vfio/pci: Fix potential Spectre v1
authorGustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Tue, 17 Jul 2018 17:39:00 +0000 (12:39 -0500)
committerAlex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Wed, 18 Jul 2018 18:57:25 +0000 (12:57 -0600)
info.index can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading
to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:

drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c:734 vfio_pci_ioctl()
warn: potential spectre issue 'vdev->region'

Fix this by sanitizing info.index before indirectly using it to index
vdev->region

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c

index b423a309a6e0d08930599cb1c0bebf5c5e08ab9a..125b58eff9369618e9a40398e089d8a0bee8deae 100644 (file)
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include <linux/vfio.h>
 #include <linux/vgaarb.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
 
 #include "vfio_pci_private.h"
 
@@ -727,6 +728,9 @@ static long vfio_pci_ioctl(void *device_data,
                        if (info.index >=
                            VFIO_PCI_NUM_REGIONS + vdev->num_regions)
                                return -EINVAL;
+                       info.index = array_index_nospec(info.index,
+                                                       VFIO_PCI_NUM_REGIONS +
+                                                       vdev->num_regions);
 
                        i = info.index - VFIO_PCI_NUM_REGIONS;