINDABLE(mnt))
seq_puts(m, " unbindable");
+ if (!uuid_is_nil(mnt->mnt_sb->s_uuid))
+ /* print the uuid */
+ seq_printf(m, " uuid:%pU", mnt->mnt_sb->s_uuid);
+
/* Filesystem specific data */
seq_puts(m, " - ");
show_type(m, sb);
if (path->dentry != path->mnt->mnt_root)
return -EINVAL;
+ err = security_sb_remount(sb, data);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
down_write(&sb->s_umount);
if (flags & MS_BIND)
err = change_mount_flags(path->mnt, flags);
/* If the security isn't preserved, we need to re-initialize them. */
if (!preserve) {
- error = ocfs2_init_security_and_acl(dir, new_orphan_inode);
+ error = ocfs2_init_security_and_acl(dir, new_orphan_inode,
+ &new_dentry->d_name);
if (error)
mlog_errno(error);
}
if (IS_ERR(s))
return PTR_ERR(s);
- error = path_lookup(s, LOOKUP_PARENT, nd);
+ error = kern_path_parent(s, nd);
if (error)
putname(s);
else
{
struct path path;
int error = -EINVAL;
- int follow;
+ int lookup_flags;
- if ((flag & ~AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) != 0)
+ if ((flag & ~(AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW | AT_EMPTY_PATH)) != 0)
goto out;
- follow = (flag & AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) ? 0 : LOOKUP_FOLLOW;
- error = user_path_at(dfd, filename, follow, &path);
+ lookup_flags = (flag & AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) ? 0 : LOOKUP_FOLLOW;
+ if (flag & AT_EMPTY_PATH)
+ lookup_flags |= LOOKUP_EMPTY;
+ error = user_path_at(dfd, filename, lookup_flags, &path);
if (error)
goto out;
error = mnt_want_write(path.mnt);
int (*open)(struct inode *, struct file *),
const struct cred *cred)
{
+ static const struct file_operations empty_fops = {};
struct inode *inode;
int error;
f->f_mode = OPEN_FMODE(f->f_flags) | FMODE_LSEEK |
FMODE_PREAD | FMODE_PWRITE;
+
+ if (unlikely(f->f_flags & O_PATH))
+ f->f_mode = FMODE_PATH;
+
inode = dentry->d_inode;
if (f->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
error = __get_file_write_access(inode, mnt);
f->f_path.dentry = dentry;
f->f_path.mnt = mnt;
f->f_pos = 0;
- f->f_op = fops_get(inode->i_fop);
file_sb_list_add(f, inode->i_sb);
+ if (unlikely(f->f_mode & FMODE_PATH)) {
+ f->f_op = &empty_fops;
+ return f;
+ }
+
+ f->f_op = fops_get(inode->i_fop);
+
error = security_dentry_open(f, cred);
if (error)
goto cleanup_all;
if (error)
goto cleanup_all;
}
- ima_counts_get(f);
+ if ((f->f_mode & (FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE)) == FMODE_READ)
+ i_readcount_inc(inode);
f->f_flags &= ~(O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_NOCTTY | O_TRUNC);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(fd_install);
+static inline int build_open_flags(int flags, int mode, struct open_flags *op)
+{
+ int lookup_flags = 0;
+ int acc_mode;
+
+ if (!(flags & O_CREAT))
+ mode = 0;
+ op->mode = mode;
+
+ /* Must never be set by userspace */
+ flags &= ~FMODE_NONOTIFY;
+
+ /*
+ * O_SYNC is implemented as __O_SYNC|O_DSYNC. As many places only
+ * check for O_DSYNC if the need any syncing at all we enforce it's
+ * always set instead of having to deal with possibly weird behaviour
+ * for malicious applications setting only __O_SYNC.
+ */
+ if (flags & __O_SYNC)
+ flags |= O_DSYNC;
+
+ /*
+ * If we have O_PATH in the open flag. Then we
+ * cannot have anything other than the below set of flags
+ */
+ if (flags & O_PATH) {
+ flags &= O_DIRECTORY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_PATH;
+ acc_mode = 0;
+ } else {
+ acc_mode = MAY_OPEN | ACC_MODE(flags);
+ }
+
+ op->open_flag = flags;
+
+ /* O_TRUNC implies we need access checks for write permissions */
+ if (flags & O_TRUNC)
+ acc_mode |= MAY_WRITE;
+
+ /* Allow the LSM permission hook to distinguish append
+ access from general write access. */
+ if (flags & O_APPEND)
+ acc_mode |= MAY_APPEND;
+
+ op->acc_mode = acc_mode;
+
+ op->intent = flags & O_PATH ? 0 : LOOKUP_OPEN;
+
+ if (flags & O_CREAT) {
+ op->intent |= LOOKUP_CREATE;
+ if (flags & O_EXCL)
+ op->intent |= LOOKUP_EXCL;
+ }
+
+ if (flags & O_DIRECTORY)
+ lookup_flags |= LOOKUP_DIRECTORY;
+ if (!(flags & O_NOFOLLOW))
+ lookup_flags |= LOOKUP_FOLLOW;
+ return lookup_flags;
+}
+
+/**
+ * filp_open - open file and return file pointer
+ *
+ * @filename: path to open
+ * @flags: open flags as per the open(2) second argument
+ * @mode: mode for the new file if O_CREAT is set, else ignored
+ *
+ * This is the helper to open a file from kernelspace if you really
+ * have to. But in generally you should not do this, so please move
+ * along, nothing to see here..
+ */
+struct file *filp_open(const char *filename, int flags, int mode)
+{
+ struct open_flags op;
+ int lookup = build_open_flags(flags, mode, &op);
+ return do_filp_open(AT_FDCWD, filename, &op, lookup);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(filp_open);
+
+struct file *file_open_root(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
+ const char *filename, int flags)
+{
+ struct open_flags op;
+ int lookup = build_open_flags(flags, 0, &op);
+ if (flags & O_CREAT)
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+ if (!filename && (flags & O_DIRECTORY))
+ if (!dentry->d_inode->i_op->lookup)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOTDIR);
+ return do_file_open_root(dentry, mnt, filename, &op, lookup);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(file_open_root);
+
long do_sys_open(int dfd, const char __user *filename, int flags, int mode)
{
+ struct open_flags op;
+ int lookup = build_open_flags(flags, mode, &op);
char *tmp = getname(filename);
int fd = PTR_ERR(tmp);
if (!IS_ERR(tmp)) {
fd = get_unused_fd_flags(flags);
if (fd >= 0) {
- struct file *f = do_filp_open(dfd, tmp, flags, mode, 0);
+ struct file *f = do_filp_open(dfd, tmp, &op, lookup);
if (IS_ERR(f)) {
put_unused_fd(fd);
fd = PTR_ERR(f);
if (filp->f_op && filp->f_op->flush)
retval = filp->f_op->flush(filp, id);
- dnotify_flush(filp, id);
- locks_remove_posix(filp, id);
+ if (likely(!(filp->f_mode & FMODE_PATH))) {
+ dnotify_flush(filp, id);
+ locks_remove_posix(filp, id);
+ }
fput(filp);
return retval;
}
new_inode_init(inode, dir, mode);
jbegin_count += reiserfs_cache_default_acl(dir);
- retval = reiserfs_security_init(dir, inode, &security);
+ retval = reiserfs_security_init(dir, inode, &dentry->d_name, &security);
if (retval < 0) {
drop_new_inode(inode);
return retval;
new_inode_init(inode, dir, mode);
jbegin_count += reiserfs_cache_default_acl(dir);
- retval = reiserfs_security_init(dir, inode, &security);
+ retval = reiserfs_security_init(dir, inode, &dentry->d_name, &security);
if (retval < 0) {
drop_new_inode(inode);
return retval;
new_inode_init(inode, dir, mode);
jbegin_count += reiserfs_cache_default_acl(dir);
- retval = reiserfs_security_init(dir, inode, &security);
+ retval = reiserfs_security_init(dir, inode, &dentry->d_name, &security);
if (retval < 0) {
drop_new_inode(inode);
return retval;
}
new_inode_init(inode, parent_dir, mode);
- retval = reiserfs_security_init(parent_dir, inode, &security);
+ retval = reiserfs_security_init(parent_dir, inode, &dentry->d_name,
+ &security);
if (retval < 0) {
drop_new_inode(inode);
return retval;
reiserfs_write_unlock(dir->i_sb);
return -EMLINK;
}
- if (inode->i_nlink == 0) {
- reiserfs_write_unlock(dir->i_sb);
- return -ENOENT;
- }
/* inc before scheduling so reiserfs_unlink knows we are here */
inc_nlink(inode);
/* File is huge (eg. /dev/kmem): treat loff_t as unsigned */
#define FMODE_UNSIGNED_OFFSET ((__force fmode_t)0x2000)
+/* File is opened with O_PATH; almost nothing can be done with it */
+#define FMODE_PATH ((__force fmode_t)0x4000)
+
/* File was opened by fanotify and shouldn't generate fanotify events */
#define FMODE_NONOTIFY ((__force fmode_t)0x1000000)
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA
- /* protected by i_lock */
- unsigned int i_readcount; /* struct files open RO */
+ atomic_t i_readcount; /* struct files open RO */
#endif
atomic_t i_writecount;
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
#endif
};
+struct file_handle {
+ __u32 handle_bytes;
+ int handle_type;
+ /* file identifier */
+ unsigned char f_handle[0];
+};
+
#define get_file(x) atomic_long_inc(&(x)->f_count)
#define fput_atomic(x) atomic_long_add_unless(&(x)->f_count, -1, 1)
#define file_count(x) atomic_long_read(&(x)->f_count)
wait_queue_head_t s_wait_unfrozen;
char s_id[32]; /* Informational name */
+ u8 s_uuid[16]; /* UUID */
void *s_fs_info; /* Filesystem private info */
fmode_t s_mode;
extern int iterate_mounts(int (*)(struct vfsmount *, void *), void *,
struct vfsmount *);
extern int vfs_statfs(struct path *, struct kstatfs *);
+extern int user_statfs(const char __user *, struct kstatfs *);
+extern int fd_statfs(int, struct kstatfs *);
extern int statfs_by_dentry(struct dentry *, struct kstatfs *);
extern int freeze_super(struct super_block *super);
extern int thaw_super(struct super_block *super);
extern long do_sys_open(int dfd, const char __user *filename, int flags,
int mode);
extern struct file *filp_open(const char *, int, int);
+extern struct file *file_open_root(struct dentry *, struct vfsmount *,
+ const char *, int);
extern struct file * dentry_open(struct dentry *, struct vfsmount *, int,
const struct cred *);
extern int filp_close(struct file *, fl_owner_t id);
if (file)
atomic_inc(&file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_writecount);
}
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IMA
+ static inline void i_readcount_dec(struct inode *inode)
+ {
+ BUG_ON(!atomic_read(&inode->i_readcount));
+ atomic_dec(&inode->i_readcount);
+ }
+ static inline void i_readcount_inc(struct inode *inode)
+ {
+ atomic_inc(&inode->i_readcount);
+ }
+ #else
+ static inline void i_readcount_dec(struct inode *inode)
+ {
+ return;
+ }
+ static inline void i_readcount_inc(struct inode *inode)
+ {
+ return;
+ }
+ #endif
extern int do_pipe_flags(int *, int);
extern struct file *create_read_pipe(struct file *f, int flags);
extern struct file *create_write_pipe(int flags);
extern void free_write_pipe(struct file *);
-extern struct file *do_filp_open(int dfd, const char *pathname,
- int open_flag, int mode, int acc_mode);
-extern int may_open(struct path *, int, int);
-
extern int kernel_read(struct file *, loff_t, char *, unsigned long);
extern struct file * open_exec(const char *);
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/fsnotify.h>
#include <linux/binfmts.h>
+ #include <linux/dcache.h>
#include <linux/signal.h>
#include <linux/resource.h>
#include <linux/sem.h>
*/
extern int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
int cap, int audit);
-extern int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz);
+extern int cap_settime(const struct timespec *ts, const struct timezone *tz);
extern int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
extern int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent);
extern int cap_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted);
* @orig the original mount data copied from userspace.
* @copy copied data which will be passed to the security module.
* Returns 0 if the copy was successful.
+ * @sb_remount:
+ * Extracts security system specifc mount options and verifys no changes
+ * are being made to those options.
+ * @sb superblock being remounted
+ * @data contains the filesystem-specific data.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
* @sb_umount:
* Check permission before the @mnt file system is unmounted.
* @mnt contains the mounted file system.
* then it should return -EOPNOTSUPP to skip this processing.
* @inode contains the inode structure of the newly created inode.
* @dir contains the inode structure of the parent directory.
+ * @qstr contains the last path component of the new object
* @name will be set to the allocated name suffix (e.g. selinux).
* @value will be set to the allocated attribute value.
* @len will be set to the length of the value.
* @cap contains the capability <include/linux/capability.h>.
* @audit: Whether to write an audit message or not
* Return 0 if the capability is granted for @tsk.
- * @sysctl:
- * Check permission before accessing the @table sysctl variable in the
- * manner specified by @op.
- * @table contains the ctl_table structure for the sysctl variable.
- * @op contains the operation (001 = search, 002 = write, 004 = read).
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
* @syslog:
* Check permission before accessing the kernel message ring or changing
* logging to the console.
const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
int (*capable) (struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
int cap, int audit);
- int (*sysctl) (struct ctl_table *table, int op);
int (*quotactl) (int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb);
int (*quota_on) (struct dentry *dentry);
int (*syslog) (int type);
- int (*settime) (struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz);
+ int (*settime) (const struct timespec *ts, const struct timezone *tz);
int (*vm_enough_memory) (struct mm_struct *mm, long pages);
int (*bprm_set_creds) (struct linux_binprm *bprm);
int (*sb_alloc_security) (struct super_block *sb);
void (*sb_free_security) (struct super_block *sb);
int (*sb_copy_data) (char *orig, char *copy);
+ int (*sb_remount) (struct super_block *sb, void *data);
int (*sb_kern_mount) (struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data);
int (*sb_show_options) (struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb);
int (*sb_statfs) (struct dentry *dentry);
int (*inode_alloc_security) (struct inode *inode);
void (*inode_free_security) (struct inode *inode);
int (*inode_init_security) (struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
- char **name, void **value, size_t *len);
+ const struct qstr *qstr, char **name,
+ void **value, size_t *len);
int (*inode_create) (struct inode *dir,
struct dentry *dentry, int mode);
int (*inode_link) (struct dentry *old_dentry,
int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, int cap);
int security_real_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap);
int security_real_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap);
- int security_sysctl(struct ctl_table *table, int op);
int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb);
int security_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry);
int security_syslog(int type);
-int security_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz);
+int security_settime(const struct timespec *ts, const struct timezone *tz);
int security_vm_enough_memory(long pages);
int security_vm_enough_memory_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages);
int security_vm_enough_memory_kern(long pages);
int security_sb_alloc(struct super_block *sb);
void security_sb_free(struct super_block *sb);
int security_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy);
+ int security_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data);
int security_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data);
int security_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb);
int security_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry);
int security_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode);
void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode);
int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
- char **name, void **value, size_t *len);
+ const struct qstr *qstr, char **name,
+ void **value, size_t *len);
int security_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode);
int security_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir,
struct dentry *new_dentry);
return ret;
}
- static inline int security_sysctl(struct ctl_table *table, int op)
- {
- return 0;
- }
-
static inline int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id,
struct super_block *sb)
{
return 0;
}
-static inline int security_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz)
+static inline int security_settime(const struct timespec *ts,
+ const struct timezone *tz)
{
return cap_settime(ts, tz);
}
return 0;
}
+ static inline int security_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
+ {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
static inline int security_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
{
return 0;
static inline int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode,
struct inode *dir,
+ const struct qstr *qstr,
char **name,
void **value,
size_t *len)
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = sched_rt_handler,
},
- {
- .procname = "sched_compat_yield",
- .data = &sysctl_sched_compat_yield,
- .maxlen = sizeof(unsigned int),
- .mode = 0644,
- .proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
- },
#ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_AUTOGROUP
{
.procname = "sched_autogroup_enabled",
.data = &sysctl_sched_autogroup_enabled,
.maxlen = sizeof(unsigned int),
.mode = 0644,
- .proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
+ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
.extra1 = &zero,
.extra2 = &one,
},
.data = &sysctl_perf_event_sample_rate,
.maxlen = sizeof(sysctl_perf_event_sample_rate),
.mode = 0644,
- .proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
+ .proc_handler = perf_proc_update_handler,
},
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_KMEMCHECK
int sysctl_perm(struct ctl_table_root *root, struct ctl_table *table, int op)
{
- int error;
int mode;
- error = security_sysctl(table, op & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC));
- if (error)
- return error;
-
if (root->permissions)
mode = root->permissions(root, current->nsproxy, table);
else
inode = shmem_get_inode(dir->i_sb, dir, mode, dev, VM_NORESERVE);
if (inode) {
- error = security_inode_init_security(inode, dir, NULL, NULL,
- NULL);
+ error = security_inode_init_security(inode, dir,
+ &dentry->d_name, NULL,
+ NULL, NULL);
if (error) {
if (error != -EOPNOTSUPP) {
iput(inode);
if (!inode)
return -ENOSPC;
- error = security_inode_init_security(inode, dir, NULL, NULL,
- NULL);
+ error = security_inode_init_security(inode, dir, &dentry->d_name, NULL,
+ NULL, NULL);
if (error) {
if (error != -EOPNOTSUPP) {
iput(inode);
{
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
- if (*len < 3)
+ if (*len < 3) {
+ *len = 3;
return 255;
+ }
if (inode_unhashed(inode)) {
/* Unfortunately insert_inode_hash is not idempotent,
return ret;
}
- int security_sysctl(struct ctl_table *table, int op)
- {
- return security_ops->sysctl(table, op);
- }
-
int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
{
return security_ops->quotactl(cmds, type, id, sb);
return security_ops->syslog(type);
}
-int security_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz)
+int security_settime(const struct timespec *ts, const struct timezone *tz)
{
return security_ops->settime(ts, tz);
}
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_copy_data);
+ int security_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
+ {
+ return security_ops->sb_remount(sb, data);
+ }
+
int security_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
{
return security_ops->sb_kern_mount(sb, flags, data);
}
int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
- char **name, void **value, size_t *len)
+ const struct qstr *qstr, char **name,
+ void **value, size_t *len)
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- return security_ops->inode_init_security(inode, dir, name, value, len);
+ return security_ops->inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, name, value,
+ len);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_init_security);
return 0;
return security_ops->path_mkdir(dir, dentry, mode);
}
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_mkdir);
int security_path_rmdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
{
return 0;
return security_ops->path_unlink(dir, dentry);
}
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_unlink);
int security_path_symlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
const char *old_name)
return security_ops->path_rename(old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir,
new_dentry);
}
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_rename);
int security_path_truncate(struct path *path)
{
projects / platform / adaptation / renesas_rcar / renesas_kernel.git / commitdiff